

ISLAMIC PHILOSOPHY THEOLOGY AND SCIENCE

Texts and Studies

EDITED BY

H. DAIBER and D. PINGREE

VOLUME XLVI



A MEDIEVAL
ANTHROPOLOGY

Ibn al-Jawzi

A CRITICAL EDITION

INTRODUCTION

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A MEDIEVAL CRITIQUE OF ANTHROPOMORPHISM

Ibn al-Ǧawzī's Kitāb Akhbār aṣ-Ṣifāt

A CRITICAL EDITION OF THE ARABIC TEXT WITH TRANSLATION,
INTRODUCTION AND NOTES BY

MERLIN SWARTZ



BRILL
LEIDEN · BOSTON · KÖLN
2002

This book is printed on acid-free paper

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data

Swartz, Merlin L., 1933-

A medieval critique of anthropomorphism : Ibn al-Jawzī's Kitāb Akhbār aṣ-Ṣifāt : a critical edition of the Arabic text with translation, introduction and notes / by Merlin Swartz.

p. cm. — (Islamic philosophy, theology and science, v. 46)

Includes bibliographical references and index.

ISBN 9004123768 (alk. paper)

1. Ibn al-Jawzī, Abū al-Faraj 'Abd al-Raḥmān ibn 'Alī, 1116 (ca.)-1201. Kitāb Akhbār aṣ-Ṣifāt. 2. God (Islam)—Attributes. 3. Hanbalites. I. Ibn al-Jawzī, Abū al-Faraj 'Abd al-Raḥmān ibn 'Alī, 1116 (ca.)-1201. Kitāb Akhbār aṣ-Ṣifāt. II. Ibn al-Jawzī, Abū al-Faraj 'Abd al-Raḥmān ibn 'Alī, 1116 (ca.) Kitāb Akhbār aṣ-Ṣifāt. English. III. 'Althi, Abū al-Faḍl. Risāla. English. IV. Title. V. Series.

BP166.2.I21463 S 93 2002

297.2'112—dc21

2001043147


Die Deutsche Bibliothek – CIP-Einheitsaufnahme

Swartz, Merlin:

A medieval critique of anthropomorphism : ibn-Al-Jawzī's Kitāb Akhbār aṣ-Ṣifāt ; a critical edition of the Arabic text with translation, introduction and notes / by Merlin Swartz. — Leiden ; Boston ; Köln : Brill, 2001

(Islamic philosophy, theology and science ; Vol. 46)

ISBN 90 04 12376-8



ISSN 0169-8729

ISBN 90 04 123768

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PRINTED IN THE NETHERLANDS

For

Sondra and Souhil,
Daryl and Wanda,
Kenton and Amy

*whose imagination, optimism and love
have been a perpetual source of
inspiration and hope*

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As I have tried to indicate, *Akhbār aṣ-Ṣifāt* occupies a unique position in the history of Islamic thought. *Aṣ-Ṣifāt*, which might be translated as *Attributes*, is not just another work on the attributes of God, but an impassioned critique of the Hanbali tradition of attributes, written by Ibn al-Jawzī. *Kitāb Akhbār aṣ-Ṣifāt* focuses on the patterns of thought common to the work, the work is medieval Hanbali. It is a critique of the attributions of God championed by the Hanbali school of Baghdad. Since Ibn al-Jawzī was a member of the Hanbali school and since the object of his critique was the Hanbali school, *Kitāb Akhbār aṣ-Ṣifāt* is a work of Hanbalism and, indirectly, a critique of Hanbalism. As an intra-Hanbali polemic, it is more significant than any other work of the genre. It is a critique of Hanbalism. By exposing the social and intellectual tensions and the intellectual diversity that characterized the Hanbali school in the Middle Ages.

Kitāb Akhbār aṣ-Ṣifāt is a work of evidence of the extent to which the Hanbali school (in sort) had penetrated the Islamic world. Ibn al-Jawzī makes extensive use of dialectical and crafting his argument using dialectical methods that have been used by the schools of medieval Islam. The rationalist temper of the Hanbali school, an orientalist assessment of the Hanbali school, in my view, it effectively explains why *aṣ-Ṣifāt* is significant, for in its fragmentary form, materi-

ABBREVIATIONS¹

Abū Shāma:	<i>adh-Dhayl ar-Rawḍatayn.</i>
Ambivalences:	"Les Ambivalences d'un sermonnaire Ḥanbalite...", A. Hartmann.
Asmā' :	<i>Kitāb al-Asmā' wa'ṣ-Ṣifāt</i> , Abū Bakr al-Bayhaqī.
Attributs divins:	<i>Le problème des attributs divins</i> , M. Allard.
BA :	<i>Bāz al-Ashhab</i> , Ibn al-Jawzī.
Bayhaqī:	<i>Kitāb al-Asmā'</i> , Abū Bakr al-Bayhaqī.
BEO:	<i>Bulletin d'études orientales</i>
BSOAS:	<i>Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African Studies</i> , London
Dhayl:	<i>Dhayl 'alā Ṭabaqāt al-Ḥanābila</i> , Ibn Rajab.
DST:	<i>Daf' Shubhat at-Tashbīh</i> , Ibn al-Jawzī.
EI ² :	<i>Encyclopaedia of Islam</i> , new edition.
ER:	<i>Encyclopedia of Religion</i> , ed. Mircea Eliade (New York, c1987)
GAL:	<i>Geschichte der arabischen Litteratur</i> (2 vols.) and Supplement (3 vols.), Brockelmann
GAS :	<i>Geschichte des arabischen Schrifttums</i> , F. Sezgin (9 vols.)
Ḥilya:	<i>Ḥilyat al-Awliyā'</i> , Abū Nu'aym al-Iṣbahānī. ²
Ḥuffāz:	<i>Tadhkirat al-Ḥuffāz</i> , Dhahabī.
Ibn Khuzayma:	<i>Kitāb at-Tawḥīd</i> .
Ibn 'Aqīl:	<i>Ibn 'Aqīl et la résurgence de l'Islām traditionaliste</i> (1963), George Makdisi
Ibn 'Aqīl (1997):	<i>Ibn 'Aqīl: Religion and Culture in Classical Islam</i> (1997), G. Makdisi
Image:	<i>Dieu à l'image de l'homme: les anthropomorphis- mes de la sunna et leur interprétation par les théo- logiens</i> , Gimaret, D.
IJMES:	<i>International Journal of Middle East Studies</i>
IOS:	<i>Israel Oriental Studies</i> .
JA:	<i>Journal Asiatique</i>
JRAS:	<i>Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society</i>

¹ For the full details on the above titles, see the Bibliography at the end of this work.

KAS:	<i>Kitāb Akhbār aṣ-Ṣifāt</i> , Ibn al-Jawzī
Kaz.:	Kazimirski, <i>Dictionnaire Arabe-Français</i> , 2 vols.
KDM:	<i>Kitāb aḍ-Ḍuʿafāʾ wa'l-Matrūkīn</i> , Ibn al-Jawzī
KQ:	<i>Kitāb al-Quṣṣās wa'l-Mudhakkirīn</i> , Ibn al-Jawzī (Beirut 1971)
<i>La doctrine:</i>	<i>La doctrine d'al-Ashʿarī</i> , D. Gimaret.
Lane:	Lane, <i>Arabic Lexicon</i> , 8 vols.
Lecomte:	<i>Le traité des divergences du Ḥadīṭ d'Ibn Qutayba</i> , trans. Gerard Lecomte.
<i>Les traditions:</i>	<i>Les traditions islamique</i> (vols. I and II, by O. Houdas and W. Marçais; vols. III and IV, by O. Houdas)
<i>Lisān :</i>	<i>Lisān al-ʿArab</i> , Ibn Manẓūr, 15 vols. (Beirut 1968)
<i>Manāqib</i> or <i>Manāqib Aḥmad:</i>	<i>Manāqib Aḥmad b. Hanbal</i> , Ibn al-Jawzī
<i>Maqālāt:</i>	<i>Maqālāt al-Islāmīyīn</i> , Abūl-Ḥasan al-Ashʿarī
<i>Marāṣid:</i>	<i>Marāṣid al-Iṭṭilāʿ ʿalā Asmāʾ al-Amkina</i> , Ṣafīʿd-Dīn
<i>Mawḍūʿāt:</i>	<i>Kitāb al-Mawḍūʿāt</i> , Ibn al-Jawzī
MIDEO:	<i>Mélanges de l'Institut dominicain d'études orientales du Caire</i>
al-Mundhirī:	<i>at-Takmilat li-Wafayāt an-Naqala</i> , al-Mundhirī.
<i>Muʿtamad:</i>	<i>Kitāb al-Muʿtamad fī Uṣūl ad-Dīn</i> , Abū Yaʿlā
<i>Muntaẓam:</i>	<i>Kitāb al-Muntaẓam</i> , Ibn al-Jawzī
<i>Mushkil:</i>	<i>Mushkil al-Ḥadīth wa Bayānuhu</i> , Ibn Fūrak
<i>Musnad:</i>	<i>al-Musnad</i> , Aḥmad b. Ḥanbal
<i>Muḥīṭ:</i>	<i>Muḥīṭ al-Muḥīṭ</i> , al-Bustānī
<i>Mizān:</i>	<i>Mizān al-ʿItidāl</i> , Dhahabī
MZ:	<i>Mirʾāt az-Zamān</i> , Sibṭ b. al-Jawzī
<i>Proofs:</i>	<i>Proofs for Eternity, Creation and the Existence of God in Medieval Islamic and Jewish Philosophy</i> , H. A. Davidson.
REI:	<i>Revue des études Islamiques</i>
RHR:	<i>Revue de l'histoire des religions</i>
RSO:	<i>Rivista degli studi orientali</i>
S:	<i>Surah</i>
<i>Ṣafwa:</i>	<i>Ṣafwat aṣ-Ṣafwa</i> , Ibn al-Jawzī.
SEI:	<i>Shorter Encyclopaedia of Islam</i>

Shadharāt:

SI:

Ṣayd:

Ṭabaqāt:

Ṭabaqāt:

Tafsīr:

Tahdhīb:

Talbis:

Talkhīṣ:

Tawḥīd:

Taʾwīl:

TB:

TH:

Wafāʾ:

Wright:

Zād:

ZDMG:

مكتبة السليمانية. ١٥٦١ في

مكتبة كوبرلي. ١٢٠٢ في

(١٣٥٩)

(١٩٩٦)

<i>Shadharāt:</i>	<i>Shadharāt adh-Dhahab fī Akhbār Man Dhahab</i> , Ibn al-ʿImād
<i>SI:</i>	<i>Studia Islamica</i>
<i>Ṣayd:</i>	<i>Ṣayd al-Khāṭir</i> , Ibn al-Jawzī
<i>Ṭabaqāt:</i>	<i>aṭ-Ṭabaqāt al-Kubrā</i> , Ibn Saʿd
<i>Ṭabaqāt:</i>	<i>Ṭabaqāt al-Ḥanābila</i> , Ibn Abī Yaʿlā
<i>Tafsīr:</i>	<i>Jāmiʿ al-Bayān fī Tafsīr al-Qurʾān</i> , Abū Jaʿfar aṭ-Ṭabarī
<i>Tahdhīb:</i>	<i>Kitāb Tahdhīb at-Tahdhīb</i> , Ibn Ḥajar al-ʿAsqalānī
<i>Talbīs:</i>	<i>Talbīs Iblīs</i> , Ibn al-Jawzī
<i>Talkhīṣ:</i>	<i>Talkhīṣ al-Bayān fī Majāzāt al-Qurʾān</i> , Raḍī
<i>Tawhīd:</i>	<i>Kitāb at-Tawhīd</i> , Ibn Khuzayma
<i>Taʾwīl:</i>	<i>Taʾwīl Mushkil al-Qurʾān</i> , Ibn Qutayba.
<i>TB:</i>	<i>Tārīkh Baghdād</i> , Abū Bakr al-Khaṭīb
<i>TH:</i>	<i>Ṭabaqāt al-Ḥanābila</i> , Ibn Abī Yaʿlā
<i>Wafāʾ:</i>	<i>Kitāb al-Wafāʾ bi Aḥwāl al-Muṣṭafā</i> , Ibn al-Jawzī
<i>Wright:</i>	Wright, <i>Arabic Grammar</i> (2 vols.)
<i>Zād:</i>	<i>Zād al-Masīr fī ʿIlm at-Tafsīr</i> , Ibn al-Jawzī
<i>ZDMG:</i>	<i>Zeitschrift der Deutschen Morgenländischen Gesellschaft</i> , Wiesbaden

الرموز المستعملة في التعاليق النقدية
في نص الكتاب

- الأسماء: كتاب الأسماء والصفات للبيهقي
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استانبول)
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تاريخ بغداد: تاريخ بغداد للخطيب البغدادي (القاهرة ١٣٤٩)

- تلبیس، او تلبیس إبلیس: تلبیس إبلیس لابن الجوزي (القاهرة ١٣٦٩)
تأویل مشکل القرآن: تأویل مشکل القرآن لابن قتيبة (القاهرة ١٣٧٣)
دفع: دفع شبهة التشبيه والرد على المجسمة لابن الجوزي (دمشق ١٣٤٥)
زاد المسير: زاد المسير في علم التفسير لابن الجوزي (بيروت ١٣٨٤)
ص: صفحة
مسلم: صحيح مسلم بن الحجاج (القاهرة، ١٣٧٤)
مشكل: مشکل الحديث وبيانه لابن فورك (بيروت ١٤٠٥)
ميزان: ميزان الاعتدال في نقد الرجال للذهبي (بيروت ١٣٨٢)
م: مجلد
س: سطر

THE ARGUMENT OF *KITĀB AKHBĀR AS-SIFĀT*

Above all, Ibn al-Jawzī's rhetorical arts, and that fact that they developed in KAS and the madrasa, if one can call them that, is a style developed by Ibn al-Jawzī of homilies. It is this, in part, that Fūrak's *Mushkil al-Hadīth* and al-Bayhaqī, both of which are, viz., that of mounting a vigorous argument against anthropomorphizing Ibn Fūrak nor al-Bayhaqī (in the service of theology) with and, indeed, fettered preacher.

from the writings of Ibn 'Aqil. I (82-85), Ibn al-Jawzī cites three *Kitāb al-Ārāʾ wa'd-Diyānāt* of a theologian who sought to integrate *Kitāb al-Maqālāt* of Abū'l-Qāsim of Mu'tazilism, al-Khayyāt (cf., 173). The third source cited in *Ta* theological anthology which is not of Mu'tazilism was in part, and perhaps also know from the *Muntaẓam* of several Mu'tazilī theologians in the school from conversation with even though critical, is reflective of theological issues posed by Mu'tazilism (VII, 193-197).

⁵ He almost certainly learned from Abū'l-Faḍl b. Nāṣir, who had o (225-226).

⁶ I have placed the term transcendence in this way in order to distinguish it from the way in which the term is used in the medieval literature. For a delineation of the concept of transcendence in the medieval literature produced by medieval philosophers, see here, the idea of transcendence as it is used in the medieval literature is rooted in an atomistic ontology, and

⁴ The question of the sources from which he drew his knowledge of Muʿtazilism is admittedly complicated. He cites no works by Muʿtazilī authors in *KAS*. One can be sure that he derived some of his knowledge of Muʿtazilism (and undoubtedly Ashʿarism also)

extent, also through discussions with those closest to him.⁵

Above all, Ibn al-Jawzī was a preacher, a master of the literary and rhetorical arts, and that fact is reflected both in the content of the argument developed in *KAS* and the manner of its presentation. The excesses of *KAS*, if one can call them that, are in large measure a function of a rhetorical style developed by Ibn al-Jawzī over many years as a preacher and composer of homilies. It is this, in part, that sets *KAS* apart from such works as Ibn Fūrak's *Mushkil al-Ḥadīth* or the *Kitāb al-Asmā' wa's-Ṣifāt* of Abū Bakr al-Bayhaqī, both of which were inspired by the same theological concern, viz., that of mounting a vigorous defense of the idea of divine "transcendence" against anthropomorphizing tendencies within traditionalist Islam.⁶ But neither Ibn Fūrak nor al-Bayhaqī came to the task of analysis and construction (in the service of theology) with the experience and the aptitude of an accomplished and, indeed, feted preacher.

from the writings of Ibn 'Aqīl. In the course of his discussion of the Mu'tazila in *Talbīs* (82-85), Ibn al-Jawzī cites three sources, two of which were the works of Mu'tazilīs: the *Kitāb al-Ārā' wa'd-Diyānāt* of Abū Muḥammad an-Nawbakhtī (d. ca. 920), the Imāmī theologian who sought to integrate Mu'tazilite thought into a Shī'ite framework; and the *Kitāb al-Maqālāt* of Abū'l-Qāsim al-Balkhī (d. 931), a disciple of the Baghdādī historian of Mu'tazilism, al-Khayyāt (cf., *Muntaẓam*, VI, 238, and *GAS*, I, 622-623; *Talbīs*, 83, 173). The third source cited in *Talbīs* (83) is Abū Ya'la's *Kitāb al-Muqtabas*, apparently a theological anthology which is no longer extant. It is worth emphasizing that his knowledge of Mu'tazilism was in part, and perhaps to a large extent, drawn from primary sources. We also know from the *Muntaẓam* that Ibn al-Jawzī was personally acquainted with at least several Mu'tazilī theologians in Baghdad and undoubtedly drew some of his information on the school from conversation with them. His lengthy notice on Ibn Burhān (d. 456/1064), even though critical, is reflective of Ibn al-Jawzī's intense interest in Mu'tazilism and the theological issues posed by Mu'tazilī thought (*Muntaẓam*, VIII, 236-237; cf., also *Muntaẓam*, VII, 193-197).

⁵ He almost certainly learned a good deal about Ash'arism through his maternal uncle, Abū'l-Faḍl b. Nāṣir, who had once been a member of the Ash'arite school (*Dhayl*, I, 225-226).

⁶ I have placed the term transcendence here within quotation marks primarily to differentiate it from the way in which the term is commonly used today in Western works on theology. For a delineation of the concept of transcendence as it appears in *KAS* and much of the literature produced by medieval Muslim theologians, see what follows. Suffice it to say here, the idea of transcendence as it appears in the works of the medieval *mutakallimūn* is rooted in an atomistic ontology, apart from which it loses much of its force.

Reason ('aql) and Revelation (naql)

For Ibn al-Jawzī, our knowledge of God derives from two sources and only two: reason ('aql)⁷ and revelation (naql).⁸ The knowledge derived from these two sources may overlap at certain points, but, on the whole, what each tells us is quite different. For Ibn al-Jawzī, the knowledge obtained through reason is more foundational in character in that it constitutes the necessary starting point from which the quest for God must begin if it is to be successful.⁹ In the larger picture, revelation too is essential, but it cannot do its work, so to speak, until reason has laid the groundwork and prepared the way. The principal function of revelation is to fill in the picture whose form and contours have been mapped out and at least partially filled in by reason. In brief, the task of revelation is to add to and complete the work begun by reason. It is through reason that the existence of God and His necessary attributes are established. Revelation itself makes no attempt to demonstrate God's existence on the basis of logical principles because that does not lie within its power or purview. There is no credible or compelling reason to listen to the "voice" of revelation—to accept it as an authoritative

⁷ Ibn al-Jawzī frequently uses the terms *naẓar* and *istidlāl* to refer to the reasoning process. Reason, in turn, draws from two sources: 1) from itself, i.e., through logical analysis and reflection, and 2) from the observation of nature and human experience in society.

⁸ The term *naql* (literally, a transmission or report) was adopted by the 'ulamā' to refer to scripture in the broadest sense, i.e., including both the Quran and the teaching of the Prophet. According to Ibn al-Jawzī, knowledge of God is derived from two sources, and only two, viz., reason ('aql) and revelation or scripture (naql). Sense experience and the language of sense experience are excluded as potential sources, for they are powerless, by themselves, to tell us anything about God, since He is, in His very essence, an incorporeal being and, therefore, not available to the senses in any respect. If the term "transcendent" is used to qualify Ibn al-Jawzī's God, that term can only refer to the non-corporeal nature of the divine being. As we shall see in more detail below, transcendence does not mean that God is totally other; for Ibn al-Jawzī it means only that He is not among the objects available to sense perception. Ibn al-Jawzī has no difficulty referring to God as knowing, seeing, hearing, etc. (cf., Gimaret, *EP*, VII, 788b; and *Maqālāt*, 155-156; also W. M. Watt, "Some Muslim Discussions of Anthropomorphism," 9, 8-12).

⁹ §§2-6, 16, 167 (and note). There are numerous references to reason and its function scattered throughout *KAS*. This was standard procedure for the Mu'tazila as it was for many Ash'arites. Cf., R. Frank, "The Science of *Kalām*," *Arabic Sciences and Philosophy*, II (1992), 16-17.

text—until God's existence is proven by remptory evidence (*adilla q*

It is essentially on the basis of this that Ibn al-Jawzī, following the Mu'tazila, prove God's existence.¹¹ Such an argument points to the fact that it is impossible for a cause other than itself; and that God must be the elements or parts of the world. The immediate cause of the world is too is caused, but this kind of argument is the problem of an infinite regress. The conclusion to be drawn is that the world is made of parts—is the result of a causal argument from contingency

¹⁰ §§11, 14, 33/3, 148, etc.

¹¹ §§4-6, 9-11. The argument is called the argument from change or from the doctrine of *La doctrine*, 230-234; see *KAS*, I, 148.

¹² For Ibn al-Jawzī, again following the Mu'tazila, the world ('ālam) is the realm of "being" and is composed of three and only three: bodies (*ajsād*), accidents (*awṣāf*), and atoms (*ḥuṣūṣ*). It must be noted that atoms (apart from the accidents) are not from, or outside of, bodies. Bodies are composed of atoms in which a certain number of atoms and their arrangement determine the internal properties of such things as size, shape, weight, etc. Atoms, whether moving or at rest, in contact with other atoms, or objects fall into the category of accidents. One attribute of bodies is that they are composed of atoms determines their composition (the accidents that define them). In the Mu'tazila view, that is a non-negotiable element of the doctrine. For details, see §§5-7, 9, 29, 44, as well as the introduction.

¹³ One of the bits of evidence is the argument from the composite entity. In the logic of the Mu'tazila, the composer.

¹⁴ As Watt points out, the argument is based on the view by the early Mu'tazila (W. M. Watt, *op. cit.*, 7, 28-33).

¹⁵ Cf., §6.

text—until God's existence has been demonstrated on the basis of the peremptory evidence (*adilla qaṭʿīya*) of reason.¹⁰

It is essentially on the basis of the argument from contingency (*ḥudūth*) that Ibn al-Jawzī, following the tradition of medieval *kalām*, attempts to prove God's existence.¹¹ Since the world exists¹² and since the evidence points to the fact that it is temporal,¹³ it follows that the world must have a cause other than itself; and if the world as a whole is contingent, so also must the elements or parts of which it is made.¹⁴ It might be argued that the immediate cause of the world is also caused and that the cause of this latter too is caused, but this kind of reasoning leads only to the insuperable problem of an infinite regression of causes (*tasalsul*).¹⁵ The only plausible conclusion to be drawn is that the world—both as a whole and in all of its parts—is the result of a cause that is itself uncaused. On the basis of the argument from contingency, it is possible to assert that God exists, that He

¹⁰ §§11, 14, 33/3, 148, etc.

¹¹ §§4-6, 9-11. The argument from contingency is supplemented by what might be called the argument from change or what Gimaret calls the argument from "metamorphoses" (*La doctrine*, 230-234; see *KAS*, the latter half of §5).

¹² For Ibn al-Jawzī, again following definitions developed by the *mutakallimūn*, the world (*ʿālam*) is the realm of "bodily" existence. The elements that make up the world are three and only three: bodies (*aḥsām*), atoms (*jawāhir*) and accidents (*aʿrāḍ*), although it must be noted that atoms (apart from the *basāʾiṭ* [*KAS* §9]) and accidents do not exist apart from, or outside of, bodies. Bodies are defined as composite entities consisting of aggregations of atoms in which a certain number of accidents reside. The number of atoms and their arrangement determine the internal structure and density of bodies; accidents determine such things as size, shape, weight, color, smell, whether a body is living or inanimate, moving or at rest, in contact with other bodies or separate from them, etc. All material objects fall into the category of bodies as defined by Ibn al-Jawzī. The other important attribute of bodies is that they must have a cause which brings them into being and determines their composition (the number and arrangement of their atoms along with the accidents that define them). In the words of Ibn al-Jawzī, everybody must have a composer. That is a non-negotiable element in Ibn al-Jawzī's definition of bodies. For additional details, see §§5-7, 9, 29, 44, as well as other references scattered throughout *KAS*.

¹³ One of the bits of evidence indicating that the world is temporal is the fact that it is a composite entity. In the logic of *kalām*, everything composite must by definition have a composer.

¹⁴ As Watt points out, the argument from contingency is a method of proof developed by the early Muʿtazila (W. M. Watt, "Some Muslim Discussions of Anthropomorphism," 7, 28-33).

¹⁵ Cf., §6.

is the uncaused cause of all that is, and that since He is himself uncaused He is necessarily eternal. Moreover, on the basis of what is sometimes known as the argument from "mutual interference" (*tamānuṣ*),¹⁶ Ibn al-Jawzī concludes that the cause of the universe must be one.¹⁷ Finally, it can be shown on the basis of the argument from contingency that God is not a "body,"¹⁸ for a body is by definition composite, viz., an aggregation of atoms qualified by a certain number of accidents; if He were a body, He would necessarily require a cause for His composition, that is, He would require a composer. If God is not a body, none of the attributes of bodies can be applied to Him: He does not—indeed, cannot—occupy space (*taḥayyuz*); He is beyond change (*taghayyur*), movement (*taḥarruk*, *intiqāl*), rest (*sukūn*), and the other conditions that govern the relations of bodies: contact (*mumāssa*, *mubāshara*), conjunction (*ijtimāʿ*), separation (*infisāl*), difference (*tabayyun*), and so forth.

To recapitulate, on the basis of reason alone it is possible to show that God exists, that He is the eternal uncaused cause of all that is, that He is One, and that He is transcendent in the sense that He is beyond the world of material forms, beyond all bodily attributes, and beyond the conditions that govern the relations of bodies in space (movement, rest, contact, et cetera), and, finally, beyond time. In short, the God discovered through, and established by, reason is, in His essence, outside the cosmos,¹⁹ that is to say, outside the categories of time²⁰ and space, in every respect except perhaps in a metaphorical

¹⁶ This argument, cited frequently in works on *kalām*, was traced by medieval theologians not to Greek sources, but to the Quran itself, and especially S. 23: 91 ("God has not taken to himself a son, nor is there any god with Him; for then each god would have...risen up against others." Cf., also S. 21: 22). For al-Ashʿarī's use of the argument, see his *Lumaʿ* §8. See also H. Davidson, *Proofs for Eternity, Creation and the Existence of God in Medieval Islamic and Jewish Philosophy* (New York 1987), 166-167, where the argument and its place in medieval *kalām* is discussed in greater detail.

¹⁷ Cf., §10, where Ibn al-Jawzī briefly alludes to the argument. While the idea of God's Oneness, in the sense of having no equal, is important to Ibn al-Jawzī, much more important to the argument developed in *KAS* is the idea of internal oneness, the notion that God is not made up of parts (*tabʿīd*) and therefore cannot be a body.

¹⁸ Cf., §§7, 137, 237. Cf., also §9 where it is said, following a similar line of reasoning, that God cannot be an atom "for [all] atoms are identical to each other (*tamāthul*) and occupy space (*taḥayyuz*)."

¹⁹ See e.g., §55.

²⁰ See §57 where the point is made more explicitly than perhaps anywhere else in *KAS*.

sense.²¹ While Ibn al-Jawzī holds that God, that otherness is not a body. His existence and primary attributes, and deductive powers of reason, however, will have to await further discussion.

Moreover, the task of explaining God's attributes through reason is not only in the experience of every intelligent being, but also in His necessary attribute of existence on the basis of His own authority. This is not true because human beings are deficient in that they cannot make judgments based on "heavenly" evidence to the extent why Ibn al-Jawzī reasons about matters—and why he devoted so much of his explanation of the reasons for His necessary attributes, *taqlīd* is, in effect, to proceed on the basis of human authority. This is not acceptable in the eyes of a human being must exert his reason (*ʿaql*, *ijtihād*) with w

²¹ Ibn al-Jawzī will allow that some knowledge is not in this sense necessary.

²² In the words of Ibn al-Jawzī: "every creature" (§20).

²³ Cf., §§14, 18-22.

²⁴ The concept of *maʿrifat* or *taqlīd* (cf., also the last part of §10) is, in effect, to proceed on the basis of human authority. *maʿrifat* Allāh and *taqlīd* are inconceivable. *maʿrifat* of God *taqlīd* is not permissible in the argument of the work, see §10.

²⁵ Cf., §§18-22. Ibn al-Jawzī holds that the principles upon which religious law is based are principles (principles). He did allow for a *maʿrifat* of God.

²⁶ How far Ibn al-Jawzī was in this regard on the basis of the evidence from the Quran were not capable of using reason is not clear. All adults share equally in the po

sense.²¹ While Ibn al-Jawzī comes down on the side of otherness in describing God, that otherness is not absolute. This much is apparent from the fact that His existence and primary attributes can be established through the inferential and deductive powers of reason. The final definition of God's otherness, however, will have to await a consideration of revelation.

Moreover, the task of establishing God's existence and His necessary attributes through reason is not a one-time undertaking; it must be replicated in the experience of every individual.²² No one can establish God's existence and His necessary attributes for another human being. To believe in God's existence on the basis of someone else's effort is to ground one's belief in authority. This is not true belief, however, for judgments based on authority are deficient in that they lack certitude. They fall into the category of judgments based on "hearsay" or "reports" (*akhbār*).²³ This is to a large extent why Ibn al-Jawzī rejects *taqlīd* (the authority of tradition) in such matters—and why he devotes a substantial part of chapter I to a detailed explanation of the reasons why, in matters pertaining to God's existence and His necessary attributes, *taqlīd* is unacceptable.²⁴ To proceed on the basis of *taqlīd* is, in effect, to proceed on the basis of presumption (*ẓann/maznūn*). This is not acceptable in matters pertaining to God's existence.²⁵ Every human being must exert himself to the fullest in exercising the powers of reason (*ʿaql, ijtihād*) with which he has been endowed.²⁶

²¹ Ibn al-Jawzī will allow that God is present in a metaphorical sense, viz. through His knowledge but only in this sense.

²² In the words of Ibn al-Jawzī, it is *ʿalā kulli makhḷūq* ("[a responsibility incumbent] on every creature" [§20]).

²³ Cf., §§14, 18-22.

²⁴ The concept of *maʿrifa* or *ʿilm* (knowledge) is central to Ibn al-Jawzī's critique of *taqlīd* (cf., also the last part of §37 of *KAS* where Ibn al-Jawzī states quite explicitly that *maʿrifat Allāh* and *taqlīd* are incompatible: "...especially in matters pertaining to the knowledge of God *taqlīd* is not permissible"). On the concept of "knowing" (vs. *taqlīd*) and its place in the argument of the work, see notes to the Translation §20.

²⁵ Cf., §§18-22. Ibn al-Jawzī rejected *taqlīd* not only in the sphere of *uṣūl ad-dīn* (the principles upon which religion is based), but also in the field of *uṣūl al-fiqh* (juridical principles). He did allow for a measure of *taqlīd* in the realm of positive law (*furūʿ al-fiqh*).

²⁶ How far Ibn al-Jawzī was prepared to push this point is difficult to say—i.e., solely on the basis of the evidence from *KAS*. He knew, e.g., that children below a certain age were not capable of using reason except at the most elementary level; he also knew that not all adults share equally in the powers of reason, and he certainly knew that there are those

Revelation (naql)

Despite its power and its centrality to the quest for God, reason (*‘aql*) is limited in what it can do. It can establish God's existence and identify those attributes (*ṣifāt*) that are necessary to His being as the eternal uncaused cause, but it cannot tell us what God expects of us or delineate the values and principles by which human conduct in this life is to be judged.²⁷ That kind of knowledge can only be acquired by recourse to the revealed text of scripture: the Quran and the Sunna. Indeed, according to Ibn al-Jawzī, the primary function of revelation is to provide human beings with a knowledge of those principles (*ahkām*) and commands (*awāmir*) that ought to govern the conduct of individuals and their relationship to each other (*mu‘āmalāt*) in this life.²⁸

Revelation, however, is indispensable in another respect: it adds to what can be known of God through reason, and in doing so makes possible a fuller, richer, more adequate understanding of God. Thus it is only through the Quran and the Sunna that we can know, for example, that He is living, that He knows, wills, hears, sees, speaks, and that He possesses the power (*qudra*) to act.²⁹ These attributes, sometimes referred to as the *ṣifāt khabariyya* (scriptural attributes), are perfectly in accord with what can be known of God through reason.

Revelation does present a problem, however, in that it ascribes to God a host of “additional” attributes, some of which do appear to conflict with the

individuals—the mentally handicapped, e.g.—who are unable to participate in the rational effort to establish God's existence.

²⁷ To put it in another way, reason can disclose the existence of God as the Creator; it cannot disclose his existence as Legislator.

²⁸ Here Ibn al-Jawzī clearly differs with the Mu‘tazila, who held that through observation and rational reflection human beings can arrive at a knowledge of those principles that ought to guide human conduct—a knowledge sufficient to satisfy the demands of God. In the Mu‘tazilī view human beings are responsible to God for their conduct independently of revelation. Sunnīs, by contrast, insisted that human responsibility before God is contingent on revelation. See Reinhart, *Before Revelation: the Boundaries of Muslim Moral Thought* (Albany 1995) for the arguments pro and con on this question.

²⁹ §71; cf., also §85. It might be argued that it is possible to establish the attribute of *qudra* through reason, for in establishing God as the cause of the world, the act of creation is also established.

non-corporeal nature of God. As reason makes clear, God is simple and hence timeless. The apparent conflict between the timeless nature of God and the temporal nature of the world poses two sets of questions. First, how can the language of scripture be squared with the timeless nature of God? Second, if the Quran is God's speech, how can the anthropomorphic expressions used by the anthropomorphists be still real, for the language of the Prophet himself, it too, is temporal.

Although such questions were at the center of the debates of the schools of medieval Islam, they were also in some of the less obvious questions unique to Sunni Islam.

To answer the question of the nature of the expressions and images, Ibn al-Jawzī argues that the language which he cobbles together is more than satisfactory, fashion. It is a product of sense experience and reflects human experience. This follows from the fact that human construction.³² Language is a human construction.

³⁰ Some of these belong to the category of anthropomorphism.

³¹ For a rapid survey, along with a discussion of anthropomorphism from approximately 1000 to 1500, see *God: Anthropomorphism in Early Islam*.

³² Ibn al-Jawzī does not say that what he says about the nature of God is a human construction.

non-corporeal nature of God's being as established through reason.³⁰ As reason makes clear, God cannot be a body, for all bodies are by definition composite and hence temporal in origin; all bodies require a composer. The apparent conflict between the language of reason and that of revelation poses two sets of questions: How is the anthropomorphic language of scripture to be squared with the language of reason, and how is the presence of such language in scripture to be explained? Secondly, if the language of the Quran is God's speech (as Ibn al-Jawzī took it to be), how are its anthropomorphic expressions to be construed? Although the challenge posed by the anthropomorphisms of the *ḥadīth* is less daunting, the problem is still real, for the language of the Prophet is also "inspired" language; like the Prophet himself, it too is in some sense *maʿṣūm* (sacrosanct).³¹

Although such questions were not commonly addressed by Ḥanbalī thinkers, they were at the center of debates that went on within the great theological schools of medieval Islam, especially among the Muʿtazila and the Ashʿarites, but also in some of the lesser schools such as the Kullābīya. Nor were these questions unique to Sunnī thinkers. For Ibn al-Jawzī these are serious questions.

The Language of Scripture

To answer the question of why it is that scripture contains anthropomorphic expressions and images, Ibn al-Jawzī has recourse to elements of a theory of language which he cobbles together in an interesting, though perhaps less than satisfactory, fashion. Essentially, language, as Ibn al-Jawzī understands it, is a product of sense experience in such a way that words and expressions reflect human experience at its most basic, its most primitive, level. All of this follows from the fact that language is in some fundamental sense a human construction.³² Language, however, is a multilayered, multidimen-

³⁰ Some of these belong to the category of the *awṣāf* referred to in *KAS* §33/1.

³¹ For a rapid survey, along with a provocative discussion, of the problem of anthropomorphism from approximately the 8th to the 10th centuries, see J. van Ess, *The Youthful God: Anthropomorphism in Early Islam* (1988), 1-20.

³² Ibn al-Jawzī does not say this in so many words, but it must, I think, be inferred from what he says about the nature of language.

sional phenomenon. At its highest level it is capable of the kind of abstraction and manipulation that make possible the various proofs for the existence of God. Between these two levels,³³ judging from the scattered comments made by Ibn al-Jawzī in *KAS*, is the language of imagination (*takhyīl*), a language that makes use of mental images (*taṣawwurāt*) drawn from sense experience, but a language that is under the influence of reason. This imaginal language is, in effect, a language pulled in two directions, perhaps one might even say, it is a hybrid language. The language that occupies this intermediate sphere is the kind of language on which poetry and refined prose draw. It is also the language of dream experiences as well as those forms of expression that have moved beyond sense experience but have not attained the status of abstraction.³⁴

Ibn al-Jawzī does not attempt a classification of the language of scripture in terms of these categories, but he does readily concede that much of the language of the Quran and the *ḥadīth* is language of the simpler sort—language still closely linked to sense experience, and necessarily so—because it is the language of the great masses of human beings.³⁵ For the most part, it is the only kind of language they can grasp. Since scripture aims to communicate its message to the widest possible audience, it has no choice but to draw on the more elemental forms of language—those closest to the experience of ordinary people. This explains why, for example, God is so frequently portrayed in scripture as a corporeal being: as one who has a face, eyes, hands, ears, and so forth; a being who moves from place to place, and who, at every moment in time, occupies a particular place.³⁶ According to Ibn al-Jawzī, scripture uses such language for the benefit of ordinary human beings in order to underscore the reality of God's existence in the most

³³ That is, between the level of sense experience and the level at which reason is operative.

³⁴ Cf., §§ 74, 75, 76 and 79 where the subject is broached in connection with the imaginal creations of the dream experience.

³⁵ See §34 where Ibn al-Jawzī defends this view of the language of scripture. He alludes to this way of thinking of language frequently in the pages that follow (cf., for example §§123, 167, 216, 225 and 233); unfortunately, nothing essentially new is added to the position outlined in §34.

³⁶ He is said, e.g., to be seated on a throne located above the heavens.

concrete, vivid, compelling and doubt.³⁷

By understanding the argument Ibn al-Jawzī is treading on orthodox, if not transgressive language of scripture—the Quran itself—is a concession borders on suggesting that it is conditioned.³⁸ What happens to the unconditioned word of God? an attempt to accommodate? Was Ibn al-Jawzī aware of this? sets forth so confidently? that Ibn al-Jawzī is mouth to others. Not so here. The argument adapted to the needs of the

³⁷ See §34 where the issue is discussed in chaps. II and III.

³⁸ See §§34 and 59, among others, of Abū Bakr al-Jaṣṣāṣ's treatment of the Quran. God addressed humankind in terms of idioms current in the speech of the people, dangerously close to saying the truth, prefabricated elements already in use. See "Literary Theory," *Zeitschrift für Arabistik* [1991-92], 268-269. We may also see a Hanafī in jurisprudence, is he also Heinrichs, "'Takhyīl' and 'Imagination'" in *Journal of Islamic Studies* 233, where Zamakhshari, in a discussion with S. 33:72, insists that the earth be taken as a figurative expression. This is common in the language of the people to their ways and molds [or perhaps] adopts this view but defends it with

³⁹ There is nothing in *KAS* to suggest a problematic theological.

⁴⁰ Not in the sense that the argument was fully convinced of its truth.

concrete, vivid, compelling way possible and, in so doing, to dispel uncertainty and doubt.³⁷

By understanding the anthropomorphic language of scripture in this way, Ibn al-Jawzī is treading dangerously close to the limits of traditionalist orthodoxy, if not transgressing those limits, for in suggesting that the language of scripture—the language of both the Prophet and that of the Quran itself—is a concession to the needs of the masses, Ibn al-Jawzī borders on suggesting that the language of scripture is historically conditioned.³⁸ What happens to the doctrine of the Quran as the eternal, unchanging, unconditioned word of God when it is suggested that its language represents an attempt to accommodate the needs of ordinary, uneducated human beings? Was Ibn al-Jawzī aware of the theological implications of the position he sets forth so confidently?³⁹ Occasionally in KAS, one has the impression that Ibn al-Jawzī is mouthing words (and expressing views) formulated by others. Not so here. The notion that the language of scripture is a language adapted to the needs of the common people was clearly his own,⁴⁰ a view

³⁷ See §34 where the issue is addressed. Ibn al-Jawzī reiterates this point frequently in chaps. II and III.

³⁸ See §§34 and 59, among others. Heinrichs alludes to this problem in his discussion of Abū Bakr al-Jaṣṣāṣ's treatment of *majāz* in his *Uṣūl al-Fiqh*. Al-Jaṣṣāṣ insists that in the Quran God addressed humankind in clear Arabic speech, and that in doing so He made use of idioms current in the speech of the Arabs. "Here al-Jaṣṣāṣ (Heinrichs writes) comes dangerously close to saying that God is not creative in his *majāz* expressions, using only prefabricated elements already existing in the language" ("Scriptural Hermeneutics and Literary Theory," *Zeitschrift für Geschichte der Arabisch-Islamischen Wissenschaften*, 7 [1991-92], 268-269). We may assume that al-Jaṣṣāṣ, who was a Mu'tazilī in theology and a Ḥanafī in jurisprudence, is here reflecting a view that was shared by other Mu'tazilīs (see also Heinrichs, "'Takhyīl' and Its Traditions" in *Gott ist schön und Er lebt die Schönheit*, p. 233, where Zamakhsharī, in a discussion of the meaning of *amāna* (trust) in connection with S. 33:72, insists that the term *amāna* along with the reference to the heavens and the earth be taken as a figurative expression, and then he adds: "[Figurative] expressions like this are common in the language of the Arabs and the Koran came down exactly according to their ways and molds [or patterns of thought]"). The fact that Ibn al-Jawzī not only adopts this view but defends it vigorously and repeatedly in KAS is certainly significant.

³⁹ There is nothing in KAS to suggest that he saw this view of language as in any way problematic theologically.

⁴⁰ Not in the sense that the idea was original with him, but rather in the sense that he was fully convinced of its truth.

that he held with some conviction. He alludes to it repeatedly in *KAS*.⁴¹ And it is not difficult to see why, for it is a reflection of the experiences of a man who, in composing homilies for a popular audience, must have spent a good deal of time and energy searching for expressions and images—for a language—that would resonate with ordinary believers. As a preacher and author of numerous homiletical anthologies, Ibn al-Jawzī had first hand experience of the difficulties involved in crafting a language that could speak effectively to audiences made up, for the most part, of uneducated people—persons steeped in what he called the language of sense experience.

Taʾwīl in the Service of Reason

Given the presence of anthropomorphisms in the Quran and the *ḥadīth*, how are such expressions to be construed? Is such language used merely to emphasize the reality of God's existence, or do the anthropomorphic expressions of scripture carry a meaning that goes beyond merely reinforcing the fact of God's existence? For Ibn al-Jawzī the answer to the latter question is clearly, yes.⁴² If that is so, how or by what means is the meaning of such a language to be deciphered? A literalistic approach cannot possibly be the answer, because it merely accents the "materialist," corporeal aspect of scriptural anthropomorphisms since, for Ibn al-Jawzī, literalism by definition takes sense experience as its frame of reference. If the anthropomorphisms of scripture were to be taken at face value the inevitable result would be a God conceived in corporeal, this-worldly terms. For Ibn al-Jawzī such language taken literally, in effect, reduces God to the status of an idol.⁴³

⁴¹ Cf., §34.

⁴² See W.M. Watt's comments on *taʾwīl* in his "Some Muslim Discussions of Anthropomorphism," 2-3 and 9.

⁴³ Admittedly, Ibn al-Jawzī does not say this in so many words, but it is certainly present by implication. Indeed, it is precisely this understanding of anthropomorphism that is behind the emotional intensity of his denunciation of *tashbīh/tajsīm* (on the meaning of these terms for Ibn al-Jawzī, see notes to the Translation §1). By ascribing to God corporeal features He is, in effect, reduced to the status of an idol. For Ibn al-Jawzī idols are not only objects in the external world; they can also exist within the mind as mental constructs or images, particularly when God is conceived as possessing corporeal features. Indeed, idols understood in the traditional sense are (for Ibn al-Jawzī) nothing less than externalizations of mental images. These latter represent the necessary first phase in a process that ends in

Much of *KAS* is a diatribe against anthropomorphism by some members of the Ḥanbalī school. The displeasure is severe and the condemnation of fellow Ḥanbalīs who construe God beyond the pale of Islam.

Ibn al-Jawzī's response is straightforward. Since it is for this reason that must be our starting point, in particular the intention behind *aṣ-ṣifāt*.⁴⁵ For Ibn al-Jawzī the relationship between the God discovered by the method of exegesis and the God of oneness and transcendence is infinite and eternal, viz., the being.

For Ibn al-Jawzī, it is a dilemma posed by the anthropomorphisms in *KAS*. Ibn al-Jawzī *taʾwīl* is a mode of transcending or metaphorically. Although he makes this transcending of his reasoning seems to be a transcending of language which assumes

the creation of idols as objects is easily recognized for what they are as anthropomorphisms in *KAS*. This understanding of the connection helps to explain the passion so often expressed in *KAS*. Although Ibn al-Jawzī understands them. I would contend these connections clearly in mind (and his opposition to literalism as *majāzāt* (instances of figurative language) (cf., §34).

⁴⁴ See, e.g., §244, last line.

⁴⁵ §167, etc.

⁴⁶ His position was and remains. *al-Funūn*: شرع إلا بما يوافق العقل. Reason is in agreement with revelation with reason [509, 8-9. Cf., Makrūḥāt, 100, 101, 102, 103, 104, 105, 106, 107, 108, 109, 110, 111, 112, 113, 114, 115, 116, 117, 118, 119, 120, 121, 122, 123, 124, 125, 126, 127, 128, 129, 130, 131, 132, 133, 134, 135, 136, 137, 138, 139, 140, 141, 142, 143, 144, 145, 146, 147, 148, 149, 150, 151, 152, 153, 154, 155, 156, 157, 158, 159, 160, 161, 162, 163, 164, 165, 166, 167, 168, 169, 170, 171, 172, 173, 174, 175, 176, 177, 178, 179, 180, 181, 182, 183, 184, 185, 186, 187, 188, 189, 190, 191, 192, 193, 194, 195, 196, 197, 198, 199, 200, 201, 202, 203, 204, 205, 206, 207, 208, 209, 210, 211, 212, 213, 214, 215, 216, 217, 218, 219, 220, 221, 222, 223, 224, 225, 226, 227, 228, 229, 230, 231, 232, 233, 234, 235, 236, 237, 238, 239, 240, 241, 242, 243, 244, 245, 246, 247, 248, 249, 250, 251, 252, 253, 254, 255, 256, 257, 258, 259, 260, 261, 262, 263, 264, 265, 266, 267, 268, 269, 270, 271, 272, 273, 274, 275, 276, 277, 278, 279, 280, 281, 282, 283, 284, 285, 286, 287, 288, 289, 290, 291, 292, 293, 294, 295, 296, 297, 298, 299, 300, 301, 302, 303, 304, 305, 306, 307, 308, 309, 310, 311, 312, 313, 314, 315, 316, 317, 318, 319, 320, 321, 322, 323, 324, 325, 326, 327, 328, 329, 330, 331, 332, 333, 334, 335, 336, 337, 338, 339, 340, 341, 342, 343, 344, 345, 346, 347, 348, 349, 350, 351, 352, 353, 354, 355, 356, 357, 358, 359, 360, 361, 362, 363, 364, 365, 366, 367, 368, 369, 370, 371, 372, 373, 374, 375, 376, 377, 378, 379, 380, 381, 382, 383, 384, 385, 386, 387, 388, 389, 390, 391, 392, 393, 394, 395, 396, 397, 398, 399, 400, 401, 402, 403, 404, 405, 406, 407, 408, 409, 410, 411, 412, 413, 414, 415, 416, 417, 418, 419, 420, 421, 422, 423, 424, 425, 426, 427, 428, 429, 430, 431, 432, 433, 434, 435, 436, 437, 438, 439, 440, 441, 442, 443, 444, 445, 446, 447, 448, 449, 450, 451, 452, 453, 454, 455, 456, 457, 458, 459, 460, 461, 462, 463, 464, 465, 466, 467, 468, 469, 470, 471, 472, 473, 474, 475, 476, 477, 478, 479, 480, 481, 482, 483, 484, 485, 486, 487, 488, 489, 490, 491, 492, 493, 494, 495, 496, 497, 498, 499, 500, 501, 502, 503, 504, 505, 506, 507, 508, 509, 510, 511, 512, 513, 514, 515, 516, 517, 518, 519, 520, 521, 522, 523, 524, 525, 526, 527, 528, 529, 530, 531, 532, 533, 534, 535, 536, 537, 538, 539, 540, 541, 542, 543, 544, 545, 546, 547, 548, 549, 550, 551, 552, 553, 554, 555, 556, 557, 558, 559, 560, 561, 562, 563, 564, 565, 566, 567, 568, 569, 570, 571, 572, 573, 574, 575, 576, 577, 578, 579, 580, 581, 582, 583, 584, 585, 586, 587, 588, 589, 590, 591, 592, 593, 594, 595, 596, 597, 598, 599, 600, 601, 602, 603, 604, 605, 606, 607, 608, 609, 610, 611, 612, 613, 614, 615, 616, 617, 618, 619, 620, 621, 622, 623, 624, 625, 626, 627, 628, 629, 630, 631, 632, 633, 634, 635, 636, 637, 638, 639, 640, 641, 642, 643, 644, 645, 646, 647, 648, 649, 650, 651, 652, 653, 654, 655, 656, 657, 658, 659, 660, 661, 662, 663, 664, 665, 666, 667, 668, 669, 670, 671, 672, 673, 674, 675, 676, 677, 678, 679, 680, 681, 682, 683, 684, 685, 686, 687, 688, 689, 690, 691, 692, 693, 694, 695, 696, 697, 698, 699, 700, 701, 702, 703, 704, 705, 706, 707, 708, 709, 710, 711, 712, 713, 714, 715, 716, 717, 718, 719, 720, 721, 722, 723, 724, 725, 726, 727, 728, 729, 730, 731, 732, 733, 734, 735, 736, 737, 738, 739, 740, 741, 742, 743, 744, 745, 746, 747, 748, 749, 750, 751, 752, 753, 754, 755, 756, 757, 758, 759, 760, 761, 762, 763, 764, 765, 766, 767, 768, 769, 770, 771, 772, 773, 774, 775, 776, 777, 778, 779, 780, 781, 782, 783, 784, 785, 786, 787, 788, 789, 790, 791, 792, 793, 794, 795, 796, 797, 798, 799, 800, 801, 802, 803, 804, 805, 806, 807, 808, 809, 810, 811, 812, 813, 814, 815, 816, 817, 818, 819, 820, 821, 822, 823, 824, 825, 826, 827, 828, 829, 830, 831, 832, 833, 834, 835, 836, 837, 838, 839, 840, 841, 842, 843, 844, 845, 846, 847, 848, 849, 850, 851, 852, 853, 854, 855, 856, 857, 858, 859, 860, 861, 862, 863, 864, 865, 866, 867, 868, 869, 870, 871, 872, 873, 874, 875, 876, 877, 878, 879, 880, 881, 882, 883, 884, 885, 886, 887, 888, 889, 890, 891, 892, 893, 894, 895, 896, 897, 898, 899, 900, 901, 902, 903, 904, 905, 906, 907, 908, 909, 910, 911, 912, 913, 914, 915, 916, 917, 918, 919, 920, 921, 922, 923, 924, 925, 926, 927, 928, 929, 930, 931, 932, 933, 934, 935, 936, 937, 938, 939, 940, 941, 942, 943, 944, 945, 946, 947, 948, 949, 950, 951, 952, 953, 954, 955, 956, 957, 958, 959, 960, 961, 962, 963, 964, 965, 966, 967, 968, 969, 970, 971, 972, 973, 974, 975, 976, 977, 978, 979, 980, 981, 982, 983, 984, 985, 986, 987, 988, 989, 990, 991, 992, 993, 994, 995, 996, 997, 998, 999, 1000.

Much of *KAS* is a diatribe against the literal approach to scripture championed by some members of the Ḥanbalī school; the language used to express his displeasure is severe and unforgiving. He does not hesitate to characterize fellow Ḥanbalīs who construe scripture in this way as having placed themselves beyond the pale of Islam.⁴⁴

Ibn al-Jawzī's response to the hermeneutic challenge posed by scripture is straightforward. Since it is through reason that we first "encounter" God, it is reason that must be our guide in deciphering the meaning of scripture, in particular the intention behind its anthropomorphic expressions, the *akhbār aṣ-ṣifāt*.⁴⁵ For Ibn al-Jawzī it was a given that there can be no conflict between the God discovered by reason and the God of scripture.⁴⁶ Whatever method of exegesis one employs, the result must be an affirmation of the oneness and transcendence of God. In short, it must point to a God who is infinite and eternal, viz., a God who is beyond all forms of contingent being.

For Ibn al-Jawzī, it is *taʾwīl* that offers the best hope for resolving the dilemma posed by the anthropomorphisms of scripture. In general, for Ibn al-Jawzī *taʾwīl* is a mode of exegesis in which language is construed tropically or metaphorically. Although he nowhere explains how it is that *taʾwīl* makes this transcending of language in its elemental, primal form possible, his reasoning seems to be as follows: in contrast to a literalistic interpretation of language which assumes that language has only one level of meaning,

the creation of idols as objects in the external world. Mental images are more subtle, less easily recognized for what they are, but they are no less idols. What Ibn al-Jawzī denounces as anthropomorphisms in *KAS* are (for him) idols in their subjective, internal, mental form. This understanding of the connection between idolatry in its objective and subjective forms helps to explain the passion so often displayed in the denunciation of anthropomorphism in *KAS*. Although Ibn al-Jawzī nowhere spells out these connections, it is clear that he understands them. I would contend that it is impossible to understand *KAS* without keeping these connections clearly in mind. They also explain his passionate commitment to *taʾwīl* (and his opposition to literalistic exegesis), for it is only by construing the *akhbār aṣ-ṣifāt* as *majāzāt* (instances of figurative language) that one can avoid the dangers of *tashbih/tajsīm* (cf., §34).

⁴⁴ See, e.g., §244, last line.

⁴⁵ §167, etc.

⁴⁶ His position was and remained that of Ibn ʿAqīl as the latter expresses it in his *Kitāb al-Funūn*: نقول: إنَّ العقل مطابق للشرع وإنَّه لا يرد الشرع إلا بما يوافق العقل (we maintain that reason is in agreement with revelation and there is nothing in revelation that does not agree with reason [509, 8-9. Cf., Makdisi, *Ibn ʿAqīl* (1997), 88]).

viz., what might be called the surface (*ẓāhir*) meaning of the text, *taʿwīl* insists that language sometimes admits of at least two levels of meaning, the obvious, literal meaning (*ḥaqīqa*) and a tropic or metaphorical sense (*majāz*). The kind of *taʿwīl* practiced by Ibn al-Jawzī seeks to move from the one to the other, that is, from the literal or surface meaning to the tropic. Language, including the language of scripture, does not always have multiple levels of meaning. It is a question of the intention of the language used. The first task of the exegete is to determine the intention behind a particular expression or text, that is to decide when *taʿwīl* is warranted and when not.

For Ibn al-Jawzī, there are two ways to decide the answer to the question. The first is to consult the context for clues that suggest or point, whether subtly or overtly, to the presence of a metaphorical sense. This kind of analysis is, strictly speaking, linguistic and literary in nature. The second approach might be called theological and takes as its starting point the nature of God as disclosed through reason. Since reason shows conclusively that God is the uncaused, eternal, non-corporeal One, those references in scripture that might on the surface suggest otherwise must be deemed necessarily to have a metaphorical sense and therefore to be construed by means of *taʿwīl*. But to conclude that a particular text must be construed metaphorically does not answer the question as to which one, among the various possible metaphorical meanings, is intended. In the end that can only be determined through linguistic/literary analysis.

Ibn al-Jawzī takes the need for linguistic/literary analysis seriously, as can be seen from the amount of space devoted to it in chapters II and III of *KAS*. It can fairly be said that the bulk of these two chapters is taken up with textual analysis, including considerations of a philological, grammatical, semantic, and literary nature. The function of the theological approach is largely negative: it provides protection against construing scripture in any way that might conflict with the God discovered through reason. It is only through the often tedious process of textual analysis that the precise and correct meaning of a given text can be determined. Here Ibn al-Jawzī turns to the work of the experts on language (grammarians, philologists and lexicographers), to literary criticism, exegesis,⁴⁷ and poetics for guidance in

⁴⁷ Especially, the many commentaries on the Quran and the various *ḥadīth* collections. In the case of the *ḥadīth*, Ibn al-Jawzī also drew on the substantial literature in the field of *jarḥ wa-taʿdīl* (the critical analysis of *ḥadīth*) in addition to the commentary literature.

determining the precise meaning of much of the analysis in *KAS*.⁴⁸ Ubayda, Ibn Qutayba, Tirmidhi, Bayhaqī, and others.⁴⁹ His approach to the Quran (chap. II) and to the *ḥadīth* (chap. III) is based on how Ibn al-Jawzī uses *taʿwīl* through careful analysis of the text. If *taʿwīl* is not disciplined, it can become an excuse for saying, of course, that the exegesis is correct. To demand that would be to

The Hermeneutic

The hermeneutic objective is to be critical. *KAS* is constructive criticism of scripture for the benefit of the community. Critical (which here means philological and anthropomorphizing argument) is one of a number of fellow Ḥanbalī methods. Its principal purpose, as Ibn al-Jawzī had become convinced through the Ḥanbalī school had lost its original purpose, is to reform the prominent Ḥanbalīs whose exegesis was of the *akḥbār aṣ-ṣifāt*.⁵¹

Ibn al-Jawzī's specific objective is to reform the names within the school. His attempt to reform the exegesis of the fellow Ḥanbalīs that their exegesis is indefensible, a negation of the

⁴⁸ See, e.g., §§39, 46, etc.

⁴⁹ Ibn al-Jawzī repeatedly cites them, e.g., §167).

⁵⁰ See especially §§14, 30, 33.

⁵¹ Above all, Ibn Ḥāmid (d. 527/1132).

determining the precise meaning called for by a particular text. This is why much of the analysis in *KAS* is based on the writings of men like Abū ʿUbayda, Ibn Qutayba, Thaʿlab, al-Farrāʾ, Ibn al-Anbārī, al-Khaṭṭābī, al-Bayhaqī, and others.⁴⁸ His discussion of the anthropomorphic expressions in the Quran (chap. II) and the *ḥadīth* (chap. III) provide detailed evidence as to how Ibn al-Jawzī uses the scholarly tools available to him. It is only through careful analysis that one is led to the intended meaning of the text. If *taʾwīl* is not disciplined into submission to the findings of the experts, it can become an excuse for arbitrary, fanciful interpretations.⁴⁹ This is not to say, of course, that the exegesis carried out in *KAS* is free of subjectivity. To demand that would be to expect the impossible.

The Hermeneutic Objectives of KAS

The hermeneutic objective of *KAS* is twofold: one constructive, the other critical. *KAS* is constructive in that it seeks to uncover the true meaning of scripture for the benefit of educated, honest seekers of the truth. It is critical (which here means polemical) in that it seeks to expose the indefensible anthropomorphizing arguments and conclusions promulgated in the writings of a number of fellow Ḥanbalīs. Indeed, the polemical purpose of the work is its principal purpose, as Ibn al-Jawzī makes clear early in chapter I.⁵⁰ He had become convinced that, on the question of the divine attributes, the Ḥanbalī school had lost its way, largely as a result of the influence of three prominent Ḥanbalīs whose writings defended anthropomorphic interpretations of the *akhbār aş-şifāt*.⁵¹

Ibn al-Jawzī's specific objectives in attacking some of the most influential names within the school were several: On one level, *KAS* is part of an attempt to reform the theological outlook of the school by convincing fellow Ḥanbalīs that their literalistic, anthropomorphic approach to scripture is indefensible, a negation of the legacy of Aḥmad and the school at its best.

⁴⁸ See, e.g., §§39, 46, etc.

⁴⁹ Ibn al-Jawzī repeatedly calls attention to the dangers that are implicit in *taʾwīl* (see, e.g., §167).

⁵⁰ See especially §§14, 30, 33 and 37.

⁵¹ Above all, Ibn Ḥāmid (d. 403/1012), Abū Yaʿlā (d. 458/1065) and Ibn Zāghūnī (d. 527/1132).

KAS may well have been the most thoroughgoing attack on anthropomorphic conceptions of God to come out of medieval Islam.⁵⁶ It was certainly the most forceful statement on the subject to be produced within the Ḥanbalī school during the Middle Ages.⁵⁷ While *KAS* may be unique among the writings produced by medieval Ḥanbalīs, it does have to be remembered, however, that Ibn al-Jawzī was not alone among Ḥanbalīs in defending a non-anthropomorphic conception of God based on *taʿwīl*. Though less daring in some respects, Ibn ʿAqīl (d. 513/1119) had argued for an openness to other theological orientations and to the use of *taʿwīl* in dealing with the question of the divine attributes. Abū Muḥammad at-Tamīmī (d.488/1095), an older contemporary of Ibn ʿAqīl, produced a major Ḥanbalī creed (*ʿaqīda*) in which he defended a non-literalist approach to the *akhbār aş-şifāt*.⁵⁸ Abū'l-Ḥusayn b. al-Munādī (d. 335/947), a second-generation Ḥanbalī, had called for the use of *taʿwīl* in dealing with texts bearing on the divine attributes; his writings clearly reflect the influence of *kalām* within the Ḥanbalī school and that at a surprisingly early date.⁵⁹

There may well have been other defenders of *taʿwīl* within the school not recorded in our sources. One of the claims made repeatedly in *KAS* is that anthropomorphist ideas had been introduced into the school only after the time of Aḥmad. To be sure, this was an argument developed in the heat of internecine debate within the school; nonetheless there does appear to be some justification for Ibn al-Jawzī's contention. As we have seen, there is

⁵⁶ Cf., Gimaret, *Image*, 53-56.

⁵⁷ So far as can be determined based on what we currently know of the theological literature produced during the Islamic Middle Ages.

⁵⁸ *Ṭabaqāt al-Ḥanābila*, II, 263-290.

⁵⁹ See *KAS* §125 where Ibn al-Jawzī quotes a passage from one of Ibn al-Munādī's works that reveals the influence of *kalām*; it reads as follows: "Describing the *hawāʾ* (empty space) as being above or below Him is abhorrent to the learned (*ahl al-ʿilm*) because it implies containment [within space] and posits something like a receptacle (*wiʿāʾ*) for Him who is not like [other] beings (*ashyāʾ*). We are in agreement that no part of creation is above the Almighty in any sense, and that He neither indwells things nor is separate from them. If He were present in things He would be part of them, and if He were distinct from them He would be separated from them. Agreement amongst us on this point is widespread (*sic.*)—more so, than on the matter of the 'objectionable', [i.e., the literal,] interpretation. The metaphorical interpretation (*taʿwīl*) [of this tradition], however, is the most reliable." Ibn al-Munādī was a contemporary of Barbahārī and Aḥmad's son ʿAbd Allāh. For more on the term *hawāʾ*, see notes to Translation §125.

evidence for the existence of a theologically informed non-anthropomorphist tradition within the school reaching as far back as the latter half of the 10th century. No less an authority than Ibn Taymīya believed that, in fact, it went all the way back to Aḥmad himself; according to him, Aḥmad was one of the few *salaf* to have recourse to the notion of *majāz* in the interpretation of the Quran.⁶⁰

Ibn al-Jawzī, a Ḥanbalī Eclectic

If Ibn al-Jawzī's own theological stance was in many ways shaped by the non-anthropomorphist tradition within medieval Ḥanbalism, it is clear that he also drew on theological sources outside the school in the formulation of his position. Indeed, in theological matters Ibn al-Jawzī's position as articulated in *KAS* can best be described as eclectic. He was clearly influenced by Ash'arism, particularly the later more sophisticated Ash'arism of men like al-Bāqillānī (d. 403/1013), Ibn Fūrak (d. 406/1015), al-Baghdādī (d. 429/1038), and perhaps also al-Juwaynī (d. 478/1085/6). Despite his criticism of the Mu'tazila,⁶¹ they too played a role—and apparently a significant one—in shaping the views set forth in *KAS*.⁶² Ash'arite influence can most readily be seen in Ibn al-Jawzī's insistence on a distinction between the *ṣifāt* and the *awṣāf*,⁶³ but also to some extent in his understanding of the mutually interdependent relationship between reason and revelation, and his stand on the question of the divine attributes. Mu'tazilism's contribution to Ibn al-Jawzī's thought can be seen in his emphasis on the importance of reason *vis-à-vis* revelation, but Mu'tazilism's influence is most evident in his approach to exegetical questions—especially in his reliance on the linguistic sciences (grammar, philology, and lexicography),⁶⁴ and on literary criticism in dealing with the anthropomorphic expressions found in the Quran and

⁶⁰ *Kitāb al-Imān* (Beirut, 1392/1972), 83-85; see also W. Heinrichs, "On the Genesis of the *Ḥaḳīqa/Majāz* Dichotomy," *SI*, 59 (1984), 115-117.

⁶¹ See his extended comments in *KAS* §§27-29.

⁶² The fact of Mu'tazilī influence was recognized by his Ḥanbalī critics: among the sharpest of his critics were al-ʿAlthī (*Dhayl*, II, 205-210), and Ibn Taymīya (Makdisi, *Ibn ʿAqīl*, 508). Although Ibn al-Jawzī is not mentioned by Ibn Qudāma in his *Dhamm at-Taʿwīl*, it seems likely Ibn Qudāma had him in mind when he blasted Ḥanbalīs who use *taʿwīl*.

⁶³ See especially *KAS* §33.

⁶⁴ Some of those on whom he relied—men like al-Farrāʾ—were Mu'tazilī in orientation.

the Sunna and, above all, Ash'arites did make use of it. Ash'arites were more reticent in their attitude toward it.⁶⁶ Further, Mu'tazilī influence was evident in the approach he adopted in dealing with it in his stand on the question of the divine attributes. The logic of the position of the Mu'tazilīs on the possibility of a literal vision of God had argued.⁶⁷

Despite the role played by Mu'tazilism in Ibn al-Jawzī's thought, Ibn al-Jawzī was a Ḥanbalī. He was a follower of the doctrine of Aḥmad al-Ḥanbalī, the founder of the school, and especially to Aḥmad's work to the life and teaching of the school. A biographical sketch of the school in the middle of the 12th century

⁶⁵ G. Makdisi, *Censure*, XV-XVI. Heinrichs introduced the distinction between the text of the Quran (i.e., between the *ṣifāt* and the *awṣāf*) in the course of the latter part of the 19th century. Heinrichs, they did so specifically in the context of the Quran (Heinrichs, "On the Genesis of the *Ḥaḳīqa/Majāz* Dichotomy," 116-117, 132-139; see also his "Theory in Islam: The Case of *Majāz*," *Wissenschaften*, 7 [1991-92], 253). Heinrichs pointed out the distinction between *majāz* and *ṣifāt*; they were apparently the first to do so in interpretation, which they indicated in their notes, those who practiced this kind of interpretation ("Contacts between Scriptural Exegesis and Grammar," 9). Ash'arites who later adopted this approach did so under the tutelage of the Mu'tazilīs. It can be seen as the masters of this kind of interpretation, others (Ash'arites, Ḥanbalīs, etc.) followed in to Mu'tazilī influence.

⁶⁶ According to W. M. Watt, even Ash'arites were of *taʿwīl* (cf., Watt, "Some Muslim Views on the Quranic Text," 10).

⁶⁷ See §§202-203; cf., also §§204-205; *ʿAqīl* (cf., Makdisi, *Ibn ʿAqīl* [1997], 508).

⁶⁸ *Manāqib al-Imām Aḥmad*, ed. by W. M. Watt, 10.

the Sunna and, above all, in his consistent preference for *taʿwīl*.⁶⁵ Some Ashʿarites did make use of *taʿwīl*, to be sure, but in general they were more reticent in their attitude toward *taʿwīl* and some were quite deeply suspicious of it.⁶⁶ Further, Muʿtazilī influences can be seen in the specific interpretations he adopted in dealing with the anthropomorphisms of scripture and, finally, in his stand on the question of *ruʾya* (the vision of God in the hereafter). The logic of the position developed in *KAS* seems clearly to rule out the possibility of a literal vision of God in the afterlife—exactly as the Muʿtazila had argued.⁶⁷

Despite the role played by Ashʿarism and Muʿtazilism in the shaping of his thought, Ibn al-Jawzī was a devoted Ḥanbalī, a defender of what he believed to be the doctrine of Aḥmad. Given the intensity of his loyalty to the school, and especially to Aḥmad, it is not surprising that he devoted a major work to the life and teaching of Aḥmad, the last part of which is a biographical sketch of the school's history from its inception up to the middle of the 12th century.⁶⁸ Beyond his attachment to the theological

⁶⁵ G. Makdisi, *Censure*, XV-XVI. It is significant that it was the Muʿtazila who first introduced the distinction between the figurative and the literal (or proper, veridical) senses of the text of the Quran (i.e., between the *majāz* and the *ḥaqīqa* of the Quran), sometime in the course of the latter part of the 9th century and the first half of the 10th; according to W. Heinrichs, they did so specifically in order to deal with the anthropomorphisms of the Quran (Heinrichs, "On the Genesis of the *Ḥaqīqa-Majāz* Dichotomy," *SI*, 59 [1984], 116-117, 132-139; see also his "Contacts between Scriptural Hermeneutics and Literary Theory in Islam: The Case of *Majāz*," *Zeitschrift für Geschichte der Arabisch-Islamischen Wissenschaften*, 7 [1991-92], 253-284). Not only were the Muʿtazilites the first to work out the distinction between *majāz* as tropical language and *ḥaqīqa* as a literal interpretation, they were apparently the first to introduce the idea of tropical language as a method of interpretation, which they indicated by the term *majāz* and later the term *taʿwīl*. As Heinrichs notes, those who practiced this kind of interpretation were "mostly...of a Muʿtazilite persuasion" ("Contacts between Scriptural Hermeneutics and Literary Theory in Islam...", 256, n. 9). Ashʿarites who later adopted this mode of exegesis, even though on a limited basis, did so under the tutelage of the Muʿtazilites. There is no mystery why the Muʿtazilites came to be seen as the masters of this kind of interpretation, and it is not surprising that when others (Ashʿarites, Ḥanbalīs, etc.) adopted *taʿwīl* they were often accused of having caved in to Muʿtazilī influence.

⁶⁶ According to W. M. Watt, even Ashʿarites like al-Juwaynī were cautious in their use of *taʿwīl* (cf., Watt, "Some Muslim Discussions of Anthropomorphism," 8, 19-23).

⁶⁷ See §§202-203; cf., also §§75-76. This seems in line with the position taken by Ibn ʿAqīl (cf., Makdisi, *Ibn ʿAqīl* [1997], 147).

⁶⁸ *Manāqib al-Imām Aḥmad*, ed. Muḥammad Amīn al-Khānjī (Cairo 1349/1930). The

CHAPTER FOUR

THE MANUSCRIPT: A BRIEF DESCRIPTION

The manuscript used for the preparation of the critical edition of *Kitāb Akhbār aṣ-Ṣifāt* is preserved in the Şehid Ali Paşa collection (# 1561) of the Süleymaniye Library, Istanbul. It is, so far as is known, the only surviving copy of the work.¹ Despite repeated efforts, over a number of years, to locate other copies of the work, these efforts have not so far been successful. It is entirely possible that our work originally circulated under another title. We do know that some of Ibn al-Jawzī's works did circulate under several titles.² All efforts to identify alternate titles of *Kitāb Akhbār aṣ-Ṣifāt* have proven inconclusive.

The name of the copyist of the Istanbul manuscript is not given, though the colophon does indicate that the copying of the manuscript was completed on the 17th of Rajab 890 (30 July 1485), presumably in Damascus. In the colophon, the copyist states that the copy (*nuskha*) from which he made our manuscript descended from one produced earlier by a certain Nūr ad-Dīn ʿAlī b. Jamāl ad-Dīn b. ʿAbd Allāh, who is identified as a Shāfiʿite from Damascus. I have not so far been able to identify this Nūr ad-Dīn from the biographical sources available to me, but the colophon does state that he was a student (*talmīdh*) of a certain Shams ad-Dīn, a Shāfiʿite *muḥaddith* also from Damascus.³ The copyist notes finally in the colophon that his original was made from a copy of the manuscript produced by Nūr ad-Dīn. Although it cannot be proven conclusively, it seems likely that the various copies referred to in the colophon were all made in Damascus. If this is true we may conclude that *Kitāb Akhbār aṣ-Ṣifāt* had attracted a fair amount of interest among the scholars of Damascus, particularly among Shāfiʿites.

¹ Neither the title of the work nor the Istanbul manuscript is listed in Brockelmann.

² One example of this turns out in fact to be an abridgment of *Kitāb Akhbār aṣ-Ṣifāt*, which was widely known under two separate titles: *Dafʿ ash-Shubhat at-Tashbīh* and *al-Bāz al-Ashhab* (cf., *GAL*, Suppl. I, 918, no. 29). A comparison of the manuscripts bearing these two titles shows them to be identical. The only difference is in the titles.

³ Too little of his name is given to make an identification possible.

[CHAPTER ONE]

[THE PLACE OF REASON IN MATTERS OF FAITH AND THE
PROBLEM OF ANTHROPOMORPHISM]¹

[fol.1b] In the name of God the Merciful and Compassionate One.

1 The *shaykh*, *imām*, Jamāl ad-Dīn Abū'l-Faraj 'Abd ar-Raḥmān b. 'Alī b. Muḥammad b. al-Jawzī, may God have mercy on him, said: Praise be unto God for the success made possible through the soundest of approaches

¹ The term anthropomorphism is used here and throughout this work as a rough equivalent for the Arabic terms *tajsīm* and *tashbīh*, two terms that occur frequently in *KAS*. For the most part, *tajsīm* and *tashbīh* are used as synonyms or near synonyms and are, therefore, virtually interchangeable. For Ibn al-Jawzī, they refer to any attempt to compare God to corporeal beings and categories, and they lead inevitably to a God conceived as a corporeal being. Such a process, according to Ibn al-Jawzī, necessarily takes sense perception as its point of departure and its frame of reference. When the two terms are differentiated, *tashbīh* comes to denote the act of comparison in and of itself, i.e., the act of comparing God to what is other than God, whereas *tajsīm* focuses attention on the object of the comparison, viz., God and the world of corporeal existents. In this somewhat more refined usage, the terms refer to two quite different but necessarily complementary things, viz., the act of comparison and its object.—It is important to distinguish Ibn al-Jawzī's conception of anthropomorphism from contemporary Western usage. In the latter, the term generally refers to attempts to conceive God in human terms, i.e., as a being possessing human attributes, irrespective of whether these attributes are emotional, rational or corporeal, or a combination of these. In *KAS*, by contrast, the notion of anthropomorphism is used only to refer to attempts to conceive God in corporeal terms. Thus, while Ibn al-Jawzī, who is adamant in his rejection of corporealist conceptions of God, vigorously denies that God has a body with limbs and organs, he has no trouble speaking of God as knowing, willing, acting, speaking, hearing, seeing, etc. (cf., §§71, 85, etc.). Again, while Ibn al-Jawzī repeatedly rejects the notion that God has eyes, he has no difficulty with the notion that God sees (cf. §160, e.g.). In fairness to Ibn al-Jawzī, however, it must be noted that when he speaks of God as seeing, knowing, speaking, etc., he may well be using these expressions metaphorically, i.e., as *majāzāt* or figures of speech. Unfortunately, this is an issue that is simply not addressed in *KAS*. Finally, it should be noted that the critique of anthropomorphism elaborated in *KAS* assumes an atomistic ontology—one consisting of bodies (*ajsām*), atoms (*jawāhīr*) and accidents (*a'rāḍ*). Although there was an occasional exception, atomism was almost universally assumed in medieval *kalam* (rational theology), at least until the late 11th and early 12th centuries. The essential elements of this ontology and their relationship to each other are elaborated in some detail in early parts of *KAS*.

(*minhaj*) and the straightest of paths (*ṭarīq*),² who has blessed us with reason (*ʿaql*), which steadfastly “speaks” the truth,³ and with a knowledge of revelation (*maʿrifat an-naql*).⁴ And so our claim to noble descent (*nasab*), thank God, is rooted in [our] understanding of [revelation],⁵ and we thus have joined the two of them together.⁶ He has led us out of the narrow pass into the wide open expanses; we give praise that His branch (*farʿuhu*) endures and that His root (*aṣluhu*) is possessed of rich foliage. We invoke God’s blessing on our lord, Muḥammad, the Prophet, giver of sincere counsel (*shafīq*), on his Family, and on those who were his Companions and their Successors in establishing the truth. May God’s blessing also secure acceptance for us on the day of gathering and scattering.⁷

2 It is the first and principal duty of the believer to acquire a knowledge of God (*maʿrifat Allāh*),⁸ for that is obtained through reason (*ʿaql*) and

² A reference to the guidance provided through the Quran and the Sunna of the Prophet.

³ Cf., §§20 and 59 (among others) where Ibn al-Jawzī speaks of the truth-telling powers of reason.

⁴ The term *naql* includes both the Quran and the Sunna, the two principal forms of revelation understood in the broadest sense. Both belong to the category of transmitted reports, hence the term *naql* (transmission).

⁵ That is, *naql*. True nobility is based on the knowledge of revelation (*naql*), not on birth or ethnicity. The subtext of this part of the *khuṭba* is the contrast between the religious attitude of Islam and traditional Arab notions of racial superiority. The only basis for claims to superiority is a knowledge of revelation, a knowledge ultimately made possible by the God-given faculty of reason. For Ibn al-Jawzī, the acquisition of knowledge by means of the rational faculties presupposes disciplined and determined effort. Cf., Ibn al-Jawzī, *Manāqib al-Imām Aḥmad b. Ḥanbal*, 502, 3-6, where the relationship of *maʿrifa* (knowledge of sacred texts) and *nasab* is discussed; here too (indeed, throughout *KAS*) he insists on (or assumes) the intrinsic superiority of the former over the latter.

⁶ That is, reason (*ʿaql*) and revelation (*naql*) Cf., Frank, *al-Ghazālī and the Ashʿarite School*, 7).

⁷ The imagery of “gathering and scattering” comes from the Quran and is a reference to the day of resurrection and judgment (see S. 6: 22, 124; 10: 28, 45; 15: 25; 17: 97; 20: 124; 25: 17; 59: 2, etc.).

⁸ For Ibn al-Jawzī it is a question here of a quite specific kind of knowledge, viz., the knowledge that God exists, not a knowledge of God’s nature or essence (Makdisi, *Ibn ʿAqīl* [1997], 86-87). This latter kind of knowledge is, by definition, beyond the reach of reason and human understanding. Following common practice in medieval *kalām*, the terms *maʿrifa* and *ʿilm* are used virtually interchangeably by Ibn al-Jawzī in *KAS*; thus he sometimes speaks of the *maʿrifat Allāh* (e.g., §§2 and 36) and sometimes of the *ʿilm Allāh*

made obligatory by Scripture follows that rational reflection (*istidlāl*)⁹ are also obligatory verses of Scripture: “Reflect on earth.”¹⁰ “Have they not seen earth, and all that God has created (unẓurū)!”¹² And finally, “observe (tubṣirūna)?”¹³

3 Those who reflect on science to their advantage, for all religious purposes taken in their entirety, fall

(§§4 and 104). The identity of these expressions as well. Thus in so knowledge or understanding of *ʿilm an-naql* (§106). On the use of “Knowledge and *Taqīd*: The F JAOS, 109 (1989), 37-62. See also for *kalām* in general the two terms they are not interchangeable in a similar use of these two terms by *Created Speech*, 47-56. On the literature, see the very useful article on *ʿilm*, *Er*, III, 1133-1134, as in Gardet.

⁹ For Ibn al-Jawzī *istidlāl* is a indication) and ends with the *ma* sign points). Although *istidlāl* or between the sign (*dalīl*) and the nature as the *madlūl*; hence, in the phenomenal world to the invisible its starting point, stands in contrast is deduced from the universal. F 238 (*Ḳiyās*); and J. van Ess, “*T Classical Islamic Culture*, 21-50.

¹⁰ S. 10:101.

¹¹ S. 7:185.

¹² S. 16: 36; also 27: 69; 29: 20.

¹³ S. 51:21.

¹⁴ The expression *ahkām ad-dīn* human actions as their object. (cf.

made obligatory by Scripture (*naql*). If [such knowledge] is obligatory, it follows that rational reflection (*naẓar*) and the use of inferential reason (*istidlāl*)⁹ are also obligatory, as God himself has commanded in the following verses of Scripture: "Reflect (*unẓurū*) on what is in the heaven and the earth."¹⁰ "Have they not reflected on the kingdom of the heavens and the earth, and all that God has created?"¹¹ "Travel about on the earth and reflect (*unẓurū*)!"¹² And finally, "In your very selves [there are signs]; do you not observe (*tubṣirūna*)?"¹³

3 Those who reflect on such things with the aid of reason have a decisive advantage, for all religious precepts pertaining to human acts (*aḥkām ad-dīn*),¹⁴ taken in their entirety, fall into three categories: firstly, those which may be

(§§4 and 104). The identity or near identity of *maʿrifa* and *ʿilm* may be observed in other expressions as well. Thus in some contexts he uses the expression *maʿrifat an-naql*, the knowledge or understanding of scripture (§1), whereas elsewhere he uses the expression *ʿilm an-naql* (§106). On the use of the two terms in Ashʿarite *kalām*, see R. Frank, "Knowledge and *Taqlīd*: The Foundations of Religious Belief in Classical Ashʿarism," *JAOS*, 109 (1989), 37-62. See esp. p. 47, n. 24 where Frank notes that for al-Ashʿarī and for *kalām* in general the two terms "are understood as essentially synonymous..., even if they are not interchangeable in every context." Cf., also his comments on p. 54, n. 38. For a similar use of these two terms by the Muʿtazilī theologian ʿAbd al-Jabbār, see Peters, *God's Created Speech*, 47-56. On the term *maʿrifa* and its use in various genres of Arabic literature, see the very useful article by R. Arnaldez in *IE*², VI, 568-571. See also the article on *ʿilm*, *IE*², III, 1133-1134, as well as the art. *ʿilm al-kalām*, *IE*², III, 1141-1150 by L. Gardet.

⁹ For Ibn al-Jawzī *istidlāl* is a logical movement that begins with the *dalīl* (the sign or indication) and ends with the *madlūl* or *madlūl ʿalayhi* (the conclusion or that to which the sign points). Although *istidlāl* or inferential reason assumes the existence of a connection between the sign (*dalīl*) and the conclusion (*madlūl*), the *dalīl* need not be of the same nature as the *madlūl*; hence, it is possible for Ibn al-Jawzī to move from the visible, phenomenal world to the invisible without difficulty. *Istidlāl*, which takes the particular as its starting point, stands in contrast to the strict deductive syllogism in which the particular is deduced from the universal. For more on *istidlāl*, see *IE*², II, 101-102 (*Dalīl*); *IE*², V, 238 (*Qiyās*); and J. van Ess, "The Logical Structure of Islamic Theology" in *Logic in Classical Islamic Culture*, 21-50.

¹⁰ S. 10:101.

¹¹ S. 7:185.

¹² S. 16: 36; also 27: 69; 29: 20; and 30: 43.

¹³ S. 51:21.

¹⁴ The expression *aḥkām ad-dīn* used here refers to those values or judgments that have human actions as their object. (cf., Makdisi, *Ibn ʿAqīl* [1997], 86).

known only through reason (*ʿaql*) to the exclusion of revelation (*samʿ*); secondly, those which may not be known by reason, indeed, cannot be known except through revelation; and, thirdly, those things that may be known through both [reason and revelation].¹⁵

4 The establishment of the contingency of the world, the existence of its Creator, His absolute uniqueness (*waḥdānīya*), those attributes that are necessary to Him (*ṣifāt wājiba*), His revelation (*risāla*) and its possibility (*tajwīz ʿalayhi*),¹⁶ and all such related matters, including God's unity (*tawḥīd*) and prophecy (*nubuwwa*), [fol.2a] are possible only through the exercise of reason (*ʿaql*). The evidence (*dalīl*) for this is that the term revelation (*samʿ*) refers only to (1) the Word of God, (2) to what was transmitted on the authority of His Messenger who [in turn] received it from Him, and (3) to the consensus of those whom His Messenger declared to be protected against error. But it will never be possible to determine with certainty that the words [attributed to God] are the actual words of God and of His Prophet unless one knows that God exists, just as it is impossible to determine whether the words attributed to Zayd are indeed the words of Zayd unless one knows that Zayd exists.¹⁷ It is essential, therefore, that the knowledge

¹⁵ Cf., Ibn ʿAqīl, *al-Wāḍiḥ fī Uṣūl al-Fiqh* (Beirut/Stuttgart, 1996), 32, 7-9; also Abū Yaʿlā, *al-Muʿtamad fī Uṣūl ad-Dīn*, ed. W. Haddad (Beirut, 1974), 24-25, where a similar three-fold distinction among the *aḥkām ad-dīn* is made.

¹⁶ As opposed to its being *mustaḥīl* (impossible).

¹⁷ For Ibn al-Jawzī (following Ibn ʿAqīl), the credibility and authority of revelation rest on a prior, autonomous operation of reason through which the individual comes to know that God exists, the essential nature of His being (His Otherness and Oneness), the character of His attributes, the contingent nature of His creation etc. (cf., §31). The establishment of these foundational principles is the work of *uṣūl ad-dīn* (as opposed to *uṣūl al-fiqh*). It is only on the basis of this kind of knowledge that the claims of revelation can be judged and its authenticity established. Ibn al-Jawzī's statements here indicate quite clearly that there is for him a form of obligation that is independent of and prior to the obligations imposed by scripture—viz., to follow reason's lead in seeking answers to the ultimate questions. He makes it quite clear in what follows, however, that the specific duties set forth in scripture can be known only through revelation. Thus, once reason has done its work in establishing the foundational principles, reason defers to revelation. It is here that *uṣūl al-fiqh* steps forward and takes up its work—viz., the task of working out the implications of revelation for human conduct. Ibn al-Jawzī was not the only Ḥanbalī to differentiate the various categories of *aḥkām ad-dīn*. Similar distinctions are to be found in Ibn ʿAqīl, Ibn Taymīya and Ibn Qayyim al-Jawzīya. For the approach of these three Ḥanbalī thinkers to the differentiation of these categories, see George Makdisi, "Ethics in Islamic Traditionalist Doctrine," *Ethics in Islam*, edited by R. G. Hovannisian (1985, Malibu, California), 47-63,

of God's [existence] (*ʿilm*) category of what can be known by the Friend of God, employed when he said: "I do not know [by reason] that what participates in revelation must necessarily be created, but the attributes of the Creator and the revelation (*samʿ*) alone, that is, no part [as a source], are necessary for the actions of a responsible agent and are prohibited.²⁰ In the category of reason and revelation] are such things as the sinner and the use of analogy

esp. 59ff. (cf., also his *Ibn ʿAqīl* (

¹⁸ On this expression and its pu

¹⁹ S. 6: 76.

²⁰ Cf., Ibn ʿAqīl, *Wāḍiḥ*, 33, in an abridged form. Following the Sunni view generally held by the Muʿtazilī, reality and can be known through its classic formulation in the writings of al-Jawzī, see esp. G. Hourani, *Islamic Philosophy and the Classical Tradition* (1971), as well as the shorter account in *Islamic Philosophy and the Classical Tradition*. See M. Fakhry, *Ethical Theories in Islam*, for a discussion of Muʿtazilī ethics within the larger context of Islamic thought. Ibn al-Jawzī the determination of what is good on divine command and can be known within the general voluntarist tradition (and embraced by most Ḥanbalī perspectives on this question). See D. Gimaret, "Théories de l'acte moral," *Ethics in Islam*, edited by R. G. Hovannisian and D. Gimaret, "Théories de l'acte moral: An interesting comparison of the Hourani's 'Two Theories of Value' and the Muʿtazilī's 'One Theory of Value'."

²¹ Cf., G. Makdisi, "Ethics in Islam: Among the things that may be known by the Friend of God, is 'the possibility of seeing' (1997), 88). Ibn al-Jawzī's deliberate ambivalence on his part toward the

of God's [existence] (*ʿilm bi-Allāh*)¹⁸ and of His Messenger belong to the category of what can be established through reason [alone]. Abraham, the Friend of God, employed reason to arrive at certain logical conclusions when he said: "I do not love things that vanish."¹⁹ He understood [through reason] that what participates in change (*taghayyur*) and movement (*intiqāl*) must necessarily be created, and that change and movement cannot, therefore, be attributes of the Creator. Among the things that may be known through revelation (*samʿ*) alone, that is, [a form of knowing] in which reason plays no part [as a source], are matters such as the determination of whether the actions of a responsible adult (*mukallaf*) are good or bad, allowed or prohibited.²⁰ In the category of what may be known through both [reason and revelation] are such things as the possibility of forgiveness for the sinner and the use of analogy (*qiyās*) in arriving at legal judgments (*aḥkām*).²¹

esp. 59ff. (cf., also his *Ibn ʿAqīl* (1997), 124-126).

¹⁸ On this expression and its parallel, *maʿrifat Allāh*, see notes to §2.

¹⁹ S. 6: 76.

²⁰ Cf., Ibn ʿAqīl, *Wāḍiḥ*, 33, for the longer text which Ibn al-Jawzī "cites" here in an abridged form. Following the Sunnī traditionalist position, Ibn al-Jawzī diverges from the view generally held by the Muʿtazila that moral qualities have an independent ontological reality and can be known through reason independently of revelation—a view that received its classic formulation in the writings of ʿAbd al-Jabbār (for a systematic account of this position, see esp. G. Hourani, *Islamic Rationalism: The Ethics of ʿAbd al-Jabbār* [Oxford, 1971], as well as the shorter account in his "The Rationalist Ethics of ʿAbd al-Jabbār," *Islamic Philosophy and the Classical Tradition* [Columbia, South Carolina, 1972], 105ff. See M. Fakhry, *Ethical Theories in Islam* [Leiden, 1991], 31-45, for a discussion of Muʿtazilī ethics within the larger context of medieval Islamic ethical theory). For Ibn al-Jawzī the determination of what is good and bad in the sphere of human action is based on divine command and can be known only through revelation. Here Ibn al-Jawzī stands within the general voluntarist tradition of medieval Islam as articulated by Shāfiʿī (and others) and embraced by most Ḥanbalīs and Ashʿarīs. For an excellent discussion of Ḥanbalī perspectives on this question, see G. Makdisi, "Ethics in Islamic Traditionalist Doctrine," *Ethics in Islam*, edited by R. G. Hovannisian (1985, Malibu, California), 47-63; and D. Gimaret, "Théories de l'act humain dans l'école ḥanbalite," *BEO*, 29 (1977), 157-178. An interesting comparison of the voluntarist and rationalist positions is to be found in G. Hourani's "Two Theories of Value in Medieval Islam," *Muslim World*, 50 (1959), 269-278.

²¹ Cf., G. Makdisi, "Ethics in Islamic Traditionalist Doctrine," *Ethics in Islam*, 63. Among the things that may be known through both revelation and reason, according to Ibn ʿAqīl, is "the possibility of seeing God with our eyes" (*Wāḍiḥ*, 33; cf., Makdisi, *Ibn ʿAqīl* (1997), 88). Ibn al-Jawzī's deletion of this reference is interesting and may reflect some ambivalence on his part toward the idea.

*Establishing the Creator's Existence by Reason
Contrary to the Claims of the Materialists*

5 We maintain that creation must have a Creator, and our proof (*dalīl*) is that everything which originates in time (*ḥādith*) must have a cause for its origination (*ḥudūth*).²² Thus, since the world (*ʿālam*) originated in time it follows that it must have a cause.²³ The term world [taken in its broadest sense] refers to everything in existence other than God.²⁴ An existent (*mawjūd*) which occupies space (*mutaḥayyiz*) and is not joined to anything other than itself is called an atom (*jawhar*).²⁵ If it is joined to something other than

²² In general, for Ibn al-Jawzī, the active participle, *ḥādith*, refers to the act or state of coming into existence at some point in time, whereas the verbal noun *ḥudūth* refers to the state or condition of temporal existence that follows from *ḥādith*. For Ibn al-Jawzī, as for the whole of medieval *kalām*, *ḥādith* includes everything that does not belong to the category of the eternal (*qadīm*). These two terms include the whole of reality; everything is either temporal or eternal; there is no third or intermediate category, and there is no link or *wāsiṭa* between the two.

²³ The basis for asserting the world's contingency is provided in what follows.

²⁴ Cf. Baghdādī, *Uṣūl ad-Dīn*, 33, where "world" is defined in terms that are virtually identical to those employed here by Ibn al-Jawzī.

²⁵ For Ibn al-Jawzī, the "atom" is an indivisible particle that forms the basis of all finite, corporeal existence. The contingency of atoms is shown by the fact that they are essentially identical to each other (*tamāthul*) and may be joined (*tarkīb* or *ta'līf*) to each other so as to form composite entities or bodies (*ajsām*). In addition, they occupy space (*taḥayyuz*) and admit of receiving accidents (*ʿarāḍ*). Although the term *jawhar* (pl. *jawāhir*) has sometimes been rendered "substance" (cf., Peters, *God's Created Speech* [Leiden, 1976], 119-123; and Gimaret, *La doctrine d'al-Ashʿarī* [Paris, 1990], 43-72), R. M. Frank has argued persuasively against such a translation on the grounds that it implies acceptance of an essentially Aristotelian conceptual framework and leads to a distortion when imposed on the thought of medieval Muslim theologians. For a fuller account of this argument, see R. Frank, "Bodies and Atoms: The Ashʿarite Analysis," *Islamic Theology and Philosophy* (M. E. Marmura, ed.), 19, n. 1; esp. p. 44, n. 19; as well as his *The Metaphysics of Created Beings*, 39, n. 5 (cf. *ET*², II, 493-494 [*Djawhar*]). Ibn al-Jawzī was not the first Ḥanbalī to use the technical theological terminology developed by the early Muʿtazilī thinkers and later taken over by the Ashʿarīs. The *Muʿtamad fī Uṣūl ad-Dīn* of Abū Yaʿlā (d. 458/1066), written at least a century before our work, is replete with the technical language of *kalām* (see p. 35ff. for a discussion of atoms, bodies and accidents). Other Ḥanbalīs, also, are mentioned in KAS as being conversant with *kalām*; among them Ibn Ḥāmid (d. 403/1012), Ibn ʿAqīl (d. 511/1119) and Ibn Zāghūnī (d. 527/1132). When the history of Ḥanbalī *kalām* is finally written the list will most certainly include other names from the 5th and 6th centuries A.H. (for some interesting observations on the question of *kalām* within medieval

itself it is a body (*jism*). "entity"] that can only s includes such things as col What consists of such tem originated in time (*ḥādith* follows from the fact tha coming into being, hence i its having come into being possible (*mumkin*) is not a never admit of existence. the possible admits of bo essential then that there be a [so to speak] in favor of [e will (*irāda*) of one who cre by reason and thus beyon begins as a clot, then beco blood, for we know that from one stage to the next developed [post-natal] stat to hear and see. If it is unal less able to do so in a state there must be an agent (*fāʿ*). Anyone who observes the cessation as the grain ripe

Ḥanbalism, see Gimaret, "Thé [1977], 157-178).

²⁶ Accidents require a substr can exist independently of a m accidents, see §§9, 22, 24, 33, 52

²⁷ An assumption that under Gimaret, "Théories de l'acte hum

²⁸ *Ibid.*, 171ff.

²⁹ Sometimes referred to as though the Muʿtazila found it un

³⁰ See his *Kitāb al-Maḳāmā reasoning. This was of course c see the *Lumaʿ* of al-Ashʿarī (ed. argument.*

itself it is a body (*jism*). An accident (*ʿaraḍ*), on the other hand, is [an "entity"] that can only subsist through something other than itself and includes such things as color (*lawṇ*), movement (*ḥaraka*) and rest (*sukūn*).²⁶ What consists of such temporally originated entities (*ḥawādith*) is necessarily originated in time (*ḥādith*). The proof that its origination in time is caused follows from the fact that its non-existence (*maʿdūm*) is anterior to its coming into being, hence it is not possible that its existence should precede its having come into being. Whether its existence is impossible (*muḥāl*) or possible (*mumkin*) is not a matter open to debate, for the impossible can never admit of existence. Thus it follows that its existence is possible, for the possible admits of both existence [fol.2b] and non-existence.²⁷ It is essential then that there be an agent capable of "tipping the scales" (*muraḥḥijh*)²⁸ [so to speak] in favor of [existence] over non-existence, that agent being the will (*irāda*) of one who creates (*mūjid*). This conclusion, which is required by reason and thus beyond refutation, explains why it is that a person begins as a clot, then becomes an embryo and finally a fetus of flesh and blood, for we know that [the embryonic life-form] is not able to move from one stage to the next by itself,²⁹ since it is plain that even in its fully developed [post-natal] state it is not capable of creating by itself the power to hear and see. If it is unable to do this in a fully developed state, it is even less able to do so in a state of incomplete development. This indicates that there must be an agent (*fāʿil*) who causes the movement and who directs it.³⁰ Anyone who observes the coming of the rain at the time of planting and its cessation as the grain ripens, followed by the arrival of the autumn winds

Ḥanbalism, see Gimaret, "Théories de l'acte humain dans l'école ḥanbalite," *BEO*, 29 [1977], 157-178).

²⁶ Accidents require a substrate (*maḥall*) in which to exist in contrast to atoms which can exist independently of a *maḥall* (cf., al-Baghdādī, *Uṣūl ad-Dīn*, 33). For more on accidents, see §§9, 22, 24, 33, 52-53, 89, etc.

²⁷ An assumption that underlies most medieval Muʿtazilite and Ashʿarite *kalām* (cf., Gimaret, "Théories de l'acte humain dans l'école ḥanbalite," *BEO*, 29 [1977], 171).

²⁸ *Ibid*, 171ff.

²⁹ Sometimes referred to as the argument from change; frequently used by Ashʿarites, though the Muʿtazila found it unconvincing (cf., Gimaret, *La Doctrine*, 231-234).

³⁰ See his *Kitāb al-Maqāmāt* (fol. 5b) where he develops much the same line of reasoning. This was of course one of the standard arguments used by the *mutakallimūn*; see the *Lumaʿ* of al-Ashʿarī (ed. McCarthey, 1953), §§3-4, for a typical statement of the argument.

and the sun's drawing near so as to dry the grain and prepare it for storage—and anyone who observes how teeth are made hard for cutting and the molars wide for grinding and the tongue nimble for turning what is to be chewed, as the saliva gushes forth to moisten the food so that it can be swallowed³¹—knows that there exists a wise and sovereign Agent who is in control. It would take too long to cite all of the evidence [in support of this proposition]. [Suffice it to say that] in every existent (*kull shayʿ*) there are signs indicating that He is One.

6 The Creator of the universe must be an existent (*mawjūd*),³² for existence and non-existence are polar opposites (*mutaqābilān*) between which there is no intermediate mode of being (*wāsiṭa*).³³ Since it has been established that things must have a cause (*fāʿil*),³⁴ it is necessary that it be both existent (*mawjūd*) and eternal (*qadīm*), for a [first] cause must be antecedent to

³¹ See *Talbīs*, 42; and *Ṣayd al-Khāṭir*, 415, for much the same argument.

³² He is one of whom existence can be predicated.

³³ Although both Muʿtazilites and Ashʿarites subscribed to the view that there is no intermediate state between existence and non-existence, the two schools understood the relationship between the two in quite different terms (cf. R. M. Frank, “*al-Maʿdūm wal-Mawjūd*,” *MIDEO*, 14 [1980], 198). Ashʿarites posited a radical distinction between existence and non-existence, and regarded non-existence (*ʿadam*) as pure nothingness—a “state” of which nothing can be predicated and which cannot be an object of knowledge. Muʿtazilites held a quite different view of the matter. As the repository of all possibles (i.e., all that is potentially existent), non-existence has a certain reality or positive character (*thubūt*), since each possible possesses its own special nature (*ṣifat adh-dhāt*) consisting of those qualities it will exhibit if and when it comes into being; i.e., if and when God as efficient cause chooses, in His freedom, to grant it existence. Creation in this view consists of clothing non-existent possibles with existence as an additional qualification. Since the essential nature of each possible “exists” prior to creation it is independent of God. For the Ashʿarites, this was tantamount to acknowledging the existence of eternal entities independent of God’s will and power—hence their insistence on the absolute nothingness of non-existence. Ibn al-Jawzī takes the side of the Ashʿarites on the question of *ʿadam* and *mawjūd* in the present work (cf., *Talbīs*, 83, 3-8). For more on the debate between Ashʿarites and Muʿtazilites, see Gimaret, *La doctrine*, 29-31; Wensinck, *Muslim Creed*, 166-167; and esp. Frank, *MIDEO*, 14 (1980), 185ff. On the debate within the Muʿtazilī school over the question of the *maʿdūm*, see Frank, “Remarks on the Early Development of the *Kalām*,” *Atti del terzo congresso di studi arabi e islamici* (Naples 1967), 323-329; also, Van den Bergh, *Tahāfut*, II, 62, n. 85.2. On how this debate played itself out in the field of grammatical theory, see Versteegh, *Greek Elements in Arabic Linguistic Thinking* (Leiden 1977), 135f. and nn. 35 and 36.

³⁴ An ultimate or first cause.

what is caused, necessary had a beginning in time i form a *regressus ad infinitum* non-being may not be pre (*qīdam*) is established ca existence were possible, H one whose existence is non-existence.

7 God is not a body (*jāṣid*) atoms (*jawhar*) joined to subject, like all bodies, to rest and those qualities

³⁵ Cf., Abū Yaʿlā, *Muʿtamad*.

³⁶ Cf., §§29 (Hishām b. al-H)

³⁷ The minimum number of a at length by medieval Muslim debated first in Muʿtazilite cū Muʿtazilite speculation for sever of the question was not confine attracted the attention of leading what is even more interesting century, at least, it was also the be seen, e.g., from the *Muʿtamad* by Ibn al-Jawzī, according to v each other in order to be a bo central element in its definition al-Jawzī aligns himself with the the majority of Ashʿarites. The especially from the time of Muʿ are three dimensional entities (th of eight atoms (*Maqālāt*, 302-3 Peters, *God's Created Speech*, 12 position championed by most A Muʿtazilite circles. Abū Jaʿfar al Baghdad and a student of Jaʿfa 126-127; and Gimaret, *La doctr question among Ḥanbali *mutakal* does not declare himself on the able to determine. Did Ibn al-J position, or were there earlier H he is here following the position*

what is caused, necessary to its existence and without beginning, for if it had a beginning in time it would itself require a cause (*muḥdith*) and thus form a *regressus ad infinitum* (*tasalsul*). Since [God] is eternally existent, non-being may not be predicated of Him, for He whose eternal pre-existence (*qidam*) is established cannot be conceived as non-existent.³⁵ If His non-existence were possible, He would be dependent on a cause. However, He is one whose existence is uncaused, hence there can be no cause for His non-existence.

7 God is not a body (*jism*),³⁶ for bodies consist of [a minimum of] two atoms (*jawhar*) joined to each other.³⁷ If He were a body, He would be subject, like all bodies, to such temporally produced states as movement and rest and those qualities that are inseparable [fol.3a] from the state of

³⁵ Cf., Abū Yaʿlā, *Muʿtamad*, 37-38.

³⁶ Cf., §§29 (Hishām b. al-Ḥakam), 34 and 237.

³⁷ The minimum number of atoms required to constitute a body was a question debated at length by medieval Muslim theologians. Although the problem appears to have been debated first in Muʿtazilite circles (in Basra), and though it remained at the center of Muʿtazilite speculation for several centuries, both in Basra and later in Baghdad, discussion of the question was not confined to the Muʿtazilite school. From the 10th century on it also attracted the attention of leading Ashʿarite theologians (including al-Ashʿarī himself), and, what is even more interesting within the context of the present study, by the mid-11th century, at least, it was also the focus of debate within Ḥanbalī circles in Baghdad, as can be seen, e.g., from the *Muʿtamad* of Abū Yaʿlā (see espec. 35-39). The view, championed by Ibn al-Jawzī, according to which a body requires a minimum of two atoms joined to each other in order to be a body, made the idea of "union" (*taʿlīf*, *ṭīlāf*, or *ijtimāʿ*) the central element in its definition of bodies. It is interesting that, in adopting this view, Ibn al-Jawzī aligns himself with the position taken by al-Ashʿarī and subsequently defended by the majority of Ashʿarites. The definition of bodies adopted by the majority of Muʿtazilites, especially from the time of Muʿammar (d. 215/830), emphasized two elements: that bodies are three dimensional entities (they are "long, deep, and wide") and they require a minimum of eight atoms (*Maqālāt*, 302-303; also see Gimaret, *La doctrine*, ch. 1, esp., 67ff.; and Peters, *God's Created Speech*, 122-123). It should be added here, however, that the minimalist position championed by most Ashʿarites and at least some Ḥanbalīs was not unknown in Muʿtazilite circles. Abū Jaʿfar al-Iskāfī (d. 240/854), a member of the Muʿtazilite school of Baghdad and a student of Jaʿfar b. Ḥarb, is known to have held this view (cf., *EF*, IV, 126-127; and Gimaret, *La doctrine*, 67-78). Whether there was a standard position on this question among Ḥanbalī *mutakallimūn* of the 11th and 12th centuries is unclear. Abū Yaʿlā does not declare himself on the question of number in the *Muʿtamad*, so far as I have been able to determine. Did Ibn al-Jawzī draw on Ashʿarite sources in the formulation of his position, or were there earlier Ḥanbalīs who held to a similar view? It is quite possible that he is here following the position of Ibn ʿAqīl, as he does on so many other questions.

contingency. On this question some Muslims have departed from the truth. They maintain, for instance, that He is a body but that He is not like other bodies. Some of them go so far as to say that [His body] is a form (*ṣūra*) composed of flesh and blood.³⁸ Others say simply that He is a body [and leave it at that], while still others maintain that His body has the shape (*hayʾa*) of an ingot (*sabīka*). Then there are those who say that His body has the shape of a clear, round crystal (*billawra*).³⁹ Finally, there are those who say that He is a body (*jism*) consisting of space (*faḍāʾ*) and that all other bodies exist within it.⁴⁰

8 If it were not for the fact that some of the *ʿulamāʾ*⁴¹ have made reference to such beliefs [in their writings], it would not be necessary to discuss them here.⁴² [Some of] my fellow Ḥanbalites (*aṣḥābunā*),⁴³ however, have exceeded the bounds of propriety (*insānīya*) and reason (*ʿaql*) in setting forth their views [on these matters].⁴⁴ Some have chosen to accept

³⁸ See *Maqālāt*, 34, where this view is attributed to certain Rāfiḍites.

³⁹ See *Talbīs*, 86, where many of the same views are reported, though in *Talbīs* they are associated with the Imāmī theologian Hishām b. al-Ḥakam. On the latter see Ashʿarī, *Maqālāt*, esp., 32-33, but also 207, 210-211 and 521; Shahrastānī, *Milal*, I, 399; and Baghdādī, *Farq*, 65. For more on Hishām, see Watt, *Formative Period*, 186-189; the valuable article by Madelung in *EP*, III, 496-498; and esp. van Ess, *Theologie und Gesellschaft im 2. und 3. Jahrhundert Hidschra*, I, 349-379.

⁴⁰ Cf., *Talbīs*, 86, 22-23, where the same belief is mentioned; neither in *KAS* nor in *Talbīs* does he identify those who championed this belief.

⁴¹ Experts in the religious sciences, especially *fiqh*, *ḥadīth*, and *tafsīr*, along with certain ancillary sciences such as Arabic grammar, lexicography, etc.

⁴² This paragraph which, in some respects, disrupts the flow of the argument in this section of *KAS*, appears to have been inserted here (by Ibn al-Jawzī) to provide a justification for mentioning beliefs (such as those referred to in the preceding paragraph), which some were certain to find objectionable. For Ibn al-Jawzī too, the less said about such views the better, for the mere mention of such might encourage some to delve into them and perhaps be influenced by them. However, once such views have been aired, ignoring them is no longer an option; they must be identified and rebutted, even if that means airing them again. It is a question of the lesser of two evils.

⁴³ Also see §§29, 30, 32 and 36, where the expression *aṣḥābunā* appears. In three of these occurrences (§§29, 30 and 36), the term is explicitly linked to the Ḥanbalī school. Though the term's referent in the other two occurrences (§§8 and 32) is not quite as clear, the context does support its identification with Ḥanbalīs.

⁴⁴ Here Ibn al-Jawzī is alluding to the views of certain Ḥanbalīs—views which he regarded as anthropomorphist and which will form the central concern of *KAS*. In Ibn

blindly what they have received under scrutiny (*naẓar*).⁴⁵ Now c traditions [and attributed shame on the experts in comment: "So this is w Muḥammad b. Shujāʿ al- [claimed to have] received that includes Ḥammād b.

al-Jawzī's view, such conception the previous paragraph.

⁴⁵ For a fuller discussion of t

⁴⁶ Or perhaps: "Is this what t

⁴⁷ Abū ʿAbd Allāh Muḥammad Hanafite jurist of Baghdad w al-Luʿluʾī (d. 204/819), a stud evolution of the Hanafī school of Law [Leiden 1997], 51-52, al association with Bishr al-Marī question of the Quran (refusing ghayr makhliq [cf., *Fihrist*, 20 addition to his work as a jurist both as a student and a trans received a good deal of critica orientation. In addition to the Bayhaqī, *Kitāb al-Asmāʾ*, 372-3 105-106, 348-9; Ibn Ḥajar, *Tal a generally sympathetic assessm fi Tabaqāt al-Ḥanafīya* (Baghda works, among them a critique o which, however, is no longer ext notices on him, see *GAS*, I, 436.

⁴⁸ Ḥibbān b. Hilāl Abū Ḥabīb reportedly abandoned the study had become disillusioned with Basrans who claimed the mantle Ibn Kathīr, *Bidāya* (Beirut, 1985

⁴⁹ Ḥammād b. Salama b. D traditionist from Basra who died a transmitter of *ḥadīth*, although about certain of the traditions t included some of Ḥammād's tradi

blindly what they have received from their teachers without giving it sufficient scrutiny (*naẓar*).⁴⁵ Now certain unprincipled individuals have fabricated traditions [and attributed them to reliable traditionists] in order to bring shame on the experts in this science so that some might be prompted to comment: "So this is what they believe!"⁴⁶ One such [fabricator] was Muḥammad b. Shujā' al-Balkhī⁴⁷ who transmitted a tradition, which he [claimed to have] received from Ḥibbān b. Hilāl⁴⁸ in a chain of authorities that includes Ḥammād b. Salama,⁴⁹ Abū'l-Muhazzim⁵⁰ and Abū Hurayra

al-Jawzī's view, such conceptions of deity belong to the same class as those mentioned in the previous paragraph.

⁴⁵ For a fuller discussion of the problem of *taqlīd*, see §§18-21.

⁴⁶ Or perhaps: "Is this what they really believe?"

⁴⁷ Abū 'Abd Allāh Muḥammad b. Shujā' al-Balkhī ath-Thaljī (d. 266/880), a respected Ḥanafite jurist of Baghdad who received his education in law under Ḥasan b. Ziyād al-Lu'lu'ī (d. 204/819), a student of Abū Ḥanīfa (for more on his contributions to the evolution of the Ḥanafī school of law, see Melchert, *The Formation of the Sunni Schools of Law* [Leiden 1997], 51-52, also 9, n. 41). Despite his Mu'tazilī sympathies and his close association with Bishr al-Marīsī, Ibn Shujā' is said to have sided with the *wāqifa* on the question of the Quran (refusing to declare himself on the matter of whether it is *makhḷūq* or *ghayr makhḷūq* [cf., *Fihrist*, 206; *Maqālāt*, 583; and Watt, *Formative Period*, 203]). In addition to his work as a jurist and a theologian, he was also active in the field of *ḥadīth*, both as a student and a transmitter in his own right. It was in this area that his work received a good deal of critical comment, particularly from scholars of a traditionalist orientation. In addition to the judgments cited above in the text of our work, see also Bayhaqī, *Kitāb al-Asmā'*, 372-374; *Ta'rīkh Baghdād*, V, 350-352; *Kitāb al-Mawḍū'āt*, I, 105-106, 348-9; Ibn Ḥajar, *Tahdhīb*, IX, 220-221; and Dhahabī, *Mizān*, III, 577-579. For a generally sympathetic assessment of Ibn Shujā', see esp., Ibn Qutlūbughā, *Tāj at-Tarājīm fī Ṭabaqāt al-Ḥanafīya* (Baghdad, 1962), 55-56. Ibn Shujā' was the author of a number of works, among them a critique of anthropomorphism (*Kitāb ar-Radd 'alā al-Mushabbīha*), which, however, is no longer extant. For a list of his works as well as additional biographical notices on him, see GAS, I, 436.

⁴⁸ Ḥibbān b. Hilāl Abū Ḥabīb al-Bāhilī (d. 216/831), a respected Basran traditionist who reportedly abandoned the study of *ḥadīth* toward the end of his life apparently because he had become disillusioned with the loose and undisciplined habits of many of his fellow Basrans who claimed the mantle of *muḥaddith* (Ibn Sa'd, VII, 299; *Shadharāt*, II, 36; and Ibn Kathīr, *Bidāya* [Beirut, 1985-88], 283).

⁴⁹ Ḥammād b. Salama b. Dīnār Abū Salama, a *mawlā* of the Banū Tamīm and a traditionist from Basra who died in 167/783. He was generally considered to be reliable as a transmitter of *ḥadīth*, although there were some (including Ibn al-Jawzī) who had doubts about certain of the traditions transmitted in his name. Dhahabī notes that while Muslim included some of Ḥammād's traditions in his *Ṣaḥīḥ*, Bukhārī carefully avoided them (Dhahabī,

respectively, in which it was reported that the Prophet was once asked: "O Messenger of God, of what does your Lord consist?" He replied: "From water that flows copiously⁵¹ [God] created a horse (*khayl*) and caused it to run so that it perspired whereupon he created His *nafs*⁵² from the perspiration."⁵³ Abū Aḥmad b. ʿAdī⁵⁴ maintained that Muḥammad b. Shujāʿ was a

Mizān, I, 594). For more on Ḥammād, see §§77 and 150 (*KAS*), including the notes to §150.

⁵⁰ Abū'l-Muhazzim (Muhazzam in some sources) Yazīd b. Sufyān (according to some ʿAbd ar-Raḥmān b. Sufyān), a disciple of Abū Hurayra, who later settled in Basra where he died, sometime after 700. Despite his association with Abū Hurayra, his reliability as a transmitter was frequently the subject of heated debate among traditionists. For a summary of these judgments, see esp., Ibn Saʿd, VII, 238; Ibn al-Jawzī, *Kitāb aḍ-Ḍuʿafāʾ wa'l-Matrūkīn*, III, 209; Dhahabī, *Mizān*, IV, 426; and Bayhaqī, *Kitāb al-Asmāʾ*, 373-374.

⁵¹ *min māʾin min darrin* or perhaps *min māʾi man darra* (from the water of him who runs swiftly...), though this latter reading fits less easily into the syntactical structure of the sentence. The linking of water, horse, perspiration and soul in this tradition is striking, and may indicate that we have here the reflection of a cosmogonic (or "theogonic") mythical pattern with quite possibly ancient (perhaps Indo-European) roots. Cf., Gimaret, *Images*, 32.

⁵² Dhahabī states that this tradition was fabricated by the Jahmīya in order to buttress their view that the word (*kalām*) of God is created (*muḥdath*). According to him, the Jahmīya reasoned that if God's *nafs* is a created entity (*muḥdatha*) in Him, even more should God's *kalām* be regarded as something created in Him and by Him. Thus, in the Jahmī view as presented by Dhahabī, one should understand expressions such as *nafs Allāh* and *kalām Allāh* as analogous to the Quranic expression *bayt Allāh* (Dhahabī, *Mizān*, III, 359). For an illuminating discussion of the Jahmī view on the divine attributes, see R.M. Frank, "The Neoplatonism of Ḡahm ibn Ṣafwān," *Muséon*, 78 (1965), 395-424. On the term *nafs* and its interpretation in medieval Islam, see *EI*², VII, 880-884.

⁵³ Cf., J. Burton, *An Introduction to the Ḥadīth*, 121. For other versions of this tradition, see Ibn Fūrak, *Mushkil*, 350; Bayhaqī, *Kitāb al-Asmāʾ*, 372-373; Ibn Qutayba, *Taʾwīl Mukhtalif al-Ḥadīth*, 7 and note 3 (cf., Lecomte, 6 and note 1); *Kitāb al-Mawḍūʿāt*, I, 105; and Dhahabī, *Mizān*, III, 579. Although Ibn al-Jawzī rejected this tradition on the grounds that both its *isnād* and *matn* are defective, he argues in his *Kitāb al-Mawḍūʿāt* (I, 106) and elsewhere that a tradition may be disqualified solely on the basis of a defective *matn*. He puts it thus: "In a tradition of this sort, one should not assign undue value to the *isnād*, for an absurd text (*mustaḥīl*), even if it comes from reliable transmitters, is to be rejected and ascribed to an error on their part. It is obvious that if a group of reliable transmitters were in agreement on the merits of a certain text and reported, e.g., that a camel passed through the eye of a needle, their reputation as reliable transmitters should not influence one's judgment regarding the merits of the text, for they reported what is clearly impossible." And he follows with what, for him, is a fundamental principle: "Any tradition whose *matn* contravenes the canons of reason (*maʿqūl*) or is in conflict with the canonical sources (*uṣūl*) is a

zealot (*mutaʿassib*) who falsifies the tradition which he then attributed to the Prophet (yathlibuhum bihā).⁵⁵ Am b. Ḥanbal⁵⁶ insisted that Abū'l-Qawāriri⁵⁷ went so far as to claim that Abū'l-Muhazzim of being

9 God, may He be praised, is similar to each other (*tatawaw*) and are subject to change (*taghayyru*) and are capable of receiving their origination in time (attribute of [eternal] pre-existence is eternal (*qadīm*) cannot be noted that atoms (*jawāhīr*) (*basāʾit*)⁵⁸ and those that are atoms (*basāʾit*) being entities

fabrication (*mawḍūʿ*), and it is in *al-Mawḍūʿāt*, I, 106).

⁵⁴ Abū Aḥmad ʿAbd Allāh b. ʿAdī, the author of *al-Kāmil fī Maʾrifat al-Ḥadīth*, source of the above quote (cf., Lecomte, on Ibn ʿAdī and his writings in *op. cit.*).

⁵⁵ For alternative readings, see *op. cit.*

⁵⁶ Abū ʿAbd Allāh Aḥmad b. Ḥanbalī school of law and theology, teaching see *GAS*, I, 502-509; and *op. cit.*

⁵⁷ Abū Saʿīd ʿUbayd Allāh b. ʿUbayd, leading *muhaddith* of Basra (cf., *op. cit.*), he eventually settled, he won the throne Aḥmad b. Ḥanbal and Yahyā 320-323; *Shadharāt*, II, 85 (where X, 286, 328).

⁵⁸ The difference between *basāʾit* (from all else) is that the *basāʾit* atoms to which something has been accidents (*ʿarāḍ*) which they have. For more on the *basāʾit*, see *op. cit.* 1083-1084.

zealot (*mutaʿaṣṣib*) who fabricated traditions of an anthropomorphic character which he then attributed to reliable traditionists thereby discrediting them (*yathlibuhum bihā*).⁵⁵ Among such traditions is the one cited above. Aḥmad b. Ḥanbal⁵⁶ insisted that [Ibn Shujāʿ] was an innovator and a heretic. Indeed, al-Qawāriri⁵⁷ went so far as to accuse him of being an infidel (*kāfir*) and Abū'l-Muhazzim of being entirely unreliable in matters of tradition.

9 God, may He be praised, is not an atom (*jawhar*), for [all] atoms are similar to each other (*tatamāthal*) and occupy space (*tataḥayyaz*). They are subject to change (*taghayyur*), admit of being joined to each other (*tarkīb*) and are capable of receiving accidents (*ʿrāḍ*), all of which is evidence of their origination in time (*ḥadath*). The Creator, however, possesses the attribute of [eternal] pre-existence (*qidam*). What is predicated of one who is eternal (*qadīm*) cannot be ascribed to any other than Him. It should be noted that atoms (*jawāhir*) fall into two classes: those that exist singly (*basāʾit*)⁵⁸ and those that are joined to other atoms (*murakkabāt*). Single atoms (*basāʾit*) being entities whose coming into existence (*ḥuṣūl*) does not

fabrication (*mawḍūʿ*), and it is not necessary to give it any further consideration" (*Kitāb al-Mawḍūʿāt*, I, 106).

⁵⁴ Abū Aḥmad ʿAbd Allāh b. ʿAdī b. ʿAbd Allāh b. Muḥammad al-Jurjānī (d. 365/976), the author of *al-Kāmil fī Maʿrifat aḍ-Ḍuʿafāʾ wa'l-Matrūkīn*, which appears to be the source of the above quote (cf., Goldziher, *Muhammedanische Studien*, II, 142). For more on Ibn ʿAdī and his writings in the field of *ḥadīth* criticism, see GAS, I, 198-199.

⁵⁵ For alternative readings, see the notes to the Arabic text.

⁵⁶ Abū ʿAbd Allāh Aḥmad b. Muḥammad b. Ḥanbal (d. 241/855), eponym of the Ḥanbalī school of law and theology. For a general survey of the sources of his life and teaching see GAS, I, 502-509; and the excellent article by H. Laoust, *EF*, I, 272-277.

⁵⁷ Abū Saʿīd ʿUbayd Allāh b. ʿUmar b. Maysara al-Qawāriri al-Jushamī (d. 235/849), a leading *muḥaddith* of Basra (cf., *Taʾrīkh Baghdād*, X, 321-322). In Baghdad also, where he eventually settled, he won the respect of some of the leading scholars in the field, among them Aḥmad b. Ḥanbal and Yaḥyā b. Maʿīn. For more on his life, see *Taʾrīkh Baghdād*, X, 320-323; *Shadharāt*, II, 85 (where his *ism* is given as ʿAbd Allāh); and Ibn Kathīr, *Bidāya*, X, 286, 328.

⁵⁸ The difference between *basāʾit* and the single atom in its simplest form (i.e., abstracted from all else) is that the *basāʾit* are atoms that possess certain accidents. That is, they are atoms to which something has been added. They are not *murakkabāt*, however, because the accidents (*ʿrāḍ*) which they have received are not "entities" or "things" in and of themselves. For more on the *basāʾit*, see the article by F. Rahman "Basīṭ wa Murakkab," *EF*, I, 1083-1084.

depend on pre-existing atoms, include the primal elements (*uṣṭuquṣṣāt*):⁵⁹ water, earth, air and fire. Composite entities (*murakkabāt*),⁶⁰ on the other hand, are those whose origination [fol.3b] is dependent on [the joining of two or more] atoms, as is [the case of] animals and plants, for example. The origination [of composite entities as composite entities] thus depends on other things that are temporally prior (*awṣīl*).⁶¹ Those things which cannot come into existence apart from the existence of other things cannot precede the latter in time, and so the prior existence of the former is impossible. Thus the contingency (*ḥudūth*) of composite substances is established; moreover, the simple entities which precede composite substances cannot be eternal since everything that pertains to them cannot [be eternal]: they admit of being changed from one state to another whose nature is entirely different. Thus, for example, when heat is applied to water it becomes steam and the steam, in turn, changes to air. The eternal, however, is not subject to change.

10 We do not grant the possibility of two [deities] existing simultaneously, for if they [were to will things that] are in conflict with each other the one unable to realize the object of his will would be deficient in power.⁶²

⁵⁹ The term, which appears in medieval Arabic in a variety of spellings (cf., *Muḥīṭ al-Muḥīṭ*, I, 23; also Dozy, I, 22), derives from the Greek *stoicheion* (elements) via the Syriac *estuṣā* (cf., Daiber, *Aetius Arabus. Die Vorsokratiker in arabischer Überlieferung* [Wiesbaden: Steiner, 1980], 18). The word *uṣṭuquṣṣāt* was adopted as a technical term in several scientific disciplines, especially medicine (cf., M. Ullmann, *Islamic Medicine*, 56-57) and grammar, where the term was gradually replaced by the term *ḥarf* (*ḥurūf*), meaning element in the sense of particle or letter (cf. Versteegh, *Greek Elements in Arabic Linguistic Thinking*, 46-47 and n. 69).

⁶⁰ That is, atoms joined to each other or what, in other contexts, Ibn al-Jawzī calls bodies (*ajsām*).

⁶¹ That is, simple, unjoined atoms.

⁶² An abridged and highly simplified form of the argument from *tamānuʿ* (mutual interference or hindrance), one of the proofs in medieval *kalām* used to demonstrate the unity of God. In the argument as presented here, the one deficient in power obviously cannot be a deity; and so only one (the one here assumed to possess the power to realize what he wills) can be God. For a more elaborate presentation of the argument, see Ashʿarī's *Lumaʿ* in *The Theology of al-Ashʿarī* edited by R. McCarthy (Beirut 1953), §88; and Ibn Taymīya, *Minhāj*, I, 438-441; for other appeals to the argument, see ʿAbd al-Jabbār, *Sharḥ al-Uṣūl*, 278, 283; al-Juwaynī, *Irshād*, 53-54, 57; Baghdādī, *Uṣūl*, 85; Shahrastānī, *Nihāyat al-Iqdām* (ed. Guillaume 1934), 91-92; and al-Ījī, *Mawāqif*, VIII, 42; The argument from mutual interference had a long history going back to the Greeks (see Davidson, *Proofs*,

11 The divine attributes of a peremptory nature (Book of God and those E through multiple chains whose transmission the Co regard to what is false (*kā* consensus (*ijmāʿ*) of the Co nature, viz., the evidence of against the possibility [of [ascribe to] Him.

12 Knowledge (*ʿulūm*) ma these is knowledge about v consists of two types. The f (*badihat al-ʿaql*) and is sel than one, and that a single the same time. The second through reason although, i one of two means. The first (*darūriya*), as in the case of (*mutaʿābiba*) in which certa each other.⁶⁴ Thus, in the necessarily to posit a build (*muharrik*).⁶⁵ Knowledge c

166-167, 407-409); for medieva clearly the Quran, esp., S. 21:2 (earth) other than God, [the hear 91.

⁶³ For a summary of medieval *Triumphans* (Leiden: E. J. Brill,

⁶⁴ Cf., Frank, *al-Ghazālī and*

⁶⁵ Cf., Ibn al-Jawzī's *Alḥikām* judgment is that the link betwe (mawṣūf) is rendered necessary by (as, for examples, that two is m inferential reason in which the b

11 The divine attributes (*ṣifāt*) we establish only on the basis of evidence of a peremptory nature (*dalīl maqṭūʿ bihi*), that is, [the evidence of] the Book of God and those Prophetic Traditions that have come down to us through multiple chains of authority (*ḥadīth mutawātir*) on the basis of whose transmission the Community (*al-jamāʿa*)—one which cannot agree in regard to what is false (*kidhb*)—has established a consensus. Moreover, the consensus (*ijmāʿ*) of the Community too is based on evidence of a peremptory nature, viz., the evidence of reason (*dalīl al-ʿaql*), for [reason] is a safeguard against the possibility [of ascribing to] the Creator what is not possible to [ascribe to] Him.

Categories of Knowledge

12 Knowledge (*ʿulūm*) may be divided into three categories.⁶³ The first of these is knowledge about which there can be no doubt (*ʿulūm qaṭʿīa*), and it consists of two types. The first pertains to what is given to reason immediately (*badīhat al-ʿaql*) and is self-evident, such as, for example, that two is more than one, and that a single object cannot be present in two places at one and the same time. The second type also belongs to the class of things known through reason although, in this case, reason must have recourse to either one of two means. The first of these may be called necessary means (*wasāʾit ḍarūrīya*), as in the case of knowledge based on correspondences (*maʿlūmāt mutaṭābiqa*) in which certain things are seen as being necessarily linked to each other.⁶⁴ Thus, in the case of a building, for example, one is led necessarily to posit a builder or, in the case of movement (*ḥaraka*), a mover (*muḥarrik*).⁶⁵ Knowledge of this sort shares certain features with the first

166-167, 407-409); for medieval Muslim theologians, however, the immediate source was clearly the Quran, esp., S. 21:22 ("If there were gods in them (i.e., the heavens and the earth) other than God, [the heavens and the earth] would fall into ruin"). Cf., also, S. 23: 91.

⁶³ For a summary of medieval theories of knowledge (*ʿilm*), see F. Rosenthal, *Knowledge Triumphant* (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1970), esp., ch. 4.

⁶⁴ Cf., Frank, *al-Ghazālī and the Ashʿarite School*, 10 and nn. 6-7 (105-106).

⁶⁵ Cf., Ibn al-Jawzī's *Aḥkām an-Nisāʾ*, 6. What distinguishes this from the first type of judgment is that the link between the two things (building and builder, movement and mover) is rendered necessary by experience, not by something that is intrinsic to reason (as, for examples, that two is more than one). This experienced-based reason is a kind of inferential reason in which the building or the movement are taken as "signs" that point to a

category of knowledge in that it concerns what is necessarily true. The second type is arrived at through inferential means (*wasā'it istidlāliya*). Thus, for example, we say that atoms are contingent (*muḥdatha*), since they are incapable of [fol.4a] generating themselves...or facsimiles of themselves, and so we infer that they are dependent on an agent who belongs to another order of being (*min ḡhayr jinsihā*), namely, a deity who is eternal.

13 The second category of knowledge is that acquired by the five senses, viz., hearing, seeing, smelling, tasting and touching.⁶⁶

14 The third category of knowledge (*ʿilm*) is that based upon reports, of which there are two classes. The first of these includes those reports that have been transmitted by numerous individuals (*tawātur*) who [on account of their number] could not have colluded in the transmission of something erroneous,⁶⁷ including such things as the Community's transmission of the Quran and the five daily prayers or reports of such things as the fact that there is a city called Mecca.⁶⁸ The second class consists of *āḥād* or "isolated"

builder or a mover. The Stoics called them commemorative signs (in contrast to indicative signs) because they presuppose past experience, without which the necessary connection could hardly have been perceived as necessary. For more on these distinctions, see van Ess, "The Logical Structure of Islamic Theology," 33.

⁶⁶ As will be seen later in this work, Ibn al-Jawzī has very little confidence that knowledge arising out of sense experience can contribute to an understanding of the nature of deity.

⁶⁷ Cf., §11 where much the same language is used. Knowledge based on *tawātur* reports is certain knowledge precisely because it has been transmitted by a sufficiently large number of persons so as to rule out the possibility of collaborative fabrication. The number required to meet this condition varied from forty to seventy-two, depending on the theorist in question, although some (like al-Ghazzālī) categorically rejected any attempt to fix the number and held that it is known only to God. This condition of numerical sufficiency must apply to every point in the process of transmission between the original eye-witness of the event and the latest recipient of the report. According to al-Ghazzālī, who appears to represent the mainline view, every statement which meets these conditions will produce in the mind of its hearer a knowledge of its truth—a knowledge which is tantamount to a knowledge of the event itself with which the report is concerned. This is an historical knowledge, not a knowledge based either on sense experience or on discursive reason. For more on the concept of *tawātur*, see the excellent study by B. Weiss "Knowledge of the Past: the Theory of *Tawātur* according to al-Ghazzālī," *SI*, 61(1985), 81-105; cf., also his "Language and Tradition in Medieval Islam: the Question of *al-Ṭarīq ilā Maʿrifat al-Luḡha*," *Der Islam*, 61 (1984), 91-99.

⁶⁸ Cf., S. van den Bergh, *Averroes' Tahafut al-Tahafut* (London 1969), II, 16, where this line of reasoning, with virtually identical examples, is traced back to Galen and the

reports which are distinguished by a relatively small number of transmitters into two sub-classes. The first class, which has been widely accepted because it rests on highly probable and so far as is known being cognizant of their probability, is elevated to the status of positive evidence, however. Thus, the basis of such reports is of the same kind of compelling evidence as the divine essence (*dhāt*). It is on the basis of these reports that the people are given the excuse to say that the basis of peremptory evidence is highly probable evidence (*dalil ḡalib*) on their eternal character. The second [category of evidence] by appealing to the

Greek empiricist tradition (cf., V. J. van der Meer, [Leiden 1977], 90ff., where the question of its place in medieval Islam is discussed) as an interesting example of the medieval Muslim knowledge of the world, both positive and negative, one can have a certain knowledge of the world, one can have knowledge of events.

⁶⁹ Since *āḥād* reports are those which are no more than one in a given genre, they are falsifiable unless it can be established that the transmitters were credible, honest persons known to the critical analysis of *ḥadīths* genre. This is generally regarded, even in the most favorable view, as insufficient. While probability was sufficient for the purpose, see art. "Khabar al-Wāḥid" by Juynboll. This generally accepted in medieval Islam was not confined to al-Anbārī, the 12th century scholar. See discussion of the distinction between *ḥadīth* and *ḥikma* by Weiss, "Language and Tradition in Medieval Islam: the Question of *al-Ṭarīq ilā Maʿrifat al-Luḡha*," *Der Islam*, 61(1984), 91-99. al-Bughdādī, who insisted on a distinction between *ḥadīth* and *ḥikma*, the latter occupying a position of reports (cf., *Uṣūl ad-Dīn*, 12).

reports which are distinguished by the fact that they were passed on by a relatively small number of transmitters.⁶⁹ Isolated reports, in turn, fall into two sub-classes. The first consists of those reports which the Community has accepted because it regards the reliability of their transmission as being highly probable and so has agreed to base legal rulings on them though being cognizant of their probable character. That such reports should be elevated to the status of peremptory evidence (*maqām al-qaṭʿ*) is out of the question, however. Thus, the predication of the divine attributes on the basis of such reports is objectionable, for the attributes must rest on the same kind of compelling evidence (*dalīl qaṭʿī*) that is used to establish the divine essence (*dhāt*). It is not permissible to differentiate between the attributes on the basis of the evidence on which they rest—thus giving some people the excuse to say that certain of the attributes are established on the basis of peremptory evidence (*dalīl maqtūʿ bihi*) and some on the basis of probable evidence (*dalīl ḡannī*)—because they are all equal by virtue of their eternal character. Thus they should not be established on [probable evidence] by appealing to the divine sayings: “I am present in my servant’s

Greek empiricist tradition (cf., Versteegh, *Greek Elements in Arabic Linguistic Thinking* [Leiden 1977], 90ff., where the influence of the empiricist tradition on various disciplines in medieval Islam is discussed at some length). For Ibn al-Jawzī, geographical reports are an interesting example of the *mutawātir* report and demonstrate the possibility of a genuine knowledge of the world, both present and past, based on transmitted information. Just as one can have a certain knowledge of the existence of other places—even distant ones—so one can have knowledge of events located in the past, even the distant past.

⁶⁹ Since *āḥād* reports are those handed down by relatively few transmitters (generally no more than one in a given generation), it is necessary to admit the possibility of error or falsification unless it can be established (in the case of individual reports) that the transmitters were credible, honest persons known for their piety. Specialists in *jarḥ wa taʿdīl* (the critical analysis of *ḥadīths*) generally acknowledged that *āḥād* traditions could never be regarded, even in the most favorable circumstances, as more than probably true (*maẓnūn*). While probability was sufficient in Ibn al-Jawzī’s view to establish a point of law (see the art. “*Khabar al-Wāḥid*” by Juynboll in *EI*², IV, 896), it was not adequate to establish a divine attribute. This generally accepted classification of reports into *tawātur* and *āḥād* in medieval Islam was not confined to traditionists. It was widely used by grammarians (e.g., Ibn al-Anbārī, the 12th century grammarian) as well as by jurists and theologians. For a discussion of the distinction between *tawātur* and *āḥād* traditions and its implications, see Weiss, “Language and Tradition in Medieval Islam: the Question of *al-Ṭarīq ilā Maʿrifat al-Lughā*,” *Der Islam*, 61(1984), 91-99. Cf., also *EI*², III, 25. There were those, like al-Baghdādī, who insisted on a threefold classification of reports into *tawātur*, *āḥād* and *mutawassīṭ*, the latter occupying an intermediate position between the *tawātur* and the *āḥād* reports (cf., *Uṣūl ad-Dīn*, 12).

supposition (*ẓann*) of Me," and "I am the Associate most free of association (*shirk*)"⁷⁰ as though these texts were on a par with the Quran itself, for the channels of transmission (*ṭarīq*) [of *āḥād* reports] are simply not equal to those of the Quran.⁷¹ Abū 'Abd Allāh b. Ḥāmid al-Warrāq⁷² and some of his

⁷⁰ Divine sayings (*ḥadīth qudsī*) apparently used by some in Ibn al-Jawzī's day to justify the use of *āḥād* reports (i.e., presumptive evidence) as a basis for affirming certain of the divine attributes. The first saying is to be found in the following collections among others: Bukhārī, 97: 15(3) (cf., Houdas, *Les traditions*, IV, 588[3]); Muslim, 49 (*tawba*):1; 48 (*dhikr wa du'ā'*): 2 (1, 2), 19, 20 (1, 2); Ibn Māja, 33 (*adab*): 58; Tirmidhī, 34 (*zuhd*): 51; 45 (*da'awāt*): 131; *Musnad*, II, 315, 391, 413; al-Munāwī, *al-Iḥāfāt as-Saniya bi'l-Āḥādīth al-Qudsīya*, ed. Zī'bī (Beirut, w.d.), 37-40; etc. For a complete list of the occurrences, see Wensinck's *Concordance*, s.v., *ẓann*; also W. Graham, *Divine Word*, 127-128. The second saying is also found in a number of *ḥadīth* collections, among them: Muslim, 53 (*zuhd*): 46; Ibn Māja, 37 (*zuhd*): 21(1,2); *Musnad*, III, 446, IV, 215 (cf. II, 301); al-Munāwī, *Iḥāfāt*, 34; and Graham, *Divine Word*, 125-126.

⁷¹ Since this divine saying belongs to the class of *āḥād* traditions, it does not have the authority of a text from the Quran which belongs to the class of *mutawātir* reports.

⁷² Al-Ḥasan b. Ḥāmid b. 'Alī b. Marwān Abū 'Abd Allāh al-Warrāq who died in 403/1013 at Wāqīša (the victim of a Bedouin attack), on his return to Baghdad from the *Ḥajj*. A traditionist, jurist, theologian and ascetic, Ibn Ḥāmid was undoubtedly one of the most influential figures within the Ḥanbalī school of Baghdad during the first half of the Būyid period. He left behind a number of works in *ḥadīth*, *fiqh*, *uṣūl al-fiqh*, and *uṣūl ad-dīn*, though apparently only one of these, his *Kitāb Tahdhīb al-Ajwiba*, has survived (cf. GAS, I, 515). The work for which he was best known, his *al-Jāmi' fi Ikhtilāf al-Fuqahā'*, aimed at reconciling divergent tendencies within Ḥanbalī *fiqh*. His *Sharḥ Uṣūl ad-Dīn* appears to have been his principle work in theology; it undoubtedly was a major influence on the thought of Abū Ya'la b. al-Farrā' (d. 458/1066), his leading student, and perhaps also on Ibn Zāghūnī (d. 527/1132). Although Ibn al-Jawzī does not mention the *Sharḥ* in *KAS*, it is quite possibly this work that is the source of his information on Ibn Ḥāmid's theological views. While Ibn al-Jawzī speaks highly of his writings in *fiqh* (cf., *Muntaẓam*, VII, 263-264), he was severely critical of Ibn Ḥāmid's approach to theological and hermeneutic questions, especially his literalism and the anthropomorphic character of his theological views. It is evident from the many references to him in *KAS* (cf. §§30, 33, 36, 37, 39, 40, 48, 52, 56, 61, 64, 76, 135, 151, 177, 186, 188, and 244) that Ibn al-Jawzī held him primarily responsible for introducing anthropomorphist conceptions of God into Ḥanbalism. Ibn Ḥāmid is the earliest example of anthropomorphism (*tajāsīm/tashbīh*) cited by Ibn al-Jawzī in the history of Ḥanbalism. The other Ḥanbalīs who receive the sharpest criticism in *KAS* (Abū Ya'la and Ibn Zāghūnī) were both spiritual and intellectual descendents of Ibn Ḥāmid. It is not surprising, therefore, that of these three Ḥanbalīs, Ibn Ḥāmid comes in for the sharpest criticism (cf., §§42, 46, 50, 54, 59, 62, etc.). Among the more important sources on Ibn Ḥāmid and his intellectual influence within the Ḥanbalī school, see *Ṭabaqāt al-Ḥanābila*, II, 171-177; *Ta'rīkh Baghdād*, VII, 303; *Shadharāt*, III, 166-67; *Bidāya*, XI,

associates⁷³ have assimilate regarding both as valid source distinction as a basis for est a grievous error, for what knowledge (*'ilm*) [sufficient astonishing that people ca [fol.4b] claim to have a kno (*uṣūl al-fiqh*).⁷⁵

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16 Many people search for they do not discover Him th that there are existents that c they would not have fallen soul (*rūḥ*) and reason (*'aql*

373; Shaṭṭī, *Mukhtaṣar*, 26; Ibn Ba sources, see GAS, I, 515; *EF*, III,

⁷³ It is impossible to identify group, but it certainly did include influential of Ibn Ḥāmid's student the school during much of the first

⁷⁴ According to Ibn al-Jawzī, the Ḥanbalī school made no real for establishing the divine attribut

⁷⁵ In addition to sources listed i of this paragraph, see Laoust, *Le t of *ṭawātir* (and its relationship to theory. For additional references p the article by Juynboll in *EF*, IV,*

⁷⁶ Perhaps simply by virtue of t transmitted by individuals of obvi

⁷⁷ In no case, however, may ā principle (*uṣūl al-fiqh*); their use is questions (*uṣūl ad-dīn*) such as the

associates⁷³ have assimilated this class of reports entirely to the first class,⁷⁴ regarding both as valid sources of knowledge (*ʿilm*) and using them without distinction as a basis for establishing the divine attributes. This, however, is a grievous error, for what it does is to make probability (*ẓann*), not sound knowledge (*ʿilm*) [sufficient for the establishment of the attributes]. It is astonishing that people can take such a position and at the same time [fol.4b] claim to have a knowledge of jurisprudence (*fiqh*) and its principles (*uṣūl al-fiqh*).⁷⁵

15 The second class of *āḥād* reports are those which the Community has refused to accept. These encourage⁷⁶ the use of supposition in matters relating to positive law, but it should not be extended beyond this.⁷⁷

[The Limits of Sense Perception]

16 Many people search for the Creator (*ṣāniʿ*) through the senses, and when they do not discover Him they are overtaken by doubt. Had they understood that there are existents that can be known without the aid of sense perception they would not have fallen prey to doubt. Among such [existents] are the soul (*rūḥ*) and reason (*ʿaql*), even though they are not perceived by the

373; Shaṭṭī, *Mukhtaṣar*, 26; Ibn Badrān, *Madkhal*, 206; and *al-Kāmil*, IX, 242. For additional sources, see GAS, I, 515; *EF*, III, 784 (Laoust), and Makdisi, *Ibn ʿAqīl*, 227-232.

⁷³ It is impossible to identify all the individuals whom Ibn al-Jawzī included in this group, but it certainly did include Abū Yaʿlā b. al-Farrāʾ (d. 458/1066), who was the most influential of Ibn Ḥāmid's students and certainly one of the most important figures within the school during much of the first half of the 11th century.

⁷⁴ According to Ibn al-Jawzī, Ibn Ḥāmid and his anthropomorphizing associates within the Ḥanbalī school made no real distinction between *āḥād* and *tawātur* reports as a basis for establishing the divine attributes.

⁷⁵ In addition to sources listed in the notes on *āḥād* and *tawātur* reports at the beginning of this paragraph, see Laoust, *Le traité de droit d'Ibn Taimīya*, 71, n. 62, where the concept of *tawātur* (and its relationship to *āḥād* reports) is discussed in relation to the field of legal theory. For additional references pertinent to the status of *āḥād* reports in legal matters, see the article by Juynboll in *EF*, IV, 896.

⁷⁶ Perhaps simply by virtue of the fact that such reports exist, having in some cases been transmitted by individuals of obviously good character.

⁷⁷ In no case, however, may *āḥād* reports be used when dealing with questions of legal principle (*uṣūl al-fiqh*); their use is even less justifiable in relation to fundamental theological questions (*uṣūl ad-dīn*) such as the divine attributes, as Ibn al-Jawzī has already noted.

senses, for the influence of the soul is evident in the body [of a living creature], and the influence of reason is apparent in its organization. So also the existence of the Creator may be inferred from His influence and His workmanship. Anyone who suppresses [knowledge of] the soul and who fails to report it betrays a lack of interest in intellectual reflection (*fikr*).

17 Those who fail to reflect on this evidence (*dalil*) fall into several classes. Among them are the *dahrīya*,⁷⁸ who deny the existence of a creator. A person who was sympathetic to this point of view once came to me and requested my help on account of the residue of faith (*li-baqīyat īmān*) that still lingered in his heart.⁷⁹ I said to him: "Summon your heart (*qalb*) and call upon your powers of reason! Neither the inanimate thing nor even the rational creature (*nāṭiq*) is able to generate itself (*yaṣnaʿu nafsahu*). Thus, when you hear people saying that something is the work of nature (*ṭabīʿa*) point out to them, first of all, that what they refer to [as nature] is in fact the Creator, and it is merely in their designation of Him as nature that they err, and, secondly, that nature is not a living thing, nor does it possess the power to know (*ʿālima*) what it is that defines human well-being (*maṣāliḥ*). To the extent that [nature] has been so inspired and given the power to act, the One who [inspired it and] endowed it with that power (*quwwa*) is God. If [nature] is not cognizant of what it does, the one who perfected it must be someone other than [nature] itself." [The *dahrī*] said to me: "The arguments of my opponent have convinced me." I replied: "Reflect on the evidence [pointing to the existence of a creator] and then act with prudence (*aḥwaṭ*)."
[fol.5a] Sages (*ḥukamāʾ*) [of old] have coined a striking parable (*mathal*) in which they said: "We arranged the prophets by rank and we arranged the *dahrīya*⁸⁰ by rank."⁸¹ And we said to the *dahrīya*: 'What is your view of the

⁷⁸ The *dahrīya* generally adhered to what might be called a materialistic world view. They denied the existence of a creator, insisted on the eternity of the world, and maintained that knowledge is limited to what is available to the senses. It is this last point that makes them relevant to this section of KAS. For a more detailed account of the *dahrīya*, see the substantial article in *EL*, II, 95-97. See also *Atheismus im Mittelalter und in der Renaissance*, edited by Fr. Niewöhner and O. Pluta (Wiesbaden 1999 [= *Wolfenbütteler Mittelalter-Studien*, 12]), especially the contributions by H. Daiber, 23-44; and Badran, 61-84. Cf., also see *Talbīs*, 41-42, where Ibn al-Jawzī deals with some of the issues posed by the *dahrīya*.

⁷⁹ It might perhaps be rendered: requested my help in rescuing (restoring) his faith.

⁸⁰ Materialists.

⁸¹ I have not been able so far to locate this saying in other medieval Arabic sources. The text as it appears in KAS may be an abridgment of a longer text. If this is the case, it would

prophets?' They replied: 'The persons endowed with wisdom concerning the hereafter is given only to instill fear in the heart. The enjoyment of the present life has consequences for me if I do not. 'No, but you will waste your time in punishment or reward [in the afterlife]. The prophets: 'What do you say? Those who follow our teachings will be rewarded. 'He responded: "Following [the teachings] of one's soul even if there is no reward. But what if the evidence in the heart itself? It is to this that the po

The astrologer and the p

'The dead will not be

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help to explain some of the difficul

⁸² Who is represented by the first person in the text to indicate the identity of the speaker that follow the speaker interrogates. It is likely that what we have here is a parable of persons who appear in the parable.

⁸³ An early version of Pascal's w

⁸⁴ The author of the lines that follow (449/1057), whom, in other contexts, e.g., KAS, §29; and esp., *Muntaḥan al-ʿUlūm*, cited here without attribution.

⁸⁵ For the complete Arabic text of the lines and R. A. Nicholson, *Studies in Islamic Mysticism*, translations of these lines and comments by J. Laoust, "La vie et la philosophie d'Ibn al-Jawzī".

prophets?' They replied: 'They are authors of legal codes (*nawāmīs*) and are persons endowed with wisdom (*ḥikma*). However, what they promise concerning the hereafter is groundless. They make promises and issue threats only to instill fear in the hearts of people and to convince them to postpone enjoyment of the present life.' I asked them if there would be any unfortunate consequences for me if I chose to follow the prophets,⁸² and they replied: 'No, but you will waste your time; and as to whether there will be a punishment or reward [in the hereafter], the answer is no.' Then I said to the prophets: 'What do you have to say?' They replied: 'Those who do not follow our teachings will suffer painful punishment in the hereafter.'" I responded: "Following [the prophets] is a better way of insuring the safety of one's soul even if there should be no evidence [to support their claims]."⁸³ But what if the evidence in support of their claims is brighter than the sun itself? It is to this that the poet makes reference when he says:⁸⁴

The astrologer and the physician both say:
 'The dead will not be raised.' I say to them:
 'Even if what you say is true, I have nothing to lose,
 But if I am right, the loss will be yours, not mine.'"⁸⁵

help to explain some of the difficulties presented by the text as it appears here in *KAS*.

⁸² Who is represented by the first person singular in this sentence? There is nothing in the text to indicate the identity of the speaker. It can hardly be Ibn al-Jawzī, for in the lines that follow the speaker interrogates the prophets. Perhaps it is one of the *ḥukamā'*. It seems likely that what we have here is an abridged version of a longer text in which the various persons who appear in the parable are identified.

⁸³ An early version of Pascal's wager?

⁸⁴ The author of the lines that follow is none other than Abū'l-ʿAlā al-Maʿarrī (d. 449/1057), whom, in other contexts, Ibn al-Jawzī condemns as a sceptic and a heretic (cf., e.g., *KAS*, §29; and esp., *Muntaẓam*, VIII, 184-188). This may be the reason these lines are cited here without attribution.

⁸⁵ For the complete Arabic text of the poem, see *Luzūmīyāt* (Cairo 1343/1924), II, 300; and R. A. Nicholson, *Studies in Islamic Poetry* (Cambridge 1921), 279, no. 282. For translations of these lines and commentary, see Nicholson, *Studies*, 185 (no. 282); and H. Laoust, "La vie et la philosophie d'Abū'l-ʿAlā al-Maʿarrī," *BEO*, 10 (1944-45), 149.

[Knowledge and the Authority of Tradition:
Ma'rifa versus Taqlid]

18 Among those [who fail to reflect on the evidence] are people who follow their experts and their ancestors blindly—a practice common among Jews and Christians, for example.⁸⁶ I once met a rabbi (*ʿālim al-Yahūd*) and I said to him: "If we were to meet Moses we would say to him: 'We (Muslims) believe in your prophethood and your Book, and we believe that God spoke to you directly. If someone were to believe in our Book and our Prophet but not in you [or your Book], his beliefs (*īmān*) would avail him

⁸⁶ In medieval Muslim discussions of *taqlid*, Jews and Christians are frequently cited as examples of people who blindly accept what they are taught by parents and religious authorities rather than investigate matters for themselves and form an independent judgment. Cf., e.g., Ghazzālī, *Tahāfut al-Falāsifa* (Cairo, 1958), 71. For other examples, see Lazarus-Yafeh, "Taqlid in the Writings of al-Ghazzālī," *Israel Oriental Studies*, I (1971), 250-251 (cf., *Talbīs*, 81). In contrast to al-Ghazzālī, who felt it was a waste of time to engage Jews and Christians in theological debates (cf., *Ibid*, 252, n. 10) because of their blind adherence to tradition, Ibn al-Jawzī did apparently invite such encounters if we are to judge from what follows. It is important to keep in mind, however, that the arguments against *taqlid* set forth in this and the following paragraphs are directed primarily against fellow Ḥanbalīs (cf., §37), not against Muslims of other schools, certainly not against Christians and Jews. In his *Talbīs*, 81-82, Ibn al-Jawzī characterizes *taqlid* as one of the more serious "delusions of the devil". He argues that even the *salaf* are not to be followed uncritically (81, line 9), and in support of his argument cites several Quranic references (in particular 43:22, and 37:98). Further, he argues, the practice of *ijtihād* is incumbent even on lay persons, but he does add a caveat: in matters of positive law (*ʿilm al-furūʿ*), lay persons and non-experts in general are excused from the practice of *ijtihād* because of the inherent complexity of positive law and the vast knowledge of textual sources required if it is to be practiced properly. In matters of belief (*ʿitiqād*), however, lay persons are expected to practice *ijtihād* (*Talbīs*, 82; also §20 below). Among the defenders of *taqlid* within the early Ḥanbalī school, perhaps the two most outspoken were ʿAbd al-Wahhāb al-Warrāq (*Ṭabaqāt al-Ḥanābila*, I, 210, 20ff.) and al-Barbahārī (*Ṭabaqāt al-Ḥanābila*, II, 29, 10; and 39, 1-5). For a fuller account of Ḥanbalī views on *taqlid*, see Makdisi, "Freedom in Islamic Jurisprudence: *Ijtihad*, *Taqlid*, and Academic Freedom," *La notion de liberté au Moyen Age: Islam, Byzance, Occident* (Paris 1985), 79-88. A brief but useful summary of Ashʿarite and Muʿtazilite views on *taqlid* is found in Baghdādī, *Uṣūl ad-Dīn*, 254-255. For an analysis and interpretation of selected Ashʿarite thinkers, among them al-Bāqillānī, al-Isfarāʿīnī, and al-Juwaynī, see R. M. Frank, "Knowledge and *Taqlid*: The Foundations of Religious Belief in Classical Ashʿarism," *JAOS*, 109 (1989), 37-62; cf., also his "al-Ghazzālī on *Taqlid*: Scholars, Theologians and Philosophers," *Zeitschrift für Geschichte der Arabisch-Islamischen Wissenschaften*, 7 (1991/92): 207-252. Ibn al-Jawzī, of course, was not the only Ḥanbalī to attack *taqlid*, as is clear from his comments in the following paragraphs.

nothing.'⁸⁷ Indeed, we are [one of the] elements of] your creed. Your admission, is that we do not observe the Sabbath observance properly (*al-furūʿ*) and that difference [in practice] does not render one liable to [punishment]. "By God, we do not demand [anything] required only of the Banī Mūsā, however, you and your community.""⁸⁸ To that he had no [response]."

19 [fol.5b] Uncritical imitation with the knowledge of God (*dalīl*) for this comes from the community (*naql*),⁸⁹ and from [the act of *taqlid* itself]. The subsequent verse: "You should know [the truth] following the following verse [where the fathers following a command] they are, in effect, condemning the subsequent verse, addressing if I were to bring you guidance. The clear implication is: 'The fathers?'"

20 As for the established [practice]

⁸⁷ I take this to be the end of the sentence referring to the referent of the second person.

⁸⁸ Apparently for the following (cf., *Talbīs*, 81, 12-14), they cite the principle (*uṣūl*) (cf., *Ṣayd al-Khāṭir* of Muḥammad.

⁸⁹ Cf., *Ṣayd al-Khāṭir* (Beirut) for beliefs and practices in the writing of Muḥammad.

⁹⁰ See §20 where the term *athar* is used.

⁹¹ S. 47:19. Here knowledge of the Quran is addressed, not just to an individual. Ibn al-Jawzī takes from the verse.

⁹² S. 43:23.

⁹³ S. 43:24.

nothing.⁸⁷ Indeed, we are in accord with you as regards [the essential elements of] your creed. Your principal complaint against us, by your own admission, is that we do not observe the Sabbath. Our contention is that Sabbath observance properly belongs to the sphere of positive law (*far' min al-furū'*) and that differences regarding the prescriptions of positive law do not render one liable to eternal punishment." The rabbi then said to me: "By God, we do not demand that you observe the Sabbath, for it is a duty required only of the Banū Isrā'īl." I replied: "I accept your statement; however, you and your coreligionists (still) run the risk of eternal punishment."⁸⁸ To that he had no reply.⁸⁹

19 [fol.5b] Uncritical imitation of others (*taqlīd*) in matters having to do with the knowledge of God (*ma'rifat Allāh*) is not permissible. The evidence (*dalīl*) for this comes from the Quran, the established teaching of the community (*naql*),⁹⁰ and from a consideration of what is implied (*ma'nā*) [in the act of *taqlīd* itself].—As for the evidence of the Quran, there is the verse: "You should *know* that there is no deity apart from God."⁹¹ In the following verse [where the *munāfiqūn* are quoted as saying]: "We found our fathers following a community (*umma*) and we follow in their footsteps,"⁹² they are, in effect, condemned for the blind imitation of their ancestors. [In the subsequent verse, addressed again to the *munāfiqūn*, God says:] "What if I were to bring you guidance better than you found your fathers following?"⁹³ The clear implication is: "Would you continue to follow [blindly] after them (the fathers)?"

20 As for the established tradition (*athar*) of the community, there are the

⁸⁷ I take this to be the end of the imaginary conversation with Moses. If this is correct, the referent of the second person pronouns that follow is the rabbi.

⁸⁸ Apparently for the following reasons: they follow traditional practices blindly (*taqlīd*) (cf., *Talbīs*, 81, 12-14), they confuse matters of positive law (*furū'*) with matters of principle (*uṣūl*) (cf., *Ṣayd al-Khāṭir*, 162, 3), and they refuse to acknowledge the prophethood of Muḥammad.

⁸⁹ Cf., *Ṣayd al-Khāṭir* (Beirut 1987), 572-573. For a more detailed critique of Jewish beliefs and practices in the writings of Ibn al-Jawzī, see *Talbīs*, 70-74.

⁹⁰ See §20 where the term *athar* is used in place of *naql*.

⁹¹ S. 47:19. Here knowledge (*ilm*) of God is a duty imposed on all those to whom the Quran is addressed, not just to an elite class of religious experts. This, at any rate, is what Ibn al-Jawzī takes from the verse.

⁹² S. 43:23.

⁹³ S. 43:24.

words of 'Alī to Ḥārith b. Ḥawṭ.⁹⁴ When the latter asked ['Alī] whether he thought Ṭalḥa and Zubayr were in error, ['Alī] replied: "O Ḥārith, you are confused! The truth is not known by reference to human beings. You should first of all establish the truth and then you will be able to identify those who possess it."⁹⁵ Aḥmad b. Ḥanbal once said: "A man must be severely limited in his knowledge if he chooses to imitate another person in matters of belief (*i'tiqād*)."⁹⁶ Indeed, it is not permissible that we should follow others uncritically, not even men of the calibre of Abū Bakr, 'Alī, Aḥmad, or Shāfi'ī. On the contrary, belief (*īmān*) in God and His attributes (*ṣifāt*) and a knowledge (*ma'rifa*)⁹⁷ of what is consistent with His nature and

⁹⁴ Perhaps Ḥūṭ. Cf., Dhahabī, *Mushtaba*, I, 259; also *Talbīs*, 81 (trans. by Margoliouth, *Islamic Culture*, 9 [1935], p. 389).

⁹⁵ Cf., *Talbīs*, 81; and *Ṣayd al-Khāṭir* (Beirut 1987), 48-49.

⁹⁶ Cf., *Talbīs*, 82; and *Ṣayd al-Khāṭir* (Beirut 1987), 166. However, cf. *Ṭabaqāt al-Ḥanābila*, I, 31, where Aḥmad is quoted as approving *taqlīd*. What his views on the question of *taqlīd* were is difficult to determine from the sources available to us. If Aḥmad endorsed the idea of *taqlīd*, as seems possible (cf., Laoust, *La profession de foi d'Ibn Baṭṭa*, 7, n. 2; for a somewhat different perspective, see KAS, §§21 and 37, among others), later generations of Ḥanbalī scholars gradually distanced themselves from that position, perhaps in response to powerful Mu'tazilī and Ash'arī critiques of *taqlīd* (cf., Frank, "Knowledge and *Taqlīd*: The Foundations of Religious Belief in Classical Ash'arism," *JAOS*, 109 [1989], 37-62). This shift is apparent already in the *Ibāna* of the 10th century Ḥanbalī, Ibn Baṭṭa (p. 4, etc.); by the early 11th century, the Ḥanbalī position as reflected in the *Mu'tamad* (e.g., pp. 20, 31) of Abū Ya'qūb is scarcely distinguishable from that of the Ash'arite school. Clearly the position outlined by Ibn al-Jawzī in KAS (e.g., §37) and elsewhere is little more than the restatement of a view that had been well represented within Ḥanbalism, at least from the early 11th century.

⁹⁷ The concept of *ma'rifa* or *ilm* (knowledge) is central to Ibn al-Jawzī's critique of *taqlīd* (cf., also the last part of §37 where Ibn al-Jawzī states quite explicitly that *ma'rifat Allāh* and *taqlīd* are incompatible: لا يجوز فيها التقليد ["... especially in matters pertaining to the knowledge of God *taqlīd* is not permissible"]). For him "knowing" means possessing knowledge (*ma'rifa* or *ilm*) based on an investigation of the sources, rational reflection on the evidence and inferences arrived at through this reflection. Knowing, in this sense, is necessarily a personal act—something which each individual who seeks knowledge must do for himself. Hence, examination of the evidence and reflection on its meaning is legally obligatory (§§2, 20, etc.). It is a duty that rests on the shoulders of every believer. In the words of Ibn al-Jawzī, it is على كل مخلوق (§20, last line). Ibn al-Jawzī is careful, however, to make a distinction between *ma'rifat Allāh* and *ma'rifat* (or *ilm*) *al-furū'ī* (positive law). In the sphere of positive law, by contrast, knowledge is the responsibility of the experts, viz., those who have been duly trained and are able to find

what is not, as indicated by (‘alā kulli makhlūq).⁹⁸

21 [Reflection on] the essence of the one who follows others [he realizes that the truth is not what he supposes]. *Taqlīd* negates the truth solely for the purpose of following the one who is endowed with the power of knowledge. The one who practices *taqlīd* depends on someone other than himself.

their way amidst the complexity of the world. (Talbīs, 82, 4-8; cf., G. Makdisi, *Islamic History and Thought*, 1984, 100-101).

⁹⁸ For one Ḥanbalī view on the permissibility of knowledge of God is permissible, see the discussion in *Mu'tamad*, 23-24. For the knowledge of God and the duty of the Muslim, see Gimaret, *La doctrine de l'Épouse d'Erkenntnislehre des 'Adudoddīn al-Iḥfārī*, a fairly strict position on the matter.

⁹⁹ Alī b. 'Aqīl b. Muḥammad Aḥmad, the Ḥanbalī scholar of Baghdad and within a Ḥanafī family, and from 'Aqīl joined the Ḥanbalī school for the remainder of his life. A conservative element of the school had been influenced by his earlier influence in the school and through a number of promising young scholars of Ibn 'Aqīl on the thinking of particularly those that deal with doctrine is particularly evident in KAS, which was a thinker for whom Ibn al-Jawzī thought of Ibn 'Aqīl, see the excellent study, *Ibn 'Aqīl et la réformation* (1963). Not to be overlooked is his *Culture in Classical Islam* [Edinburgh, 1963]. Ibn al-Jawzī himself wrote in his *Muntaẓam*, IX, 212-215; and *taqlīd*, Ibn 'Aqīl "believes that the simply because they come first, [khalaf]. Servile imitation of the an-

what is not, as indicated by the evidence, are incumbent on every creature (*‘alā kullī makhḷūq*).⁹⁸

21 [Reflection on] the essential meaning (*ma‘nā*) [of *taqlīd*] indicates that the one who follows others does so because he is uncertain, in as much as [he realizes that the truth of] the matter may be other [than what he supposes]. *Taqlīd* negates the benefits of reason, for reason was created solely for the purpose of reflection (*ta‘ammul*). It is a disgrace that those endowed with the power of reason should extinguish its flame and deny themselves its benefits, for reason is a light meant to provide illumination. The one who practices *taqlīd* is, in effect, [like] a blind person who must depend on someone other than himself. Ibn ‘Aqīl⁹⁹ said: “Since Aḥmad did

their way amidst the complexity. Here it is permissible for the lay person to rely on experts (*Talbīs*, 82, 4-8; cf., G. Makdisi, *Ibn ‘Aqīl* [Edinburgh, 1997], 98).

⁹⁸ For one Ḥanbalī view on the question of whether a delay (*muhla*) in acquiring a knowledge of God is permissible for a person who has reached adulthood, see Abū Ya‘lā’s discussion in *Mu‘tamad*, 23-24. For a survey of Ash‘arite views on the general question of the knowledge of God and the degree to which this knowledge is incumbent on the adult Muslim, see Gimaret, *La doctrine d’al-Ash‘arī* (Paris 1990), 215-218 (also van Ess, *Die Erkenntnislehre des ‘Aḍudaddīn al-Īcī*, 349-350). As is frequently the case, Mu‘tazilīs took a fairly strict position on the matter (Gimaret, 217-218).

⁹⁹ Alī b. ‘Aqīl b. Muḥammad Abū’l-Wafā’ al-Baghdādī (d. 513/1119), a pivotal figure in the Ḥanbalī school of Baghdad during the latter half of the 11th century. Though raised within a Ḥanafī family, and from an early age exposed to Ḥanafī/Mu‘tazilī thinking, Ibn ‘Aqīl joined the Ḥanbalī school and remained a defender of the school’s central doctrines for the remainder of his life. Although he ran into difficulty with some of the more conservative elements of the school on account of his theological views (some of which had been influenced by his earlier encounter with Mu‘tazilism), he remained an important influence in the school and through his writings and his teaching helped to shape the views of a number of promising young Ḥanbalī scholars, among them Ibn al-Jawzī. The influence of Ibn ‘Aqīl on the thinking of Ibn al-Jawzī is evident in many of the latter’s works, particularly those that deal with doctrinal and methodological questions. Ibn ‘Aqīl’s influence is particularly evident in *KAS*, where he is quoted frequently and sometimes at length. He was a thinker for whom Ibn al-Jawzī had profound admiration. For a survey of the life and thought of Ibn ‘Aqīl, see the excellent article by G. Makdisi in *ET*², III, 699-701, as well as his seminal study, *Ibn ‘Aqīl et la résurgence de l’Islam traditionaliste au xi^e siècle* (Damascus 1963). Not to be overlooked is his more recent work on Ibn ‘Aqīl (*Ibn ‘Aqīl: Religion and Culture in Classical Islam* [Edinburgh 1997]) which updates and augments his earlier work. Ibn al-Jawzī himself wrote several important biographical notices on Ibn ‘Aqīl, esp., in his *Muntaẓam*, IX, 212-215; and in his *Manāqib*, 526-527. On the specific question of *taqlīd*, Ibn ‘Aqīl “believes that there is absolutely no reason why the ‘ancients’ [the *salaf*], simply because they come first, should be considered as superior to the ‘moderns’ [the *khalaf*]. Servile imitation of the ancients is simply not in the true spirit of Ḥanabalism. For

not practice *taqlid* he was free to accept the position adopted by Zayd on the question of the grandfather's [right of inheritance] and reject the view of Abū Bakr.¹⁰⁰ Indeed, it is essential that people follow where the evidence (*dalil*) leads. If you wish to know whether this position is correct or not, consider what is more likely, that I am closer to Aḥmad or that Aḥmad is closer to himself? Is it not true that Aḥmad is closer to himself?¹⁰¹ How often did he adopt a point of view and then later change his mind! This phenomenon is well attested in reports concerning Abū Ḥanīfa [fol.6a] and in statements from Shāfiʿī. If such persons sometimes contradicted themselves, it was primarily because of the evidence [available to them]."¹⁰²

22 Ibn ʿAqīl [reported hearing] a man discourse on the "soundness" (*salāma*) of *taqlid*. I myself came across a book written by Abū Bakr ʿAbd

Ibn Ḥanbal himself did not shrink from criticizing the Companions of the Prophet when a principle was at stake. He bids us follow scripture, and to reason on the basis of scripture rather than to follow him blindly. We must therefore do his bidding; to do otherwise would be tantamount to rejecting the teaching of the founder of the school himself" (G. Makdisi, *The Notebooks of Ibn ʿAqīl*, Part I, xlix). Ibn ʿAqīl's defense of *ijtihād* is, according to G. Makdisi, "one of the most characteristic traits of his doctrine. [In his *Kitāb al-Funūn*] he shows his preference for the *ijtihād* of contemporaries over that of predecessors, for each generation has to solve a new set of problems...by a fresh interpretation and application of the sacred texts" (*The Notebooks of Ibn ʿAqīl*, Part I, l).

¹⁰⁰ Cf., *Talbīs*, 81, 2-82, 3; and G. Makdisi, "Quatre opuscules d'Ibn ʿAqīl sur le coran," *BEOS*, 24 (1971), 11 (introduction). For a discussion of the legal issues involved, see N. A. Coulson, *Succession in the Muslim Family*, 79-90.

¹⁰¹ The point here seems to be that since examination of, and reflection on, the evidence is essentially an interior process—one in which reason and the conscience are the principle guides—one cannot know (i.e., participate in) the experience by which others arrive at their beliefs, what evidence (*dalil*) those beliefs ultimately rest on, or the degree of conviction or certitude (*īmān*) with which those beliefs are held. It follows then that if one chooses to follow another person, even an eminent authority, one's beliefs by the very nature of things can never arise above the level of supposition (*ẓann*). That is not a sufficient basis for authentic belief, especially in matters of *uṣūl*. For Ibn al-Jawzī (here following Ibn ʿAqīl), authentic belief must be accompanied by the kind of certitude that is only possible if one personally considers the evidence, reflects on that evidence and draws for himself those inferences (*istidlāl*) that arise from such consideration and reflection. *Ijtihād* is therefore indispensable. For Ibn al-Jawzī, belief is a necessarily personal matter; to make the views of others the basis of one's beliefs is to abdicate one's own responsibility.

¹⁰² It is a question of changing positions, in part, because of the discovery of new evidence and, in part, because the ambiguity and/or complexity of the evidence rendered it amenable to different interpretations. For an interesting and important discussion of *taqlid*, see Ibn ʿAqīl's, *Kitāb al-Funūn*, 606, 8-17; cf., Makdisi, *Ibn ʿAqīl* (1997), 68.

ar-Raḥmān b. Aḥmad a he maintained that the God by way of *taqlid* a to reason and its dicta the Prophet received t *taqlid* and without req (*aṣḥāb al-ḥadīth*) admin in his thought astonishe angel he was disturbed [so he went to his wife have been deceived!]" (prayed: "O God, show those who accuse me of to this tree and it will approached him leaving the tree]: "Return [to y whereupon [the Prophet] [to other human beings? angel and a devil throug the Prophet, for their par [bearing on the question believed.

¹⁰³ Or perhaps as-Sinnī. Al and historical sources of the p associate or disciple of the 4th the latter is known to have been II, 29, 20; and 39, 1ff). G. Ma as-Sinnī, a contemporary of I Bakr mentioned by Ibn al-Jaw Makdisi, *Ibn ʿAqīl* [1997], 5; Damascus 1957), 124; and his

¹⁰⁴ See Ibn al-Jawzī's *al-Waj* this tradition are to be found, o former that is cited here in *KAS* "evidence" provided in respons in the face of uncertainty.

ar-Raḥmān b. Aḥmad as-Sunnī¹⁰³ entitled *al-Munabbih fī t-Tawḥīd* in which he maintained that the Messenger of God received his religion (*dīn*) from God by way of *taqlīd* and that [in such matters] he refused to have recourse to reason and its dictates. In like fashion, he asserted, the Companions of the Prophet received their religion from him, that is, in accordance with *taqlīd* and without requiring proof (*ḥujja*). I observed that traditionists (*aṣḥāb al-ḥadīth*) admired this man's work. However, the confusion evident in his thought astonished me. After the Messenger of God encountered the angel he was disturbed by the thought that it might have been a devil, and [so he went to his wife and] said: "O Khadīja, I am fearful [that I might have been deceived]!" On more than one occasion, he was known to have prayed: "O God, show me a sign (*āya*) so that I need not be troubled by those who accuse me of lying." [On one such occasion] he was told: "Speak to this tree and it will come to you!" And so he spoke to it, and it approached him leaving a furrow behind it in the ground. Then he said [to the tree]: "Return [to your former place]!" And it did as he commanded, whereupon [the Prophet] was reassured.¹⁰⁴ Indeed, prophets are not superior [to other human beings?] except in their ability to distinguish between an angel and a devil through the use of reason (*ijtihād*). The Companions of the Prophet, for their part, spared no effort in ferreting out evidence (*dalīl*) [bearing on the question] of his veracity and, [having obtained it,] they believed.

¹⁰³ Or perhaps as-Sinnī. Although I have found no reference to him in the biographical and historical sources of the period, he was undoubtedly a Ḥanbalī, and quite possibly an associate or disciple of the 4th century firebrand conservative, al-Barbahārī (d. 329/941); the latter is known to have been an unapologetic defender of *taqlīd* (cf. *Ṭabaqāt al-Ḥanābila*, II, 29, 20; and 39, 1ff). G. Makdisi mentions a Muḥammad b. ʿAbd ar-Razzāq b. Aḥmad as-Sinnī, a contemporary of Ibn ʿAqīl, who may have been a distant cousin of the Abū Bakr mentioned by Ibn al-Jawzī, but Makdisi was not able to identify him further (see Makdisi, *Ibn ʿAqīl* [1997], 5; his "L'affaire d'ibn ʿAqīl," *Mélanges L. Massignon* [Paris-Damascus 1957], 124; and his "Autograph Diary—III," *BSOAS*, XIX [1957], 48).

¹⁰⁴ See Ibn al-Jawzī's *al-Wafāʾ bi-Aḥwāl al-Muṣṭafā*, I, 172-173, where two versions of this tradition are to be found, one ascribed to ʿUmar, the other to Anas b. Mālik. It is the former that is cited here in *KAS*. This story is recounted here because it is an example of "evidence" provided in response to the Prophet's demand that he be given evidence/proof in the face of uncertainty.

[The Dangers of Kalām]

23 Nothing has been attributed to Aḥmad in the sources that even remotely smacks of anthropomorphism (*tashbīh*), for his position was that the traditions of the Prophet should be allowed to stand as they are without comment. This also was the viewpoint of such leading authorities as Mālik b. Anas,¹⁰⁵ Sufyān,¹⁰⁶ Awzāʿī,¹⁰⁷ Ibn al-Mubārak,¹⁰⁸ and Shāfiʿī,¹⁰⁹ all of whom were

¹⁰⁵ Author of the celebrated *Muwattaʿa*, eponym of the Mālikī school of law, and a leading figure in the evolution of Muslim jurisprudence in the early period, who died in Medina in 179/796. For an account of the most important sources on him and an assessment of his contribution to the development of Islamic thought, see the excellent article on him by J. Schacht, *EP*², VI, 262-265; also see *GAS*, I, 457-484; *GAL*, I, 297-299; Y. Dutton, *The Origins of Islamic Law: the Quran, the Muwatta and Madinan Amal*; and Goldziher, *Muhammedanische Studien*, II, 213-231 (Eng. trans. 198-214).

¹⁰⁶ Abū ʿAbd Allāh Sufyān b. Saʿīd ath-Thawrī, a *ḥadīth*-oriented jurist and exegete, and a critic of the speculative tendencies of early Kufan legal circles. Despite his insistence on the importance of *ḥadīth*, however, his theological views place him close to the Qadariya on a number of important questions, and among the precursors of early Muʿtazilism (cf., *EP*², IX, 771a). For a sketch of his life, an assessment of his contribution to early Islamic thought, and a list of sources on him, see the article by H. P. Raddatz in *EP*², IX, 770-772. Ibn al-Jawzī regarded Sufyān as a pillar among the early *salaf* and devoted an entire work to his life and thought (*Mirʾāt az-Zamān*, 486, 2; *Dhayl*, I, 418, 5-6). The work appears to be lost, however.

¹⁰⁷ Abū ʿAmr ʿAbd ar-Raḥmān b. ʿAmr al-Awzāʿī (154/770), a leading Syrian authority in the fields of *ḥadīth* and *fiqh*, who died in 154/770 at Ḥantūs, near Beirut. For an account of his contributions to early *fiqh* and an outline of his life see the article by J. Schacht in *EP*², I, 772-773.

¹⁰⁸ ʿAbd Allāh b. al-Mubārak Abū ʿAbd ar-Raḥmān al-Marwazī (d. 181/797), a Khurasanian of non-Arab stock (according to al-Khaṭīb, his mother was a Khwārizmian and his father a Turk [*Taʾrīkh Baghdād*, X, 153]); he was the first Khurasanian to rise to prominence in the field of *ḥadīth* studies. Staunchly traditionalist in outlook, he bitterly attacked the study of *kalām* and insisted that interest in *kalām* inevitably leads to the adoption of heretical views (cf., Ibn Baṭṭa, *Ibāna*, 32: مَنْ تَعَاطَى الْكَلَامَ تَزْنَقُ ["Those who devote themselves to *kalām* will succumb to heretical views"]). Among his contemporaries, he was well known for his mystical and ascetic practices (proof that Sufism and the traditionalist outlook were not seen as incompatible even in the early period). For more on his life and place within the emerging traditionalist movement of the second century, see the lengthy notices on him in *Taʾrīkh Baghdād* (X, 152-169), the *Ḥilya* of Abū Nuʿaym (VIII, 162-190), and Ibn al-Jawzī's *Ṣafwat aṣ-Ṣafwa*, IV, 109-122. Additional sources are listed in *GAS* (I, 95), and *EP*², III, 879. For other references to him in *KAS*, see §§37 and 132.

¹⁰⁹ Abū ʿAbd Allāh Muḥammad b. Idrīs (d. 204/820), who played a pivotal role in

opposed to the science of seek [to understand] religion to heresy. Of [all] people loathing of *kalām*. Muḥammad urge us to study jurisprudence ʿAmr b. ʿUbayd.

working out the doctrinal and Islam. For a list of the Arabic account of his life and place in J. Schacht, "On Shāfiʿī's Life" 318-326; and his *Origins of Islamic Law* also G. Makdisi, "The Juridical al-Fiqh," *SI*, 59 (1984), 5-47; "Islamic Jurisprudence?" *IJM* Feener).

¹¹⁰ Yaʿqūb b. Ibrāhīm al-Aʿẓamī apparently the first to occupy the Ḥanafī school of law. Although he distinguished his position, he assigned more importance to the interesting that, despite his assignment of a biography in his *Tabaʾat* relationship between Abū Yūsuf and Yūsuf was the first of Aḥmad al-Mubārak list of the more important biographical writings, see *GAS*, I, 419-421.

¹¹¹ Presumably the reference to Allāh ash-Shaybānī (d. 189/805) period. Although his family hailed up in Kufa, where he came into life to the study of law and traditions. For a full list of sources, see *I*, 421-433.

¹¹² Nuʿmān b. Thābit Abū Ḥanīfa law and one of the most important principle sources on his life and thought, see *GAS*, I, 409-419; and him are cited.

¹¹³ A student of Ḥasan al-Baṣrī doctrine of free-will; he did not accept traditions that supported a predestination prophétique dans la théologie musulmane.

opposed to the science of *kalām*. It was Abū Yūsuf's¹¹⁰ view that those who seek [to understand] religion (*dīn*) by means of *kalām* inevitably succumb to heresy. Of [all] people, Aḥmad b. Ḥanbal was the most vigorous in his loathing of *kalām*. Muḥammad b. al-Ḥasan¹¹¹ said: "Abū Ḥanīfa¹¹² used to urge us to study jurisprudence and to avoid *kalām*. He used to say: 'God curse 'Amr b. 'Ubayd,¹¹³ who was the first to encourage the study of

working out the doctrinal and methodological implications of *ḥadīth*-centered, traditionalist Islam. For a list of the Arabic sources on Shāfi'ī, see *GAS*, I, 484-490. For a general account of his life and place in the history of Muslim jurisprudence and *ḥadīth*-studies, see J. Schacht, "On Shāfi'ī's Life and Personality," in *Studia Orientalia J. Pedersen* (1953), 318-326; and his *Origins of Muhammadan Jurisprudence* (Oxford, 1950), 1-22, etc. See also G. Makdisi, "The Juridical Theology of Shāfi'ī: Origins and Significance of *Uṣūl al-Fiqh*," *SI*, 59 (1984), 5-47; and W. B. Hallaq, "Was al-Shafi'i the Master Architect of Islamic Jurisprudence?" *IJMES*, 25 (1993), 587-605 (I owe this reference to Michael Feener).

¹¹⁰ Ya'qūb b. Ibrāhīm al-Anṣārī ad-Dawraqī (d. 192/807), a prominent Kufan lawyer, apparently the first to occupy the office of *qāḍī'l-quḍāt*, and one of the founders of the Ḥanafī school of law. Although he made a place for the principle of *ra'y* in his jurisprudence, he distinguished his position on this question from his teacher, Abū Ḥanīfa, in that he assigned more importance to the *ḥadīth* as a source of doctrine (cf., *ET*², I, 164-165). It is interesting that, despite his association with the Ḥanafī school, Ibn Abī Ya'la accords Abū Yūsuf a biography in his *Ṭabaqāt al-Ḥanābila* (I, 414-415) and notes the close personal relationship between Abū Yūsuf and Aḥmad b. Ḥanbal; indeed, al-Khaṭīb claims that Abū Yūsuf was the first of Aḥmad's teachers in *ḥadīth* (*Ta'rikh Baghdād*, XIV, 255f.). For a list of the more important biographical sources on him as well as an enumeration of his writings, see *GAS*, I, 419-421.

¹¹¹ Presumably the reference here is to Muḥammad b. al-Ḥasan b. Farqad Abū 'Abd Allāh ash-Shaybānī (d. 189/805), a leading influence in the Ḥanafī school in its formative period. Although his family hailed from Ḥarastā, a village near Damascus, Shaybānī grew up in Kufa, where he came into contact with Abū Ḥanīfa at an early age and devoted his life to the study of law and tradition under the direction of Abū Ḥanīfa, Abū Yūsuf and others. For a full list of sources on him as well as an enumeration of his writings, see *GAS*, I, 421-433.

¹¹² Nu'mān b. Thābit Abū Ḥanīfa at-Taymī (d. 150/767), eponym of the Ḥanafī school of law and one of the most important legal authorities of the early period. For a list of the principle sources on his life and a brief account of his place in the history of early Islamic thought, see *GAS*, I, 409-419; and *ET*², I, 123-124, where important secondary works on him are cited.

¹¹³ A student of Ḥasan al-Baṣrī (d. 144/762), who, like his teacher, endorsed the Qadārī doctrine of free-will; he did not conceal his doubts regarding the validity of those prophetic traditions that supported a predestinarian viewpoint (cf., van Ess, "La autorité de la tradition prophétique dans la théologie mu'tazilite" in *La notion d'autorité au moyen âge*, ed. G.

kalām.” [fol.6b] Nūḥ al-Jāmi¹¹⁴ asked Abū Ḥanīfa his view on what theologians had to say regarding such things as accidents (*ʿarāḍ*) and bodies (*ajsām*), and he replied: “[What they teach is derived from] the doctrines of the philosophers. It is essential that you follow the path laid down by the *salaf*. Be on your guard against innovations of whatever sort.” Thawrī was asked about *kalām* and he responded: “Leave it alone, it is worthless!” ‘Abd ar-Raḥmān b. Maḥdī¹¹⁵ said: “Those who study *kalām* will inevitably fall prey to heresy (*zandaqa*).”¹¹⁶

Makdisi [Paris 1982], 215-216). As the biographical notices on him indicate, his Qadārī views were combined with strong ascetic tendencies. For more on this important figure, see notes to §26.

¹¹⁴ Nūḥ b. Abī Maryam Abū ʿIṣma al-Marwazī (d. 173/789), known as *al-Jāmiʿ* (the comprehensive) because of his wide-ranging scholarly interests: “... he studied *fiqh* with Abū Ḥanīfa and Ibn Abī Laylā, *ḥadīth* with Ḥajjāj b. Arṭāt, *tafsīr* with al-Kalbī and Muqātil, and *maghāzī* with Ibn Ishāq” (*Mīzān*, IV, 279). During the reign of Maṣṣūr he was made *qāḍī* of Marw, a position he held until the end of his life. He seems to have won the respect of leading traditionalists, including Aḥmad b. Ḥanbal, because of his strong criticism of the Jahmiya and his vigorous opposition to *kalām* (cf., Ibn Qudāma, *Dhamm at-Taʿwīl*, 35). But these same traditionalists were severely critical of his practices in the science of *ḥadīth* and generally regarded his traditions as unreliable. Ibn al-Jawzī, himself, accuses him of deliberate fabrication (*Kitāb al-Mawḍūʿāt*, I, 41; II, 60, 76, 291-293; III, 40, 53, 227-228; cf., also his *KDM*, III, 167-168). One of the traditions he reportedly acknowledged fabricating celebrated the excellent qualities (*faḍāʾil*) of the Quran “because (Nūḥ explained) I saw people ignoring the Quran and occupying themselves with the study of the *fiqh* of Abū Ḥanīfa and the *maghāzī* of Ibn Ishāq” (*Mawḍūʿāt*, I, 41). His vigorous opposition to rationalist tendencies in early Islam, it seems, was enough to overcome his shortcomings as a traditionalist. Cf., Watt, *Formative Period*, 145-146.

¹¹⁵ Abū Saʿīd ‘Abd ar-Raḥmān b. Maḥdī b. Ḥassān al-Baṣrī al-Luʿluʾī (d. 198/813), a *mawlā* of the Azd, and a leading Iraqī scholar (especially in *ḥadīth* and *fiqh*) noted for his highly emotional attacks against the Muʿtazila and their sympathizers (cf., *Ḥilya*, IX, 7 (1-10). His support of the traditionalist cause took him to Baghdad in 180/796, where he met Aḥmad b. Ḥanbal and joined forces with the traditionalist circles of the city. Aḥmad is said to have been impressed with his knowledge of tradition (particularly in the field of *jarḥ wa taʿdīl*) and jurisprudence (*TB*, X, 242-243). Although Ibn Maḥdī died forty years before Aḥmad, and well before the appearance of the Ḥanbalī school, Ibn Abī Yaʿlā accords him a biography in his *Ṭabaqāt al-Ḥanābila*, I, 206-207. For other notices on him, see *Shadharāt*, I, 355; Ibn Saʿd, VII, 297; and *Bidāya*, X, 255. This reference to Ibn Maḥdī here in KAS is the only mention of him in the whole of the work.

¹¹⁶ On the term *zandaqa* and its participial form *zindīq*, see SEI, 659 (Massignon); cf., also Laoust, *La Profession de foi d'Ibn Baṭṭa*, 56, n. 2, and 59, n. 2. The perspective of Massignon and Laoust must now, however, be supplemented by the more recent and more thorough study by M. Chokr, *Zandaqa et Zindiqs en Islam au second siècle de l'Hégire*

24 Muzani¹¹⁷ said: “I use [Egypt] I went to discuss with him. He said to me: ‘Do you know the cathedral mosque of Fustāt, on the Sea of Qulzum’¹¹⁸ where no one asks a question pertaining to jurisprudence. I raised certain points that he replied with another answer. He again expressed dissatisfaction with him, he would expose the view. ‘If this is jurisprudence which people introduce such things which has as its object the destruction of the religion concerning Him is tantamount

(Damascus 1993). In §§26-28 I discuss his “heretical” views that *kalām* is cited by Ibn al-Jawzī in these terms. Muʿtazilism as such. Indeed, in the attention to the equally heretical anthropomorphist conceptions of reason is abandoned or misused. calling for is not a rejection of an attitude towards it. It is quite clear that the detailed analyses found in chapter 11 of application of reason to religious

¹¹⁷ Although he was one of the compilers of a compendium of Shāfiʿī in the systematizing and dissemination of the school (d. 240/854) he is a thinker who did not hesitate to challenge (822). As Christopher Melchert points out, he did not consult Ḥanafī sources even at the *Sunni Schools of Law*, 7, n. 2. For him, see, GAS, I, 492-493.

¹¹⁸ A term applied sometimes to the city of Suez, owing to the fact that a port was near its western banks. Medieval tradition was near the port of Qulzum the background of Shāfiʿī's remarks that *kalām* will be destroyed as surely as the city. III, 1116-7; Yāqūt, *Maʿjam al-Bihar*, I, 1116-7; Yāqūt, *Maʿjam al-Bihar*, I, 1116-7; list of medieval sources on Qulzum

24 Muzanī¹¹⁷ said: "I used to study *kalām* and so when Shāfi'ī came [to Egypt] I went to discuss with him a matter having to do with *kalām*, and he said to me: 'Do you know where you are?' I replied: 'Yes, I am here in the cathedral mosque of Fuṣṭāṭ.' Then he said to me: 'At times you are on the Sea of Qulzum'¹¹⁸ where no ship is ever safe.' He then proceeded to ask me a question pertaining to jurisprudence. I responded to it, whereupon he raised certain points that exposed the inadequacy of my answer. I then replied with another answer, to which he raised further objection and so again expressed dissatisfaction with my answer. Whenever I tried to answer him, he would expose the weakness of my response. Finally, he said to me: 'If this is jurisprudence which is based on the Quran and the Sunna, and people introduce such things into it, how much more dangerous is *kalām*, which has as its object the Lord of the Universe, for disputation (*jidāl*) concerning Him is tantamount to disbelief.' At this I abandoned *kalām* and

(Damascus 1993). In §§26-28 Ibn al-Jawzī provides concrete examples of the "absurd" and "heretical" views that *kalām* can lead to. Although the specific instances of "heresy" cited by Ibn al-Jawzī in these paragraphs concern Mu'tazilīs, he nowhere condemns Mu'tazilism as such. Indeed, in the section that follows (beginning with §30), he turns his attention to the equally heretical views of certain traditionalists who championed anthropomorphist conceptions of God. These are examples of what can happen when reason is abandoned or misused. One might conclude from this that what Ibn al-Jawzī is calling for is not a rejection of *kalām per se* but rather a more moderate (and cautious) attitude towards it. It is quite clear from the early paragraphs of *KAS* as well as from the detailed analyses found in chapters II and III, that Ibn al-Jawzī cannot be against the application of reason to religious questions.

¹¹⁷ Although he was one of the most important of Shāfi'ī's Egyptian disciples (he compiled a compendium of Shāfi'ī's legal teaching, the *Mukhtaṣar*, and played a major role in the systematizing and dissemination of the master's views), he was also an independent thinker who did not hesitate to challenge Shāfi'ī when he thought he was wrong (*ET*², VII, 822). As Christopher Melchert points out, al-Muzanī was a former Ḥanafī and continued to consult Ḥanafī sources even after his adoption of a Shāfi'ite perspective (*Formation of the Sunnī Schools of Law*, 7, n. 25). For a list of his extant works along with sources on him, see, *GAS*, I, 492-493.

¹¹⁸ A term applied sometimes to the Red Sea as a whole, and sometimes also to the Gulf of Suez, owing to the fact that a port known as Qulzum (the Greek Clysma) was located on its western banks. Medieval tradition (and perhaps pre-Islamic tradition also) had it that it was near the port of Qulzum that Pharaoh and his armies perished. If this legend is the background of Shāfi'ī's remarks here, his point is clear: those who pursue the study of *kalām* will be destroyed as surely and completely as were Pharaoh and his men (*Marāṣid*, III, 1116-7; Yāqūt, *Muʿjam al-Buldān*, I, 344/2, line, 5-6; also cf., *ET*², V, 367-369, for a list of medieval sources on Qulzum and Baḥr Qulzum).

devoted myself to the study of jurisprudence." Aḥmad b. Ḥanbal once said: "The best evasive device (*ḥīla*) employed by Shāfi'ī was the absence of any desire for, or interest in, *kalām*; jurisprudence was his only concern." Shāfi'ī said to Rabī':¹¹⁹ "Do not allow yourself to become preoccupied with *kalām*. My view regarding those who engage in *kalām* is that their heads should be covered with scourges and that they should flee to other lands. They should be dealt with like 'Umar did with Ṣabīgh."¹²⁰ According to a different line of transmission, Shāfi'ī is reported to have said: "My advice concerning those who take up the study of *kalām* is that they should be beaten with palm-branches, carried around on the backs of camels and paraded among the people, and that it should be proclaimed: 'This [fol.7a] is the punishment appropriate for those who abandon the Quran and the Sunna and take up the study of *kalām*.'" ¹²¹ Shāfi'ī also said: "Whenever I hear someone say that the name (*ism*) is other than the thing named (*musammā*), I declare that such a person is guilty of heresy (*zandaqa*)."¹²² If someone were to bequeath his books to another and works of *kalām* were to be found among them, such things should not form part of the bequest since *kalām* has nothing to do with knowledge (*ilm*). Shāfi'ī once observed people debating theological questions in accordance with the rules of *kalām*, and he said: "These people should speak about matters that merit discussion or else they should leave." When Ḥafṣ al-Fard¹²³ said to Shāfi'ī [in the course of a

¹¹⁹ Rabī' b. Sulaymān b. 'Abd al-Jabbār Abū Muḥammad al-Miṣrī (d. 270/883), one of Shāfi'ī's Egyptian disciples (cf., *Talbīs*, 113). For notices on him see *Muntaẓam*, V, 77; *Ṭabaqāt ash-Shāfi'īya*, II, 132-139; and *Shadharāt*, II, 159.

¹²⁰ Ṣabīgh b. 'Isl al-Ḥanzalī, a young Basran who reportedly was punished by 'Umar b. al-Khaṭṭāb for his obsessive questioning of obscure terms used in the Quran. For the various accounts of Ṣabīgh and 'Umar, see Ibn al-Jawzī's *Ta'rikh 'Umar b. al-Khaṭṭāb*, 146-148. Cf., also *Lisān al-'Arab*, VIII, 439; and Mālik, *al-Muwaṭṭa' (jihād)*, 19).

¹²¹ Cf., *Talbīs*, 82-83.

¹²² Cf., *Talbīs*, 82; al-Bayhaqī, *I'tiqād*, 22. For more on the question of the *ism* and the *musammā*, see notes to §25.

¹²³ Very few biographical details about him are known with certainty; his *kunya* is generally given as Abū 'Amr (though occasionally as Abū Yaḥyā), and he is said to have been a native of Egypt, though neither the date of his birth or death are reported. He went to Basra where he attended the lectures of the great Mu'tazilī theologian Abū'l-Hudhayl, and seems to have considered himself a Mu'tazilī for a time; eventually, however, he turned against his former teacher and wrote a refutation of his ideas (cf., *Fihrist*, 189). As van Ess has shown in his study on Ḍirār b. 'Amr (*Der Islam*, 44 [1968], 24-30), Ḥafṣ al-Fard came into contact with the ideas of Ḍirār and was profoundly influenced by him. Among

debate] that the Quran is overtaken you." Shāfi'ī and *kalām*, they would flee it from things from¹²⁴ the theolog a person to be in violation ed—is to be preferred to t

25 A man once said to I study of *kalām*?" He repli counsel (*naṣīḥa*), it is my h Muslim (*muslim salīm*) ev such things as the particl

his other Iraqī teachers was the Ḥafṣ come into contact with Sh the latter's censure (cf., *Ṭabaq* Dhahabī reports that Shāfi'ī co involvement with *kalām*).

¹²⁴ Or perhaps "about."

¹²⁵ Cf., *Talbīs*, 82, where a s Tritton, *Muslim Theology*, 53, w are cited in translation.

¹²⁶ The term *juz'*, here roughly to the atom as an indivisible ent *صَلَة فَإِذَا كَانَ وَاحِدًا فَهُوَ غَيْرُ مُتَجَزِّئٍ* an expression for (entities) that whether it is part of a whole or e *El'*, II, 493-494 (S. van den Berg II, 219-220, on the term *dharra* Dhanani, *The Physical Theory Cosmology* (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1

¹²⁷ A theory adopted by the M non-atomistic explanation for the by an-Nazzām's doctrine of the in of *mudākhala* (mutual penetration may pass from one point to anothe points of space. For a fuller ex an-Nazzām, see especially the tw of Abū Ishāq an-Nazzām (Ann l'histoire du mu'tazilisme," *REI*, 4 be associated with the theology of has shown that it played an impor

debate] that the Quran is created (*makhlūq*), he replied: "Unbelief has overtaken you." Shāfi'ī added: "If people knew [the dangers that lurk in] *kalām*, they would flee it like they flee from lions. Indeed, I have learned things from¹²⁴ the theologians (*ahl al-kalām*) that I had never suspected. For a person to be in violation of what God has forbidden—polytheism excepted—is to be preferred to the study of *kalām*."¹²⁵

25 A man once said to Ibn 'Aqīl: "Do you think that I should take up the study of *kalām*?" He replied: "Since religion entails [the giving of] sincere counsel (*naṣīḥa*), it is my honest belief that you are now a sound, well-rounded Muslim (*muslim salīm*) even though you have not taken up speculation on such things as the particle (*juz*),¹²⁶ the leap (*ṭafra*),¹²⁷ the void (*khalā*), the

his other Iraqī teachers was the Ḥanafite jurist Abū Yūsuf. Following his return to Egypt, Ḥafṣ came into contact with Shāfi'ī, sometime between 198/814 and 204/820, and earned the latter's censure (cf., *Ṭabaqāt ash-Shāfi'īya*, II, 98; cf., also *Mizān*, I, 564, where Dhahabī reports that Shāfi'ī condemned Ḥafṣ as a *kāfir*, apparently on account of his involvement with *kalām*).

¹²⁴ Or perhaps "about."

¹²⁵ Cf., *Talbīs*, 82, where a slightly different version of this saying is given; see also Tritton, *Muslim Theology*, 53, where some of the anti-*kalām* statements attributed to Shāfi'ī are cited in translation.

¹²⁶ The term *juz*, here roughly synonymous with the term *jawhar* or *jawhar fard*, refers to the atom as an indivisible entity (cf., *Mu'tamad*, 280, 8-9: ومعنى الجزء عبارة عن بعض الأجسام وحقيقة أنه منفرد من جملة، فإذا كان واحداً فهو غير متجزئ [the term particle (or atom) is an expression for (entities) that make up bodies (*ajsām*); in reality (a *juz*) is indivisible whether it is part of a whole or exists by itself]). For more on these terms, see "Djawhar," *EP*², II, 493-494 (S. van den Bergh); and "Djuz" *EP*², II, 607-608 (L. Gardet); cf., also *EP*², II, 219-220, on the term *dharra*. For the impact of atomism on the natural sciences, see Dhanani, *The Physical Theory of Kalām; Atoms, Space and Void in Basrian Mu'tazilī Cosmology* (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1994).

¹²⁷ A theory adopted by the Mu'tazilī theologian an-Nazzām (d. ca. 840) to provide a non-atomistic explanation for the possibility of movement—seemingly rendered impossible by an-Nazzām's doctrine of the infinite divisibility of bodies. Closely linked to the concept of *mudākhala* (mutual penetration of bodies), the theory of the leap maintained that a body may pass from one point to another without having to pass through all of the intermediate points of space. For a fuller explanation of the theory and its place in the thought of an-Nazzām, see especially the two studies by J. van Ess, *Science and Theology: The Case of Abū Ishāq an-Nazzām* (Ann Arbor 1978), 4-16; and his "Une lecture à rebours de l'histoire du mu'tazilisme," *REI*, 46 (1978), 199ff. Although the theory of the leap came to be associated with the theology of an-Nazzām among later Muslim thinkers, W. Madelung has shown that it played an important role in the thought of the Imāmī theologian, Hishām

plenum (*malāʾ*),¹²⁸ the atom (*jawhar*), and the accident (*ʿaraḍ*),¹²⁹ or such questions as whether an accident can endure over two separate moments of time,¹³⁰ whether the power to act (*qudra*) [exists only] at the time of the

b. al-Ḥakam (d. 795-6), and perhaps for some of the same reasons, since Hishām also rejected atomism (*EP*, III, 492). It is entirely possible, of course, that the idea of the leap was taken over from Greek sources since, as van Ess has shown, the idea is found already in the work of the late Neoplatonic philosopher, Damascius (van Ess, *Theology and Science*, 15). On objections to the concept of the leap among later Muʿtazilī and Ashʿarī theologians, see Gimaret, *La doctrine d'al-Ashʿarī*, 54-60. It is interesting that, beginning in the 11th century (if not before), Ḥanbalī theologians took up the question (cf. e.g., Ibn al-Jawzī, *Ṣayd al-Khāṭir*, 479; and Abū Yaʿlā, *Muʿtamad*, 39, 280, where the position of the Muʿtazilī theologian, Abū'l-Hudhayl, is in effect endorsed). For more on this term, see Tritton, *Muslim Theology* (London, 1947), 93; Pines, *Beiträge zur islamischen Atomenlehre* (Berlin 1936), 12, 141; R. Frank, *The Metaphysics of Created Being*, 19; A. Dhanani, *The Physical Theory of Kalām* (Leiden 1994), espec., 176-181; and KAS, §§27-29. For the most definitive account of the thought of Nazzām and its impact on subsequent developments within Muʿtazilism and medieval Islamic theology as a whole, see J. van Ess, *Theologie und Gesellschaft im 2. und 3. Jahrhundert Hidschra*, III, 296-445.

¹²⁸ The terms *khalāʾ* (void) and *malāʾ* (plenum) here refer to a debate carried on primarily within the Muʿtazilī and Ashʿarī schools, it would seem, over the question of whether there is such a thing as empty, unoccupied space (*khalāʾ*), or whether the world is to be thought of as completely filled (*malāʾ*). Without reproducing the details of the debate here, suffice it to say that atomists, within both the Muʿtazilite and Ashʿarite schools, appear to have argued for the theory of the void, that is, that there exists between atoms and bodies interstices, i.e., empty spaces which are susceptible of being occupied by atoms or bodies. This was the position of both al-Jubbāʾī and al-Ashʿarī, for example, and both argued that if there is no void in the universe, no movement or displacement of space would be possible. For a fuller discussion of the question, see Gimaret, *La doctrine d'al-Ashʿarī*, 63-64; Pines, *Beiträge zur islamischen Atomenlehre* (Berlin 1936); and H. Wolfson, *The Philosophy of the Kalam*, 466ff., esp., 492ff. Also see the work by Dhanani referred to in the preceding note, espec., 71-89, where the question of the void is taken up.

¹²⁹ On the terms *jawhar* (atom) and *ʿaraḍ* (accident), see KAS, §5 and notes to the translation.

¹³⁰ The question, that is, whether accidents are strictly momentary phenomena or have the capacity to endure (*baqāʾ*) a succession of instants, was debated at some length by medieval *mutakallimūn*. According to al-Ashʿarī (*Maqālāt*, 358-360) and al-Baghdādī (*Uṣūl*, 50-52) there was little consensus on this question among the Muʿtazila; some like al-Balkhī and others (especially in the school of Baghdad) took the position that all accidents are strictly momentary phenomena, whereas Abū'l-Hudhayl and al-Jubbāʾī (of the Basran school) held the view that there are different classes of accidents, some momentary in duration and others which have the capacity to survive over time (until driven into non-existence by a contrary accident). Ashʿarites, on the other hand, appear to have generally adhered to the view that all accidents exist only for an instant, being created anew in each moment of time

action or is anterior to its divine essence (*dhār*) [or (*ism*) is the same as the t

(cf., al-Baghdādī, *Uṣūl*, 50, because of their general antipathy to the idea of the leap, in the early 11th century some Ḥanbalī theologians took up the question. Abū Yaʿlā (d. 458/1066) takes the position that accidents come into being more detailed discussion of accident in *La doctrine*, 75-97, esp., 89-91; 16-23; and Peters, *God's Creation*

¹³¹ A reference to the position of the Muʿtazilī school on human action. Muʿtazilīs in general took the position that the power to act exists only at the time of the action and its opposite, that is, entails the existence of two points, the Muʿtazila intended to show that the power of God's power and one exercising the power to act exists only at the time of the action, not another, and that this power (long associated with the Jahannam responsibility, Ashʿarites adopt the position of the human actor, though not the creature, as a role in the action and the decision. Garfield surveys the history of the Muʿtazilī perspective analysis of the Ḥanbalī human action, see Gimaret, "The Muʿtazilī Position" (1977), 57-178. As Gimaret has shown, this area—as it did on other ques

¹³² For more on the question of the *ism*, see Introduction, part III.

¹³³ Cf., §24 where a similar distinction is made between the *ism* (name) and the *maṣṣam* (essence). Both grammarians and theologians took the position that the *ism* itself out in grammatical circle. Garfield (1977), esp., 149-161. Both grammarians and theologians, therefore, are fundamentally in agreement on a question of how the divine name emerges. Three principal positions emerged: 1) that *ism* and *maṣṣam* are not one and the same (transcendence); 2) that of the Ashʿarites

action or is anterior to it,¹³¹ whether the attributes (*ṣifāt*) are added to the divine essence (*dhāt*) [or are identical with it],¹³² and whether the name (*ism*) is the same as the thing named (*musammā*) or other than it.¹³³ I am

(cf., al-Baghdādī, *Uṣūl*, 50, 11). While early Ḥanbalīs generally avoided such questions because of their general antipathy toward *kalām* (cf., the *Ibāna* of Ibn Baṭṭa, e.g.), by the early 11th century some Ḥanbalīs were beginning to take an interest in the question. Thus, Abū Yaʿlā (d. 458/1066) takes up the question repeatedly in his *Muʿtamad* (pp. 30, 36, 140, 141, etc.). It is interesting that Abū Yaʿlā follows the Ashʿarī position on the main point: accidents come into being and cease to exist in each instant of time (cf. 30, 36). For a more detailed discussion of accidents within the context of medieval *kalām*, see Gimaret, *La doctrine*, 75-97, esp., 89-91; Frank, *The Metaphysics of Created Being* (Istanbul 1966), 16-23; and Peters, *God's Created Speech* (Leiden 1976), 123ff.

¹³¹ A reference to the positions taken by Ashʿarīs and Muʿtazilīs on the question of human action. Muʿtazilīs in general (though there were differences among them) took the position that the power to act exists prior to the act and is a power to perform both an act and its opposite, that is, entails choice on the part of the human actor. By insisting on these points, the Muʿtazila intended to maintain that the power to act is a human power independent of God's power and one exercised freely. The Ashʿarīs, on the other hand, insisted that the power to act exists only at the time of the action, that it is a power to perform that act and not another, and that this power to act is a creation of God. To avoid a radical determinism (long associated with the Jahmiya) and to make a place for some degree of human responsibility, Ashʿarites adopted the theory of acquisition (*kasb*), according to which the human actor, though not the creator of the power by which he acts, does, nonetheless, play a role in the action and the decision on which it is based (see *EP*², IV, 692-4, where L. Gardet surveys the history of the concept of *kasb* in medieval Islam). For an interesting and perceptive analysis of the Ḥanbalī position (or rather positions) on the larger question of human action, see Gimaret, "Théories de l'acte humain dans l'école ḥanbalite," *BEO*, 29 (1977), 57-178. As Gimaret has shown, Ḥanbalism underwent a remarkable evolution in this area—as it did on other questions also.

¹³² For more on the question of the divine attributes, see "The Argument of the Work", Introduction, part III.

¹³³ Cf., §24 where a similar statement is attributed to Shāfiʿī. How the relationship between the *ism* (name) and the *musammā* (named) is to be understood was a problem for both grammarians and theologians. For an interesting account of the debate as it played itself out in grammatical circles, see Versteegh's, *Greek Elements in Arabic Linguistic Thinking* (1977), esp., 149-161. By the 10th century there was virtual unanimity among grammarians that *ism* and *musammā* participate in two distinctly different levels of being and, therefore, are fundamentally different. Among theologians, for whom it was primarily a question of how the divine names are to be understood in relation to a transcendent God, three principal positions emerged: 1) that of the Muʿtazila who, along with the grammarians, maintained that *ism* and *musammā* are fundamentally different (God and the names ascribed to Him are not one and the same; to suppose otherwise is to compromise His oneness and transcendence); 2) that of the Ashʿarites, who in general insisted on the identity of *ism* and

certain that the Companions of the Prophet died without knowing of such matters. If you think that the approach of the dialectical theologians (*mutakallimūn*) is more prudent than that adopted by Abū Bakr and ʿUmar, you are in error. The science of *kalām* has produced doubts among its proponents, and the odors of heresy (*ilhād*) emanate from the errors of their doctrines.¹³⁴ The root cause of all this is that the theologians are not satisfied with [the study of] the *Sharīʿa* and its provisions, and so they seek to probe the divine realities themselves; reason, however, is powerless to apprehend the wisdom (*ḥikma*) to which God alone has access."¹³⁵

26 [fol.7b] If someone should ask what this *kalām* is that has been

musammā; and 3) that of the early Ḥanbalīs (and other traditionalists perhaps), who argued that the very debate over *ism* and *musammā* represented a heretical innovation and ought to be avoided (*Ṭabaqāt al-Ḥanābila*, II, 280, 4-10). Up until the 4th century, Ḥanbalīs generally seem to have adhered to the third position. By the mid-5th/11th century, however, and most likely as a result of Abū Yaʿlā's influence, some Ḥanbalīs began to nuance their position on this question (perhaps under the influence of the Kullābiya). In his *Muʿtamad* (71-70), Abū Yaʿlā devotes several lengthy and involved paragraphs to the question, in which he differentiates between two classes of divine names: 1) those that designate the divine essence itself (among which he mentions such terms as Allāh, *qadīm*, *mawjūd*, *thābit*, etc.), and 2) those that "belong" to the divine essence (such as *ḥayy*, *ʿālim*, *qādir*, *khāliq*, etc.). Names of the first class are identical with the divine essence, but of those in the second class he says: "They cannot be said to be identical with [God's] essence or other than it" (71, 18-19). In his *ʿaqīda*, Abū Muḥammad at-Tamīmī (d. 488/1095) indicates that Ḥanbalīs were at variance on this question, but he himself advocates a position that is very close (if not identical) to that of Abū Yaʿlā (*Ṭabaqāt al-Ḥanābila*, II, 280, 4-10). Versteegh suggests that the Muʿtazilite and Ashʿarite positions reflected a fundamentally different understanding of the term *ism*: the Muʿtazila took it in its literal sense to mean the "physical" expression (*lafẓ*), i.e., the finite (human) word as uttered, whereas for the Ashʿarites the term *ism* referred to the essence of the thing named. When Ashʿarites said that the *ism* and the *musammā* are one and the same they were saying, in effect, that the essence of the name and the thing named are one and the same (Versteegh, 158-161; cf., Baghdādī, *Uṣūl*, 114ff.; and Bāqillānī, *Tamhīd* [ed. McCarthy, Beirut 1957], 225-236). Reflected in the Muʿtazilite and Ashʿarite positions, of course, were their respective views on the Quran.

¹³⁴ See *Talbīs*, 85, where the quotation from Ibn ʿAqīl is found in a slightly different form.

¹³⁵ Cf., Makdisi, *Ibn ʿAqīl* (1997), 149-150. The idea of a transcendent wisdom that lies beyond the reach of reason—a wisdom which God alone possesses, and in relation to which human reason has only two choices, submission or resistance—is a theme to which Ibn al-Jawzī returns repeatedly in his *Ṣayd al-Khāṭir* (see, e.g., 323-326, 364-366, 367-368, 375-376, 478-479).

condemned, our answer is *takallimūn*) pieced together it] from the philosophers developed in the course of is unnecessary and [at best minds of people, and it is as we have noted in state matters. The ʿulamāʾ maintain such things by relying on the which reason itself points, the text], the results of which

¹³⁶ See §23, where a similar charge to philosophy is an allegation even by men who were themselves al-Ashʿarī alleges that Abū'l-Hudā Ashʿarī does not identify the simply reiterating a charge made mind is difficult to determine from to keep in mind, however, that undergoing something approaching ideas into *kalām*, thanks in large to Fakhr ad-Dīn ar-Rāzī (d. 606/12 the works of later theologians, and In a series of important studies, profound impact of Avicenna's Ghazzālī's theology; see especially London, 1994); and the more d (Heidelberg, 1992). Earlier, van Avicennian logic on al-Ghazzālī's Islamic Theology," 21-50; cf., Islamic Theology," *Zeitschrift für* IX [1994], 1-42). The changes in 12th century were both method significant influence on the future

¹³⁷ By *ṣawākīr* Ibn al-Jawzī he keeping with its true meaning or I and II. Ibn al-Jawzī frequently he does so he has in mind interpre

condemned, our answer is that it is something which the theologians (*mutakallimūn*) pieced together out of what they produced, drawing [some of it] from the philosophers¹³⁶ and [some of it] from notions which they developed in the course of debate (*jidāl*) among themselves, most of which is unnecessary and [at best] of fleeting value. [*Kalām*] creates doubts in the minds of people, and it is often difficult to free them from such thoughts, as we have noted in statements cited from Ibn ʿAqīl and others on such matters. The ʿulamā maintain that God has given them protection against such things by relying on the apparent meaning of scripture (*ṣawāhir*),¹³⁷ to which reason itself points, without having to delve beneath the surface [of the text], the results of which are not to be trusted. The evidence of reason

¹³⁶ See §23, where a similar charge is attributed to Abū Ḥanīfa. *Kalām's* alleged indebtedness to philosophy is an allegation that was made frequently by traditionalists, and sometimes even by men who were themselves associated with *kalām* (cf., *Maqālāt*, 485, where al-Ashʿarī alleges that Abū'l-Hudhayl borrowed elements of his theology from Aristotle—al-Ashʿarī does not identify the so-called borrowed ideas). Whether Ibn al-Jawzī is here simply reiterating a charge made by earlier critics of *kalām* or has something different in mind is difficult to determine from the general nature of his comments above. It is important to keep in mind, however, that the *kalām* of Ibn al-Jawzī's time was in the process of undergoing something approaching a paradigm shift as a result of the infusion of Avicennian ideas into *kalām*, thanks in large measure to the efforts of men like al-Ghazzālī (d. 505/1111), Fakhr ad-Dīn ar-Rāzī (d. 606/1209), and al-Bayḍāwī (d. 685/1286)—a trend continued in the works of later theologians, among them al-Ījī (d. 756/1355) and al-Jurjānī (d. 816/1413). In a series of important studies, Frank has called attention to the subtle but nonetheless profound impact of Avicenna on the cosmological foundations and framework of al-Ghazzālī's theology; see especially his *Al-Ghazzālī and the Ashʿarite School* (Durham and London, 1994); and the more detailed analysis in his *Creation and the Cosmic System* (Heidelberg, 1992). Earlier, van Ess had called attention to the impact of Aristotelian, Avicennian logic on al-Ghazzālī's thought (see especially his "The Logical Structure of Islamic Theology," 21-50; cf., also Sabra, A. I. "Science and Philosophy in Medieval Islamic Theology," *Zeitschrift für Geschichte der Arabisch-Islamischen Wissenschaften*, IX [1994], 1-42). The changes in *kalām* that were well underway by the beginning of the 12th century were both methodological and substantive, and were destined to have a significant influence on the future of religious thought in Islam.

¹³⁷ By *ṣawāhir* Ibn al-Jawzī here seems to mean an understanding of the text that is in keeping with its true meaning or intention. As will be seen later in *KAS*, especially in chaps. II and II, Ibn al-Jawzī frequently attacks *ṣāhir/ṣawāhir* interpretations of scripture; when he does so he has in mind interpretations that carry with them anthropomorphic implications.

cannot be denied, for by it we have access to a knowledge [of God's existence] that cannot be refuted.

27 Abū Sulaymān b. al-Khaṭṭābī¹³⁸ said: "Satan has [sometimes] come in the guise of reasonableness, saying to those in whom he perceives a high degree of intelligence and understanding: 'Do not be satisfied with a knowledge of the apparent meaning (*ẓāhir*) of the traditions of the Prophet (*sunna*), for this is the sort of understanding characteristic of the uneducated masses (*ʿamma*).' Satan thus misleads them so as to entangle them in doubt. Then when they consider the Book of God in which they profess to believe, they confuse one thing with another and interpret the text (*taʿawwala*) in the light of what happens to occur to them [at the moment]. They display contempt for the traditions of the Prophet and distort their contents in the course of transmitting them." ʿAmr b. ʿUbayd,¹³⁹ for example, used to say:

¹³⁸ Ḥamd (or Aḥmad) b. Muḥammad b. Ibrāhīm Abū Sulaymān al-Khaṭṭābī al-Bustī (d. 388/998, according to some in 386/996), a native of Bust (Sijistān) whose learning spanned a number of disciplines (law, tradition, literary criticism and theology). His reputation as a scholar seems in part to have been the result of his ability to integrate fields of learning (especially tradition, literary criticism and theology) that tended increasingly in his day to go their separate ways. His two most influential works (*Kitāb Gharīb al-Ḥadīth* and his *Sharḥ al-Asmāʾ al-Ḥusnā*) were products of an interdisciplinary effort, and influenced several generations of scholars after him. His *Sharḥ al-Asmāʾ*, e.g., was one of the principal sources of al-Bayhaqī's *Kitāb al-Asmāʾ wa-ṣ-Ṣifāt*. Although they belonged to different schools (al-Khaṭṭābī was a Shāfiʿite and possibly also an Ashʿarite), Ibn al-Jawzī had a great deal of respect for his views and cites him frequently in *KAS* (see, e.g., §§27, 58, 69, 85, 115, 144, 162, 180, 224, 225). Al-Khaṭṭābī was also a poet (his literary abilities attracted the attention of Thaʿālibī, among others) and a deeply religious person. For a list of his works and the most important sources on his life and thought, see *GAS*, I, 210-211; *EP*, IV, 1131-1132; and above all, Audebert, *al-Khaṭṭābī et l'inimitabilité du Coran* (Damascus 1982), esp., 19-53. Also see Allard, *Le problème des attributs divins* (Beirut 1965), 351-364; and Gimaret, *Images*, 46-48.

¹³⁹ A disciple of Ḥasan al-Baṣrī, a defender of Qadarism and a vigorous opponent of predestinarian views that began to gain currency in the generation after Ḥasan. Although claimed by later Muʿtazilīs as the founder of their school (along with Wāṣil b. ʿAṭā), this seems doubtful, since none of the views attributed to him (apart from his Qadarī beliefs) are characteristic of Muʿtazilism or even of proto-Muʿtazilism. As the text cited at the end of §27 indicates, he was openly sceptical of traditions then coming into circulation, which represented the Prophet as defending the notion that what happens on earth, including the sinful acts of human beings, is decreed by God. For more on his attitude toward the newly emerging "science" of *ḥadīth*, see van Ess, "L'autorité de la tradition prophétique dans la théologie muʿtazilite," in *La notion d'autorité au moyen âge*, ed. G. Makdisi (Paris 1982), 215-216. On the question of his relationship to the later Muʿtazilī school, see van Ess,

"If the expression 'May the Preserved Tablet' (*lawḥ*) for his misdeeds?"¹⁴⁰ [ʿAmr b. Masʿūd in which the latter spoke the truth given to coheres in the mother's womb it becomes an embryo. This and now as well as its father enjoy bliss—is recorded.] said: "If al-Aʿmash had not him of having fabricated it have rejected it; if Ibn refused to accept it; and e [fol.8a] these words to

"Une lecture à rebours de l'histoire Formative Period, 107ff. For a Suppl., I, 338).

¹⁴⁰ S. 111:1.

¹⁴¹ That is, if the misdeeds of (and therefore decreed by God for his transgressions. One must have been in the *lawḥ* *malʿūq*; gegen ʿUmar b. ʿUbayd [Beirut, with slight variation, in a note ʿUbayd (Beirut, 1967), 10, 19:1 *Mizān*, III, 276, 16-17; and Ibn see Watt, *Formative Period*, 10 1967), which includes a critical edition and commentary.

¹⁴² Although this tradition does Umayyad period (cf., Watt, *Formative Period*, 107ff. For a note above saying, in its many permutations *ḥadīth*: Bukhārī, *baṣʿ al-khalq*, *sunna*, 16; Tirmidhī, *qadar* 4 (2) *al-Asmāʾ*, 386-7, where several

¹⁴³ In the standard versions of Wāḥab (d. ca. 703), and al-Aʿmash transmitters (cf., Watt, *Formative Period*, 107ff. For a note above and Zayd is discussed).

"If the expression 'May the hands of Abū Lahab perish'¹⁴⁰ is recorded in the 'Preserved Tablet' (*lawḥ mahfūz*), how can Abū Lahab be held responsible for his misdeeds?"¹⁴¹ [ʿAmr] also commented on a tradition attributed to Ibn Masʿūd in which the latter reported: "The Messenger of God who faithfully spoke the truth given to him said to me: 'The individual human being coheres in the mother's womb during a period of forty days; [from] a drop it becomes an embryo. Thereafter the term of its life, its fortune in the here and now as well as its fate in the hereafter—whether it will be damned or enjoy bliss—is recorded.'"¹⁴² [In his commentary on this tradition ʿAmr] said: "If al-Aʿmash had reported this tradition to me, I would have accused him of having fabricated it; if Zayd b. Wahb had reported it to me, I would have rejected it; if Ibn Masʿūd¹⁴³ had reported it to me, I would have refused to accept it; and even if the Messenger of God himself had spoken [fol.8a] these words to me, I would have said to him: 'They are not

"Une lecture à rebours de l'histoire du Muʿtazilisme," *REI*, 47 (1979), 56ff.; and Watt, *Formative Period*, 107ff. For a list of medieval sources on him, see *GAS*, I, 597 (cf. *GAL*, Suppl., I, 338).

¹⁴⁰ S. 111:1.

¹⁴¹ That is, if the misdeeds of Abū Lahab had in fact been recorded in the *lawḥ mahfūz* (and therefore decreed by God) from the beginning, he cannot justly be held responsible for his transgressions. One must conclude then, according to ʿAmr, that this text could not have been in the *lawḥ mahfūz* (cf., *EL*², IV, 371a; and van Ess, *Traditionistische Polemik gegen ʿUmar b. ʿUbayd* [Beirut, 1967], 16). The text, cited here by Ibn al-Jawzī, is found, with slight variation, in a number of sources (see, e.g., Dāraqūṭnī, *Akhbār ʿUmar b. ʿUbayd* (Beirut, 1967), 10, 19; *Taʾrīkh Baghdād*, XII, 170, 20-21; 172, 15-16; 183, 18-19; *Mīzān*, III, 276, 16-17; and Ibn Kathīr, *Bidāya*, X, 81, 22-23). For discussions of this text, see Watt, *Formative Period*, 108; and esp., J. van Ess, *Traditionistische Polemik* (Beirut, 1967), which includes a critical edition of Dāraqūṭnī's polemic against ʿAmr with a translation and commentary.

¹⁴² Although this tradition does not appear to have come into circulation until late in the Umayyad period (cf., Watt, *Formative Period*, 104; and van Ess, *EL*², IV, 371a), it gradually became a favorite in those circles that championed a predestinarian point of view. The above saying, in its many permutations, appears in virtually all of the major collections of *ḥadīth*: Bukhārī, *badʾ al-khalq*, 6; *anbiyāʾ* 1; *qadar* 1; Muslim, *qadar* 1; Abū Dāwūd, *sunna*, 16; Tirmidhī, *qadar* 4 (2137); *Musnad*, I, 382, 414, 430, etc. Cf., Bayhaqī, *Kitāb al-Asmāʾ*, 386-7, where several versions of this tradition are cited and discussed.

¹⁴³ In the standard versions of this tradition, the names Ibn Masʿūd (d. ca. 652), Zayd b. Wahb (d. ca. 703), and al-Aʿmash (d. 765), respectively, appear in the *isnād* as the earliest transmitters (cf., Watt, *Formative Period*, 113, where the relationship between al-Aʿmash and Zayd is discussed).

[consistent with] the revelation (*sharī'a*) given to you."¹⁴⁴

28 Abū'l-Hudhayl,¹⁴⁵ one of the *mutakallimūn*, used to assert that the objects of God's creative power (*maqdūrāt al-bāri'*)¹⁴⁶ will arrive at a point

¹⁴⁴ Cf., *Ta'rikh Baghdād*, XII, 172, 5-8; and *Mizān*, III, 278, 17-19.

¹⁴⁵ Abū'l-Hudhayl Muḥammad b. Hudhayl al-'Allāf (d. 226/840), one of the most original and influential members of the early Mu'tazilī school of Basra. He is credited, e.g., with the introduction of atomism into Islamic theology, a doctrine that was to become the dominant view not only within the Mu'tazilī school but also in both Ash'arism and in non-Ash'arite traditionalist *kalām* down to the end of the Middle Ages. For a masterful account of what is currently known of the life and thought of Abū'l-Hudhayl in its most important aspects, see J. van Ess, *Theologie und Gesellschaft im 2. und 3. Jahrhundert Hidschra*, III, 209-296; for a much briefer, though by now dated, summary, see the article on him by Nyberg, *EL*², I, 127-129. *GAS*, I, 617-618, contains a list of the most important medieval sources on him.

¹⁴⁶ The term *maqdūrāt* has been rendered variously by scholars, but for Abū'l-Hudhayl it generally has the same sense as the terms *ḥawādith* and *muḥdathāt*, i.e., phenomenal occurrences (entities, events or movements) brought into being by God's power (*qudra*); they are from Abū'l-Hudhayl's perspective actualizations (objects) of God's power. For a variety of reasons, but primarily, it would seem, to defend the idea of creation *ex nihilo* against the philosophers, on the one hand, and the *dahriya* (materialists), on the other, Abū'l-Hudhayl advanced the view that the *maqdūrāt* (all things that have ever been or will ever be) form a "whole" (*kull, jamī'*) that must necessarily be finite in terms of both space and time. There must be a last *maqdūr* if we are to suppose that there was a first (as the Quranic doctrine of creation requires); when the last *maqdūr* has been actualized all movement will cease as will the creation of new beings. Abū'l-Hudhayl postulated that this would happen sometime in the hereafter, at which time all movement (activity) in Paradise and Hell would cease, and the inhabitants of each would be reduced to a state of permanent quiescence (cf., *Talbīs*, 83, 12-14; *Maqālāt*, 163, 13-14; 475, 1-2; 485, 11-14; and al-Khayyāf, *al-Intiṣār*, 12, 8-10). Despite the good intentions behind the theory, it was perceived as problematic almost from the beginning—partly because of the dubious conclusions Abū'l-Hudhayl drew from it, but primarily because it appeared to impose limits on God's power. This was the criticism levelled by theologians such as al-Baghdādī (*Uṣūl*, 50f., 94, 238), and it appears to be the central problem for Ibn al-Jawzī (in addition to §§28 and 29, cf., also his *Talbīs*, esp., 83, 9-19). Because of the problems which attended the theory, it was soon abandoned by Mu'tazilīs themselves (even by some of Abū'l-Hudhayl's own students, among them Shaḥḥām and Ja'far b. Ḥarb), and there are reports that Abū'l-Hudhayl himself eventually abandoned it, although van Ess is convinced that he did not do so, and produces some evidence indicating that the theory survived in isolated pockets within the school for several generations. For a fuller discussion of Abū'l-Hudhayl's views on the *maqdūrāt*, see R.M. Frank's important studies, "The Divine Attributes According to the Teaching of Abū'l-Hudhayl," *Muséon*, 82 (1969), 451-506, esp., 473-490; and *The Metaphysics of Created Being According to Abū'l-Hudhayl al-'Allāf* (Istanbul 1966), 22ff.; as well as the study by van Ess, "Abu l-Hudhayl in Contact: The Genesis of an Anecdote," *Islamic Theology and Philosophy*, (Albany 1984), 13-30; and his *Theologie und Gesellschaft im 2.*

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29 [The words of] this foolish man are in conflict with a number of scriptural texts, including the verse: “What is with God will remain [forever].”¹⁴⁸ Had [Abū’l-Hudhayl] reflected on this matter he would have realized that contingent entities (*ḥawādith*) which do not yet exist have not entered into existence (*wujūd*); rather they are brought into being (one by one) over a succession of instants (*ḥālan fa-ḥālan*). What has not entered into existence cannot be termed “finite” (*mutanāhiyan*)¹⁴⁹ until it has been in existence and terminated; the power (*qudra*) of God, however, cannot come to an end (or reach its limit) since He has not yet created the totality of contingent entities (*makhluqāt*) and abrogated His *maqdūrāt*, for had He created [contingent entities] all at once (*daf’an*) they would be limited [in duration].¹⁵⁰

und 3. Jahrhundert Hidschra, III, 255ff. For a more general introduction to Abū’l-Hudhayl’s thought, see van Ess, “Une lecture à rebours de l’histoire du mu’tazilisme,” *REI*, 46 (1978), 216-240; and the article by Nyberg in *EP*, I, 127-129. For a list of primary sources on his life and thought, see *GAS*, I, 617-618; and *GAL*, Suppl., I, 338.

¹⁴⁷ The punishment of Hell will not literally come to an end; rather the punishment experienced at the moment when the last *maqdūr* has been realized will become permanently fixed, and the inhabitants of Hell will remain in that condition presumably for ever (cf., Shahrastānī, *Milal* [Cairo 1910], I, 73, 3-5; Ibn Ḥazm, *Fīṣal*, IV, 83, 21-84, 4; al-Baghdādī, *Uṣūl*, 94, 14-16; and Ibn Taymīya, *Minhāj*, I, 310-311). What will be different is that all movement will have ceased. Strictly speaking then, punishment will continue but it will be punishment frozen in time, if that is possible to conceive. Abū’l-Hudhayl’s view is to be distinguished from that of Jahm b. Ṣafwān, who held that the *maqdūrāt* will be totally annihilated so that in the end only God will remain (cf. *Maqālāt*, 148, 11-149, 5).

¹⁴⁸ S. 16:97; cf., *Zād al-Masīr*, IV, 488.

¹⁴⁹ Since the word here in the MS is blurred, *mutanāhiyan* should be regarded as a tentative reading.

¹⁵⁰ If God had created all of them at once that event would necessarily have been in the past (since things obviously do exist); hence, from the vantage point of the present, His creative activity would be a thing of the past, and the *makhluqāt/maqdūrāt* would necessarily be finite in terms of time or duration. One could not in that case speak of God’s creative activity as being eternal (without end). The *maqdūrāt* would then be finite because they have ceased, and God’s power (*qudra*) would be limited in the sense that there would be no further actualizations of that power. This leads me to conclude that when Ibn al-Jawzī speaks of the infinite in this paragraph it is an infinity of time or duration, not one of

kam¹⁵⁶ used to teach that God should be conceived of as a body and that bodies resemble each other. As for Ibn ar-Rāwandī,¹⁵⁷ nothing absorbed

¹⁵⁶ An early Imāmī theologian (d. 179/795) who, despite certain anthropomorphist tendencies, exerted an important influence on a number of early Muʿtazilī thinkers, among them an-Nazzām. For a sketch of his life and a summary of his teaching, see the excellent art. by W. Madelung on him in *EF*², III, 496-498; for a more detailed treatment reflecting more recent research, see J. van Ess, *Theologie und Gesellschaft im 2. und 3. Jahrhundert Hidschra*, I, 349-379.

¹⁵⁷ Aḥmad b. Yaḥyā b. Ishāq Abū'l-Ḥusayn ar-Rāwandī (d. 298 or 310 [*Muntaẓam*, VI, 99]), originally a member of the Muʿtazilī school who, allegedly under the influence of the Manichean Abū 'Isā al-Warrāq, abandoned the teachings of the school and, according to Ibn al-Jawzī, embraced a number of dangerous heretical views combined with a systematic scepticism regarding the revealed religions. It was the tone of Ibn ar-Rāwandī's critique as much as its content that angered Ibn al-Jawzī and explains his remark that Ibn ar-Rāwandī was worse than Iblīs himself: even though Iblīs disobeyed God, he at least addressed Him with respect (*Muntaẓam*, VI, 102, 15-18). The importance which Ibn al-Jawzī attached to the case of Ibn ar-Rāwandī may be seen in the unusually long biographical notice devoted to him in *Kitāb Muntaẓam* (VI, 99-105; for a translation of Ibn al-Jawzī's notice, see H. Ritter, "Ibn al-Ḡauzīs Bericht über Ibn ar-Rēwendī," *Der Islam*, 19 [1931], 1-17; reprinted in *Beiträge zur Erschliessung der Arabischen Handschriften in Istanbul und Anatolien*, II [1986], 51-67). There Ibn al-Jawzī outlines some of the more dangerous views held by Ibn ar-Rāwandī and cites a number of refutations of him, all by Muʿtazilī scholars: Abū 'Alī al-Jubbā'ī, his son Abū Hāshim, and Abū'l-Ḥusayn al-Khayyāṭ, the Baghdādī historian of Muʿtazilism (cf. also *Talbīs*, 111-112). Because none of Ibn ar-Rāwandī's works (which, according to van Ess, may have numbered as many as a hundred) are extant, the reconstruction of his life and his theological views by modern scholarship has progressed rather slowly. Even the date of his death has been the subject of considerable debate, with views ranging from 250 to 300AH. Among the contributions of modern scholarship to the study of Ibn ar-Rāwandī, especially important are the writings of P. Kraus ("Beiträge zur islamischen Ketzer-geschichte," *RSO*, 14 [1934], 93-129, 335-379); H. S. Nyberg ("Amr Ibn 'Uba'id et Ibn al-Rawendi, deux reprouvés," *Classicisme et declin* [Paris 1957], 125-136); G. Vajda (cf., *EF*², III, 905-906); J. van Ess ("Ibn ar-Rēwandī, or the Making of an Image," *al-Abhath*, 27 [1987/89], 5-25); his "Une Lecture à rebours de l'histoire du muʿtazilisme," *REI*, 46 [1878], 163-191); and the study by S. Stroumsa, "The Blinding Emerald: Ibn al-Rāwandī's *Kitāb al-Zumurrud*," *JAOS*, 114 (1994), 163-185; and her *Freethinkers of Medieval Islam*, 37-86. J. van Ess maintains (on the basis of a set of carefully constructed arguments) that Ibn ar-Rāwandī was not the dangerous heretic that he is made out to be in our medieval sources, but rather more likely a questioning believer who became the victim of a vicious campaign launched against him by the Muʿtazila of Baghdad. Stroumsa, on the other hand, is sceptical of van Ess's reading of the sources and argues that the traditional view of Ibn ar-Rāwandī is essentially correct. It is perhaps not entirely surprising, given the state of our sources on Ibn ar-Rāwandī, that modern scholarship should arrive at rather different views of Ibn ar-Rāwandī and his place in the intellectual history of medieval Islam. For a useful

more of his time than reproaching the Creator. Such also was the case of Abū'l-ʿAlāʾ al-Maʿarrī,¹⁵⁸ as is [fol.8b] evident from the following lines:

Commandments there are which some people take lightly,
Yet no one knows whom destruction will befall.
The Book of Muḥammad, and the Book of Moses,
The Gospel of Mary's Son and the Psalms of David.¹⁵⁹

In another poem he said (may God punish him!):

The vicissitudes of time wrench lovers from each other;
O God, judge between that and me!
Do you forbid (to humankind) the premeditated taking of life,
While You Yourself dispatch two angels to seize it?
You claim there will be a second chance in the hereafter.
How much better it would be to escape both states!¹⁶⁰

survey of the medieval Arabic sources on Ibn ar-Rāwandī, see *GAS*, I, 620-621.

¹⁵⁸ Cf., *Talbīs*, 111-112, where Ibn al-Jawzī lumps the cases of Ibn ar-Rāwandī and al-Maʿarrī together; see also *Muntaẓam*, VIII, 185, where Abū Ḥayyān at-Tawḥīdī is added to the list of reprobates. The notice in the *Muntaẓam* is particularly scathing in its condemnation of Abū'l-ʿAlāʾ al-Maʿarrī; apart from his vegetarianism, his sympathy for the plight of animals and his ascetic lifestyle, which Ibn al-Jawzī notes with some interest, the poet is accused of harboring severe doubts concerning a number of doctrines central to Islam (prophecy, the revealed character of the Quran, resurrection and the afterlife) and concealing a scepticism, even unbelief, under the cover of pious-sounding language. Ibn al-Jawzī was not alone in his views, as Laoust points out in his important study of the poet ("La vie et la philosophie d'Abū'l-ʿAlāʾ al-Maʿarrī," *BEO*, 10 [1944-45], 136-138). For a critical discussion of the views held by Abū'l-ʿAlāʾ, see R. Nicholson, *Studies in Islamic Poetry* (Cambridge 1921), esp., ch. 2; and H. Laoust, "La vie et la philosophie d'Abū'l-ʿAlāʾ al-Maʿarrī," *BEO*, 10 (1944-45), 119-156. Smoor's article on him in *EP*, V, 927-935, provides an overview of his life and his literary production (cf., also *GAL*, I, 254-255; and Suppl. I, 449-454).

¹⁵⁹ The following line, not included by Ibn al-Jawzī, reads: "No nation gave heed to their bans, [and so] their wisdom perished in vain." Cf., Nicholson, *Studies in Islamic Poetry* (Cambridge 1921), 215, where additional lines are cited; also cf., *Muntaẓam*, VIII, 187; and Taha Husayn, *Taʾrīf al-Qudamāʾ*, 24, 57, 110, 146, 193, 306, 324, 330. For H. Laoust's rendering of these lines, see his "La vie et la philosophie d'Abū'l-ʿAlāʾ al-Maʿarrī," *BEO*, 10 (1944-45), 142.

¹⁶⁰ That is, by never having been born. According to Smoor, al-Maʿarrī regarded the act of procreation as itself a sin (*EP*, V, 930b). In his *Muntaẓam* (VIII, 188) Ibn al-Jawzī prefaces the above lines (which he says he took from the history of Abū'l-Ḥasan Muḥammad b. Hilāl b. Muḥsin aṣ-Ṣābiʿ) with the remark: "I mention these lines of poetry only to demonstrate this man's unbelief (*kufr*)" (cf., *Taʾrīf al-Qudamāʾ*, 25, 56, 116, 145, 193, 283, 291, and 306).

[*Anthropomor*]

30 I have observed that s
positions on matters of
are three persons, name
Qāḍī [Abū Yaʿlā],¹⁶³ and I
writing and whose books
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Thus when they learn th
they conclude that God ha
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¹⁶¹ That is, *uṣūl ad-dīn*, viz.,
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must be the principle guide.

¹⁶² On Ibn Ḥāmid, see notes t

¹⁶³ See notes to §37.

¹⁶⁴ See notes to §37.

¹⁶⁵ Cf., §32 where the charge
al-ʿAlthī (d. 634) preserved in
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وجوهنا بمقاتلتك القاسية was th
embrace of *taʿwīl* and his under
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by opposing factions within the

¹⁶⁶ That is, an attribute over a

¹⁶⁷ Cf., Gimaret, *Image*, 54-55.

[Anthropomorphist Tendencies in the Ḥanbalī School]

30 I have observed that some members of the [Ḥanbalī] school have taken positions on matters of *uṣūl*¹⁶¹ that are not acceptable. Among them there are three persons, namely, Abū ʿAbd Allāh b. Ḥāmid,¹⁶² his disciple the *Qāḍī* [Abū Yaʿlā],¹⁶³ and Ibn Zāghūnī,¹⁶⁴ who have detailed [their views] in writing and whose books have brought shame on the school.¹⁶⁵ In my view they have descended to the level of the vulgar masses (*ʿawāmm*) by interpreting [texts from the Quran and the *ḥadīth* bearing on] the divine attributes (*ṣifāt*) in accordance with the requirements of sense perception (*ʿalā muqtaḍāʾ-l-ḥiss*). — Thus when they learn that God created Adam in his own “form” (*ṣūra*), they conclude that God has a form [like ours?] consisting of a face (*waḡh*), which [they say is an attribute] added to His essence (*zāʾid ʿalāʾdh-dhāt*),¹⁶⁶ two eyes, a mouth, an uvula, molars, a forehead bearing the marks of prostration (*subuḡāt*), two hands, fingers—even a little finger and a thumb—a chest and a thigh, two legs and two feet, but they add: “We know of no reference to a head.”¹⁶⁷ They also assert that God can touch and be touched, and that a person may actually draw near to the divine essence. Some of them even say that [God] breathes. They delight the uneducated public by advancing views that contravene the canons of reason. Having adopted a literal interpretation of the divine names (*asmāʾ*) and the attributes (*ṣifāt*) they go on to apply the term “attribute” [to both of them] indiscriminately—an

¹⁶¹ That is, *uṣūl ad-dīn*, viz., those foundational theological principles on which religion rests. As Ibn al-Jawzī insists repeatedly in *KAS*, these are matters in which reason (*ʿaql*) must be the principle guide.

¹⁶² On Ibn Ḥāmid, see notes to §14.

¹⁶³ See notes to §37.

¹⁶⁴ See notes to §37.

¹⁶⁵ Cf., §32 where the charge is repeated. As we learn from the *Risāla* of Abūʾl-Faḍl al-ʿAlthī (d. 634) preserved in Ibn Rajab's *Dhayl* (II, 210, 12), Ibn al-Jawzī too was accused of bringing shame on the school through the views he championed (ولقد سوّدت ووجهنا بمقاتك الفاسدة was the way al-ʿAlthī put it [see Appendix, §17]), particularly his embrace of *taʾwīl* and his understanding of the divine attributes. It would appear that the charge of bringing shame on the school was one used fairly commonly in the 12th century by opposing factions within the school.

¹⁶⁶ That is, an attribute over and above the divine essence and therefore separate from it.

¹⁶⁷ Cf., Gimaret, *Image*, 54-55.

innovative method of designation for which there is no evidence (*dalīl*) in scripture or in reason.¹⁶⁸ They ignore the scriptural texts (*nuṣūṣ*) that discourage a literalistic interpretation (*ẓawāhir*) in favor of modes of representation (*maʿānī*) that are necessary to God's [oneness and transcendence] and [require] the negation of those references (*simāt*)¹⁶⁹ which, when taken literally, imply origination in time (*ḥudūth*). They are not satisfied to call such, "an attribute of action" (*ṣifat fiʿl*) but insist on designating it "an attribute of essence" (*ṣifat dhāt*). Then, having declared them to be such, they refuse to interpret them along lines required by literary usage, in which case the expression "hand [of God]" should be taken to mean His power (*qudra*) or blessing (*niʿma*); [references to His] "arriving" (*majīʾ*) or "coming" (*ityān*) as His kindness (*birr*) or His benevolence (*luṭf*), and [references to His] "thigh" (*sāq*) as His might (*shidda*). [fol.9a] Rather, they say: "We interpret such expressions literally (*ʿalā ẓāhir*)." However, since the literal meaning takes human qualities (*nuʿūt al-ādamīyīn*) as its point of reference, the expression may be construed in its concrete, literal sense (*ʿalā ḥaqīqatihi*) only when that is possible;¹⁷⁰ if that is not possible then it ought to be construed metaphorically (*ʿala majāz*). [In reality,] they are steeped in [the methods] of anthropomorphism (*tashbīh*),¹⁷¹ their following having come [largely] from the uneducated classes (*ʿawāmm*).¹⁷²

31 I have thus [thought it necessary to] expose the errors of both those who follow and those who are followed [in these matters]. I say to my fellow Ḥanbalīs: "You are proponents of scripture and tradition (*naql wa ittibāʿ*), and your distinguished *imām*, Aḥmad b. Ḥanbal, used to say when he was being scourged [on account of his beliefs]: 'How can I say what has

¹⁶⁸ For more on the problem of terminological confusion, see §33, item 1 and notes to the translation.

¹⁶⁹ By *simāt* Ibn al-Jawzī appears to mean those "attributes" mentioned above which, if taken literally, would imply that God is a corporeal being.

¹⁷⁰ Or "acceptable" in the sense that it is compatible with God's essential nature, including above all His oneness and His transcendence.

¹⁷¹ At the end of this sentence, *DST* (6) and BA, 20a insert the following: "But they resent the application of [the term *tashbīh*] to them and they say: 'We are Ahl as-Sunna'. Their statements, however, are clearly anthropomorphist in character (وكلامهم صريح في التشبيه)." (التشبيه).

¹⁷² See D. Gimaret, *Dieu à l'image de l'homme* (Paris 1997), 54-55, where parts of this paragraph are translated.

not been said [before]?"¹⁷³ heretical doctrines into his matters as the recitation (*qirāʾa*) and what is read [Aḥmad] taught that God's attributes of essence (*ṣifāt*) On what grounds do you matters? Some of you have an attribute added to His essence are in conflict with established oppose innovation (*bidʿa*). to be interpreted literally (*qadam*). [alleged to be only acceptable method is appear in the text [without to be added.

32 "If you had understood would not have fallen into God (*rūḥ Allāh*).¹⁷⁴ Christ (*ṣifa*) of God which entered God sits on the Throne in the realm of the physical ser

¹⁷³ That is, by the early authorities etc.

¹⁷⁴ On the analogous question named), see notes to §25 where

¹⁷⁵ On the question of *bidʿa*, also the art. "*Bidʿa*" in *EF*, I, 11 complex one, for which the English one.

¹⁷⁶ That is, between the literalist approach allegedly advocated by

¹⁷⁷ Cf., S. 4: 171. For a discussion for Ibn al-Jawzī is based on conciliatory "list" or corporealism in nature), see §§33 and 43, where the question

¹⁷⁸ In the Christian view, as required (cf., preceding note).

not been said [before]?¹⁷³ Be on your guard, therefore, lest you introduce heretical doctrines into his teaching! Did [Aḥmad] ever discourse on such matters as the recitation (*tilāwa*) and what is recited (*matlūw*), the reading (*qirā'a*) and what is read (*maqrū'*)?¹⁷⁴ Has anyone ever reported to you that [Aḥmad] taught that God's sitting on the Throne (*istiwā'*) is one of the attributes of essence (*ṣifāt adh-dhāt*) or an attribute of action (*ṣifāt al-fī'l*)? On what grounds do you justify venturing into [a discussion of] such matters? Some of you have stated that a 'hand' is to be ascribed to God as an attribute added to His essence (*zā'ida 'alā dh-dhāt*). All such statements are in conflict with established norms and are repugnant to those who oppose innovation (*bid'a*).¹⁷⁵ You insist that the traditions of the Prophet are to be interpreted literally (*'alā ṣāhir*), but the literal meaning of 'foot' (*qadam*), [alleged to be one of the divine attributes], is 'limb' (*jāriha*). The only acceptable method is to allow [the words of scripture] to stand as they appear in the text [without comment]. They are to be recited, but nothing is to be added.

32 "If you had understood the difference between the two positions,¹⁷⁶ you would not have fallen into error. When it is said that Jesus is the spirit of God (*rūḥ Allāh*),¹⁷⁷ Christians maintain that 'spirit' (*rūḥ*) is an attribute (*ṣifa*) of God which entered into Mary.¹⁷⁸ [Likewise] those who affirm that God sits on the Throne in His essence (*bi-dhātihi*) have relegated Him to the realm of the physical senses (*ḥissiyāt*). It is essential that due consideration

¹⁷³ That is, by the early authorities of the Community: the Prophet, Companions, Followers, etc.

¹⁷⁴ On the analogous question of the *ism* (the name) versus the *musammā* (the thing named), see notes to §25 where the Ḥanbalī position is discussed.

¹⁷⁵ On the question of *bid'a*, see Laoust, *La profession de foi d'Ibn Baṭṭa*, 8, n. 1. Cf., also the art. "*Bid'a*" in *EF*, I, 1199. It should be noted here that the question of *bid'a* is a complex one, for which the English rendering above (innovation) is not an entirely adequate one.

¹⁷⁶ That is, between the literalist position and (what might be called) the non-interventionist approach allegedly advocated by Aḥmad b. Ḥanbal.

¹⁷⁷ Cf., S. 4: 171. For a discussion of this text in relation to the Christian claim (which for Ibn al-Jawzī is based on conceptions rooted in sense experience and, therefore, "materialist" or corporeal in nature), see Ibn al-Jawzī's *Zād al-Masīr*, II, 260-262; cf. also KAS, §§33 and 43, where the question of *rūḥ* is revisited.

¹⁷⁸ In the Christian view, as represented here, "spirit" is understood as a physical substance (cf., preceding note).

be given to what can be established by the principle of reason, for it is through this latter that we can know [that] the Creator [exists] and can ascertain Him to be eternal. Use reason, then, to shield God from those finite, corporeal qualities (*tashbīh aw tajsīm*) that are alien to His being, and permit the traditions of the Prophet to stand exactly as you find them, without adding to or subtracting from them! If you had said: 'We recite them [without comment],' no one would have censured you. It is your interpretation of them in a literalistic fashion (*ʿalāʾī-ẓāhir*) alone that is objectionable. Refrain from insinuating into the doctrine of [Aḥmad], our pious ancestor, what he never taught! Instead you have brought shame and dishonor to the school, so much so that the only thing that is now said of a Ḥanbalī is that he is an anthropomorphist (*mujassim*).¹⁷⁹ Not only that, but you have embellished your doctrine with a narrowly partisan devotion (*ʿaṣabiya*) to Yazīd [b. Muʿāwiya] even though you know quite well [fol.9b] that the founder of the school actually permitted the cursing [of Yazīd].¹⁸⁰

¹⁷⁹ Ibn al-Jawzī reports in his *Muntaẓam* (IX, 4, 15-19) that al-Bakrī, an Ashʿarite preacher who was active in Baghdad in 475/1082, stated, apparently in one of his sermons, that some Ḥanbalīs held the view that God even has a penis. Although Ibn al-Jawzī dismisses the charge as false, it does indicate the kind of reputation Ḥanbalīs had in some quarters.

¹⁸⁰ Ibn Rajab reports that the Ḥanbalī school of Baghdad was indeed divided over the question of Yazīd b. Muʿāwiya (see *Dhayl*, I, 354-358, but esp., 356-357; also *Ṭabaqāt al-Ḥanābila*, II, 273-10-15, where Abū Muḥammad at-Tamīmī [d. 488/1095] confirms the observations of Ibn Rajab). According to Ibn Rajab, the Ḥanbalī traditionist ʿAbd al-Mughīth b. Zuhayr (d. 583/1187) was an outspoken defender of Yazīd, but Ibn Rajab also notes that ʿAbd al-Mughīth was not alone among Ḥanbalīs in his defense of Yazīd; among others, he mentions Abū ʿAlī al-Ḥusayn b. Abī Yaʿlā (d. 526) and a certain Abū ʿAlī al-Ḥasan b. al-Bannāʾ who died in 484 (*Dhayl*, I, 356, and *Muntaẓam*, IX, 59). Undoubtedly there were others, possibly including Ibn Abī Yaʿlā's father, Abū Yaʿlā. Ibn Rajab (who bases himself largely on the now lost chronicle of Ibn al-Qaṣīr) reports that Ibn al-Jawzī was one of the leaders of the anti-Yazīd faction and even authored a work on the question entitled *ar-Radd ʿalā al-Mutaʿaṣṣib al-ʿAnīd al-Mānīʿ Man Dhamm al-Yazīd* (*Dhayl*, I, 356, 6; *GAL*, I, 503, no. 16; and ʿAlwajī, *Muʿallaḡāt Ibn al-Jawzī* [Baghdad 1965], 103) in which he detailed the case against Yazīd. That Ibn al-Jawzī's position was well known among his contemporaries is evident from the frequent references to it in medieval chronicles (cf., e.g., Ibn Athīr, *Kāmil*, XI, 562-563 [sub anno 583]; and Ibn Kathīr, *Bidāya*, XII, 350). It is not surprising that Ibn ʿAqīl too was a member of the anti-Yazīd camp (cf., G. Makdisi, *Ibn ʿAqīl* [1997], 176). G. Makdisi notes that behind the anti-Yazīd stance was an abiding affection for ʿAlī and especially Ḥusayn. Between these two positions there was a third group of Ḥanbalīs who refused to take sides over this question. In his *ʿaqīda*, Abū Muḥammad at-Tamīmī (d. 488/1095), while conceding that a case can be made for both positions, demands that

Abū Muḥammad at-Tamīmī had brought such shame on the school until the day of resurrection.

33 The errors of the school are divided into seven categories. (1) The

partisan debate over this question in the community. For a statement of opinion preserved in *Ṭabaqāt al-Ḥanābila*, Barbahārī is cited as supporting the view; see Goldziher, *ZDMG*, 53 (1899), *Studies*, II, 96, n.6.

¹⁸¹ Abū Muḥammad Rizq al-Ḥanbalī (d. 488/1095), an influential and well-known scholar to whom Ibn al-Jawzī clearly held in high regard (*al-Ḥanābila*, II, 250-251; *Muntaẓam*, III, 384; and Ibn al-Jawzī, *Manāẓir ʿAqīl*, 269-274, 342-343, 423-424).

¹⁸² Following the printed edition of *al-Bāzīʿ al-Ashhab* (Beirut 1407/1987), here as Abū Yaʿlā b. al-Farrāʾ.

¹⁸³ Ibn Athīr's notice on Abū Yaʿlā that the object of Abū Muḥammad's criticism was other than Abū Yaʿlā himself. The Arabic text reads: 'على الخبالة خربة لا يغسلها الماء'. Ibn Athīr used to say: "Abū Yaʿlā al-Farrāʾ was so filthy that it cannot be washed." Ibn Athīr and Abū Yaʿlā, though in part the product of the social and theological divisions of the 5th/11th century (cf., Makdisi, *Ibn al-Jawzī*, 176), were affiliated with that branch of the school. [d. 425], Abū ʿAlī al-Hāshimī [d. 425], more sensitive to the problematic aspects of anthropomorphic attributes (and one might also say to theological questions) in contrast to Abū Yaʿlā, the *sharīf* Abū Jaʿfar al-Jawzī came to associate himself with the latter. This is reflected in the arguments detailed above that it reflects the outlook of a line of scholars who wished to distance itself from the doctrine of anthropomorphism and somewhat circuitous and nuance anthropomorphism be taken more seriously.

Abū Muḥammad at-Tamīmī¹⁸¹ used to say of one of your leaders¹⁸² that he had brought such shame on this school that it would not be washed away until the day of resurrection.”¹⁸³

33 The errors of the authors to whom I have referred above fall into seven categories. (1) They take scriptural texts which refer only to the

partisan debate over this question be set aside in the interest of the school and the larger community. For a statement of Abū Muḥammad's position, see the text of his *ʿaqida* preserved in *Ṭabaqāt al-Ḥanābila*, II, 273, 10-15; and 382, 10; see also II, 34, 10, where Barbahārī is cited as supporting a similar position. On the wider controversy over Yazīd, see Goldziher, *ZDMG*, 53 (1899), 645-652; *ZDMG*, 66 (1912), 139-142; and *Muslim Studies*, II, 96, n.6.

¹⁸¹ Abū Muḥammad Rizq Allāh b. ʿAbd al-Wahhāb b. ʿAbd al-ʿAzīz at-Tamīmī (d. 488/1095), an influential and well-connected member of the Ḥanbalī school of Baghdad whom Ibn al-Jawzī clearly held in high regard. For biographical details, see esp., *Ṭabaqāt al-Ḥanābila*, II, 250-251; *Muntaẓam*, IX, 88-89; *Dhayl*, I, 77-85; *Kāmil*, X, 253; *Shadharāt*, III, 384; and Ibn al-Jawzī, *Manāqib Aḥmad b. Ḥanbal*, 525 (cf., also G. Makdisi, *Ibn ʿAqīl*, 269-274, 342-343, 423-424).

¹⁸² Following the printed edition of *DST* (Damascus 1345/1926, p. 8, n. 1), the editor of *al-Bāzīʿl-Ashhab* (Beirut 1407/1987), Muḥammad Munīr, identifies the person referred to here as Abū Yaʿlā b. al-Farrāʾ.

¹⁸³ Ibn Athīr's notice on Abū Yaʿlā (*al-Kāmil*, X, 52, 19-21) makes it reasonably certain that the object of Abū Muḥammad's remarks (reported above by Ibn al-Jawzī) was none other than Abū Yaʿlā himself. The last sentence of Ibn Athīr's notice reads: *وكان ابن تميمي: الحنبلي يقول: لقد خرب أبو يعلى الفراء على الحنابلة خربة لا يغسلها الماء* [Ibn Tamīmī al-Ḥanbalī used to say: “Abū Yaʿlā al-Farrāʾ brought disgrace (lit. heaped refuse) on Ḥanbalīs to such an extent that it cannot be washed away”]. The conflict between Abū Muḥammad at-Tamīmī and Abū Yaʿlā, though in part the result of a personal rivalry, at the same time reflected the social and theological divisions that existed within the school (especially in Baghdad) in the 5th/11th century (cf., Makdisi, *Ibn ʿAqīl*, 267-268 and 342-350). Abū Muḥammad was affiliated with that branch of the school (which included such names as Abūʿl-Faraj at-Tamīmī [d. 425], Abū ʿAlī al-Hāshimī [d. 428] and Ibn ʿAqīl) that was intellectually more open, more sensitive to the problematic of the traditionalist position on the question of the divine attributes (and one might also say, less resistant to Ashʿarī and Muʿtazilī perspectives on theological questions) in contrast to the more traditionalist views of men like Ibn Ḥāmid, Abū Yaʿlā, the *sharīf* Abū Jaʿfar and Ibn Zāghūnī. It was the former tendency that Ibn al-Jawzī came to associate himself with; it is the viewpoint of that wing of the school that is reflected in the arguments detailed in *KAS*. The importance of *KAS* lies, in part, in the fact that it reflects the outlook of a line of Ḥanbalī thinkers in the 11th and 12th centuries that wished to distance itself from the die-hard traditionalist wing of the school by insisting, in a somewhat circuitous and nuanced manner, that the Ashʿarī and Muʿtazilī critique of anthropomorphism be taken more seriously.

awṣāf (qualifications)¹⁸⁴ and construe them as though they were *akhbār aṣ-ṣifāt*.¹⁸⁵ Not everything ascribed to God [in scripture], however, should be assigned the status of an attribute (*ṣifa*). Thus, when the Quran relates God as having said: "I breathed into [Adam] My spirit (*rūḥ*),"¹⁸⁶ the reference to "spirit" (*rūḥ*) here should not be taken to mean that God possesses an attribute by that name.¹⁸⁷ Indeed, those who term a simple qualification (*muḍāf*) an attribute have departed from normative practice.¹⁸⁸ (2) They say that the meaning of those sayings of the Prophet that fall into the category

¹⁸⁴ That is, "qualifications (*awṣāf*)" which may be ascribed to God based on a scriptural text. Although Ibn al-Jawzī does not use the expression *akhbār al-awṣāf* (texts on the basis of which a qualification may be ascribed to God) here, that, in fact, is what he is referring to. For more on the *awṣāf* and the distinction between these latter and the *ṣifāt*, see note 188.

¹⁸⁵ Scriptural texts on the basis of which a divine attribute may be predicated of God.

¹⁸⁶ See S. 12:29, and 38:72.

¹⁸⁷ Ibn Hāmid is said to have insisted on *rūḥ* as one of the divine attributes, indeed as one of the attributes of essence (*ṣifa min dhātihi* [§44]). See also §62, where the question of *rūḥ* in relation to God is discussed.

¹⁸⁸ Ibn al-Jawzī's insistence on differentiating between the *awṣāf* and the *ṣifāt* reflects a distinction that had long been standard within Sunnī, and especially Ashʿarī, theological circles. Ashʿarites were not the first, however, to make the distinction. It is to be found in the teachings of Ibn Kullāb (d. 855) and appears to go back as far as Hishām b. al-Ḥakam, the early Imāmī theologian (d. 795/6). Within this theological tradition the *ṣifāt* were held to be actual identifiable "entities" (*maʿānī*) within the divine essence itself, hence the designation attributes of essence, of which there were eight: life (*ḥayāt*), knowledge (*ʿilm*), power (*qudra*), will (*irāda*), hearing (*samʿ*), sight (*baṣar*), speech (*kalām*), and duration (*baqāʾ*). They are based on explicit references in the Quran and the sayings of the Prophet, that is, on what Ibn al-Jawzī calls peremptory evidence (see below, item no. 4 in §33; also §14). The *awṣāf*, by contrast, refer to "qualities" (Gimaret prefers the term "qualificatives" since it calls attention to the fact that the *awṣāf* are primarily words used by human beings) that in some way refer to God's actions, but, unlike the *ṣifāt*, they do not define the divine essence. Concerned to preserve the absolute unity of the divine essence, the Muʿtazila rejected the Ashʿarite understanding of *ṣifāt* as referring to specific entities (*maʿānī*) in the divine essence, and insisted that there is no real difference between *awṣāf* and *ṣifāt*; for them terms like *wasf* (quality) *ṣifa* (attribute) and *ism* (name) may be used interchangeably; they are merely words that we apply to God, nothing more. For more on the distinction between *awṣāf* and *ṣifāt*, see Gimaret, *Doctrine*, 235-245; also *EI*², IX, 551a-552; Frank, *EI*², suppl. 343-348; and his "Attribute, Attribution, and Being...", *Philosophies of Existence, Ancient and Medieval*, 258-278. For a Ḥanbalī statement on the divine attributes that reflects the clear influence of Ashʿarism, see Abū Yaʿlā, *Muʿtamad*, 44.

of the *mutashābihāt* (ambiguities) they add: "We take [these] as though they were *akhbār*. How strange it is that the term *ṣifa* knows?"¹⁹⁰ Can the term *ṣifa* mean anything other than "sitting" or "movement" (*intiḳāl*)?¹⁹² (3) [On this understanding] that attributes are on the same basis as essence (*dhāt*) is peremptory evidence (*adiyya*) and rejects what is ascribed to the creature. He [not] blasphemed in that those who reject traditions of the Prophet, and those who go forth, are predicated of God. Traditions in question have

¹⁸⁹ This sentence presupposes that the Quran, the *muḥkamāt* (those whose meaning is ambiguous), is who sent down to you the Book—the essence of the Book—and that whose hearts there is an inclination to (i.e., desiring dissension and seeking to change the Book), save only God." This distinction is between the sayings of the Prophet.

¹⁹⁰ Ibn al-Jawzī's position is that the mysteries which the human mind should be allowed to stand without since, by equating the mystery with a literal interpretation, or indeed, to makes a mockery of that mystery.

¹⁹¹ An allusion to the saying of the Prophet (peace be upon him) (throne), an expression that is four

¹⁹² Notions that are perfectly connected to the *mutashābihāt*, which

¹⁹³ On him, see notes to §36.

¹⁹⁴ The twofold blasphemy makes less than the respect it deserves, and

¹⁹⁵ Also referred to as *khāḥ* (a single authority in contrast to the more than two sources) and *mutawāḥid*

of the *mutashābihāt* (ambiguous sayings) is known only to God.¹⁸⁹ But then they add: "We take [these obscure texts] in their literal sense (*‘alā zāhiriḥā*)."¹⁹⁰ How strange it is that the literal meaning (*zāhir*) is one that only God knows?¹⁹⁰ Can the term *istiḥḍā*,¹⁹¹ when taken in its literal sense, mean anything other than "sitting" (*qu‘ūd*), or the term *nuzūl* anything other than "movement" (*intiqāl*)?¹⁹² (3) They ascribe attributes to God [carelessly, not understanding] that attributes (*ṣifāt*) ought to be predicated of God on the same basis as essence (*dhāt*) is predicated, [that is,] only on the authority of peremptory evidence (*adilla qaṭ‘īya*). Ibn Ḥāmid¹⁹³ said: "Anyone who rejects what is ascribed to God in reliable traditions (*akhbār thābita*)—has he [not] blasphemed in a double sense?"¹⁹⁴ The majority of Ḥanbalīs hold that those who reject traditions in which a leg, foot, fingers, palm, and so forth, are predicated of God are to be declared unbelievers even if the traditions in question have come down to us from a single source (*āḥād*),¹⁹⁵

¹⁸⁹ This sentence presupposes the traditional distinction between two classes of verses in the Quran, the *muḥkamāt* (those whose meaning is clear) and the *mutashābihāt* (verses whose meaning is ambiguous). This classification is based on S. 3: 7, which reads: "He it is who sent down to you the Book in which there are clear verses (*muḥkamāt*)—they are the essence of the Book—and those that are ambiguous (*mutashābihāt*). As for those in whose hearts there is an inclination to fall away, they follow the ambiguous part (ما تشابه به), desiring dissension and seeking its interpretation (*ta‘wīl*); and none knows its interpretation save only God." This distinction between the clear and the ambiguous was later applied to the sayings of the Prophet.

¹⁹⁰ Ibn al-Jawzī's position is that the *mutashābihāt* (ambiguous or obscure texts) concern mysteries which the human mind cannot penetrate. That being the case, all such texts should be allowed to stand without comment. A literal interpretation is particularly offensive since, by equating the mystery known to God alone with the literal (obvious) meaning, it makes a mockery of that mystery. A frankly acknowledged agnosticism is preferable to a literal interpretation, or indeed, to any interpretation at all.

¹⁹¹ An allusion to the saying *istawā ‘alā ‘l-‘arsh* (God is seated, or established, on the throne), an expression that is found in both the Quran and the *ḥadīth*.

¹⁹² Notions that are perfectly comprehensible! If this is the kind of meaning that is to be attached to the *mutashābihāt*, where is the mystery or the ambiguity?

¹⁹³ On him, see notes to §36.

¹⁹⁴ The twofold blasphemy may be this: 1) a source that ought to be accepted is given less than the respect it deserves, and 2) God is denied attributes which are rightly His.

¹⁹⁵ Also referred to as *khbar al-wāḥid* or *khbar al-infirād*, i.e., traditions going back to a single authority in contrast to those that are termed *mashhūr* (reports that go back to more than two sources) and *mutawātir* (those that go back to multiple sources). See §14, where

for, in our view, their contents belong to the category of authoritative knowledge (*‘ilm*).” Statements of this sort can come only from one who does not understand either the principles of jurisprudence or those of reason. (4) They fail to distinguish between those prophetic traditions that rest on multiple authorities (*khavar mashhūr*) such as “He (God) descends to the lowest heaven,” and traditions that are not at all reliable such as, for example, the saying “I saw my Lord in the best form (*fī aḥsani ṣūratin*).”¹⁹⁶ In fact, they establish divine attributes on the basis of both categories of traditions indiscriminately. (5) They make no distinction between traditions whose line of transmission goes back to the Prophet (*marfū‘*) and [fol.10a] those that go back only to a Companion or a Follower (*mawqūf*).¹⁹⁷ Indeed, they predicate attributes of God on the basis of both types of traditions without distinction. (6) They interpret certain expressions metaphorically (*ta’awwalū*) in one place but refuse to do so in [another] place. Thus, for example, they take the divine saying: “He who comes to Me walking I will come to him running”¹⁹⁸ as a figure of speech referring to God’s bestowal of blessings on His creatures. However, in connection with the saying of ‘Umar b. ‘Abd al-‘Azīz.¹⁹⁹ “On the day of resurrection, God will come

definitions of these terms are given. For more on these terms, see *El*², IV, 896a; III, 25; and B. Weiss, “Language and Tradition,” *Der Islam*, 61 (1984), 94-95; also *KAS*, §§102 and 116 where the question of *āḥād* traditions is discussed in relation to the “establishment” of the divine attributes.

¹⁹⁶ See §§72, 74, 76, 79 and 184, where this saying or approximations of it are cited and discussed.

¹⁹⁷ See §113 where Ibn al-Jawzī comments on the value of traditions that derive from *tābi‘ī* sources, i.e., reports derived from Followers.

¹⁹⁸ These words belong to that class of sayings known as the *ḥadīth qudsī* or divine sayings. For other references to this tradition in *KAS*, see §§115, 181, and 222; cf., Ibn al-Jawzī’s *al-Mashyakha* (Beirut 1980), 65-66, where the *isnād* is given in full as well as a brief sketch of Ibn al-Jawzī’s early encounter with the saying. Virtually all of the canonical collections of *ḥadīth* contain the saying in one or another of its variant forms: Bukhārī, *tawḥīd*, 15, 3 (Houdas, *Les traditions*, IV, 588[3]); Muslim, *dhikr*, 2, 19, 20; *tawba*, 1; *Musnad*, II, 251, 315, 391, 413, etc. For medieval discussions of this saying, see esp., Ibn Qutayba, *Ta’wīl Mukhtalif al-Ḥadīth* (Cairo 1386/1966), 224; al-Bayhaqī, *al-Asmā’*, 457ff.; and Ibn Khuzayma, *Kitāb at-Tawḥīd*, 7. For additional references and a summary of more recent scholarly discussion of the saying, see W. Graham, *Divine Word*, 127-128.

¹⁹⁹ The eighth caliph of the Umayyad dynasty, noted for his piety, his tolerant attitude toward non-Muslims, and his far-reaching reform of governmental policy, especially with respect to the *mawālī* question. See the biographical notices on him in the *Ṭabaqāt* of Ibn

walking,”²⁰⁰ they insist on a interpret a saying going back so when considering [a sir Finally, they make sense of ḥadīth. Thus, they say that moves from place to place that such statements are not they deceive those who listen and reason (*al-ḥiss wa’l-‘aql*).

[The
The Necessity of

34 If someone should ask w something by means of exp should be pointed out that s to such an extent that they the realm of the senses, an affinity (*mujānasa*) for thing

Sa’d (V, 330-408), and the Hā number of his sayings are found the author of a full-length biography Press) under the title *Sirat ‘Umar* 1984/1404 (see also ‘Alwajī, M 180).

²⁰⁰ It is not entirely clear to me utterance transmitted by ‘Umar meant since in the following line ‘Abd al-‘Azīz” (the speech or s available to me for traces of this another of ‘Umar’s sayings bearing

²⁰¹ It is not clear here whether or whether a distinction is intended occurs fairly frequently in *KAS*, to denote one particular species of *makān ilā makān*).

²⁰² The term sophistry is not in sense of specious arguments and obfuscation.

walking,"²⁰⁰ they insist on a literal interpretation. How strange it is that they interpret a saying going back to the Prophet metaphorically but refuse to do so when considering [a similar saying] from 'Umar b. 'Abd al-'Azīz! (7) Finally, they make sense experience the basis of their interpretation of the *ḥadīth*. Thus, they say that God Himself (*bi-dhātihi*) descends (*yanzilu*) and moves from place to place (*yantaqilu wa yataḥarraku*).²⁰¹ They maintain that such statements are not to be understood rationally. By such sophistry they deceive those who listen to them and they contradict both sense experience and reason (*al-ḥiss wa'l-'aql*).²⁰²

*[The Language of Revelation and
The Necessity of Metaphorical Interpretation (Ta'wīl)]*

34 If someone should ask why the Messenger of God summoned [people] to something by means of expressions that are seemingly anthropomorphic, it should be pointed out that sense experience conditions the way people think to such an extent that they are scarcely able to conceive what lies beyond the realm of the senses, and the reason for that lies in the natural human affinity (*mujānasa*) for things temporal (*ḥadīth*). [This explains why] some

Sa'd (V, 330-408), and the *Ḥilya* of Abū Nu'aym, (V, 253-353) where a very large number of his sayings are found (cf., also Ibn al-Jawzī's *Ṣafwa*, II, 63-72). Ibn al-Jawzī is the author of a full-length biography of 'Umar, published in Cairo 1331/1912 (al-Mu'ayyid Press) under the title *Sīrat 'Umar ibn 'Abd al-'Azīz*, and reprinted again in Beirut in 1984/1404 (see also 'Alwajī, *Mu'allafāt Ibn al-Jawzī* [Baghdad 1965] 112, 129, 163, 180).

²⁰⁰ It is not entirely clear to me whether this saying is meant to be taken as a prophetic utterance transmitted by 'Umar or a saying from 'Umar himself. Apparently the latter is meant since in the following line of the Arabic text it is referred to as "*kalām* 'Umar b. 'Abd al-'Azīz" (the speech or saying of 'Umar). I have searched the sources on 'Umar available to me for traces of this saying but so far without result. See §§185-186 where another of 'Umar's sayings bearing on the question of God's walking is cited and discussed.

²⁰¹ It is not clear here whether *intaqala* and *taḥarraka* are meant to be taken as synonyms or whether a distinction is intended? In general *taḥarraka*, which, along with *intaqala*, occurs fairly frequently in *KAS*, is used to denote motion in general whereas *intaqala* tends to denote one particular species of motion, viz., movement from one place to another (*min makān ilā makān*).

²⁰² The term sophistry is not intended here in its technical sense but in the more general sense of specious arguments and forms of reasoning used for the purpose of deception or obfuscation.

people worship the stars and attribute beneficial and harmful influences to them;²⁰³ [why] some people worship light and attribute good to it and evil to darkness;²⁰⁴ [why] some people worship angels, some the sun, some Jesus, some ‘Uzayr,²⁰⁵ and some the cow, and [why] the majority of people [worship] idols. [People] have a natural affinity for those things whose existence can be apprehended through the senses. It was for this reason that [the Children of Israel] said to Moses: “Make us a god.”²⁰⁶ If revelation (*sharāʾiʿ*) had been given [to the Prophet] in the language of pure transcendence (*biʾt-tanzīh al-maḥḍ*),²⁰⁷ it would have had to express itself through negation and denial (*an-nafy waʾl-jahd*). When they²⁰⁸ said [to the Prophet]: “Describe your Lord to us,”²⁰⁹ the verse: “Say, He is God the One” was revealed.²¹⁰ Had [the Prophet] merely said that He is not a body (*jism*), [fol.10b] or an atom (*jawhar*), or an accident (*ʿaraḍ*); that He is without length or breadth; that He neither occupies space nor is encompassed by space; that none of the six spatial relations apply to Him; that He neither moves (*mutaḥarrrik*) nor is at rest (*sākin*); and that He is not accessible to the senses (*aḥsās*), et cetera,—[they would not have understood]. Had [the Meccans] only said: “Limit your use of [the language of] negation by making concrete²¹¹ the One to whose worship you summon us [instead of relying solely on the language of] negation,²¹² otherwise you call us to something that has no

²⁰³ See *Talbīs*, 74, where the Ṣābiʿūn are described as worshippers of the stars: “Most of them (says Ibn al-Jawzī) claim that the world is uncreated. Some of them term the stars angels (*malāʾika*) while others call them gods and worship them....”

²⁰⁴ Cf., *Talbīs*, 75ff., where Ibn al-Jawzī discusses the Mazdian (*majūs*) dualism of light and darkness.

²⁰⁵ Cf., S. 9:30, and *Zād al-Masīr*, III, 422, where Ibn al-Jawzī summarizes the principal views current in the scholarship of his day with regard to ‘Uzayr (cf., also *Talbīs*, 73). For a brief summary of modern research on the name, see the art. by H. Lazarus-Yafeh, *IEJ*, X, 960.

²⁰⁶ S. 7: 138. Cf., Exodus 32:1-5.

²⁰⁷ A language stripped of all images and symbolic expressions.

²⁰⁸ That is, the Meccans.

²⁰⁹ See *Zād al-Masīr*, IX, 265ff., where Ibn al-Jawzī presents different views as to the identity of the questioner(s).

²¹⁰ S. 112:1.

²¹¹ Literally, by distinguishing (*bi-an tumayyiza*).

²¹² That is, limit the use of negation so that God’s existence may be discerned as something concrete and real.

reality [for us]—they would say that God applied to Himself a hand—such as, for example, anger, building the House [of God] which can be touched with hands, foot, ascending the mountain for the purpose of rendering His existence a point of revelation (*sharʿ*) of transcendence (*tanzīh*), although for this reason that the Prophet said: “On another occasion when I was asked the affirmative.”²¹⁵ However, by appealing to images (such as such representations (*tashbīh*)) the verse: “There is nothing like

²¹³ An allusion to the tradition: “The Black Stone is the right-hand of God”) This is the tradition as reported in *Mushkil al-Ḥadīth*, 117, reports a

أَرْضَهُ، يَصَافِعُ بِهَا مَنْ شَاءَ مِنْ خَلْقٍ، whomsoever God wills may touch it. This is an interpretation of this tradition—see also the Sharif Abū Jaffar (d. 477) who were prepared to adopt such a tradition, see Ibn Fūrak, 117-119.

²¹⁴ See KAS §§122-123 (traditions of God) is a part is cited and discussed. T of the standard collections of *ḥadīth* and 21 (*aymān wa nuddhūr*): 16 *Musnad*, V, 447-448. Al-Bayhaqī on it briefly (cf., Ibn Khuzayma, *Muʾtamad*, 56 of the tradition, see *Muʾtamad*, 56 is possible to speak of God’s “will”

²¹⁵ Cf., KAS, §§114-116 (traditions of God) *Sunan*, *muqaddima*, 13 (181).

²¹⁶ S. 42:11. The point seems permissible if their purpose is to be used as a basis for understanding the divine attributes) they cease to

reality [for us]—they would have spoken the truth]. It was for this reason that God applied to Himself expressions (*asmāʾ*) which they could comprehend—such as, for example, hearing, seeing, understanding, expressing anger, building the House, and designating the [Black] Stone as the hand [of God] which can be touched,²¹³ not to mention such expressions as face, hands, foot, ascending the Throne (*istiwāʾ*) and descending—all for the purpose of rendering His existence capable of affirmation. From the vantage point of revelation (*sharʿ*) this is more important than an emphasis on transcendence (*tanzīh*), although the latter is an essential part of it. It was for this reason that the Prophet once asked a slave-girl: “Where is God?”²¹⁴ On another occasion when he was asked whether God laughs he answered in the affirmative.²¹⁵ However, while [the Prophet] affirmed God’s existence by appealing to images (*ṣuwar*) drawn from sense experience, supposing such representations (*tashbīh*) [to be literally true] was proscribed by the verse: “There is nothing like unto Him.”²¹⁶

²¹³ An allusion to the tradition: الحجر الأسود يمين الله في الأرض، فمن صافحه فكأنما صافح الله (the Black Stone is the right-hand of God on earth; whoever touches it, touches [the hand of] God) This is the tradition as reported by Ibn Rajab, *Dhayl*, I, 174-175; Ibn Fūrak, *Mushkil al-Ḥadīth*, 117, reports a slightly different version of the *ḥadīth*: الحجر الأسود يمين الله في أرضه، يصافح بها من شاء من خلق (the Black Stone is the right-hand of God on earth; whomever God wills may touch it). Ibn Rajab notes that some Ḥanbalīs insisted on a literal interpretation of this tradition—e.g., al-Ḥasan b. al-Fāʿūs (d. 521/1127) and undoubtedly also the Sharīf Abū Jaʿfar (d. 470/1077). Ibn Rajab notes, however, that not all Ḥanbalīs were prepared to adopt such a position. For a discussion of other interpretations of this tradition, see Ibn Fūrak, 117-119, and Ibn Qutayba, *Taʾwīl*, 277 (cf., Lecomte, 240).

²¹⁴ See KAS §§122-123 (tradition # 17) where the larger tradition of which this question is a part is cited and discussed. The tradition (with slight variations) is found in a number of the standard collections of *ḥadīth*: Muslim, 5 (*masājid*): 33; Abū Dāwūd, 2 (*ṣalāt*): 167; and 21 (*aymān wa nudhūr*): 16 (an abridged version); Nasāʾī, 13 (*sahw*): 20; and the *Musnad*, V, 447-448. Al-Bayhaqī, *Asmāʾ*, 421-422, cites the short version and comments on it briefly (cf., Ibn Khuzayma, *Tawḥīd*, 121-122). For an interesting Ḥanbalī discussion of the tradition, see Muʿtamad, 56, where, on the basis of this text, Abū Yaʿlā argues that it is possible to speak of God’s “whereness” (*aynīya*).

²¹⁵ Cf., KAS, §§114-116 (tradition # 14). For the text of the tradition, see Ibn Māja, *Sunan*, *muqaddima*, 13 (181).

²¹⁶ S. 42:11. The point seems to be that images drawn from human experience are permissible if their purpose is to affirm the reality of God’s existence. But once they are used as a basis for understanding the nature of the divine essence (including the question of the divine attributes) they cease to be permissible.

35 The Messenger did not utter his sayings (*aḥādīth*) *en bloc* (*jumlatan*) [at a particular point in time], but rather individually on [many] different occasions. Consequently, those who have compiled them [into books], with chapters arranged according to "image" (*ṣūra*),²¹⁷ have committed an egregious error.²¹⁸ Collections (*majmūʿ*) of this sort, even those containing sound traditions, are of little value (*yasīr*), [but they do call attention to the fact that the Prophet] was an Arab given to the use of metaphorical language (*tajawwuz*). Did [the Prophet] not say: "'The Cow' and 'the People of ʿImrān'" ²¹⁹ will come forth [on the day of resurrection] like two clouds or like two flocks of birds soaring in the air with outstretched wings," or that "death will be led forth [on the day of resurrection] in the form of a speckled ram and will be slain."²²⁰

²¹⁷ That is, images (*ṣuwar*) applied to God in the Quran and the *ḥadīth*. It would seem from Ibn al-Jawzī's comments above that there were works in existence devoted to a treatment of these images, i.e., works in which individual chapters focussed on the question of a particular *ṣūra*, or perhaps entire works devoted to the treatment of a single image. Unfortunately, Ibn al-Jawzī does not tell us enough about such works to make it possible to identify them with confidence. He may, however, have in mind here works like Ibn Khuzayma's *Kitāb at-Tawḥīd*, which in fact consisted of series of chapters, each devoted to a particular image. Ibn al-Jawzī makes it clear elsewhere in *KAS* that he had little sympathy for the views of Ibn Khuzayma. Ibn al-Jawzī may also have in mind works like Ibn Zāghūnī's *Taṣḥīḥ Ḥadīth al-Aṭīf*, a short treatise devoted to a discussion of a particular facet of the *istiwāʾ*-image (i.e., God seated on the Throne). The work is lost, however, and our only knowledge of it is based on a brief reference in Ibn Rajab's *Dhayl* (I, 181, 18-19). The clear implication of Ibn al-Jawzī comments above is that there were other works of this kind in circulation, perhaps authored by the other men he takes to task in *KAS*.

²¹⁸ The point here is that, since the Prophet's utterances were given at different times and under different circumstances, they ought to be understood in light of the specific occasions on which they were given. To abstract them from time and place, and then to insist on a literal interpretation, can only lead to confusion and misunderstanding. The problem with such collections is that in organizing images by kind or type, they are torn from their proper setting and in the end distorted.

²¹⁹ Titles of the second and third surahs of the Quran, respectively. For fuller versions of the *ḥadīth*, see the following, among others: Muslim, 6 (*ṣalāt al-musāfirīn*) 252, 253; the *Musnad*, IV, 249, 251, 255, 257, 348, 353, 361; Tirmidhī, 42, (*ṭhawāb al-Qurʾān*), 5. Cf., also *Zād al-Masīr*, I, 19.

²²⁰ For the full text, see esp., Muslim, 52 (*janna*), 40; Bukhārī, 65 (*tafsīr surat*), 19 (Houdas, *Les traditions*, III, 379); Tirmidhī, 44 (*tafsīr surat*), 19; *Musnad*, II, 377, 423, 513; and III, 6. The significance of this saying lies (it would seem) in the fact that the Prophet acknowledges these two images as forms of speech that arise out of sense experience, and hence are to be treated as metaphorical expressions.

36 If someone should a scriptural texts (*aḥādīth*)²²¹ stand as they are, our answer in the first place, [the texts of so] order to focus attention (*in*). When they are interpreted of [these texts] contain ex metaphorical interpretation Lord comes"²²⁴ refers to the Ḥamad b. Ḥanbal said: "The conclusion, for movement (*i*) if a term like "hand" had been "power" (*qudra*), this latter include the notion of power diverting attention away from had adopted a metaphorical have widened and the result persons asked [the *salaf*] the (*istawā*) on the Throne (*al*) sitting on the Throne is an e its modality (*kayf*) is unknown

²²¹ What follows makes it clear Prophet (i.e., *aḥādīth* in the narrow

²²² That is, *inās* does not occur.

²²³ The argument in this paragraph public. Here Ibn al-Jawzī's point language, it is best not to interpret ordinary believers. Ibn al-Jawzī de equipped to apply it properly. I extensive use of *taʾwīl* because he of metaphorical exegesis.

²²⁴ S. 89:22.

²²⁵ See the excellent article by R.

²²⁶ The notion of *quwwa* as power and, if applied to God, would have

²²⁷ S. 7:54, etc.

36 If someone should ask why the *salaf* refused to interpret (*tafsīr*) scriptural texts (*aḥādīth*)²²¹ and insisted that these latter be permitted to stand as they are, our answer is that they did so for three reasons. In the first place, [the texts of scripture] were recited [without explanation] in order to focus attention (*īnās*) on the reality of God's existence (*mawjūd*). When they are interpreted this does not happen,²²² given the fact that some of [these texts] contain expressions that do [when explained] require a metaphorical interpretation (*taʿwīl*).²²³ Thus, for example, the verse "Your Lord comes"²²⁴ refers to the coming of His command (*amr*). [fol.11a] Aḥmad b. Ḥanbal said: "The proofs of reason (*adillat al-ʿaql*) lead to this conclusion, for movement (*intiḳāl*) cannot be attributed to Him." Secondly, if a term like "hand" had been explained metaphorically (*taʿawwul*) to mean "power" (*qudra*), this latter might have been construed in such a way as to include the notion of potentiality (*quwwa*),²²⁵ and so could have risked diverting attention away from what is acceptable.²²⁶ Thirdly, if [the *salaf*] had adopted a metaphorical method of exegesis, the breach (*kharq*) would have widened and the result would have been confusion. When uneducated persons asked [the *salaf*] the meaning of the verse "[God] seated himself (*istawā*) on the Throne (*al-ʿarsh*)",²²⁷ they were simply told that God's sitting on the Throne is an established fact (*maʿlūm*) and that, even though its modality (*kayf*) is unknown, it is to be accepted by faith (*īmān*) and not

²²¹ What follows makes it clear that Ibn al-Jawzī has in mind not just the sayings of the Prophet (i.e., *aḥādīth* in the narrow sense of the term) but Quranic passages as well.

²²² That is, *īnās* does not occur.

²²³ The argument in this paragraph assumes that the audience is the general (uneducated) public. Here Ibn al-Jawzī's point is that even though scripture does contain figurative language, it is best not to interpret such language out of respect for the simple faith of the ordinary believers. Ibn al-Jawzī does not oppose the use of *taʿwīl* if it is confined to circles equipped to apply it properly. In chapters II and III of *KAS* Ibn al-Jawzī will make extensive use of *taʿwīl* because he is addressing persons able to understand the intricacies of metaphorical exegesis.

²²⁴ S. 89:22.

²²⁵ See the excellent article by R. Arnaldez, "*Quwwa*," *EF*, V, 576-579.

²²⁶ The notion of *quwwa* as potentiality (innate unrealized power) implies imperfection and, if applied to God, would have led to a serious qualification of divine *qudra*.

²²⁷ S. 7:54, etc.

to be questioned.²²⁸—We follow this approach only because the masses (‘*awāmm*) are not able to grasp matters that are complex and subtle (*ghawāmiḍ*).

[Leading Proponents of Anthropomorphism
Within the Ḥanbalī School]

37 The *imām* Aḥmad used to say: “Let the texts of scripture (*aḥādīth*) stand as they are.” Some of his leading disciples followed this principle—men like Ibrāhīm al-Ḥarbī²²⁹ and Abū Dāwūd al-Ashram,²³⁰ as well as some of the [later] authorities of the school such as Abū’l-Ḥasan at-Tamīmī,²³¹ Abū

²²⁸ Literally, asking questions about it is “heresy” (*bid‘a*).

²²⁹ Ibrāhīm b. Ishāq b. Ibrāhīm Abū Ishāq al-Ḥarbī (198-285/811-898), a student of Aḥmad b. Ḥanbal in *ḥadīth*, and, like Aḥmad, a vigorous opponent of *kalām*, especially of the Mu‘tazilī variety. His legal affiliation is less certain: both Ibn al-Jawzī (*Manāqib*, 508; *Muntaẓam*, VI, 3-7) and Ibn Abī Ya‘lā (*Ṭabaqāt al-Ḥanābila*, I, 86-93) list him as a Ḥanbalī and devote important notices to him, but Shāfi‘ites also claimed him as one of their own (*ET*², III, 994). It is interesting that while Subkī includes a notice on him in his *Ṭabaqāt ash-Shāfi‘iyya* (II, 256-257), he does acknowledge that Ibrāhīm studied *fiqh* under Aḥmad b. Ḥanbal. For additional sources on him, see *GAL*, Suppl. I, 188, and *ET*², III, 994.

²³⁰ I have not found an Abū Dāwūd al-Ashram listed in any of the sources on early Ḥanbalism. It is possible that “al-Ashram” is a corruption perhaps of al-Ash‘ath, in which case the reference may be to Abū Dāwūd b. al-Ash‘ath, known also as Abū Dāwūd as-Sijistānī (d. 275/888), author of the well known *Kitāb as-Sunna*, which he is said to have submitted to Aḥmad b. Ḥanbal for his approval before putting the work into circulation. He was active in early Ḥanbalī circles and taught *ḥadīth* to a number of early Ḥanbalīs, among them Abū Bakr al-Khallāl. For notices on Abū Dāwūd, see *Ṭabaqāt al-Ḥanābila*, I, 159-162; *Ta‘rīkh Baghdād*, IX, 55-59; and *Muntaẓam*, V, 97. Another possibility, though on paleographic grounds somewhat more remote, is that the reference here is to Abū Bakr al-Athram Aḥmad b. Hānī (d. 296/909) whose *nisha* (al-Athram) in Arabic closely resembles al-Ashram. It is relatively easy to explain how a scribe could have mistakenly copied down al-Ashram in place of al-Athram; it is less easy to explain the *kunya* Abū Dāwūd if Abū Bakr was the intended reading. In light of the problems with the latter option, I am inclined to consider Abū Dāwūd b. al-Ash‘ath as the more likely reading. Abū Bakr al-Athram, however, cannot be ruled out. For biographical sources on Abū Bakr, see *Muntaẓam*, VI, 83; *Manāqib*, 507; *Ṭabaqāt al-Ḥanābila*, I, 66-74; and *Ta‘rīkh Baghdād*, V, 110-112.

²³¹ ‘Abd al-‘Azīz b. al-Ḥārith b. Asad b. al-Layth Abū’l-Ḥasan at-Tamīmī (317-371/929-981), an influential 10th century Ḥanbalī whose theological views reflect the subtle influences of Mu‘tazilism and Ash‘arism (Makdisi, *Ibn ‘Aqīl* [1997], 105-106, 109, and 130). For

Muḥammad [at-Tamīmī] Ri b. ‘Aqīl.²³³ However, three Ibn Ḥāmid,²³⁴ the *Qāḍī* [Ab

biographical notices on him, see and *Ta‘rīkh Baghdād*, X, 461-46

²³² For more on Abū Muḥammad

²³³ See notes to §20.

²³⁴ Al-Ḥasan b. Ḥāmid b. ‘Al perhaps the most influential Ḥan jurisprudence, he did compose questions, viz., his *Sharḥ Uṣūl* apart from a relatively insignificant and important Ḥanbalī master, see references to his views on the div 64, 76, 135, 139, 151, 177, 186.

²³⁵ Of the Ḥanbalīs chastised by none is censured more often nor Ḥanbalī school for a good part of b. al-Farrā’, known better as Abū the 19th of Ramaḍān 458/14 A writer (see *Ṭabaqāt al-Ḥanābila* Abū Ya‘lā was a complex and c (Ibn Taymīya) for his Shāfi‘ite le Ash‘arite sympathies. But the cri in spite of works like *Kitāb al-ḥ* clearly anthropomorphist, and t shame on the Ḥanbalī school (at-Tamīmī was deeply offended (*Kāmil*, X, 52). One is not surpr views and, as we learn, again fro and rather early in the career of Abū’l-Ḥasan al-Qazwīnī is menti against his views and composed *radd* [refutation] in their titles, w offensive and raising objections the following: *ar-Radd ‘alā’l-As Labbān*, etc. (*Ṭabaqāt al-Ḥanābila* sources (cf., *Kāmil*, IX, 460), it is the anthropomorphist charges was to simply as *Kitāb as-Ṣifāt*, and its

Muḥammad [at-Tamīmī] Rizq Allāh b. ‘Abd al-Wahhāb,²³² and Abū’l-Wafā’ b. ‘Aqīl.²³³ However, three persons whom we have already mentioned, viz., Ibn Ḥamid,²³⁴ the Qādī [Abū Ya‘lā],²³⁵ and Ibn Zāghūnī,²³⁶ are well-known

biographical notices on him, see esp., *Muntaẓam*, VII, 110; *Ṭabaqāt al-Ḥanābila*, II, 139, and *Taʾrīkh Baghdād*, X, 461-462.

²³² For more on Abū Muḥammad at-Tamīmī, see notes to §31.

²³³ See notes to §20.

²³⁴ Al-Ḥasan b. Ḥāmid b. ‘Alī b. Marwān Abū ‘Abd Allāh al-Warrāq (d. 403/1012), perhaps the most influential Ḥanbalī jurist of his time. In addition to his many works on jurisprudence, he did compose a treatise that dealt with theological and hermeneutical questions, viz., his *Sharḥ Uṣūl ad-Dīn*. Unfortunately, none of his writings has survived apart from a relatively insignificant legal catechism (*GAS*, I, 515). For more on this interesting and important Ḥanbalī master, see notes to §14. See the following paragraphs of *KAS* for references to his views on the divine attributes: §§14, 33, 37, 39, 40, 44, 48, 52, 56, 61, 63, 64, 76, 135, 139, 151, 177, 186, 188, 244.

²³⁵ Of the Ḥanbalīs chastised by Ibn al-Jawzī (in *KAS*) for their anthropomorphist views, none is censured more often nor more severely than Abū Ya‘lā, a leading influence in the Ḥanbalī school for a good part of the 11th century. Muḥammad b. al-Ḥusayn b. Muḥammad b. al-Farrāʾ, known better as Abū Ya‘lā or simply the Qādī, was born 380/990 and died on the 19th of Ramaḍān 458/14 August 1066. A man of immense learning and a prolific writer (see *Ṭabaqāt al-Ḥanābila*, II, 205-206, for the most complete list of his works), Abū Ya‘lā was a complex and controversial figure. He was criticized by some Ḥanbalīs (Ibn Taymīya) for his Shāfiʿite leanings on certain legal questions and by others for certain Ashʿarite sympathies. But the criticism voiced most often by Ḥanbalīs was that Abū Ya‘lā, in spite of works like *Kitāb al-Muʿtamad*, had associated himself with views that were clearly anthropomorphist, and that through his advocacy of such views he had brought shame on the Ḥanbalī school (see *KAS* §31). Ibn Athīr reports that Abū Muḥammad at-Tamīmī was deeply offended by the views of Abū Ya‘lā on the question of the *ṣifāt* (*Kāmil*, X, 52). One is not surprised to learn that Ashʿarites also took exception to his views and, as we learn, again from Ibn Athīr, expressed their views in a quite public way, and rather early in the career of Abū Ya‘lā (see esp., *Kāmil*, IX, 460, where the role of Abū’l-Ḥasan al-Qazwīnī is mentioned). Abū Ya‘lā was well aware of the objections raised against his views and composed a number of works which, despite the use of the term *radd* [refutation] in their titles, were most likely attempts to defend himself by taking the offensive and raising objections to the views of his critics. Among such titles, one notices the following: *ar-Radd ‘alā’l-Ashʿariyya*, *ar-Radd ‘alā’l-Mujassima*, *ar-Radd ‘alā Ibn al-Labbān*, etc. (*Ṭabaqāt al-Ḥanābila*, II, 205, lines 8-11). Judging from references in medieval sources (cf., *Kāmil*, IX, 460), it is quite likely that the work by Abū Ya‘lā which occasioned the anthropomorphist charges was his *Ibtāl at-Taʾwīlāt li-Akhbār aṣ-Ṣifāt*, sometimes referred to simply as *Kitāb aṣ-Ṣifāt*, and its shorter version *Mukhtaṣar Ibtāl at-Taʾwīlāt*. Unfortunately,

these works have not survived, but we do have fragments of them quoted in other works. Ibn Abī Yaʿlā cites several lengthy passages from the *Ibtāl at-Taʿwīlāt* in *Ṭabaqāt al-Ḥanābila* (II, 211-212) as does Ibn Taymiyya (e.g., in his *ʿAqida Ḥamawiya*, 454-455) and others which cannot be mentioned here. Even if it is not possible to be dogmatic on this point, it seems likely that the unnamed work which Ibn al-Jawzī has in mind in *KAS* when he criticizes Abū Yaʿlā is exactly the *Ibtāl at-Taʿwīlāt*; this latter, it would appear, was composed with a somewhat more popular audience in mind than was the case with the *Muʿtamad*. It is clear, in any case, that Ibn al-Jawzī was not the first to censure Abū Yaʿlā for holding anthropomorphist views; he does appear, however, to have been the most sustained in his critique of the *Qāḍī*. In chaps. II and III of *KAS* there are some sixty references to Abū Yaʿlā, and virtually all of them involve criticism. Whether there was a political dimension to Ibn al-Jawzī's critique of the *Qāḍī* is an interesting and important question, though one that cannot be answered satisfactorily until more is known of the internal dynamics of the Ḥanbalī school of Baghdad in the 11th and 12th centuries.—For more on the life and work of Abū Yaʿlā, see the following: *Ṭabaqāt al-Ḥanābila*, II, 193-230 (which must be read with care given the apologetic stance of its author); *Muntaẓam*, VIII, 243-244; *Manāqib*, 520-521; *Taʾrīkh Baghdād*, II, 256; *Bidāya*, XII, 101; *Kāmil*, X, 52; *Shadharāt*, III, 306-307; *GAL*, I, 502; Suppl. I, 686; *ET*², III, 765-766; Makdisi, *Ibn ʿAqīl*, 232-234 (and index); and, above all, Abū Yaʿlā's *Muʿtamad*, edited and introduced by W. Haddad. For an interesting perspective on Abū Yaʿlā and the intellectual evolution of medieval Ḥanbalism, see Gimaret, "Théories de l'acte humain dans l'école ḥanbalite," *BEO*, 29 (1977), 157-178.

²³⁶ ʿAlī b. ʿUbayd Allāh b. Naṣr b. as-Sarī Abū'l-Ḥasan b. Zāghūnī (d. 527/1132), a leading Ḥanbalī jurist (*Dhayl*, I, 180), who was also well-known as an expert in the science of *ḥadīth*, Quranic readings, Arabic grammar, philology and *waʿz* (the art of preaching). G. Makdisi refers to him, along with Ibn Ḥāmid and Abū Yaʿlā, as one of the seven most influential members of the school in the 5th/11th century (*Ibn ʿAqīl*, 227). Ibn Zāghūnī received his education in law under Yaʿqūb al-Barzabīnī (d. 486/1093), Abū Yaʿlā's leading student in this field. In the discipline of *uṣūl al-fiqh* and *uṣūl ad-dīn*, Ibn Zāghūnī's intellectual roots can be traced back to Abū Yaʿlā and through him to Ibn Ḥāmid. Ibn Zāghūnī composed a number of works on *fiqh* and *ḥadīth*, and is known to have left behind an important collection of homilies (*waʿz*), not to mention a chronicle that covered the important years between 512 and 527 (1118-1132). The chronicle, highly regarded by contemporary scholars, was continued by Ibn Zāghūnī's student Ṣadaqa b. al-Ḥusayn (Ibn Athīr, *Kāmil*, XI, 449). For a full listing of his works (see Makdisi, *Ibn ʿAqīl*, 265-267; and *Dhayl*, I, 181). Of the three men whose views on the *ṣifāt* are criticized in *KAS*, Ibn Zāghūnī is the only one whom Ibn al-Jawzī knew personally. Ibn Zāghūnī was his very first teacher in the field of jurisprudence, and one of his earliest teachers in *ḥadīth* and *waʿz*. The two men remained close until Ibn Zāghūnī's death in 527 (cf., Sibṭ b. al-Jawzī, *Mirʾāt*, 481); we can assume that Ibn al-Jawzī's analysis of Ibn Zāghūnī's position on the *ṣifāt* was not developed until later in his life. It is the personal relationship between the two men that helps to explain Ibn al-Jawzī's reticence in taking his former teacher to task in *KAS*. In contrast to Ibn Ḥāmid and Abū Yaʿlā, who are mentioned frequently in chaps. II and III,

as advocates of a method (*ʿalā'l-ḥissiyāt*) as its point of departure, Ibn al-Jawzī offers a refutation of their views which are closely associated with such notions. This would imply my acceptance of the great importance in the mind of Ibn al-Jawzī that I do not want to daunt me, for action based on the knowledge (*maʿrifa*) of God is a matter of the heart. Aḥmad was once asked a question to which his response composed a legal opinion. He set out the views which he had set out to Ibn al-Mubārak, to which he did not come down from heaven. In refuting the views of Mālik

38 Since these three men

and who are criticized severely. Ibn al-Jawzī (d. 598/1201), and Ibn al-Jawzī's commentaries on three references to Ibn Zāghūnī, §§52 and 191; the third (§106) his writings were jurisprudential (*al-ḥaqāq fī Uṣūl ad-Dīn*) as well as being according to Ibn Rajab, treated as *istiḥṣān* ʿalā al-ʿarsh (*Dhayl*, I, 180). I speculate on those of his writings which are the views of his former teacher, but see the following notices for *ad-Dhayl*, X, 32; *Dhayl*, I, 180-181; of Shatṭī, 32; and Makdisi, *Ibn ʿAqīl*, 232-234 (and index) of *ḥadīth* under Ibn Zāghūnī, see I.

²³⁷ See §245 where Ibn al-Jawzī criticizes the teaching of Aḥmad; there too he seeks to counteract those distortions.

²³⁸ Cf. §46 where the expression *ḥal* or grave situation. In §47 the expression *ḥal* or grave situation.

²³⁹ In other words, duty requires one to act regardless of what others think (cf. *ibid.*, §47).

²⁴⁰ Cf., *Ṭabaqāt al-Ḥanābila*, I, 193-230.

²⁴¹ For more on the question of

as advocates of a method of interpretation that takes sense experience — (*‘alā’l-ḥissiyāt*) as its point of departure. I have come to the conclusion that a refutation of their views is essential if [the name of] Aḥmad is not to be associated with such notions. Indeed, my not speaking out on this question would imply my acceptance of their views.²³⁷ This endeavor—a matter of great importance in the minds of many (*amr ‘aẓīm fī’n-nufūs*)²³⁸—does not daunt me, for action based on evidence (*dalīl*) and especially on the knowledge (*ma‘rifa*) of God is a matter in relation to which *taqlīd* is not permissible.²³⁹ Aḥmad was once asked a question [regarding a point of law], and in response composed a legal brief (*fatwā*). Someone pointed out to him that the views which he had set forth [in his *fatwā*] did not accord with those of Ibn al-Mubārak, to which he responded: “The views of Ibn al-Mubārak did not come down from heaven.”²⁴⁰ Shāfi‘ī once said: “I sought divine guidance in refuting the views of Mālik.”²⁴¹

38 Since these three men have written books [setting forth their views on

and who are criticized severely, Ibn Zāghūnī is referred to only three times (§§52, 107 and 191), and Ibn al-Jawzī’s comments are relatively mild—at least for Ibn al-Jawzī. Of the three references to Ibn Zāghūnī, two concern the question of God’s sitting on the throne (§§52 and 191); the third (§106) deals with the question of God’s foot. If the majority of his writings were jurisprudential in nature, Ibn Zāghūnī did write a theological treatise (*al-Īdāḥ fī Uṣūl ad-Dīn*) as well as a short work entitled *Taṣḥīḥ Ḥadīth al-Aṭīf*, which, according to Ibn Rajab, treated prophetic traditions pertaining to the question of God’s *istiwa’ ‘alā al-‘arsh* (*Dhayl*, I, 181). Since Ibn Zāghūnī’s works are lost, one can only speculate on those of his writings that Ibn al-Jawzī had in front of him when referring to the views of his former teacher, but there is a good chance that one of them was the *Taṣḥīḥ*. See the following notices for additional details on the life of this influential Ḥanbalī: *Muntaẓam*, X, 32; *Dhayl*, I, 180-184; *Shadharāt*, IV, 80-81; *Bidāya*, XII, 220; the *Mukhtaṣar* of Shaṭṭī, 32; and Makdisi, *Ibn ‘Aqīl*, 265-267. For an interesting report on his early study of *ḥadīth* under Ibn Zāghūnī, see Ibn al-Jawzī’s *Mashyakha*, 79-80 (cf., *Manāqib*, 529).

²³⁷ See §245 where Ibn al-Jawzī charges certain fellow Ḥanbalīs with distorting the teaching of Aḥmad; there too he describes his own efforts, in *KAS*, as an attempt to counteract those distortions.

²³⁸ Cf. §46 where the expression *amr ‘aẓīm* occurs; there it seems to imply a threatening or grave situation. In §47 the expression *amr shadīd* seems to have the same meaning.

²³⁹ In other words, duty requires doing what is right (following one’s conscience) regardless of what others think (cf. §245).

²⁴⁰ Cf., *Ṭabaqāt al-Ḥanābila*, I, 329, 5-7.

²⁴¹ For more on the question of *taqlīd*, see §§18-22.

the divine attributes], and especially since the *Qāḍī* [Abū Yaʿlā] devoted a work to the discussion of scriptural texts (*aḥādīth*) [bearing on the matter of the attributes], I will discuss [these texts in the next two chapters] following the order of his treatment (*ʿalā tartībihī*),²⁴² beginning with the Quranic verses.

²⁴² From this it seems clear that the organization of chaps. II and III of *KAS* corresponds to the order followed by Abū Yaʿlā in his work, whose title is unfortunately not given either here nor elsewhere in *KAS*. In my view (and for reasons suggested in the note above on Abū Yaʿlā), the most likely candidate is Abū Yaʿlā's *Kitāb Ibtāl at-Taʿwīlāt li-Akḥbār aṣ-Ṣifāt*, or perhaps its abridgment *Mukhtaṣar Ibtāl at-Taʿwīlāt*. It is undoubtedly this work or its abridgment that Ibn Athīr had in mind when he referred to a work by Abū Yaʿlā under the title *Kitāb aṣ-Ṣifāt* in connection with the events of 429 (*Kāmil*, IX, 460). If it is Abū Yaʿlā's *Kitāb Ibtāl at-Taʿwīlāt* that Ibn al-Jawzī is referring to in the passage above, chaps. II and III of *KAS*, which quote Abū Yaʿlā frequently and sometimes at length, may be seen as preserving at least a portion of this lost work and, in doing so, these chapters provide additional information on the views of Abū Yaʿlā—that is, above and beyond those found in the *Muʿtamad*, which was clearly written for professional theologians. It would appear that the information on Abū Yaʿlā in *KAS* reflects views that were designed for a less sophisticated audience. If that is the case, *KAS* may help us fill out the larger picture of Abū Yaʿlā's thought.

[fol. 11b] QUR

39 [The Quran states that] Those knowledgeable in the to mean: your Lord will en verse "They desire His face

¹ As will be seen, chapter II is Quran that were apparently use anthropomorphic representations and expressions are properly un God is beyond our categories of

² S. 55: 27.

³ See *Zād al-Masīr*, VIII, 114 *al-Bayān fī Majāzāt al-Qurʾān*, 3 *ذاتُ رَبِّكَ وَحَقِيقَتُهُ* ([to say that His His reality will endure [forever]), a position that was close to the

هو هو فوجهه هو هو ونفسه هي هو 'face' which is He Himself; His f 165, 11-12; cf., 484, 5-7]). Wh divine attributes are not always attributes and the divine essence Muʿtazilī. On other facets of the closer to the Ashʿarī view. His i *awṣāf* is essentially Ashʿarī. Tal appears to be a synthesis of Muʿ in matters of theology, at least discussion of the question of C *Asmāʾ*, 301-312; cf., also Ibn Kh

⁴ S. 30: 39.

⁵ Most likely *Dahḥāk b. Muzā*

[CHAPTER TWO]

[fol. 11b] QURANIC VERSES RELATING TO THE
DIVINE ATTRIBUTES

[The First Text]¹

39 [The Quran states that] “The face of your Lord will endure [forever].”² Those knowledgeable in the interpretation of the Quran construe this verse to mean: your Lord will endure [forever].³ In like fashion they interpret the verse “They desire His face”⁴ to mean: they desire *Him*. Ḍaḥḥāk⁵ and Abū

¹ As will be seen, chapter II is a discussion of a series of expressions or texts from the Quran that were apparently used by the “*mujassima*” of the Ḥanbalī school to justify anthropomorphic representations of God. Ibn al-Jawzī aims to show here that if these texts and expressions are properly understood they are perfectly compatible with the view that God is beyond our categories of place, time and form.

² S. 55: 27.

³ See *Zād al-Masīr*, VIII, 114 where the same explanation is given (cf., Raḍī, *Talkhīṣ al-Bayān fī Majāzāt al-Qurʾān*, 321, 10, where “face” is interpreted as follows: المراد: وتبقى: ذات ربك وحقيقته ([to say that His face will endure] means that the essence of your Lord and His reality will endure [forever]). The early Muʿtazilī theologian, Abūʾl-Hudhayl, advocated a position that was close to the one which Ibn al-Jawzī defends here: كان يقول [أبو الهذيل]: لله وجه هو هو فوجهه هو هو ونفسه هي هو [Abūʾl-Hudhayl] used to say: “God has a ‘face’ which is He Himself; His face is He Himself and His *nafs* is He Himself” [*Maqālāt*, 165, 11-12; cf., 484, 5-7]). While some of the details of Ibn al-Jawzī’s position on the divine attributes are not always clear, on the question of the relationship between the attributes and the divine essence his position is quite clear and appears to be basically Muʿtazilī. On other facets of the question of the attributes, however, his position seems closer to the Ashʿarī view. His insistence on a clear distinction between the *ṣifāt* and the *awṣāf* is essentially Ashʿarī. Taken as a whole, Ibn al-Jawzī’s position on the attributes appears to be a synthesis of Muʿtazilī and Ashʿarī views—which leads one to suspect that in matters of theology, at least, he was something of an eclectic. For a somewhat fuller discussion of the question of God’s “face” from an Ashʿarī perspective, see Bayhaqī, *Asmāʾ*, 301-312; cf., also Ibn Khuzayma, *Tawḥīd*, 10-18.

⁴ S. 30: 39.

⁵ Most likely Ḍaḥḥāk b. Muzāḥim al-Hilālī (d. 105/723), who is said to have transmitted

‘Ubayda⁶ take the verse “Everything will be destroyed except His face”⁷ to mean that everything but God Himself will be destroyed.⁸

We reject the view of those who assert that the term “face” [in these texts]

exegetical traditions on the authority of a number of Companions, among them Ibn ‘Umar, Ibn ‘Abbās, Abū Hurayra, and Anas b. Mālik. Ḍaḥḥāk is cited twice in *KAS*: here and again in §210, where he is mentioned in connection with the question of the *kursī*. Aḥmad is said to have respected him as an exegete (*Shadharāt*, I, 124-125). For additional information on him and a list of sources, see *GAS*, I, 29-30.

⁶ Ma‘mar b. al-Muthannā Abū ‘Ubayda al-Baṣrī (d. 209/824), a distinguished grammarian, philologist, and literary critic who belonged to the Sufriya branch of the Khawārij. Among Abū ‘Ubayda’s many works, his *Majāz al-Qurʾān* is the one for which he is best known; it is undoubtedly this work that lies behind Ibn al-Jawzī’s reference above (see *Majāz al-Qurʾān* [Cairo 1381/1962], II, 112, line 6ff.). Although Ibn al-Jawzī cites Abū ‘Ubayda only twice in *KAS* (here and again in §46, where he refers to his interpretation of the term *sāq* with approval), it is clear from Ibn al-Jawzī’s published works (especially his *Zād al-Masīr fī ‘Ilm at-Tafsīr*) that he was well acquainted with *Majāz al-Qurʾān* and undoubtedly other works by him. For an overview of his life and work, see the article by Gibb in *EI*² (I, 158); for a full list of sources on Abū ‘Ubayda as well as an account of his writings, see *GAS*, VIII, 67-71, and IX, 65-77.—Since the publication of Gibb’s article, a number of important studies have appeared in which Abū ‘Ubayda’s understanding of language and the question of *majāz* have been treated at some length. See especially the following: J. Wansbrough, “*Majāz al-Qurʾān*: Periphrastic Exegesis,” *BSOAS*, 33 (1970), 247-266; E. Almagor, “The Early Meaning of *Majāz* and the Nature of Abū ‘Ubayda’s Exegesis,” in *Studia Orientalia Memoriae D. H. Baneth Dedicata* (Jerusalem 1979), 307-326; and the seminal study by W. Heinrichs, “On the Genesis of the *Ḥaqīqa*-*Majāz* Dichotomy,” *SI*, 59 (1984), 111-140. Heinrichs places Abū ‘Ubayda’s *Majāz al-Qurʾān* in a somewhat larger historical context and demonstrates quite conclusively that for Abū ‘Ubayda the term *majāz* had not yet come to mean “metaphorical” interpretation in opposition to *ḥaqīqa* or non-tropical interpretation. For Heinrichs, the dichotomy between *ḥaqīqa* and *majāz*, which looms so large in later exegetical theory, most likely dates from the early 10th century.

⁷ S. 28: 88.

⁸ Abū ‘Ubayda, *Majāz al-Qurʾān*, II (Cairo 1381/1962), 112, line 6ff. Cf., *Zād al-Masīr*, VI, 251-252, where two possible interpretations are given: 1) that the term “face” is to be understood metaphorically as referring to God himself (attributed to Ḍaḥḥāk and Abū ‘Ubayda), and 2) that the term is to be interpreted literally (a view ascribed to Ibn ‘Abbās). Ṭabarī (*Tafsīr* [Cairo 1328/1910], X, pt. 20, 81-82) mentions the same two positions but without linking them to the names of specific authorities. Zamakhsharī in his *Kashshāf* (III, 194) explains the expression *إِلَّا وَجْهَهُ* as meaning *إِلَّا إِلَٰهَهُ*, and then adds: *والوجه يُعْبَرُ بِهِ عَنْ* (the “Face” is [an expression] meaning the divine essence itself). Ibn Qutayba supports a metaphorical interpretation of the term (*Taʾwīl Mushkil al-Qurʾān* [Cairo 1373/1954], 198, 366), as does Ibn ‘Aqīl (*al-Wāḍiḥ fī Uṣūl al-Fiqh* [Beirut/Stuttgart, 1996], I, 94: *المراد* (به) *إِلَّا هُوَ*).

refers to a specific qualif
‘alādh-dhāt).⁹ On what a
evidence for this view is
latter as one’s point of d
being (*tabʿīq*). If what
Himself (*dhātahu*) will be
Ḥāmid writes: “We affir
however, to assert that He
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has to assert that God has a

40 In the same category
might be reared under My
eyes.”¹² The expression “u
mean “under or by Our co
Our oversight (*marʾan min*

⁹ That is, an *ism* that is separ
meaning of “added to.” Abū Ya
51 [§85]: *سَلَىٰ ذَاتَهُ خَلَاَقًا لِلْمَجْزَمَةِ*
لِلْمَعْتَرَةِ وَجَاعَةً مِنَ الْأَتْعَرَةِ أَنْ وَجْهَهُ
ذَاتَهُ. (He has described Himself a
it is [rather] an attribute added to
who say that the face of God is
Muʿtazila and a group of Ashʿa
question of God’s “face,” Ibn al-
that Abū Yaʿlī qualifies as Muʿtaz

¹⁰ According to Ibn Ḥāmid (s
qualify as *tashbīh*.

¹¹ S. 20: 39.

¹² S. 11: 37. Cf., 23: 27.

¹³ Cf., *Talkhīs*, 224-225.

¹⁴ Muḥammad b. al-Qāsim Abū
of the Kufan school of grammar
on Quranic philology and exeges
al-Jawzī’s reference above. Cf., a

refers to a specific qualification (*ism*) added to the divine essence (*zā'id ʿalā'dh-dhāt*).⁹ On what authority do they assert this to be so? The only evidence for this view is derived from sense experience; [but taking this latter as one's point of departure] would mean that God is a composite being (*tabʿīd*). If what they claim were true it would mean that God Himself (*dhātahu*) will be destroyed and that only His face will endure. Ibn Ḥāmid writes: "We affirm that God has a face; it is not permissible, however, to assert that He possesses a head." I was shocked at the audacity of such a statement. To be guilty of anthropomorphism [in his view] one has to assert that God has a head.¹⁰

[The Second Text]

40 In the same category are the following verses: "...in order that you might be reared under My (watchful) eyes,"¹¹ and "build an ark under Our eyes."¹² The expression "under Our eyes" is taken by [some] exegetes to mean "under or by Our command (*amr*)," and by others to mean "under Our oversight (*marʿan minnā*)."¹³ Abū Bakr b. al-Anbārī¹⁴ pointed out that

⁹ That is, an *ism* that is separate from the divine essence. This would appear to be the meaning of "added to." Abū Yaʿlā clearly endorses this point of view in the *Muʿtamad* (p. 51 [§85]): وقد وصف نفسه سبحانه بالوجه... وليس بجارحة، وهو صفة زائدة على ذاته خلافاً للمجسمة. وفي قولهم ان وجه الله جارحة مخصوصة كوجه الواحد منا، وخلافاً للمعتزلة وجماعة من الأشعرية ان وجهه ذاته. (He has described Himself as having a face...but not in the sense of a bodily member; it is [rather] an attribute added to his essence in contrast to the *mujassima* [corporealists] who say that the face of God is a bodily member like our face, and in contrast to the Muʿtazila and a group of Ashʿarīs who maintain that His face is His essence). On the question of God's "face," Ibn al-Jawzī does not hesitate to identify himself with a position that Abū Yaʿlā qualifies as Muʿtazilite and Ashʿarite.

¹⁰ According to Ibn Ḥāmid (so Ibn al-Jawzī claims), anything less than this does not qualify as *tashbih*.

¹¹ S. 20: 39.

¹² S. 11: 37. Cf., 23: 27.

¹³ Cf., *Talkhīṣ*, 224-225.

¹⁴ Muḥammad b. al-Qāsim Abū Bakr b. al-Anbārī (d. 328/940), a leading representative of the Kufan school of grammar and lexicography. He wrote a number of important works on Quranic philology and exegesis, and it is likely that one of these was the source of Ibn al-Jawzī's reference above. Cf., also KAS, §120 where Ibn al-Anbārī's views are cited in

among the Arabs the plural [pronoun] is sometimes used even when the referent is singular; hence, one may say: "We travelled to Basra" [when one really means "I travelled to Basra"].¹⁵ This use of the plural derives from the practice of kings who are in the habit of saying "our command" or "our prohibition." The *Qāḍī* [Abū Yaʿlā] maintained that "eye" is an attribute added to the divine essence (*zāʿida ʿalāʾdh-dhāt*).¹⁶ Already before him Abū Bakr b. Khuzayma¹⁷ said, in connection with the above verses: "Our Lord

connection with the term *kanaf* (side). For a survey of his writings as well as a brief biographical sketch, see *GAS*, IX, 144-147 (cf., Brockelmann, *EF*, I 485).

¹⁵ See *Zād al-Masīr*, IV, 100-101, where the same linguistic explanation is ascribed to Ibn al-Anbārī, but in slightly different wording. In his "The Genesis of the *Ḥaqīqa-Majāz* Dichotomy" (*SI*, 59 [1984], 116-117 and 140), Heinrichs points out that Aḥmad b. Ḥanbal may well have been one of the first, if not the first, among "the great school-founders" to make use of the term *majāz* and precisely in connection with the Quranic use of the first person plural pronoun to express the singular.

¹⁶ Cf., *DST*, 11, and *BA*, 43, where the same reading is found. In the *Muʿtamad* (51, 1-4 [§84]) however, Abū Yaʿlā states his position as follows: وقد وصف نفسه بالعينين... وهما صفتان زائدتان على البصر والرؤية وليستا بجارحتين، خلافاً للمجسمة في قولهم انهما جارحتان مبنيتان كبنية الواحد منّا، وخلافاً للمعتزلة وجماعة من الأشعرية في قولهم: ليستا بصفتين زائدتين على الرؤية والبصر (He has described Himself as having two eyes which are two attributes added to [the attribute(s)] of sight and vision, but not in the sense of corporeal entities—this in contrast to the *mujassima* (corporealists) who say that [the two eyes] are actually two bodily members fashioned in their make-up like [the eyes] of one of us—and in contrast to the *Muʿtazila* and a group of *Ashʿarīs* who say that [the two eyes] are not attributes added to vision and sight.). This text raises an interesting question; assuming that the reading علي is correct, does Abū Yaʿlā intend it to be taken here as an equivalent of علي الرؤية is correct, does Abū Yaʿlā intend it to be taken here as an equivalent of علي الرؤية? Or does he really mean to suggest that one attribute can be added to another?

¹⁷ Muḥammad b. Ishāq b. Khuzayma b. al-Mughīra Abū Bakr an-Nisābūrī (223-311/833-924), a Shāfiʿite traditionist noted for his opposition to *kalām*. His *Kitāb at-Tawḥīd wa l-thbāt ar-Rabb*, on which his reputation rested, was essentially a *ḥadīth*-based approach to the question of the divine attributes. The *Kitāb at-Tawḥīd*, as G. Makdisi points out (*Ibn ʿAqīl*, 337-340), was an influential text within Ḥanbalī-traditionalist circles in Baghdad during much of the 11th century. The work formed part of the arsenal used to combat Muʿtazilī and Ashʿarī influences in Baghdad, and, undoubtedly, also in other centers where the traditionalist movement was active. Ibn al-Jawzī, who knew the work well and who cites it repeatedly in *KAS*, was generally critical of the work. For him it represented a point of view that was insufficiently sensitive to the anthropomorphist implications of a literalist interpretation of the *akhbār aṣ-ṣifāt*.—In addition to the lengthy notice on Ibn Khuzayma in the *Muntaẓam* (VI, 184-186), see also Subkī, *Ṭabaqāt*, III, 109-113; *Bidāya*, XI, 149; and *Shadharāt*, II, 262-263. For a more complete list of sources on him, and a survey of his

has two eyes by which He God has two eyes." This v no justification in scriptur God only through a kind the Prophet's statement: were meant only to deny God. Since it has been es not to be supposed that a l divine attributes.

41 Among the verses [used is the expression: "...to b literary usage, however, i favor (*niʿma*) or act of kind

extant writings, see *GAS*, I, 601.

¹⁸ Although the wording is s following passage in Ibn Khuzza سقى وما في السموات العلى وما بينهما من صغير وكبير. (We sees what is under the ground ar what is in the highest heaven and

¹⁹ See notes to §14.

²⁰ Cf., *KAS*, §219, where *dalīl* the technical meaning of this exp see the notes to §219.

²¹ See §§217-219 where this length. The tradition on the An standard medieval collections of the more commonly cited forms *Muslim*, *fiṭṭ*, 101. See also *Bu* Abū Dīwūd, *malāḥim* 26; *Tirm* 250, 333; II, 27, 149; and VI, 14 saying, see Ibn Khuzayma, *Tawḥ*

²² S. 38: 75. The full verse: prostrating yourself before wha hands."

has two eyes by which He sees.”¹⁸ Ibn Ḥāmid¹⁹ said: “We must believe that God has two eyes.” This view, however, is an innovation for which there is no justification in scripture. [Champions of this view] attribute two eyes to God only through a kind of inferential reason (*dalīl al-khiṭāb*)²⁰ based on the Prophet’s statement: “He is not one-eyed.”²¹ These words, however, were meant only to deny that imperfection of any sort can be ascribed to God. Since it has been established that God is not a composite being, it is not to be supposed that a literal face [with two eyes] is [fol.12a] among the divine attributes.

[The Third Text]

41 Among the verses [used by anthropomorphists in support of their position] is the expression: “...to him whom I created with My two hands.”²² In literary usage, however, the word “hand” is [frequently] taken to mean favor (*niʿma*) or act of kindness (*iḥsān*), as the poet has said:

extant writings, see *GAS*, I, 601 (cf., also *GAL*, I, 193; and Suppl. I, 345).

¹⁸ Although the wording is somewhat different, Ibn al-Jawzī may have in mind the following passage in Ibn Khuzayma’s *Kitāb at-Tawḥīd* (p. 50, line 1ff.): نحن نقول: لربنا الخالق عيان يبصر بهما ما تحت الثرى وتحت الأرض السابعة السفلى وما في السموات العلى وما بينهما من صغير وكبير.... (We hold that our Lord, the Creator, has two eyes by which he sees what is under the ground and what is beneath the seventh and lowest earth as well as what is in the highest heaven and [everything] between the two whether small or great).

¹⁹ See notes to §14.

²⁰ Cf., *KAS*, §219, where *dalīl al-khiṭāb* is used in a similar context. For a discussion of the technical meaning of this expression and its use in medieval jurisprudence and theology, see the notes to §219.

²¹ See §§217-219 where this tradition is cited by Ibn al-Jawzī and discussed at some length. The tradition on the Antichrist as a one-eyed creature occurs frequently in the standard medieval collections of prophetic traditions and with numerous variations. Among the more commonly cited forms of this tradition are the following: Bukhārī, *fitan*, 26; and Muslim, *fitan*, 101. See also Bukhārī, *jihād*, 178; *anbiyāʾ*, 3; *adab*, 77; Muslim, *fitan*, 95; Abū Dāwūd, *malāḥim* 26; Tirmidhī, *fitan*, 56, 62; Ibn Māja, *fitan*, 33; *Musnad*, I, 228, 250, 333; II, 27, 149; and VI, 140. For a discussion of the theological significance of this saying, see Ibn Khuzayma, *Tawḥīd*, 43-44; Bayhaqī, *Asmāʾ*, 312-313; and *Muʿtamad*, §84.

²² S. 38: 75. The full verse reads: “[God] said: ‘O Iblīs, what prevents you from prostrating yourself before what (or ‘before him whom’) I have created with my two hands.’”

Whenever you quietly bring your petition to the gate of the Banū Hishām
and in hope await their response,
You will surely meet with the hands of their bounty (*fawāḍil*).

42 The words "Surely God's hand is fettered,"²³ a Jewish adage cited in the Quran, refers to God's withholding of largesse (*nafaqa*).²⁴ But the term "hand" may also sometimes convey the notion of power (*quwwa*), and so people will say: "We have no *hand* in this matter." It is in this sense that 'Urwa b. Ḥizām²⁵ used the word in one of his poems.²⁶ In the Quranic verse "Nay, but His hands are outstretched,"²⁷ [said in response to the Jews], the expression "hands" connotes both favor (*ni'ma*) and power (*qudra*); hence, in the verse "what I created with my hands," [the expression "with My hands"] means with My power and My favor.²⁸ Commenting on the verse "the hand of God is above their hands,"²⁹ Ḥasan [al-Baṣrī] said: "The term 'hand' means the blessing (*minna*) or kindness (*iḥsān*) of God." These are the words of Ḥasan himself!³⁰ The *Qāḍī* [Abū Ya'ālā] maintained, however, that the expression "two hands" [when applied to God] refers to two essential attributes (*ṣiḡatāni dhātīyatāni*); it is these latter that are designated by the expression "two hands."³¹ This is an arbitrary interpretation based on personal

²³ S. 5: 63

²⁴ Abū 'Ubayda, *Majāz al-Qur'ān*, I, 170, line 10, glosses the verse as follows: أي خير الله ممسك (cf., *Zād al-Masīr*, III, 392-393).

²⁵ 'Urwa b. Ḥizām b. Muhājir (who died in the Rāshidūn or early Umayyad periods) was one of the so-called 'Udhri poets. For sources on 'Urwa and his poetry, see GAS, II, 264-265 (cf. GAL, Suppl., I, 81-82; and Blachère, *Histoire de la littérature arabe*, II, 303 and index).

²⁶ Ibn al-Jawzī cites a line of 'Urwa's poetry in *DST* (12) in which the term "hands" is used metaphorically. The line reads: بقالا شفاك الله والله ما لنا بما ضمنت منك الضلوع يدان (for variant readings, see *Shi'r 'Urwa b. Ḥizām* [Baghdad 1961], 15). This may well be the line alluded to in KAS.

²⁷ S. 5: 64.

²⁸ On the use of the term "hands" to express the double sense of power and favor, see Raḍī, *Talkhīṣ*, 276, 1ff.

²⁹ S. 48: 10.

³⁰ Cf., *Zād al-Masīr*, VII, 427-428, where this interpretation is mentioned but without reference to Ḥasan.

³¹ In the *Mu'tamad* (p. 52, 13-18[§86]) Abū Ya'ālā states his position as follows: وقد

opinion (*ra'y*); there is no
"The verse 'to him whom
Myself created.' Thus also
sent ahead" ³³ clearly me-
rather imprudently once s
on Adam over the anima
hand— taken as a divine a
mentioning [His hands in c
"By My hands." Had God
hands], no special rank w
was manifest in the creatio
[Ibn 'Aqil continued:] "
that the power expressed i
God added the expression
response is that when an
means that he has no pow
advantage [conferred on A
such [but in the fact that it
is that when God said: "Wi
made with Our hands," ³⁶ I

ولا يعنى القدرة، بل هي صفة ذاتية
ولهم وجاعة من الأنعرة أنهما تعمة
وقدره. (He has described Himself
entities nor in the sense of favor
to the *majassima* (corporealists) v
to the *Mu'tazila* and certain Ash'ri
favor and power).

³² S. 38: 75.

³³ S. 22: 10.

³⁴ Ibn al-Jawzī's conclusion se
tations (most of which are metaph
precise meaning of the term. T
explicitly by Ibn al-Jawzī, but it
approach to exegetical questions.

³⁵ The version of this passage
that the person referred to here is

³⁶ S. 36: 71.

opinion (*ra'y*); there is no [textual or rational] support for it. Ibn 'Aqīl said: "The verse 'to him whom I created [with My two hands]',³² means 'what I Myself created.' Thus also the verse 'This is that which your hands have sent ahead'³³ clearly means that which *you* have sent ahead.³⁴ Someone rather imprudently once said:³⁵ 'Had no special distinction been conferred on Adam over the animals through his having been created by [God's] hand— taken as a divine attribute—[God] would not have set him apart by mentioning [His hands in connection with Adam's creation], and so he said: "By My hands." Had God meant power (*qudra*) [when he used the term hands], no special rank would have been conferred [on Adam, for power was manifest in the creation of all things].'"

[Ibn 'Aqīl continued:] "If those [who advocate this view] should insist that the power expressed in creation does not itself confer praise, so that God added the expression 'by My hands' [to make the point clear], our response is that when an Arab says 'I have no *hands* in this matter,' he means that he has no *power* (*qudra*) over it. [When literalists] say: 'The advantage [conferred on Adam] does not reside in the act of creation as such [but in the fact that it was accomplished by God's hands], our response is that when God said: 'We have created cattle for them of what We have made with Our hands,'³⁶ He did not mean to imply that cattle enjoy a

وصف نفسه سبحانه باليدين... وليست بجارحتين ولا بمعنى النعمة ولا بمعنى القدرة، بل هي صفة ذاتية خلافاً للمجسمة في قولهم أنهما جارحتان، وخلافاً للمعتزلة في قولهم وجماعة من الأشعرية أنهما نعمة وقدر. (He has described Himself as having two hands but not in the sense of corporeal entities nor in the sense of favor or power; rather they are an essential attribute in contrast to the *mujassima* (corporealists) who maintain that they are bodily members, and in contrast to the Mu'tazila and certain Ash'arīs who insist that they are to be construed in the sense of favor and power).

³² S. 38: 75.

³³ S. 22: 10.

³⁴ Ibn al-Jawzī's conclusion seems to be that the term "hand" may have multiple connotations (most of which are metaphorical), and that it is the context that finally determines the precise meaning of the term. To be sure, the importance of context is nowhere stated explicitly by Ibn al-Jawzī, but it is clearly implied in his discussion, and is apparent in his approach to exegetical questions.

³⁵ The version of this passage as it appears in *DST* (12, line 12f.) indicates fairly clearly that the person referred to here is none other than Abū Ya'fā himself.

³⁶ S. 36: 71.

special status over other animals.³⁷ Indeed, the mere fact of God's having ascribed a quality [to Adam] is sufficient by itself to confer superiority. The 'ulamā' have said that the term 'hands' means power (*quwwa*) in the verse: 'We constructed the heavens with Our hands'."³⁸

43 [God] states [in the Quran] that He breathed into [Adam] His spirit (*rūḥ*);³⁹ however, this reference [to God's breathing into Adam His *rūḥ*] simply means that He brought Adam into existence through [fol.12b] an act of origination (*takwīn*), and so the words ["I breathed into him My *rūḥ*"] mean "I breathed" [construed as a metaphor for the act of creation].⁴⁰ The [mere] attribution (*iḍāfa*) [of the term *rūḥ* to himself] is sufficient in and of itself to confer a special distinction [on Adam].⁴¹ More than that is inappropriate to the Creator, for His actions are not dependent on means [for their actualization], seeing that He possesses neither bodily members or organs through which to act. Indeed, He is self-sufficient in and of Himself (*bi-dhātihī*). It is not fitting that one should occupy himself in seeking to exalt

³⁷ Cf., Talkhīṣ, 2275-275.

³⁸ S. 51: 47. See *Zād al-Masīr*, VIII, 40, where Ibn al-Jawzī specifically mentions the following authorities as having supported this interpretation: "Ibn 'Abbās, Mujāhid, Qatāda, and the other exegetes and philologists."

³⁹ An allusion to S. 15: 29 which reads: "When I formed [Adam] and breathed into him my spirit (*rūḥī*)...." Cf., also 32: 9. On the various uses of the term *rūḥ* and its interpretation, see the interesting summary in Ibn Qutayba, *Ta'wīl Mushkil al-Qur'ān*, 370-372. Cf., Ibn Fūrak, *Mushkil al-Ḥadīth*, 227-228, 145-149; and Bayhaqī, *Asmā'*, 361-368. For a summary discussion of Quranic uses of the term *rūḥ*, see the article "Nafs," *ET*², VII, 880.

⁴⁰ The argument here is directed against the view that *rūḥ* is a separate hypostatic entity in God which he imparted to Adam at creation. Such a view is problematic, in Ibn al-Jawzī's view, for at least two reasons: 1) it undermines the notion of God's absolute unity (*tawḥīd*), and 2) it implies that God is dependent on means other than His *dhāt* or essential being for the actualization of His will.

⁴¹ Since, in the words of the verse, it is His *rūḥ* that He imparts to Adam. For Ibn al-Jawzī it is critical that the term *rūḥ* be taken as a metaphor. In his commentary on 15: 29, Ibn al-Jawzī explains at greater length his understanding of the reference to "my *rūḥ*": هذه الروح هي التي يحيا بها الإنسان ولا تعلم ماهيتها وإنما أضافها إليه تشريقاً لأدم، وهذه إضافة ملك. ([Although] the *rūḥ* is that by which human beings live, its quiddity or essence is unknown; [God] attributed it to Himself primarily for the purpose of conferring distinction on Adam, for it entails the attribution of a quality. The moving of the *rūḥ* in him [Adam] is referred to as a "blowing" [or breathing] only because it moves in his body like the moving of wind). (*Zād al-Masīr*, IV, 400, 13-15).

Adam⁴² while at the same time denying that He is a composite of things (*ʿādāt*)⁴³ finite bodies (*ajāsām*). So imagine that God actually with His hand—a hand of divine essence. What the consists of separate bodies through it as, for example or a quality. Do you suppose bodies to influence [other] in the case of His own act who hold this view are like Adam whom He created he was."⁴⁴

44 [On the question of the you beware of His soul (saying [to God]: "You know what is in Your soul (fi nafsī) verse means: "God warns "You know what is within you (mā ʿindaka)."⁴⁵ The

⁴² By implying that he shares

⁴³ The reference here seems established pattern or "custom"

⁴⁴ S. 3: 59.

⁴⁵ S. 3: 28.

⁴⁶ S. 5: 116.

⁴⁷ Cf., Ibn Fūrak, *Mushkil al-Ḥadīth*, possible interpretations.

⁴⁸ In *Zād al-Masīr* (II, 464), Ḥabīb al-Zajjāj, glosses this exp: تعلم ما أعلم وأنا لا أعلم ما أعلم

Adam⁴² while at the same time neglecting to grant the Creator the high honor which He deserves, an honor which can (only) be rendered by denying that He is a composite being (*ab'ād*) or that He follows the natural course of things (*'ādāt*)⁴³ in His actions, for these are qualities peculiar to finite bodies (*aḥsām*). Some simple-minded persons have gone so far as to imagine that God actually touched the clay out of which He formed Adam with His hand—a hand which they regard as one of the attributes of the divine essence. What they understand is that the totality of created things consists of separate bodies and that one [body] attracts another and acts through it as, for example, sorcerers who tie knots so as to alter a condition or a quality. Do you suppose that God causes the actions of persons and bodies to influence [other] bodies (*aḥsām*) separated by a distance, but that, in the case of His own actions, He required the assistance of the clay? Those who hold this view are contradicted by the verse: "Jesus in God's eyes is like Adam whom He created from dust simply by saying to him: 'Be!' and he was."⁴⁴

[The Fourth Text]

44 [On the question of the *naḥs* (soul)] the Quran says: "God warns you that you beware of His soul (*naḥsahu*)."⁴⁵ In another verse Jesus is reported as saying [to God]: "You know what is in my soul (*fī naḥsī*) but I know not what is in Your soul (*fī naḥsika*)."⁴⁶ According to [some] exegetes, the first verse means: "God warns you that you beware of *Him*,"⁴⁷ and the second: "You know what is within me (*mā 'indī*) but I do not know what is within you (*mā 'indaka*)."⁴⁸ The most reliable experts have said that *naḥs* in these

⁴² By implying that he shares in the divine substance as the recipient of God's spirit.

⁴³ The reference here seems to be to acting through the instrumentality of means, the established pattern or "custom" (*'ādā*) for all actions carried out by finite creatures.

⁴⁴ S. 3: 59.

⁴⁵ S. 3: 28.

⁴⁶ S. 5: 116.

⁴⁷ Cf., Ibn Fūrak, *Mushkil al-Ḥadīth*, 320, line 7, where this is given as one of two possible interpretations.

⁴⁸ In *Zād al-Masīr* (II, 464) Ibn al-Jawzī, following the Mu'tazilī grammarian Abū Ishāq az-Zajjāj, glosses this expression as follows: تعلم ما أضمه ولا أعلم ما عندك علمه. التأويل: تعلم ما أعلم وأنا لا أعلم ما تعلم (You know what I conceal, but I do not know what

texts mean “essence,” the *nafs* of something being its essence (*dhāt*).⁴⁹—The *Qāḍī* [Abū Yaʿlā], on the other hand, held that God’s *nafs* is an attribute over and above His essence (*zāʿida ʿalā dhātihi*).⁵⁰ But this view is derivative of an anthropomorphist perspective, for it assumes that [God’s] essence is a “thing” (*shayʿ*) and that [His] *nafs* is something distinct from it. The view advanced by Ibn Ḥāmid is even more objectionable! He stated: “Regarding the verse: ‘I breathed into him My spirit (*rūḥī*)’,⁵¹ some [Ḥanbalīs]⁵² hold that spirit (*rūḥ*) is an attribute of essence (*ṣifa min dhātihi*) and that when it leaves [a person at the time of death] it returns to God.” Such a view is even more repugnant than what [fol.13a] Christians teach. This man spared nothing in his advocacy of an anthropomorphist point of view (*tashbīh*)!⁵³

[The Fifth Text]

45 Another text [that has been the subject of debate] is the verse: “Nothing resembles His ‘likeness’ (*ka-mithlihi*).”⁵⁴ These words, taken in their literal sense (*ẓāhir*), would indicate that [God] has a likeness (*mithl*): nothing is like His “likeness” and [His “likeness”] is like nothing else. According to the lexicographers, however, a *mithl* designates nothing other than the thing

you know, which is to say, you know what I know, but I do not know what you know). See Raḍī, *Talkhīṣ* (135, 14ff.) where the same interpretation is offered and in much the same language. Raḍī, however, does not hesitate to call the term *nafs*, as used in the verse, an instance of *istiʿāra* (tropical language).

⁴⁹ Cf., Ibn Fūrak, *Muskhil al-Ḥadīth*, 319, 13-15; and al-Bayhaqī, *Asmāʿ*, 286, 6ff., where *nafs* is construed as the equivalent of *dhāt*.

⁵⁰ I have found nothing in the *Muʿtamad* that corresponds to the position here attributed to Abū Yaʿlā. Indeed, in the chapter of the *Muʿtamad* (44-72) devoted to a discussion of the divine attributes, no mention is made of the *nafs*. Most likely Ibn al-Jawzī is referring here to a statement from Abū Yaʿlā’s work on the divine attributes which is presumed lost.

⁵¹ S. 15: 29.

⁵² Cf., a parallel text in *DST*, 19, line 1, where the Arabic reads: طائفة من أصحابنا (a group of our associates). An examination of the context of the expression أصحابنا (our associates) in both *DST* and *KAS* indicates that it is used invariably by Ibn al-Jawzī as a reference to Ḥanbalīs.

⁵³ Cf., last sentence of §56 where, apart from the use of *tajsīm*, an identical construction occurs and where again the subject is Ibn Ḥāmid.

⁵⁴ S. 43: 11.

(or being) itself.⁵⁵ Thus it you.”⁵⁶ The only possible [God].

46 Among the texts [the attributes] is the following Ibn ʿAbbās, Mujāhid, Ibn ʿulamāʾ interpret this verse matter (*shidda*) is brought term *sāq*], they cite the fo (*sāq*) to us,”⁵⁷ and “the (*sāq*)” [meaning that the b

⁵⁵ Cf., *Zād al-Masīr*, VII, 276.

⁵⁶ Literally, “the likeness of m For parallel passages, see Ibn C traité des divergences du Hadī argument developed by Ibn al- and al-Bayhaqī. The point ma none other than the person or God himself. What Ibn al-Jawzī is distinct from his essence. Pr insisted on such a distinction, o is interesting, however, that Ibn or Ibn Zāghūnī—the usual targ

⁵⁷ S. 68: 42. The full verse n called to prostrate themselves b

⁵⁸ Zamakhsharī, who takes t final judgment, reflects the sta (*Kashshaf*, IV, 147; cf., al-Fa al-irshād (Cairo 1950), 159; a the whole of Ibn al-Jawzī’s ex discussion above (§§46-48).

⁵⁹ A hemistich that is cited f not been able so far to identify t

⁶⁰ This hemistich is from on Muḥammad Ismāʿīl aṣ-Ṣawī, S Jarīr, ed. Nuʿmān Amin (Cairo

(or being) itself.⁵⁵ Thus it is said: "One like me should not speak to one like you."⁵⁶ The only possible meaning of the text is that there is nothing like [God].

[The Sixth Text]

46 Among the texts [that have figured in the discussion of the divine attributes] is the following verse: "On the day when a leg is laid bare."⁵⁷ Ibn ʿAbbās, Mujāhid, Ibrāhīm an-Nakhaʿī, Qatāda, and the majority of ʿulamāʾ interpret this verse to mean: [On a day when] a grave or serious matter (*shidda*) is brought to light.⁵⁸ In support of this interpretation [of the term *sāq*], they cite the following lines of poetry: "The battle bared its leg (*sāq*) to us,"⁵⁹ and "the battle tucked up its garment, laying bare its leg (*sāq*)" [meaning that the battle became intense or vehement].⁶⁰ Ibn Qutayba

⁵⁵ Cf., *Zād al-Masīr*, VII, 276, where Ibn Qutayba is quoted in support of this interpretation.

⁵⁶ Literally, "the likeness of me (*mithlī*) should not speak to the likeness of you (*mithlaka*)."
For parallel passages, see Ibn Qutayba's *Taʾwīl Mukhtalif al-Ḥadīth*, 275 (cf., Lecomte, *Le traité des divergences du Ḥadīth* [Damascus 1962], 243); and al-Bayhaqī's *Asmāʾ*, 277. The argument developed by Ibn al-Jawzī above follows closely the views found in Ibn Qutayba and al-Bayhaqī. The point made by both authors is that the *mithl* of a person or thing is none other than the person or thing itself. In like fashion God's *mithl* is none other than God himself. What Ibn al-Jawzī wishes to avoid is any suggestion that God has a *mithl* that is distinct from his essence. Presumably there were Ḥanbalīs or other traditionalists who insisted on such a distinction, otherwise his comments would have been purely academic. It is interesting, however, that Ibn al-Jawzī makes no mention here of Ibn Ḥāmid, Abū Yaʿlā or Ibn Zāghūnī—the usual targets of his criticism in *KAS*.

⁵⁷ S. 68: 42. The full verse reads: "On the day when a leg is laid bare, and they will be called to prostrate themselves but will not be able."

⁵⁸ Zamakhsharī, who takes the unveiling mentioned in this verse as a reference to the final judgment, reflects the standard interpretation found in the medieval commentaries (*Kashshāf*, IV, 147; cf., al-Farrāʾ, *Maʿānīʾl-Qurʾān*, III [Cairo 1972], 17; al-Juwaynī, *al-Irshād* (Cairo 1950), 159; and *Zād al-Masīr*, VII, 341). This assumption runs through the whole of Ibn al-Jawzī's exegesis of the verse and is the background of much of the discussion above (§§46-48).

⁵⁹ A hemistich that is cited frequently in medieval lexical and exegetical works. I have not been able so far to identify the original source of this fragment.

⁶⁰ This hemistich is from one of the poems of Jarīr; for the full text of the poem, see Muḥammad Ismāʿīl aṣ-Ṣawī, *Sharḥ Dīwān Jarīr* (Cairo 1353/1934), 241; and the *Dīwān Jarīr*, ed. Nuʿmān Amīn (Cairo 1969-1971), I, 470.

writes: "The underlying idea behind [the expression 'baring the leg'] derives from its application to a person who, faced with a grave situation (*amr ʿaẓīm*),⁶¹ has to exert himself to the utmost. Thus, [in a manner of speaking] he tucked up his garment, baring his leg. In effect, the word *sāq* [used in this way] was borrowed from idiomatic usage common among Arabs (*fa'stu'irat*) and employed [as a metaphor] in place of the word *shidda*."⁶² This was also the view of al-Farrā',⁶³ Abū ʿUbayda,⁶⁴ Thaʿlab,⁶⁵ and the lexicographers generally.

47 Bukhārī and Muslim report in their respective *Ṣaḥīḥs* that the Prophet said: "God the most high will bare (*yakshifu*) His leg (*sāq*)."⁶⁶ Here the

⁶¹ Cf., §37 where the expression *amr ʿaẓīm* is used. Cf., the expression *amr shadīd* used in §47, which appears to be a synonym.

⁶² For the full Arabic text of Ibn Qutayba's commentary on this verse, see *Taʿwīl Mushkil al-Qurʾān*, p. 103, line 11 ff. It is interesting that Ibn Qutayba takes up a discussion of the term *sāq* (in relation to the above verse) in a chapter devoted to a discussion of the "metaphor" or *istiʿāra*. Indeed, this verse is the very first example of *istiʿāra* cited by Ibn Qutayba. At the beginning of the chapter (p. 102, lines 2-3) he defines *istiʿāra* as follows: فالعرب تستعير الكلمة فتضعها مكان الكلمة إذا كان المسمى بها بسبب من الأخرى أو مجاوراً لها أو مشاكلاً (the Arabs borrow one word and put it in the place of another provided that the thing named [i.e., the word borrowed] is instrumental, or adjacent or similar to the other one [cf., Heinrichs, *The Hand of the Northwind* (Wiesbaden 1977), 30]). For a fuller analysis of Ibn Qutayba's definition and its significance for medieval Arabic literary theory, see the above study by Heinrichs. An explanation similar to the one offered by Ibn Qutayba is found in Raḍī's, *Talkhīṣ*, 341-342. In general the latter represented a Muʿtazilī point of view.

⁶³ Cf., his *Maʿānī l-Qurʾān* (Cairo 1972), vol. III, 177, 11, where after noting a variant reading of كشف, al-Farrā' adds the following comment: يريد القيامة والساعة لشدتها. Yaḥyā b. Ziyād Abū Zakarīyāʾ al-Farrā' (d. 207/822) was a prominent grammarian of the Kufan "school" whose writings reflect Muʿtazilī influences. For more on al-Farrā', see the article by R. Blachère in *IE*², II, 806-08; *GAS*, VIII, 123-125; and IX, 131-134, for a list of his extant writings.

⁶⁴ In his *Majāz al-Qurʾān*, II, 266, Abū ʿUbayda glosses the term as follows: إذا اشتدّ الحرب والأمر قيل: قد كشف الأمر عن ساقه (When the battle or an affair becomes intense, people say: "the affair has laid bare its leg"). For more on Abū ʿUbayda, see notes to §38.

⁶⁵ Aḥmad b. Yaḥyā Abū l-ʿAbbās Thaʿlab (d. 291/904), also a member of the Kufan "school" of grammar. For his comments on how the term *sāq* is to be construed in 68:42, see his *Majālis*, II, 11.

⁶⁶ Bukhārī, *Ṣaḥīḥ*, *tawḥīd*, 2; *tafsīr*, 68, 2; and Muslim, *Ṣaḥīḥ*, *īmām*, 302 (cf., also *Musnad*, III, 17). In each case the tradition is traced back to Abū Saʿīd al-Khudrī.

term [*sāq*] is explicitly a manifest (*yakshifu*) His power are His actions. The expression [what conceals it]. ʿĀṣim become angry, and [people] contrast to the tradition of a grave or difficult situation (however, noted that the term be used to refer to the power God show him honor—when the latter said: "I have no choice" (*sāqī*) is destroyed."⁶⁷ According to Muslim] may be taken to remove the veil [surrounding themselves before Him. So though [fol.13b] cattle's head wish to prostrate themselves

⁶⁷ ʿĀṣim b. Kulayb b. Shihāb declared to be a reliable transmitter.

⁶⁸ The reading of the name is §111). If Abū ʿAmr is the correct Aḥmad b. Ḥamdān, the author died in 378/988 (cf., *GAS*, I, 204; *al-Masīr*, VII, 341; and al-Bayhaqī whose full name is Muḥammad an-Zāhid. He was the author of 345/956 (cf. *Taʾrīkh Baghdād*, I).

⁶⁹ Cf., Bayhaqī, *Asmāʾ* (347) a different form; the point made is taken as referring to God himself.

⁷⁰ Some versions of this tradition used to roast flesh (cf., *Zād al-Maʿāḍ*, Ibn al-Jawzī adds: they will not read) because "it is as if they have

⁷¹ The last part of this tradition in various versions of this tradition none in which the text is traced back

term [*sāq*] is explicitly applied to God and the saying means: He will manifest (*yakshifu*) His power or might (*shidda*). What is predicated of God are His actions. The expression "He will bare it" means: He will remove [what conceals it]. ʿĀṣim b. Kulayb⁶⁷ said: "I saw that Saʿīd b. Jubayr had become angry, and [people] were saying: 'He is baring His leg.' Here [in contrast to the tradition from the two *Ṣaḥīḥs*] the expression refers to a grave or difficult situation (*amr shadīd*) [facing Saʿīd]." Abū ʿAmr az-Zāhid,⁶⁸ however, noted that the term "leg" [construed metaphorically] may sometimes be used to refer to the person himself. It was in this sense that ʿAlī—may God show him honor—used the term in connection with the Khārijites. When the latter said: "[We will accept] no judgment but God's," ʿAlī responded: "I have no choice but to go to war against them even if my leg (*sāqī*) is destroyed."⁶⁹ According to this, [the tradition cited by Bukhārī and Muslim] may be taken to mean that [God] will manifest *Himself* (*tajallī*) to them. In a tradition reported by Abū Mūsā, the Prophet said: "[God] will remove the veil [surrounding Him], and they will see Him and prostrate themselves before Him. Some people, however, will remain [standing] as though [fol.13b] cattle's horns (*ṣayāṣī*)⁷⁰ were put to their backs; they will wish to prostrate themselves [before Him] but will be unable to do so."⁷¹

⁶⁷ ʿĀṣim b. Kulayb b. Shihāb al-Jarmī al-Kūfī (137/754), whom Ibn Maʿīn and Nasāʾī declared to be a reliable transmitter (Ibn Saʿd, *Ṭabaqāt*, VI, 341).

⁶⁸ The reading of the name is uncertain. It appears twice in *KAS* (here and again in §111). If Abū ʿAmr is the correct reading, it is undoubtedly a question of Muḥammad b. Aḥmad b. Ḥamdān, the author of several works on the Quran and Arabic grammar, who died in 378/988 (cf., *GAS*, I, 204). However, in parallel passages in *DST*, 16; *BA*, 22a; *Zād al-Masīr*, VII, 341; and al-Bayhaqī, *Asmāʾ*, 347, the name is given as Abū ʿUmar az-Zāhid, whose full name is Muḥammad b. ʿAbd al-Wāḥid b. Abī Ḥāshim Abū ʿUmar al-Baghawī az-Zāhid. He was the author of a work on the *ḥadīth* (*Gharīb al-Ḥadīth*) and died in 345/956 (cf. *Taʾrīkh Baghdād*, II, 356-35; and *al-Kāmil*, VIII, 517).

⁶⁹ Cf., Bayhaqī, *Asmāʾ* (347 and editor's note), where this tradition is cited in a slightly different form; the point made is the same, however. The reference to God's *sāq* is to be taken as referring to God himself.

⁷⁰ Some versions of this tradition use the term *saḥāḥ al-ḥadīd*, "curved prongs of iron" used to roast flesh (cf., *Zād al-Masīr*, VIII, 341). But these are not to be taken literally, for Ibn al-Jawzī adds: they will not be able to prostrate themselves (as the end of the tradition reads) because "it is as if they had iron meat-hooks in their backs."

⁷¹ The last part of this tradition is an allusion to the second half of S. 68:42. Although various versions of this tradition are to be found in the canonical collections, I have found none in which the text is traced back to Abū Mūsā.

48 The *Qāḍī* [Abū Yaʿlā] maintained that “leg” (*sāq*) is an essential attribute (*ṣifa dhātīya*).⁷² He made comments of a similar nature in connection with [the prophetic saying]: “[God] will place His foot (*qadam*) in Hell,”⁷³ and mentioned a tradition reported by Ibn Masʿūd in which the Prophet is alleged to have said: “[God] will lay bare His right leg and the earth will glow from the light of His leg.”—Referring to “foot” and “leg” [as divine attributes] is anthropomorphism (*tashbīh*) pure and simple, and it is impossible to suppose that the statement quoted from Ibn Masʿūd is an authentic tradition. The divine attributes cannot be established on the basis of frivolous statements like these,⁷⁴ nor can the divine essence be described as rays of light by which particular places are illuminated. There is no justification for speaking [of God] in these terms, for when [it is said that] He bares His leg, [it means that] He manifests His strength or power (*shidda*). Some people suppose that the expression “to lay [something] bare” (*yakshifu*) means “to make [that thing] manifest” (*yuzhiru*), whereas it has only [the negative] connotation of “removing” (*yuzīlu*, *yarfāʿu*) [something?].⁷⁵ Ibn Ḥāmid said:

⁷² The position set forth in the *Muʿtamad* (53, 6-8) is somewhat different: وقد وصف نفسه... وليس بجراحة ولا بمعنى الشدة، بل صفة زائدة خللاً للمعتزلة وللأشعرية في نفي ذلك سبحانه بالساق... (...not in the sense of a corporeal entity or in the [metaphorical] sense of a grave matter (*shidda*); rather it is an additional attribute. This in contrast to the Muʿtazila and the Ashʿarīs who deny (that it is an attribute) and construe it as a trope for *shidda*). In the same paragraph he goes on to cite passages from the *ḥadīth* and the Quran to support his contention that *sāq* is a real attribute, though in what sense this is so is not explained other than that it is an attribute added to the divine essence. It is clear from §§37 and 38 that Ibn al-Jawzī's critique of Abū Yaʿlā in *KAS* is not concerned, for the most part, with the *Muʿtamad* but rather with views set forth in his more popular works. What is not clear on the basis of the sources available to us is whether the “anthropomorphist” views ascribed to Abū Yaʿlā above belonged to a particular period of Abū Yaʿlā's life or whether he held two positions: one for public consumption and another for the benefit of his fellow Ḥanbali theologians. The style and content of the *Muʿtamad* suggest that it was meant for a fairly sophisticated circle of experts.

⁷³ These words or variations of them are found in a number of *ḥadīths* cited in the canonical collections: Muslim, *janna*, 37, 38; Bukhārī, *tafsīr al-qurʾān*, 50; *aymān*, 12; *tawhīd*, 7; and Tirmidhi, *Janna*, 20.

⁷⁴ Literally, “*khurāfian* tales.” The expression comes from a certain Khurāfa of the tribe of ʿUdhra who, according to legend, was carried off by the Jinn and later, following his return, related his experiences. “*Khurāfian* statements” are claims based on fantasy—fictitious, far-fetched, outrageous claims.

⁷⁵ The point may appear to be a rather technical one, for to remove something (i.e., a

“It is obligatory to believe in an attribute belonging to Him. Those who view are infidels.” If an attribute were to be a serious offense; however, it does not claim to possess knowledge [such expressions] metaphors [for their approach] than [the divine] into consideration, whereas the attributes belonging to the (ajjām) and a [finite] form

49 Among the texts [relating to God] seated himself (*istaw*) h. Ahmad⁷⁶ observed that which, when used by king that the term was well known as in [early] Islam. Umayy

(cover) from something normally eye. What Ibn al-Jawzī apparently can be used in a metaphorical or a literal cover from a thing.

⁷⁶ For other possible meanings

⁷⁷ Cf. S. 10:30; 13:2; 25:59; 3

⁷⁸ Khalil b. Ahmad b. ʿAmr al-Jawzī, a composer of the earliest lexicon of the principal teachers of Sibawayh, many as the founder of the Basra influence in philological studies. List of his writings, see GAS, V (154-161); and Suppl. III, 194). A useful overview of his life and specific contributions to the field (20-27). Sellheim makes the impression initially sparked by his study of

⁷⁹ For the source of this definition (Baghdad, 1397/1967), 291, 7 (6

"It is obligatory to believe that God possesses a leg (*sāq*) and that it is an attribute belonging to His essence (*ṣifa li-dhātihi*). Those who reject this view are infidels." If an uneducated person were to say such things it would be a serious offense; how much worse it is when the person in question claims to possess knowledge [of the sacred texts]! Indeed, those who interpret [such expressions] metaphorically (*mutaʿawwilūn*) have greater justification [for their approach] than he since they at least take [current] Arabic usage into consideration, whereas the former who assert that "leg" and "foot" are attributes belonging to the divine essence end up by ascribing corporeality (*taj̣sīm*) and a [finite] form (*ṣūra*) to God.

[The Seventh Text]

49 Among the texts [relating to the attributes] is the following verse: "Then [God] seated himself (*istawā*)⁷⁶ on the Throne (*ʿalāʾl-ʿarsh*)" (7:54).⁷⁷ Khalīl b. Aḥmad⁷⁸ observed that a "throne" (*ʿarsh*) is an elevated seat (*sarīr*) which, when used by kings, is called an *ʿarsh*.⁷⁹ [He went on to point out] that the term was well known among the Arabs during the Jāhiliya as well as in [early] Islam. Umayya b. Abīʿš-Ṣalt said in one of his poems:

cover) from something normally implies rendering it visible, i.e., making it manifest to the eye. What Ibn al-Jawzī apparently wishes to insist on here is that the verb *kashafa*, *yakshifu* can be used in a metaphorical or figurative sense, in which case it does not mean removing a literal cover from a thing.

⁷⁶ For other possible meanings of the verb *istawā*, see the discussion that follows.

⁷⁷ Cf., S. 10:30; 13:2; 25:59; 32:4; and 57:4.

⁷⁸ Khalīl b. Aḥmad b. ʿAmr b. Tamīm Abū ʿAbd ar-Raḥmān al-Azdi (d. ca 175/791), composer of the earliest lexicon of the Arabic language (*Kitāb al-ʿAyn*), and one of the principal teachers of Sībawayhī, author of the celebrated *Kitāb*. Khalīl was regarded by many as the founder of the Basran "school" of Arabic grammar, and he remained a major influence in philological studies for most of the medieval period. For more on his life and a list of his writings, see GAS, VIII, 51-56; and IX, 44-48 (cf., GAL, I, 98-99; Suppl. I, 159-160; and Suppl. III, 194). Sellheim's article on him (*EP*, IV, 962-964) provides a useful overview of his life and place within linguistic studies in early Islam. For Khalīl's specific contributions to the field of lexicography, see Haywood, *Arabic Lexicography*, ch. 3 (20-27). Sellheim makes the important point that Khalīl's interest in linguistic studies was initially sparked by his study of the Quran and the *ḥadīth*.

⁷⁹ For the source of this definition, see Khalīl's *Kitāb al-ʿAyn*, ed., ʿAbd Allāh Darwīsh (Baghdad, 1397/1967), 291, 7 (cf., *Lisān al-ʿArab*, IV, 313/1, 22ff.).

Praise God, the One Who is deserving of our praise,
 Our Lord Who is great in the heavens.
 By a supreme work which preceded mankind,
 He established a Throne (*sarīr*) above the heavens,
 A Throne which no human eye can reach.
 Beneath it angels will be seen prostrating themselves.⁸⁰

⁵⁰ It should be noted that the term *istiwāʾ* [the verbal noun of *istawā*] has a variety of meanings in current Arabic usage. In one of its uses it is a synonym for *iʿtidāl* (meaning "even" or "equal").⁸¹ This sense is expressed in a saying attributed to one of the Banū Tamīm: "The one who commits a wrong against a fellow tribesman and the person wronged are on a par with each other (*istawā*)," that is, the two of them are equal (*iʿtadālā*).⁸² The term *istiwāʾ* may also mean the perfection or completion of something (*tamām ash-shayʾ*). Thus, the Quran says: "[Moses] achieved his full strength and reached maturity (*istawā*),"⁸³ meaning that he became an adult. [fol. 14a] The term *istiwāʾ* may also mean to form an intention to do (*qaṣd ilā*) something. When the Quran says: "*thumma istawā ilā as-samāʾ*,"⁸⁴ it means, He formed an intention (*qaṣd*) to create them (the heavens). Finally, the term *istiwāʾ* is sometimes used to mean "making oneself master over" (*istīlāʾ ʿalā*) something,⁸⁵ as one of the poets has said:

⁸⁰ *Umajja ibn Abī Ṣalt*, ed. by F. Schulthess (Leipzig 1911), 42, 30ff. (trans. p. 100, 3-10). Also see *Zād al-Masīr*, III, 212, 17ff.

⁸¹ Cf., Lane, 1477/3-1478/1.

⁸² That is, equal in the sense that both fall within the jurisdiction of the same legal entity, the law of the tribe, to which both belong, in contrast to those situations in which the perpetrator and the victim belong to different tribes. This seems to be the sense in which Ibn al-Jawzī uses the term *istawāʾ/iʿtadala* here.

⁸³ S. 28: 14.

⁸⁴ S. 2: 99. See *Zād al-Masīr*, I, 58, where Ibn al-Jawzī glosses this verse with the words: أي عمد إلى خلقها (he formed an intention, or resolved, to create them).

⁸⁵ Abū Yaʿlā points out in the *Muʿtamad* (54, 11ff.) that *istīlāʾ* was characteristic of the Muʿtazilī interpretation of *istiwāʾ*. This is confirmed by both al-Ashʿarī (*Maqālāt*, 211, 14) and al-Baghdādī (*Uṣūl*, 112, 7-8). R. Frank remarks that most Ashʿarites "do not accept the equivalence of *istīlāʾ* for *istiwāʾ*" in connection with the Quranic expression *istawā ʿalāʾl-ʿarsh* (*al-Ghazālī and the Ashʿarite School*, 41 and ns. 22 and 24 [pp. 118-119]). In his *Zād al-Masīr* (III, 213), Ibn al-Jawzī sides with the Ashʿarites in rejecting the view that *istiwāʾ* as used in the Quran is synonymous with *istīlāʾ*.

Then Bishr made him
 Without resorting to
 Or, as another poet has said
 Whenever he raids an
 He takes their women
 And by the time morn
 He has made himself

⁵¹ Ismāʿil b. Abī Khālīf
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 explanation (*taʿwīl*). ʿAbd
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 was ordered to leave."⁸⁷

⁵² More recently, howeve
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⁸⁶ A line from the poetry of al-
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⁸⁷ Or, perhaps "violates their sa

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⁸⁹ The name and identity of the
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 from the Arabic text.

⁹⁰ S. 20:5.

⁹¹ Or perhaps: his elevation abov

⁹² Cf., Bayhaqī, *Asmāʾ*, 404, 6-1

Then Bishr made himself master over (*istawā ʿalā*) Iraq,
Without resorting to the sword or the shedding of blood.⁸⁶
Or, as another poet has said:

Whenever he raids another tribe
He takes their women captive,⁸⁷
And by the time morning dawns
He has made himself master (*istawā ʿalā*) of what they possess.⁸⁸

51 Ismāʿīl b. Abī Khālid aṭ-Ṭāʿī reported a tradition in which the Throne (*ʿarsh*) is described as consisting of red sapphire.⁸⁹ All of the *salaf*, however, were in agreement that references to God's "sitting on the Throne (*ʿarsh*)" should be left to stand as they are without exegetical comment (*tafsīr*) or explanation (*taʾwīl*). ʿAbd Allāh b. Wahb said: "We were in the company of Mālik b. Anas when a man came up to him and said: 'O ʿAbd Allāh, [according to the Quran] "*Raḥmān* is seated on the Throne (*ʿalāʾl-ʿarsh istawā*)."⁹⁰ How is the expression *istawā* to be understood?' Mālik looked down and began to perspire [as though he had a fever]. After a bit he raised his head and said: 'The expression is to be taken as it is presented [in the Quran]. It is not for us to inquire into the modality [of His sitting on the Throne] or His rising from it (*ʿanhu marfūʿ*).⁹¹ You are an evil man and a heretic!' [Mālik then said to his associates:] 'Ask him to leave!' And so he was ordered to leave."⁹²

52 More recently, however, some people have interpreted the attribute [of God's "sitting on the Throne"] in accordance with the dictates of sense

⁸⁶ A line from the poetry of al-Akḥṭal (cf., Lane, 1478/1; and *Lisān*, XIV, 414/1). This line is frequently quoted in medieval discussions of *istiḥwāʿ* (cf., *Zād al-Masīr*, III, 21; al-Bayhaqī, *Asmāʿ*, 412; Juwaynī, *al-Lumaʿ* [ed. Allard], 151; etc.).

⁸⁷ Or, perhaps "violates their sanctuary."

⁸⁸ I have not identified the source of this line.

⁸⁹ The name and identity of the transmitter of this report are uncertain. In *DST* (18) and *BA* (fol. 22b) the name appears as Ismāʿīl b. Abī Khālid aṭ-Ṭāʿī, whereas in *Zād al-Masīr*, III, 213, the *isnād* of the report reads: Ismāʿīl b. Abī Khālid ʿan Saʿd aṭ-Ṭāʿī. I have not found the report in any other of Ibn al-Jawzī's works (including *al-Mawḍūʿāt*). Whether the report is to be taken as a prophetic tradition or simply a statement by Ismāʿīl is not clear from the Arabic text.

⁹⁰ S. 20:5.

⁹¹ Or perhaps: his elevation above it or his being exalted over it.

⁹² Cf., Bayhaqī, *Asmāʿ*, 404, 6-10.

Wrong
translation

Since it has been established that there are no 'places' (*amākin*)⁹⁸ within the divine essence (*fī dhātihi*) nor does He (*dhātuhu*) exist within them—His separation (*infiṣāluhu*) from them being clear⁹⁹—it is necessary to posit a space (*madan*)¹⁰⁰ in relation to which this separation occurred. Thus when [the Quran] says: 'Then [God] seated Himself on the Throne' we know that He meant to specify His location within a particular space (*jiha*).¹⁰¹ We have no alternative, therefore, but to conclude that His essence [may be described as] having 'defined limits' (*nihāya wa-ghāya*)¹⁰² which He knows."

54 This man does not understand the implications of what he says, for when he ascribes to God a *ghāya* and a *faṣl*, that is, a separation between the Creator and His creation, he imposes limits (*hudūd*) on Him and, in effect, declares Him to be a body (*jism*). In his book he writes:¹⁰³ "God is not an atom (*jawhar*) since an atom is an entity that occupies space (*mā taḥayyaza*)," but then he goes on to ascribe to God a place (*makān*) which

God or the origination of an attribute in time. It only means that God's right to be characterized as *mustawī* came to be established in time.

⁹⁸ *Amākin* are created and hence finite; no such entities can exist within God's being, nor is it possible for Him to exist within them. And yet, despite this, Ibn Zāghūnī goes on to claim that God occupies a *jiha* (space) by virtue of his being on the Throne. Cf., §55, where much the same kind of language is used.

⁹⁹ How God, conceived as being (in his essence) independent of space, can now (in time) be said to occupy space, as Ibn Zāghūnī clearly maintains, is difficult to comprehend, unless we assume that something is left out of Ibn Zāghūnī's argument as here presented by Ibn al-Jawzī. For the latter, quite clearly, the argument is flawed, a point he makes repeatedly in the following paragraphs.

¹⁰⁰ *DST* (19), where the reading is *بدء*, gives the sentence a temporal (rather than spatial) sense.

¹⁰¹ The inference seems to be that the creation of the Throne marks the beginning of God's relationship to space, but Ibn Zāghūnī also wants to insist that none of this involved a change in God or the origination of a new attribute.

¹⁰² The expression *nihaya wa-ghāya* here seems to convey the notion of "lines of demarcation" or "boundaries" put somewhat crudely.

¹⁰³ On the basis of the information given in *KAS*, it is impossible to determine which of Ibn Zāghūnī's works Ibn al-Jawzī is here referring to. However, judging from the titles of Ibn Zāghūnī's works preserved in the biographical dictionaries, the two most likely candidates are his *Taṣṣīḥ Ḥadīth al-Aḥī* and his *al-Īdāḥ fī Uṣūl ad-Dīn*, works on dogmatic theology. Both works are now lost. The title of the former, however, would suggest that it was a work devoted to the question of the *ʿarsh* and the related issue of *istiwāʾ* (cf., Ibn Rajab, *Dhayl*, I, 181). For more on the writings of Ibn Zāghūnī, see notes to §37.

He occupies (*yataḥayyaz*). All of this reflects the ignorance of its author and is anthropomorphism (*tashbīh*) in its purest form. This *shaykh* does not comprehend what is necessarily entailed in God's status as Creator or what is incompatible with that status, for God's existence is not like the existence of atoms and bodies which occupy space necessarily. Spatial relations of "below" and "above" apply only to entities which stand over against each other or exist side by side.¹⁰⁴ It is a matter of logical necessity that one such entity be larger than another, or smaller than it or equal to it. Relationships of this sort, however, apply only to bodies (*ajsām*). Whenever bodies are juxtaposed they admit of contact. Whatever admits of contact with (*mumāssa*), or separation from (*mubāyana*), bodies must have a beginning in time (*ḥādith*), for it has been shown that the proof of the temporal origination (*ḥudūth*) of atoms lies in the fact that they admit of contact and separation.¹⁰⁵ If such persons allow the attribution of [contact and separation] to God they concede His contingency (*ḥadath*), but if they deny [contingency while at the same time allowing Him the possibility of contact and separation] they leave us no way by which to establish the contingency of atoms. It is absurd to suppose that two beings, one independent of spatial relations (*mustaghniyan 'an al-maḥall wa'l-ḥayyiz*) and the other dependent on location in space (*muḥtājan fi'l-ḥayyiz*), can be either contiguous to each other (*mutajāwir*)¹⁰⁶ or separate from each other (*mutabāyin*), for contiguity (*tajāwur*) and separation (*tabāyun*) are concomitant attributes (*lawāzim*) of things that occupy space. How can a being who is free of localization in space—indeed, one for whom such localization is impossible—be contiguous to something other than itself or separate from it since it has been established that conjunction (*ijtimāʿ*) and separation (*iftirāq*) are attributes inseparable from things located in space? Localization in space (*taḥayyuz*) cannot be attributed to God, for if He were localized in space (*mutaḥayyiz*) He would either have to be at rest in the space that He occupies or moving from it. It is not possible that He should be characterized by movement (*ḥaraka*), or rest (*sukūn*), or conjunction (*ijtimāʿ*), or separation (*iftirāq*). What is contiguous with something or separate from it is [fol.15a] finite in its essence, and since a finite being is defined by limits it requires a cause to determine [that

¹⁰⁴ That is, entities whose relationship to each other is spatially defined.

¹⁰⁵ Cf., §§5 and 9, among others.

¹⁰⁶ Or, are in contact with each other.

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¹⁰⁷ A reference to Ibn Zāghūnī
of KAS, where words similar to th

¹⁰⁸ I have not found these w
Hanbalī.

¹⁰⁹ Cf., §§192, 193 and 213.

¹¹⁰ S. 35: 10.

¹¹¹ S. 6: 18 (also verse 61).
discussed.

condition].

55 For this reason one should not say that God is inside the world (*dākhil al-‘ālam*) or that He is outside it (*khārij minhu*), for being inside or outside are concomitant attributes (*lawāzim*) of things located in space. Both of these relations along with movement (*ḥaraka*), rest (*sukūn*), and the other accidents (*‘arāḍ*) are constitutive of bodies (*ajrām*). Regarding their¹⁰⁷ words: “No ‘places’ (*amākin*) were created in the divine essence, and so His separation from them (*infiṣāluhu ‘anhā*) was established,” I would respond as follows: The divine essence does not admit of any created entity existing within it or inhering in it. From the vantage point of sense experience, separation (*faṣl*) would require of God what it requires of atoms, for inherent in the idea of location in space is the notion that what exists within a defined space necessarily excludes the possibility of anything like it occupying that same space. The views of these people are based entirely on sense experience, and this encouraged them to embrace an anthropomorphist point of view (*tashbīh*) and led to confusion, so much so, that one of their number said: “God referred to His sitting on the Throne (*istiwā’*) only because, of all existents, it is the thing nearest to Him.”¹⁰⁸ This too is based on ignorance, for the notion of spatial proximity is conceivable only in relation to finite bodies. Another among them said: “The surface of the Throne is contiguous to that portion of the divine essence that is next to it, and so [the Throne] is not contiguous to all of the divine essence.”¹⁰⁹ To speak thus is to reduce God to corporeal terms (*tajsīm*) and to introduce division (*tab‘īḍ*) [into His essence]. It is difficult for me [to understand] how the author of such a statement can be a member of the Ḥanbalī school. As evidence in support of the view that God is actually on the Throne, one of them appealed to the verses “Goodly speech *ascends* to Him”¹¹⁰ and “He is all-powerful *above* (*al-qāhir fawqa*) His creatures.”¹¹¹ They construe this [literally, that is,] in terms of spatial elevation (*fawqīya ḥissīya*) and they associate this spatial

¹⁰⁷ A reference to Ibn Zāghūnī and those who shared his views. See §53, of the Arabic of KAS, where words similar to those that follow are attributed to Ibn Zāghūnī.

¹⁰⁸ I have not found these words cited elsewhere, though the source is probably a Ḥanbalī.

¹⁰⁹ Cf., §§192, 193 and 213.

¹¹⁰ S. 35: 10.

¹¹¹ S. 6: 18 (also verse 61). Cf., §212, where this same verse is cited and briefly discussed.

elevation with finite bodies and atoms. They forget, however, that the notion of elevation (*fawqīya*) is sometimes used to connote the idea of elevation in rank or status (*‘ulūw ar-rutba*) as, for example, when we say that so and so is above (*fawqa*) so and so.¹¹² Just as [the Quran] refers to God as being “above (*fawqa*) His creatures”¹¹³ it also refers to Him as being “with you” (*ma‘akum*).¹¹⁴ Those who interpret [*ma‘akum*]¹¹⁵ to mean [God’s being “with you” in] His knowledge (*‘ilm*) provide their opponents with encouragement to interpret *istiḥāḍ* as connoting His might or power (*qahr*).¹¹⁶

56 I was informed by ‘Alī b. Muḥammad b. Abī ‘Umar ad-Dabbās,¹¹⁷ on

¹¹² See, e.g., *Mushkil*, 453, 15-17, where Ibn Fūrak sets forth an Ash‘arite view: لله... فوق خلقه وأن ذلك راجع إلى فوقية المنزلة والرتبة وفوقية القدرة العظمة. وأما فوقية المسافة والمكان فمُحال (God is above His creation in the sense that he is above [it] in rank, degree, power and majesty. As for His being above [it] in the spatial sense—it is impossible to describe Him thus [cf., also 173-175]).

¹¹³ S. 6: 18 and 61.

¹¹⁴ S. 57: 4. See *Zād al-Masīr*, VIII, 161, 9-10, where Ibn al-Jawzī glosses this phrase with the words: أي بعلمه وقدرته (cf., VIII, 188, 3, where in connection with a similar expression, Ibn al-Jawzī adds: أي علمه معهم). See also Bayhaqī, *Asmā’*, 430-431, who attributes this interpretation to a number of early authorities, among them Sufyān ath-Thawrī, Ḍaḥḥāk and Muqātil b. Ḥayyān. As Ibn al-Jawzī well knew, this interpretation of *ma‘akum* was accepted by Aḥmad b. Ḥanbal (cf., *Ṭabaqāt al-Ḥanābila*, I, 29, 1) and by most Ḥanbalīs after him, even literal-minded Ḥanbalīs notwithstanding the fact that this interpretation entailed a metaphorical or quasi metaphorical exegesis of the expression.

¹¹⁵ The pronoun object of حملها may actually have been intended to include both expressions, not just the *ma‘akum*.

¹¹⁶ It is not clear from the above whether Ibn al-Jawzī supports this interpretation of *istiḥāḍ* or is opposed to it or means to take a non-committal position. I am inclined to believe that despite Ibn al-Jawzī’s seeming reticence in declaring himself openly on the question, he is actually sympathetic to the view that *qahr* is the meaning of *istiḥāḍ*. Could this reticence here have something to do with the fact that *istiḥāḍ* = *qahr* was an interpretation favored by the Mu‘tazila?

¹¹⁷ ‘Alī b. Muḥammad b. Abī ‘Umar al-Bazzāz, more commonly known as Abū’l-Ḥasan ad-Dabbās, who died in 549/1154. The only biographical notices I have found on him come from Ibn al-Jawzī’s *Muntaẓam* (X, 160) and his *Mashyakha* (137-139, no. 47). In these two brief notices, Ibn al-Jawzī reports that he studied under Abū’l-Ḥasan ad-Dabbās for a time. Abū’l-Ḥasan was undoubtedly a Ḥanbalī judging from the fact that he counted among his own teachers two of the most important Ḥanbalī scholars of his time, viz., Abū Muḥammad at-Tamīmī (d. 488/1095) and Ibn ‘Aqīl (d. 513/1119). We know from a number of his writings (including KAS) that Ibn al-Jawzī was deeply influenced by both

the authority of Rizq Allāh Ḥanbal [fol.15b] used to s reservation, but it does not or elevation above (*istīḥāḍ* at-Tamīmī], Aḥmad did not particular place (*jīha*), for Ḥāmid, however, stated: “ place to the exclusion of place—the locus of His ver Ḥanbalīs] maintains that C most acceptable view is that *ilīl-‘arsh*) and that the *kur* involves a relationship tha spared nothing [in promoti

57 It should be understood spatial terms (*wujūdan ma* space (*jīha*), are like those defined (*wujūdan zamāniya* time and His priority to groundless speculation (*takl* are equal [in size] relative

men, and it was undoubtedly from of their writings.

¹¹⁸ Abū Muḥammad Rizq Allāh interpreter of Aḥmad’s teaching, *al-Ḥanābila*, II, 292-308). For m

¹¹⁹ Cf., *Ṭabaqāt al-Ḥanābila*, I

¹²⁰ Cf., §193, where similar word

¹²¹ See §44 where, apart from identical to the one above. The use §44 where it is a question of *nafis* in Ibn al-Jawzī’s use of the two t bodily attributes to God and is *Tashbih* is clearly the broader of with what is not God. For Ibn al- *najīm* is a particular kind of *tashb*

¹²² This view implies that God’s of space and time.

the authority of Rizq Allāh b. ‘Abd al-Wahhāb at-Tamīmī,¹¹⁸ that Aḥmad b. Ḥanbal [fol.15b] used to say: “*Istiṭwā*” is an attribute to be accepted without reservation, but it does not entail the notion of movement toward (*qaṣd ilā*) or elevation above (*isti‘lā*) [something].” According to [Abū Muḥammad at-Tamīmī], Aḥmad did not hold the view that the Creator exists within a particular place (*jiha*), for finite spaces exclude what is outside them.¹¹⁹ Ibn Ḥāmid, however, stated: “God is defined by [His location] in a particular place to the exclusion of other places (*bi-makān dūna makān*); and His place—the locus of His very essence—is on the Throne. Indeed, a group [of Ḥanbalīs] maintains that God fills the Throne on which He [sits].¹²⁰ The most acceptable view is that He is in actual contact with the Throne (*mumāss lil-‘arsh*) and that the *kursī* serves as His footrest.” Contact (*mumāssa*) involves a relationship that can only exist between two bodies. This man spared nothing [in promoting] a corporealist point of view (*tajsīm*)!¹²¹

57 It should be understood that those who conceive God’s existence in spatial terms (*wujūdan makānīyan*), thus requiring His location in finite space (*jiha*), are like those who imagine that His existence is temporally defined (*wujūdan zamānīyan*), thereby requiring His existence within finite time and His priority to the world as temporal in nature.¹²² Both are groundless speculation (*takhyīl*), for it has been shown that all spaces (*jihāt*) are equal [in size] relative to the thing (or being) that admits of [location

men, and it was undoubtedly from ad-Dabbās that he received at least some of his knowledge of their writings.

¹¹⁸ Abū Muḥammad Rizq Allāh b. ‘Abd al-Wahhāb at-Tamīmī (d. 488/1095), an important interpreter of Aḥmad’s teaching, and also the author of an important Ḥanbalī creed (*Ṭabaqāt al-Ḥanābila*, II, 292-308). For more on Abū Muḥammad at-Tamīmī, see notes to §32.

¹¹⁹ Cf., *Ṭabaqāt al-Ḥanābila*, II, 296-297.

¹²⁰ Cf., §193, where similar words are ascribed to Abū Ya‘lā, though with some qualification.

¹²¹ See §44 where, apart from reading *tashbīh* for *tajsīm*, the concluding sentence is identical to the one above. The use of the term *tajsīm* above in §56 (in contrast to *tashbīh* in §44 where it is a question of *nafs* or *rūḥ* in relation to God) reflects an important distinction in Ibn al-Jawzī’s use of the two terms. By *tajsīm* he specifically means the predication of bodily attributes to God and is quite close in meaning to the term *tab‘īd* (composite). *Tashbīh* is clearly the broader of the two terms and refers to any attempt to compare God with what is not God. For Ibn al-Jawzī, and undoubtedly for the *mutakallimūn* in general, *tajsīm* is a particular kind of *tashbīh*.

¹²² This view implies that God’s existence presupposes the logical priority of the categories of space and time.

in] space (*jiha*).¹²³ The thing's determination (*ikhtiṣāṣ*) by virtue of its being located in a particular space is not necessary to its essence (*wājib li-dhātihi*) but rather possible (*jāʾiz*). Thus it follows that it is dependent on a cause capable of determining [its spatial specification]. Its being qualified (*ikhtiṣāṣ*) in that respect is an addition to its essence (*zāʾid ʿalā dhātihi*).¹²⁴ What admits of possibility (*jawāz*) cannot be eternal, for an eternal being is that being whose existence is necessary to the totality of defined spaces (*jihāt*). Every being that exists within such space (*jiha*) is, therefore, determined (*muqaddar*) and thus limited (*maḥdūd*). [God], however, is beyond that. Only atoms and bodies admit of spatial existence since they are entities which depend on localization in a particular space, for no defined space can exist within [another] space. When the impossibility of [God's existence] in space is established, so also is the impossibility of His existence in a particular place (*makān*). This makes it clear that a place, when it exists, circumscribes what is in it. Nothing, however, can circumscribe the Creator, nor do any of His attributes admit of origination in time.

58 If someone should point out that the two *Ṣaḥīḥs* contain a tradition concerning the Prophet's ascension reported by Sharīk b. Abī Namir in which Anas [b. Mālik] said: "Then [Gabriel] took [the Prophet] into the presence of the Almighty and, being in his place (*fī makānihi*), the Prophet said: 'O Lord, decrease [the obligations] which You placed upon us,'" ¹²⁵ we would respond by noting the following remarks of Abū Sulaymān [fol.16a] al-Khaṭṭābī:¹²⁶ "The expression [*fī makānihi*] is found only in that version of the tradition reported by Sharīk.¹²⁷ No other transmitter reported it.

¹²³ This may reflect the view, widely held in medieval *kalām*, that space like matter is discrete, i.e., it consists of "cells" of the same size as the bodies that occupy them. For more on this view of space as consisting of discrete units, see Dhanani, *Physical Theory*, 51ff.

¹²⁴ Since the power to determine its location in space is not intrinsic to its essence but is caused by something other than itself, that specification is said to be "added to" or "over and above" its essence.

¹²⁵ For citations of this *ḥadīth*, see Bukhārī, *tawḥīd*, 37; Bayhaqī, *Asmāʾ*, 438-439; and Ibn Khuzayma, *Tawḥīd*, 210-213 (cf., also 139-140). I have not found the tradition (as cited above) in the *Ṣaḥīḥ* of Muslim, though a somewhat different version attributed to Sharīk (minus the expression *fī makānihi*) is found in *īmān*, 262. In comments appended to this tradition, Muslim expresses grave doubts regarding Sharīk's reliability as a transmitter.

¹²⁶ For more on al-Khaṭṭābī, see notes to §27.

¹²⁷ In his *Kitāb aḍ-Ḍuʿafāʾ* (II, 40), Ibn al-Jawzī gives his full name as Sharīk b. ʿAbd Allāh b. Abī Namir Abū ʿAbd Allāh al-Madanī, and notes that both Yaḥyā b. Maʿīn and

Indeed, among the traditions containing objectionable expressions, [the tradition] is to be taken as referring to the Prophet's first rank or station (*maqām*). Abū Sulaymān al-Khaṭṭābī [who] has an audience with my Lord [the expression *dār*] was presuming [the expression 'in His *dār*,' [the Prophet] [God] has prepared for His [Prophet] in his *Kitāb al-Muʿtamad*: "in his *al-makān*)."¹³¹

59 If someone argues that [the Prophet's existence] is, in effect, to render

Nasāʾī regarded him as an unreliable transmitter (see II, 269-270), the scholarly opinion is that he is reliable, while Ibn Ḥazm regarded him with caution in regard to the traditions reported only when transmitted from him by

¹²⁸ For the details, see the full text of the tradition.

¹²⁹ Part of a lengthy *ḥadīth* concerning the Prophet's ascension. For versions of this tradition in *Ṣaḥīḥ* Muslim, see II, 24; and *Musnad*, III, 244. Qatāḍa reports both instances. The same tradition is absent: Bukhārī, *riqāʾ*, 51; *tawḥīd*, 37; *Musnad*, III, 116.

¹³⁰ Cf., *Lisān*, IV, 298/1, 20-21.

¹³¹ *في دار السلام والله عز وجل هو السلام* as is said, in His Paradise which is the *al-makān*. Bayhaqī's analysis of this expression is in *al-Muʿtamad*, XIII, 429, where the tradition is cited.

¹³² This is a rough paraphrase of the tradition in the *Muʿtamad* (56-57); the Prophet is said to be in the *al-makān* (It is impossible to describe the *al-makān* possible to say, however, that the Prophet is in the *al-makān* who say that He is in the *al-makān* maintain that he is in a particular place definitively that he is in heaven).

Indeed, among the traditions transmitted by him there are a number of objectionable expressions. The [pronoun] in the expression 'his place' is not to be taken as referring to God, but rather to the Prophet, and denotes the first rank or station (*maqām*) assigned to him [as the seal of the Prophet]."¹²⁸ Abū Sulaymān al-Khaṭṭābī added: "In the prophetic saying 'I will ask to have an audience with my Lord while He is in His House (*fī dārihi*)',"¹²⁹ [the expression *dār*] was presumed to be the equivalent of *makān*; by the expression 'in His *dār*,' [the Prophet] was referring only to the abode (*dār*) which [God] has prepared for His saints."¹³⁰ As the *Qāḍī* Abū Yaʿlā [rightly] states in his *Kitāb al-Muʿtamad*: "God is not to be described as being in a place (*al-makān*)."¹³¹

59 If someone argues that the denial of spatial relations (*jihāt*) [to an existent] is, in effect, to render its existence (*wujūd*) impossible, our response

Nasāʾī regarded him as an unreliable transmitter (ليس بالقوي). According to Dhahabī (*Mizān*, II, 269-270), the scholarly opinion on Sharīk was divided. Abū Dāwūd regarded him as reliable, while Ibn Ḥazm regarded him as weak. Ibn ʿAdī, on the other hand, advised caution in regard to the traditions transmitted by Sharīk: his traditions are to be accepted only when transmitted from him by persons known to be trustworthy.

¹²⁸ For the details, see the full text of the tradition in Bukhārī (*tawhīd*, 37).

¹²⁹ Part of a lengthy *ḥadīth* concerning the Prophet's intercession on the day of judgment. For versions of this tradition in which the expression *fī dārihi* occurs, see Bukhārī, *tawhīd*, 24; and *Musnad*, III, 244. Qatāda is the transmitter of the tradition from Anas b. Mālik in both instances. The same tradition occurs in the following, but in all cases *fī dārihi* is absent: Bukhārī, *riqāq*, 51; *tawhīd*, 19, 36; Muslim *īmān*, 322; Ibn Māja, *zuhd*, 37; and *Musnad*, III, 116.

¹³⁰ Cf., *Lisān*, IV, 298/1, 20-21, where *fī dārihi* is glossed as follows: أي في حضرة قدسه وقيل: في جنته فإن الجنة تسمى دار السلام واللّه عز وجل هو السلام (that is, in His Sanctuary or, as is said, in His Paradise which is also called *Dār as-Salām*, for God is *as-Salām*). For Bayhaqī's analysis of this expression, see *Asmāʾ*, 442, 15ff. (cf., Ibn Ḥajar, *Fath al-Bārī*, XIII, 429, where the tradition is cited and the various interpretations discussed).

¹³¹ This is a rough paraphrase of Abū Yaʿlā's position on the question of *makān* as set forth in the *Muʿtamad* (56-57); the first part of the passage reads: ولا يجوز وصفه بأنه في كل مكان ولا في مكان ويجوز أن يقال أنه تعالى في السماء على العرش، خلافاً للمعتزلة في قولهم: هو في مكان، والمجسمة في قولهم: هو في مكان، والأشعرية في قولهم: لا يجوز إطلاق القول عليه بأنه في السماء (It is impossible to describe Him as being everywhere or in a [particular] place. It is possible to say, however, that the Almighty is in heaven on the Throne, in contrast to the Muʿtazila who say that He is in [every] place, and the *mujassima* (corporealists) who maintain that he is in a particular place, or the Ashʿarīs who say that it is impossible to say definitively that he is in heaven).

is that if the existent (*mawjūd*) in question admits of contact (*ittiṣāl*) and separation (*infiṣāl*) the objection stands. But if [the existent] does not admit of either, the objection carries no weight, as the following will show. If you were to maintain that every existent (*mawjūd*) must either be knowing or not-knowing, I would respond: only if that existent is one that admits of both possibilities.¹³² If it does not admit of either, as in the case of a wall, for example, neither knowledge or its opposite can be ascribed to it. And so we refuse to predicate of the Creator anything that might entail origination in time (*ḥadath*). If someone should say: "Your position requires that we posit [the reality of] what lies beyond the reach of the cognitive faculty (*fahm*)," my response is that if by "cognitive faculty" you mean the power to form images and concepts (*at-takhayyul wa't-taṣawwur*) drawn from sense experience [you are right], for the Creator cannot be known through such since He cannot be perceived by the senses. Only bodies that admit of color and size fall into that category, for the imagination (*khayāl*), having apprehended objects of perception (*mubṣarāt*), can only form images on the basis of what it perceives since images are derived from sense experience. But if you mean that [God] cannot be known by the intellect (*ʿaql*) [then you are in error], for we have shown on the basis of evidence that [His existence] can be established by reason since the intellect is compelled to acknowledge as true (*taṣdīq*) what is indicated by the evidence (*dalīl*). You should know that since your experience is limited to bodies, atoms and accidents, and since you know that God is beyond such things through rational proofs (*dalīl al-ʿaql*) which dissuade you from supposing otherwise, [these same proofs] ought to dissuade you from supposing that He is a being who occupies space (*mutaḥayyiz*) or that movement (*mutaḥarrik*) or change of locality (*muntaqil*) can be predicated of Him. Since the layman (*ʿāmmī*) [fol.16b] does not understand such matters, our advice is that he not be exposed to what he cannot grasp. Do not disturb him, but rather let him remain secure in his beliefs. Make the way easy for him so that he need not inhabit the mountains.¹³³ All that one need say [on the question of *istiṭwāʾ*] is that God is on the Throne in a way that is consonant with His being.¹³⁴

¹³² Literally: only if that being admits of the two opposites.

¹³³ That is, rugged and dangerous terrain. Make matters easy for the lay person so that he need not face difficulties that might undermine his faith.

¹³⁴ As one of Baghdad's leading preachers, these sentences reflect his "pastoral" concerns.

60 Another verse [that has been established beyond question] in this sense, for, although the preposition "within" is contained within a spatial or temporal receptacle, it is not to exercise a controlling influence over what remains is a simple statement in terms that finite creatures can understand.

61 Among the verses [discussing the Throne] "O how I regret my neglect of the Throne" is to be taken as a reference to the Throne (*ʿarṣ*), for one may speak of the Throne as being neglected.

They also constitute part of the public setting.

¹³⁵ S. 67:16. Cf., *Zād al-Maʿad* 420-421; and Ibn Khuzayma's presentation of this verse are presented (cf., *DST* 23, 5).

¹³⁶ See §§122-123, where Ibn al-Qayyim speaks of God's being in heaven "above His Throne above the heavens," but not implying any kind of limitation or restriction. He has been able to determine, Ahmad notes, the relation to the heavens. For Al-Qayyim, see §58.

¹³⁷ S. 39: 56, and the only reference to a longer passage in which the remembrance they are certain to suffer from the best of what has been said comes to you suddenly before you have thoughtlessly done in regard to it.

¹³⁸ That is, the obedience which is required of the faithful.

¹³⁹ Cf., *DST*, 23, 5, where in place of the Throne is the Throne.

[The Eighth Text]

60 Another verse [that has been the subject of controversy] is the following: "Are you certain regarding Him Who is in the heavens?"¹³⁵ It has been established beyond question that this verse cannot be taken in its literal sense, for, although the preposition "in" (*fī*) denotes the location of something within a spatial or temporal receptacle (*li'z-zarfīya*), God is not a being contained within a receptacle (*maẓrūf*).¹³⁶ If sense perception is not allowed to exercise a controlling influence over the interpretation of such expressions, what remains is a simple statement designed to express [God's] greatness in terms that finite creatures can grasp.

[The Ninth Text]

61 Among the verses [discussed in connection with the *ṣifāt*] is the following: "O how I regret my neglect of God's side (*janb*)."¹³⁷ Here the term ["side"] is to be taken as a reference to God's obedience (*ṭāʿa*)¹³⁸ and to His command (*amr*), for one may speak of neglect (*tafrīt*) only in relation to such matters.¹³⁹

They also constitute part of the basis for his opposition to *kalām* when discussed in a public setting.

¹³⁵ S. 67:16. Cf., *Zād al-Masīr*, VIII, 322; Zamakhsharī, *Kashshāf*, IV, 138; Bayhaqī, *Asmāʾ*, 420-421; and Ibn Khuzayma, *Tawhīd*, 110ff. where quite different interpretations of this verse are presented (cf., *DST*, 22, n. 2).

¹³⁶ See §§122-123, where Ibn al-Jawzī returns to the question of whether it is appropriate to speak of God's being in heaven. In *ʿAqīda* I, Aḥmad b. Ḥanbal does say that "God is on his Throne above the heavens," but he adds that such language should not be construed as implying any kind of limitation on God (*Ṭabaqāt al-Ḥanābila*, I, 29), and, so far as I have been able to determine, Aḥmad nowhere uses the preposition "in" when he speaks of God in relation to the heavens. For Abū Yaʿlā's position on this question, see the last note to §58.

¹³⁷ S. 39: 56, and the only reference to God's "side" or *janb* in the Quran. Vs. 56 forms part of a longer passage in which scoffers are summoned to repent and warned of the remorse they are certain to suffer if they desist. Bell translates vss. 55-56 as follows: "But follow the best of what has been sent down to you from your Lord, before the punishment comes to you suddenly before you are aware. Lest a soul should say: 'O, alas, for what I have thoughtlessly done in regard to Allah, for I was one of the scoffers.'"

¹³⁸ That is, the obedience which God rightly requires of his creatures.

¹³⁹ Cf., *DST*, 23, 5, where in place of "*fī dhālika*" the text reads "*fī dhātihi*."

If the term "side" is construed in its commonly accepted anatomical sense, the use of the term "neglect" in this context has no meaning. Ibn Ḥāmid, however, said: "We believe that God has a side on the basis of this verse."¹⁴⁰ How shocking is the absence of reason [in his statement]! If it makes no sense to speak of "neglect" in relation to a creature's "side," how is it possible to use the term in relation to something [alleged to be] a divine attribute? Thaʿlab recited the following line of poetry in which the term appears: "O my friends, restrain yourselves and be mindful of God in respect of 'my side,'" and he glossed it as meaning "my affair" (*amrī*).¹⁴¹

[The Tenth Text]

62 Among the verses [that have been used by some to establish a divine attribute] is the following: "We breathed into her"¹⁴² from Our *rūḥ* (spirit)."¹⁴³

¹⁴⁰ See §177 where Ibn al-Jawzī returns to Ibn Ḥāmid's view on the matter of God's *janb* (cf., also §113). Abū Yaʿlā appears to be silent on the question of God's *janb* in the *Muʿtamad*, nor does KAS attribute a position to him on this question. I have not so far found any reference to Aḥmad's view on this question, nor does the question appear in the *ʿaqida* of Abū Muḥammad at-Tamīmī (*Ṭabaqāt al-Ḥanābila*, II, 292-307) or in the summary of Barbahārī's views given in *Ṭabaqāt al-Ḥanābila*, (II, 18ff.).

¹⁴¹ In *Zād al-Masīr*, Ibn al-Jawzī cites five possible interpretations of the term *janb* in the above verse: it may mean 1) the obedience (*ṭāʿa*) owed to God (a position attributed to Ḥasan al-Baṣrī); 2) whatever is God's right or due (*ḥaqq Allāh*) (so Saʿīd b. Jubayr); 3) God's affair (*amr*) (Mujāhid and Zajjāj); 4) God's honor or reputation (*dhikr*) (ʿIkrama and Ḍaḥḥāk; and 5) nearness (*qurb*) to God or what enjoys proximity to him (al-Farrāʾ). Although Ibn al-Jawzī does not explicitly endorse any of the above interpretations, his concluding comments seem to reflect some interest in (and perhaps sympathy for) the view advocated by al-Farrāʾ, and he notes that if the latter is right, *janb* may actually refer to Paradise (*janna*) (VII, 192). In any case, Ibn al-Jawzī clearly opposes the notion that *janb* is one of the divine attributes. For other discussions of the term *janb*, see the lengthy discussion in Lane, 465/3-466/2 (cf., *Lisān*, I, 275/2). An Ashʿarite perspective can be found in Juwaynī, *Irshād*, 158-159; and Bayhaqī, *Asmāʾ*, 361. Cf., Zamakhsharī's *Kashshāf*, III, 404, for one Muʿtazilī's approach to the question.

¹⁴² Strictly speaking, the antecedent of the pronoun in the expression *fīhi* is the term *farj* (womb) which occurs in the earlier part of the verse. I have chosen to follow Arberry's rendering of the prepositional phrase which, it seems to me, conveys the sense of the verse. For the full text, see the following note.

¹⁴³ S. 66: 12. The full verse reads: "And Mary, ʿImrān's daughter, who guarded virginity, so we breathed into her of our spirit, and she confirmed the words of her Lord and his books, and became one of the obedient" (Arberry). Also cf., S. 21: 91; and 19: 17, for

According to the exegetes [figure of speech] meaning closely linked to the idea of said:

I said to him: Lift [the c by your breath (*rūḥ*).

63 When the Quran uses effect "they hurt His saints it means "ask the people [found] in the words of the loves us and we love it."

I was informed that the f

similar passages in which the term

¹⁴⁴ Cf., *Zād al-Masīr*, II, 261, 1

¹⁴⁵ Macartney, *The Diwān of G* commentaries on this line, see *Zā* 460, 1-2. God's *rūḥ* is to be unde dying coals.

¹⁴⁶ S. 33: 57. The full verse n God has cursed in the present w humbling chastisement" (Arberry

¹⁴⁷ S. 12: 82

¹⁴⁸ Cf., *Zād al-Masīr*, IV, 268. words: *سأل أهل القرية* (ask the peop of this sort of phenomenon are c of the *muḍāf* (for a discussion o theory, see W. Heinrichs, "Scriptur Islamischen Wissenschaften, 7 [I Hanafi/Muʿtazili jurist, Abū Ba example of ellipsis).

¹⁴⁹ This saying appears a num Bukhārī, *ṣakāt*, 54; *jihād*, 71, 74; *ṭiḥān*, 16; Muslim, *ḥajj*, 464, 50 240, 243, 443; and V, 425.

¹⁵⁰ "The fires of animosity."

According to the exegetes, the expression "Our *rūḥ*" [is to be taken as a figure of speech] meaning "our mercy (*rahma*)," ¹⁴⁴ for the term *rūḥ* is closely linked to the idea of breath (*nafkh*) as the poet (Dhū'r-Rumma) has said:

I said to him: Lift [the coals] to [your mouth] and give them life
by your breath (*rūḥ*), nourishing [them] gently [until they blaze]. ¹⁴⁵

[The Eleventh Text]

63 When the Quran uses the expression "they hurt God" ¹⁴⁶ it means in effect "they hurt His saints (*awliyā*)." Thus when it says: "Ask the city" ¹⁴⁷ it means "ask the people [of the city]." ¹⁴⁸ [A similar recourse to ellipsis is found] in the words of the Prophet when he said: "Uḥud is a mountain that loves us and we love it." ¹⁴⁹ Thus the poet has said:

I was informed that the fires ¹⁵⁰ were ignited after [your death], ¹⁵¹

similar passages in which the term *rūḥ* figures.

¹⁴⁴ Cf., *Zād al-Masīr*, II, 261, 1; V, 385, 17ff.; and VIII, 316.

¹⁴⁵ Macartney, *The Dīwān of Ghailān Ibn 'Uqbah* (Cambridge 1919), 176 (no. 33). For commentaries on this line, see *Zād al-Masīr*, II, 261, 10 and n. 1; and *Lisān al-ʿArab*, II, 460, 1-2. God's *rūḥ* is to be understood as an act of generosity to Mary just as breath is to dying coals.

¹⁴⁶ S. 33: 57. The full verse reads: "Those who hurt God and His Messenger—they God has cursed in the present world and the world to come, and has prepared for them a humbling chastisement" (Arberry).

¹⁴⁷ S. 12: 82

¹⁴⁸ Cf., *Zād al-Masīr*, IV, 268, 17, where Ibn al-Jawzī glosses the expression with the words: *سل أهل القرية* (ask the people of the village); and I, 115, 15ff., where other examples of this sort of phenomenon are cited from the Quran and explained in terms of the ellipsis of the *muḍāf* (for a discussion of the significance of ellipsis [*ḥadf*] in medieval literary theory, see W. Heinrichs, "Scriptural Hermeneutics," *Zeitschrift für Geschichte der Arabisch-Islamischen Wissenschaften*, 7 [1991-92], 258, and 263ff. Heinrichs cites the case of the Ḥanafī/Muʿtazilī jurist, Abū Bakr al-Jaṣṣāṣ, who interpreted the above passage as an example of ellipsis).

¹⁴⁹ This saying appears a number of times in the canonical collections, among them: Bukhārī, *zakāt*, 54; *jihād*, 71, 74; *anbiyā* 10; *maghāzī*, 27, 81; *aḥīma*, 28; *daʿawāt*, 35; *ʿitṣām*, 16; Muslim, *ḥajj*. 464, 503, 504/2; and *Musnad*, II, 337, 387; III, 140, 149, 159, 240, 243, 443; and V, 425.

¹⁵⁰ "The fires of animosity."

And after you, O Kulayb, the *assembly* engaged in mutual recrimination!¹⁵²

[The Twelfth Text]

64 Finally, there is the verse: "What can they expect but that God will come to them in the shadow of the clouds (*fī ḡulal*)."¹⁵³ [The expression "in the shadow"] is to be taken in the sense [fol.17a] of "with the shadow" (*bi-ḡulal*); hence, the verse is to be construed as meaning that God will bring them "[the protection of] the shadow[s]." [God's "coming"] in the verse "Your Lord will come"¹⁵⁴ is to be interpreted in a similar fashion.¹⁵⁵ The *Qāḍī* Abū Ya'la reported Aḥmad b. Ḥanbal as having said that the verse "God will come to them"¹⁵⁶ means that [he will come to them] through His power (*qudra*) and His command (*amr*),¹⁵⁷ and in support of this interpretation he cited the verse "The command of your Lord (*amru rabbika*) will come."¹⁵⁸ The expression "Your Lord will come," which is also found in the Torah, [was explained by Aḥmad as meaning that] it is His power (*qudra*) only [that will come]. However, Ibn Ḥāmid stated: "This interpretation is in

¹⁵¹ In both the *Ḥamāsa* of Abū Tamām (ed. G. Fretag, 420, 13) and the *Amālī* of al-Qālī (I, 95, 13), this line is ascribed to the legendary poet 'Adī b. Rabī'a, better known in the annals of Arabic literature as Muḥalhil, who is alleged to have been the creator of the *qaṣīda*. The killing of the poet's brother, Kulayb b. Rabī'a (by Jassās b. Murra), precipitated the break-up of the alliance between the Bakr and the Taghlib, leading to the famous war of Basūs between the two branches of Wā'il (cf., *EF*, V, 362).

¹⁵² As Blachère has pointed out, the poetry ascribed to 'Adī is of doubtful authenticity. For a discussion of 'Adī b. Rabī'a and his place in the early history of Arabic poetry, see Blachère, *Histoire de la littérature arabe*, 251; and *GAS*, II, 148-14. For an extended commentary on the above line, see Marzūqī's *Sharḥ Diwān al-Ḥamāsa* (Cairo 1951), II, 928-930. The above line is cited twice by Ibn al-Jawzī in his *Zād al-Masīr* (I, 116, 2; and V, 69, 6). In both instances, he glosses the term *majlis* with the words أي أهل المجلس (on the elliptical use of *majlis*, cf., Lane, 444/2; and *Lisān*, VI, 40, 9-10).

¹⁵³ S. 2: 210. The expression "in the shadow (*fī ḡulal*) of the clouds" appears in a tradition that is discussed in §§185-186.

¹⁵⁴ S. 89: 22.

¹⁵⁵ That is, it is to be taken as meaning that God will bring (or send) them His protection, power, or blessing, not that God Himself will come.

¹⁵⁶ S. 2: 210.

¹⁵⁷ See *Zād*, I, 225.

¹⁵⁸ S. 16: 33.

error, for God Himself (b) that entails change of locati

65 This statement concern its point of reference as (*ajisām*).¹⁵⁹ Commenting on spirit (*ar-rūḥ*) say: "The s Ibn 'Aqil said: "[If God i questions about created thin questions about] the Creator

¹⁵⁹ According to Ibn al-Jawzī's finite entities which consist of co and 9 for a fuller discussion of the

¹⁶⁰ S. 17: 86.

¹⁶¹ I have adopted the reading supported by a number of manusc

error, for God Himself (*bi-dhātihi*) will descend only through movement that entails change of location (*intiqāl*)."

65 This statement concerning the divine essence takes sense experience as its point of reference as though it were a question of material bodies (*ajsām*).¹⁵⁹ Commenting on the verse: "[When they ask you concerning the spirit (*ar-rūḥ*)] say: 'The spirit [is a matter that] pertains to my Lord,'" ¹⁶⁰ Ibn 'Aqīl said: "[If God implored] His creatures to refrain from asking questions about created things, how much better is it to refrain from [asking questions about] the Creator and His attributes!" ¹⁶¹

¹⁵⁹ According to Ibn al-Jawzī's definition, "bodies" (designated by the term *ajsām*) are finite entities which consist of conjoined atoms (*jawāhir*) and accidents (*ʿarāḍ*). See §§5 and 9 for a fuller discussion of these terms.

¹⁶⁰ S. 17: 86.

¹⁶¹ I have adopted the reading given in the printed edition of *DST* (26), which is also supported by a number of manuscripts of *DST* (see notes to the Arabic text).

[CHAPTER THREE]

TRADITIONS CONCERNING THE DIVINE ATTRIBUTES

66 It must be emphasized that there are in the traditions [ascribed to the Prophet] both obscure (*dafā'in*) and defective elements (*āfāt*) of which only the experts (*ʿulamāʾ fuqahāʾ*) are fully aware. [What is problematic] sometimes has to do with the transmission (*naql*) of the text and sometimes with the interpretation of the content (*kashf ma'nāhā*).¹ In what follows, we shall attempt to clarify these matters, if God permits.²

The First Tradition

67 In the *Ṣaḥīḥs* of Bukhārī and Muslim there is a tradition reported by Abū Hurayra in which the Prophet said: "God created Adam in his form (*ṣūra*)."³

¹ He might also have included the *matn* (text) among the sometimes problematic aspects of *ḥadīth* since he does frequently deal with the *matn* in the analyses that follow.

² Ibn al-Jawzī wrote extensively on the problems posed by the *ḥadīth* literature. The two works that tackle these matters in a direct and sustained way are his *Kitāb al-ʿIlal al-Mutanāhiya fī l-Aḥādīth al-Wāhiya* (Beirut 1983); and his *Kitāb al-Mawḍūʿāt* (Medina, 1966). As Ibn al-Jawzī explains in his introduction to the work (p. 17, 7-14), *Kitāb al-ʿIlal* is concerned with those traditions that are defective and therefore problematic, but the defects in this case are not such as to require their wholesale rejection (cf., also *Kitāb al-Mawḍūʿāt*, I, 35, 14-19). *Kitāb al-Mawḍūʿāt*, as the title itself makes clear, is devoted to a critical examination of apocryphal traditions which have no useful function and therefore must be rejected. In connection with this latter work, Ibn al-Jawzī composed a semi-biographical work entitled *Kitāb aḍ-Ḍuʿafāʾ wa'l-Matrūkīn* (Beirut 1986) in which disreputable traditionists are listed and their errors identified. Finally, in this connection, mention should be made of his *Gharīb al-Ḥadīth* (Beirut 1984), a specialized work which, as the title indicates, is devoted to a discussion of those traditions in which obscure and rare expressions are to be found (cf., *El*², III, 25b).

³ See, Bukhārī, *Ṣaḥīḥ*, *isti'dhān*, 1 (cf., Houdas, *Les traditions*, IV, 214); for Muslim's version of this tradition, see his *Ṣaḥīḥ*, *birr*, 115 (cf., *janna*, 28). This tradition or near approximations of it can be found in a number of other canonical collections, among them the *Musnad* of Ibn Ḥanbal, vol. II, 244, 251, 315, 323, 434, 463, 519, etc. For a critical review of medieval interpretations of this tradition, see W. M. Watt, "Created in His Image: A Study in Islamic Theology," *Transactions of the Glasgow University Oriental Society*,

68 The experts have ad tradition]. One group choos in a discussion of its mea reservation. Among those different views as to the a "his form"). The first opini being (*ilā ba'di bani Ādam* in which the Prophet is rep another in the face and say [50.17b] of those whose fa "When you strike [someon form (*ʿalā ṣūratihī*)."⁵ [The transmitters of this tradition and the Prophets's respons

18 (1959-1960), 38-49.

⁴ A position which the Ḥanbal with admirable clarity in his *Kitāb al-Mawḍūʿāt*, he a tradition in its variant forms, he a نظر كما قال من تقدم من أئمة السلف are traditions in which it is incur how or in what way [they are to b asking questions] and offer them who came before you [315, 8-10] advocates as we have seen in the fi discussion of such matters is to l public are present. However, wh circles, such are entirely appropria (cf., also the last part of §59). Quite

⁵ Among the canonical collec Ahmad b. Ḥanbal, II, 252 and 434 the subject of frequent comment. *Muḥīṭ al-Ḥadīth* [Cairo 1326/1908], *Tawḥīd*, 36, 14-17).

⁶ The abridged version of the t Ibn al-Jawzī at the beginning of th the beating (including the curse) a given by Ibn Fūrak (*Maḥṣil al-ʿabridgment was that since the lo transmitter thought it unnecessary view under discussion here in K since it left out what, in their view,*

68 The experts have adopted two quite different approaches [to this tradition]. One group chooses to remain silent rather than become involved in a discussion of its meaning;⁴ the other group, however, has no such reservation. Among those who make up the latter group, there are three different views as to the antecedent of the pronoun "his" [in the expression "his form"]. The first opinion maintains that the pronoun refers to a human being (*ilā baʿḍi banī Ādam*). Those who advocate this view cite a tradition in which the Prophet is reported to have passed by a man who was striking another in the face and saying to him: "God curse your face and the face [fol.17b] of those whose face is like yours." The Prophet then said to him: "When you strike [someone] spare his face, for God created Adam in his form (*ʿalā ṣūratihī*)."⁵ [The proponents of this view] claim that one of the transmitters of this tradition abridged it [by omitting reference to the beating and the Prophets's response],⁶ and so the shortened version ought to be

18 (1959-1960), 38-49.

⁴ A position which the Ḥanbalī traditionist and jurist, al-Ājurī (d. 360/970), sets forth with admirable clarity in his *Kitāb ash-Sharʿa* (Beirut 1983). After quoting the above tradition in its variant forms, he adds: هذه من السنن التي يجب على المسلمين الإيمان بها ولا يقال: كيف ولم؟ بل تستقبل بالتسليم والتصديق وترك النظر كما قال من تقدم من أئمة المسلمين (These are traditions in which it is incumbent upon Muslims to believe, and one should not ask how or in what way [they are to be understood]. On the contrary, submit to them [without asking questions] and offer them your assent. Shun rational reflection as did the *imāms* who came before you [315, 8-10]). This is a position which Ibn al-Jawzī himself sometimes advocates as we have seen in the first chapter of *KAS*. But he makes an important distinction: discussion of such matters is to be shunned on occasions when members of the general public are present. However, when it is a question of discussions confined to scholarly circles, such are entirely appropriate. This much is evident from §36 (last sentence) of *KAS* (cf., also the last part of §59). Quite obviously, *KAS* was intended for an academic readership.

⁵ Among the canonical collections, this tradition is found only in the *Musnad* of Aḥmad b. Ḥanbal, II, 252 and 434 (the two texts are virtually identical). The tradition was the subject of frequent comment by later scholars (cf., for example, Ibn Qutayba, *Taʾwīl Mukhtalif al-Ḥadīth* [Cairo 1326/1908], 277-278; Bayhaqī, *Asmāʾ*, 291, 3-5; and Ibn Khuzayma, *Tawḥīd*, 36, 14-17).

⁶ The abridged version of the tradition referred to here is apparently the one cited by Ibn al-Jawzī at the beginning of this section (§68). What was left out was the reference to the beating (including the curse) and the Prophet's response. According to the explanation given by Ibn Fūrak (*Mushkil al-Ḥadīth* [Beirut 1985], 49), the assumption behind the abridgment was that since the longer version of the tradition was so widely known the transmitter thought it unnecessary to repeat it in full. One senses that the proponents of the view under discussion here in *KAS* were not entirely happy with the abridged version, since it left out what, in their view, corroborated their interpretation of the tradition.

understood in accordance with the meaning of the fuller tradition [if ambiguity is to be avoided].⁷ They further point out that the expression "the face of those whose face is like yours" includes prophets as well as believers. [In their view] Adam was singled out for special mention in this tradition only because he was the first whose face was created in accordance with this form—but a form also shared by those who came after. Thus, it is as though the Prophet warned the man that [in cursing another] he had also in effect cursed both Adam and his progeny. This tradition shows the length to which the Prophet was prepared to go in restraining the man. According to those who hold this view, then, the pronoun "his" is to be taken as referring to the man who was struck,⁸ and it is [according to them] a grievous error to suppose that it refers to God, given the tradition's use of the expression "the face of him whose face is like yours." If God is taken as the antecedent of the pronoun the result is anthropomorphism (*tashbih*) pure and simple. In the *Ṣaḥīḥ* of Muslim there is another version of this tradition, reported by Abū Hurayra, in which the Prophet said: "If one of you does battle against his brother, spare his face, for God created Adam in his form."⁹

⁶⁹ The second view is that while, in principle, the pronoun may be taken as referring to either of two explicitly stated nouns, [that is, God or Adam],¹⁰ it may not in this instance be taken as referring to God in view of the evidence (*dalīl*) indicating that he does not possess a form. It must, therefore, be taken as referring to Adam. The meaning of the tradition [according to this view] is that God created Adam "in his, that is, Adam's, form" by creating him in a fully developed, adult form, and not through the gradual process of natural procreation as in the case of [Adam's] descendents. This view, adopted by Abū Sulaymān al-Khaṭṭābī,¹¹ was mentioned [favorably]

⁷ Cf., Ibn Fūrak, *Mushkil*, 49, 5, where the wording is almost identical to that used in KAS, although Ibn Fūrak adds the words: حتى يزول الإشكال.

⁸ Cf., Ibn Qutayba, *Taʿwīl Mukhtalif al-Hadīth* (Cairo 1326/1908), 277-278; Ibn Fūrak, *Mushkil*, 49; and Bayhaqī, *Asmāʾ*, 290, 20-23.

⁹ Muslim, *birr*, 115.

¹⁰ It should be kept in mind that the argument in this paragraph concerns the basic tradition cited in §67.

¹¹ Cf., Bayhaqī, *Asmāʾ* (290, 4-11) where al-Khaṭṭābī is quoted at some length on the meaning of the term *ṣūra*. The passage reads: «خلق الله آدم» وقد قال أبو سليمان الخطابي قوله «خلق الله آدم» على صورته «الهاء وقعت كناية اسمين ظاهرين فلم تصلح أن تصرف إلى الله عز وجل لقيام الدليل على أنه ليس بذي صورة سبحانه ليس كمثله شيء فكان مرجعها إلى آدم فالمعنى أن ذرية آدم إنما خلقوا أطواراً كانوا في مبدأ الخلقة نطفة ثم علقه ثم مضغة، ثم صاروا صوراً أجنة إلى أن تتم مدة الحمل فيولدون أطفالاً»

before him by Thaʿlab in his

⁷⁰ The third view is that the two views as to how [the term *ṣūra* denotes something that derives from his action and to God for two reasons: 1) through their association [My house,"¹² or 2) to signify that Adam was created] on the basis of conflicting *isnāds*. [cited in support of this view the Prophet [fol.18a] said: "Adam was created in the form of a man in three respects. In the first basis of conflicting *isnāds*. a Follower"¹³ whereas in the

مكن خلقه على هذه الصفة لكنه أول ما تناوله الخلق وجد خلقاً تاماً (Cf. form." Abū Sulaymān al-Khaṭṭābī referring to either of the two statements that it be taken as referring to God does not possess a form, for [the pronoun here must refer to Adam] created only in stages: in the beginning forms until pregnancy reached completion as children and became adults. Adam created in a fully completed [form]

¹² See Thaʿlab, *Majālis* (=Ar. preferred this interpretation (cf., and Ibn Fūrak, *Mushkil*, 52).

¹³ S. 22: 26. The argument here is that the house by associating it with God is a kind of association or "annexation" (*Tawḥīd*, 39, 5-17. The argument here is that Adam was a way of conferring a

¹⁴ Cf., Bayhaqī, *Asmāʾ*, 291, 5-6.

¹⁵ I have not found this tradition above text with brief commentary (cf., Lecomte, *Le traité*, 244); Bayhaqī, 4-8.

¹⁶ That is, a second generation

before him by Tha'lab in his *Amālī*.¹²

70 The third view is that [the pronoun] refers to God, though there are two views as to how [the term *ṣūra*] is to be construed. The first is that the term *ṣūra* denotes something God possesses (*mulk*) in the sense that it derives from his action and creative effort. [Form (*ṣūra*)] is said to belong to God for two reasons: 1) to confer distinction [on things or persons] through their association [with God] as in the Quranic expression "purify My house,"¹³ or 2) to signify that He did not fashion [the *ṣūra* by which Adam was created] on the basis of a pre-existing model.¹⁴ The tradition [cited in support of this view] goes back to Ibn 'Umar, who reported that the Prophet [fol.18a] said: "Do not abuse the face of a person, for humankind was created in the form of *Raḥmān*."¹⁵ This tradition, however, is defective in three respects. In the first place, Thawrī and A'mash reported it on the basis of conflicting *isnāds*. In Thawrī's *isnād* the tradition is traced back to a Follower¹⁶ whereas in the case of A'mash it is traced back to a Companion.

وينشأون صغاراً، إلى أن يكبروا فتطول أجسامهم، يقول إن آدم لم يكن خلقه على هذه الصفة لكنه أول ما تناولته الخلقه وجد خلقاً تاماً (Concerning the prophetic tradition, "God created Adam in his form," Abū Sulaymān al-Khaṭṭābī said: "The pronoun *hā* [in this saying] may be taken as referring to either of the two stated nouns [i.e., God or Adam]. It is not fitting, however, that it be taken as referring to God because of the [scriptural] evidence indicating that He does not possess a form, for [the Quran says:] 'There is nothing like unto Him'. Hence, the pronoun here must refer to Adam, and the meaning is that the descendents of Adam were created only in stages: in the beginning they were drop(s), then clot(s), etc., and finally fetal forms until pregnancy reached completion, and so they were born as infants and grew up as children and became adults. Adam was not created in this fashion, but was the first to be created in a fully completed [form].").

¹² See Tha'lab, *Majālis* (= *Amālī*), I, 115. A number of Ash'arite theologians also preferred this interpretation (cf., al-Baghdādī, *Uṣūl*, 75-76; al-Juwaynī, *Irshād*, 163-164; and Ibn Fūrak, *Mushkil*, 52).

¹³ S. 22: 26. The argument here is that special distinction is conferred on a particular house by associating it with God. For other Quranic expressions supposedly reflecting this kind of association or "annexation," see Bayhaqī, *Asmā*, 291, 7; and Ibn Khuzayma, *Tawḥīd*, 39, 5-17. The argument here seems to be that the attribution of God's form to Adam was a way of conferring a special distinction on him.

¹⁴ Cf., Bayhaqī, *Asmā*, 291, 5-8.

¹⁵ I have not found this tradition in any of the canonical collections. For citations of the above text with brief commentaries, see Ibn Qutayba, *Ta'wīl Mukhtalif al-Ḥadīth*, 278, 4-5 (cf., Lecomte, *Le traité*, 244); Bayhaqī, *Asmā*, 291, 9-12; and Ibn Khuzayma, *Tawḥīd*, 38, 4-8.

¹⁶ That is, a second generation Muslim, literally, those who came after the Companions

Secondly, Aʿmash was in the habit of concealing defects in his *isnāds* (*kāna yudallis*). Thus, for example, he made no mention of the fact that he received [this tradition] from Ḥabīb b. Abī Thābit. Thirdly, Ḥabīb too was known to have concealed defects in his *isnāds*, for he does not report that he had received this tradition from ʿAṭā [b. Abī Ribāh].¹⁷ If these considerations, taken together, require that this tradition be considered weak (*wahn*), the same judgment ought to be applied to the view that construes the term *ṣūra* as something belonging to God.

71 [Among those who take the pronoun as referring to God,] the second view holds that the term *form* (*ṣūra*) denotes an attribute (*ṣifa*). It is sometimes said “this is the *form* of the matter” (*ṣūrat al-amr*), that is, this is its nature or attribute. The meaning of God’s creation of Adam according to His *ṣifa* is that he endowed [Adam] with His own attributes, *viz.*, life, knowledge, power, hearing, sight, speech and will, by virtue of which [Adam] was set apart from all of the animals. Moreover, God also granted him a rank superior to that of the angels when he ordered them to prostrate before [Adam]. Ibn ʿAqīl said: “[God] set Adam apart by endowing him with His own ‘form’ (*ṣūra*) for no other reason than to confer distinction on him, *viz.*, [by granting him] power (*sulṭana*) and sovereign authority (*rubbūbiya*) to govern, receive homage, maintain law and order, and to regulate public affairs, [the exercise of which] brings prosperity and well-being to the [various] lands and their inhabitants. Among the angels and the jinn there is no race (*nawʿ*) or tribe (*qabīl*), apart from humans, that agrees to render Him obedience. This is the meaning of the tradition [‘God created Adam in his form’]. It follows, therefore, that *form* (*ṣūra*) here refers to spiritual essence (*maʿnawīya*), not to a form (or shape) possessing external features.”¹⁸

Abū Muḥammad b. Qutayba’s view of this tradition is seriously flawed (*qabīḥ*), for he writes: “God possesses an actual form, though it is not like

of the Prophet. These *mursal* traditions, as they were called, were characterized by the fact that there was a gap in the first part of the *isnād*, that is, between the Prophet and the second generation authority who reported it. *Ḥadīth* critics such as Ibn al-Jawzī regarded such *isnāds* as problematic and therefore open to question as regards their authenticity.

¹⁷ Cf., Ibn Khuzayma, *Tawḥīd*, 38-39, where a similar analysis of the *isnād* of this tradition is given. It is interesting that Ḥabīb b. Abī Thābit is not listed in Ibn al-Jawzī’s *Kitāb al-Ḍuʿafāʾ*. For a somewhat more favorable assessment of Ḥabīb, see Dhahabī’s *Mizān*, I, 451 (1690). On ʿAṭā, see *Mizān*, III, 70. Cf., *Asmāʾ*, 291, 12-14, where al-Bayhaqī focuses his critical comments on the *matn* of the tradition rather than its *isnād*.

¹⁸ Cf., Maimonides, *Guide*, I, 1-2.

other forms, and he fashioned (*takhlīṭ*) and incoherent (*taḥlīṭ*) like God’s. The *Qāḍī* [Abī] God although it is not a form term essence (*dhār*) [when] for the term essence refers to whereas [the word] *form* (*ṣūra*) [fol.18b] and composition (Those who use the expres

¹⁹ Although these words do not far as I have been able to determine Qutayba was identified with both here in KAS. Without identifying (p. 67) as follows: لا كالشيء، not like other forms, just as he Qutayba’s position, Ibn Fīrak ha الله، وتوغل في تشبيه الله تعالى، ثم قال: إن آدم مخلوق على تلك متناقض متناهات يدفع أولئك آخره [and] insisted that it is not like Adam [and patterned] him after guilty of comparing God with construing the term metaphorical and that Adam was patterned after in which the last part contradicts section of *Mushkil* (68) where Ibn

²⁰ Cf., *Maʿṣumāt*, 58, 13-16, to God though, he adds: كاصور، approves the use of the terms *ṣūra* he adds: لا كالتواتر والتشويش (essences). Some Hanbalis, especially Yaʿqūb’s qualification unnecessary his *Thawr* (ed. by H. Laoust), 5 literally. In his longest *ʿAqida*, A (God created Adam 29, 1: cf., I, 313, 2-3). Perhaps Abū ʿAlī-Ḥasan al-Warrāq (d. 854: آدم على صورة الرحمن فهو جسمي the form of Raḥmān is a Jāhīm [

other forms, and he fashioned Adam after it.”¹⁹ This statement is confused (*takhlīt*) and incoherent (*tahāfut*), for it clearly implies that Adam’s form is like God’s. The *Qāḍī* [Abū Yaʿlā] said: “The term *form* may be applied to God although it is not a form like other forms; the same is also true of the term essence (*dhāt*) [when applied to God].”²⁰ This reflects serious confusion, for the term essence refers to the quintessential character (*maʿnā*) of something whereas [the word] *form* (*ṣūra*) implies a shape (*hayʾa*) with limits (*takhāṭīf*) [fol.18b] and composition (*taʿlīf*), and it presupposes a fashioner or composer. Those who use the expression “a form not like other forms” face the same

¹⁹ Although these words do not appear in Ibn Qutayba’s *Taʾwīl Mukhtalif al-Ḥadīth*, so far as I have been able to determine, it is clear from Ibn Fūrak’s *Mushkil* (67-69) that Ibn Qutayba was identified with both the wording and position ascribed to him by Ibn al-Jawzī here in *KAS*. Without identifying his source, Ibn Fūrak quotes Ibn Qutayba in the *Mushkil* (p. 67) as follows: *إِنَّ لِلَّهِ عِزًّا وَجَلَّ صُورَةً لَا كَالصُّورِ كَمَا أَنَّهُ شَيْءٌ لَا كَالْأَشْيَاءِ* (God is a form but not like other forms, just as he is a being unlike other beings). In his comments on Ibn Qutayba’s position, Ibn Fūrak has the following to say: *فَأَثْبَتَ لِلَّهِ تَعَالَى صُورَةً قَدِيمَةً، زَعَمَ أَنَّهَا لَا كَالصُّورِ وَأَنَّ اللَّهَ خَلَقَ آدَمَ عَلَى تِلْكَ الصُّورَةِ، وَهَذَا جَهْلٌ مِنْ قَائِلِهِ، وَتَوَعَّلَ فِي تَشْبِيهِهِ اللَّهَ تَعَالَى بِخَلْقِهِ. وَالْعَجَبُ مِنْهُ أَنَّهُ تَأَوَّلَ الْخَبَرَ ثُمَّ زَعَمَ أَنَّ اللَّهَ صُورَةٌ لَا كَالصُّورِ، ثُمَّ قَالَ: إِنَّ آدَمَ مَخْلُوقٌ عَلَى تِلْكَ الصُّورَةِ وَهَذَا كَلَامٌ مُتَنَاقِضٌ مُتَهَاوٍ يَدْفَعُ أَوَّلَهُ آخِرُهُ* (He predicated of God an eternal form [and] insisted that it is not like other forms, but then he went on to say that God created Adam [and patterned] him after that form. Those who speak thus are misguided and are guilty of comparing God with His creatures. It is astonishing that he should begin by construing the term metaphorically and claim that it is not a form like other forms but then add that Adam was patterned after that form. This is a contradictory, incoherent statement in which the last part contradicts the first [*Mushkil*, 67, 6-68, 3]). See the remainder of this section of *Mushkil* (68) where Ibn Fūrak expands on the comments cited above.

²⁰ Cf., *Muʿtamad*, 58, 13-16, where Abū Yaʿlā insists that the term *ṣūra* may be applied to God though, he adds: *صُورَةٌ لَا كَالصُّورِ* (a form unlike other forms). In the same passage he approves the use of the terms *nafs* and *dhāt* as designations that may be applied to God, but he adds: *نَفْسٌ وَذَاتٌ لَا كَالذَّوَاتِ وَالنَّفُوسِ* (a soul and an essence unlike other souls and essences). Some Ḥanbalīs, especially those of a more literalist bent of mind, thought Abū Yaʿlā’s qualification unnecessary. See, for example, the position set forth by Ibn Baṭṭa in his *Ibāna* (ed. by H. Laoust), 57, 9-13 (trans. 104), where he takes the term *ṣūra* quite literally. In his longest *Aqida*, Aḥmad states his position as follows: *وَخَلَقَ [اللَّهُ] آدَمَ بِيَدِهِ* (God created Adam by His hand after His own form [*Ṭabaqāt al-Ḥanābila*, I, 29, 1; cf., I, 313, 2-3]). Perhaps the most uncompromising position is that attributed to Abū’l-Ḥasan al-Warrāq (d. 864/5 A.H.) who is quoted as having said: *إِنَّ اللَّهَ خَلَقَ: مَنْ لَمْ يَقُلْ: إِنَّ اللَّهَ خَلَقَ: آدَمَ عَلَى صُورَةِ الرَّحْمَنِ فَهُوَ جَاهِلٌ* (He who refuses to say that God created Adam according to the form of Raḥmān is a Jahmī [*Ṭabaqāt al-Ḥanābila*, I, 212, 8-9]).

problem as those who say "a body not like other bodies" for [in both cases] they contradict themselves.

The Second Tradition

72 'Abd ar-Raḥmān b. 'Ā'ish reported that the Prophet once said: "I saw my Lord in the most beautiful form (*fī aḥsani šūratin*) and He said to me: 'About what is the High Council (*mala' a'lā*)²¹ disputing, O Muḥammad?' I said: 'O Lord, only You know'. Then He placed His hand between my shoulders and I felt its coolness against my breast, whereupon I understood both what is in heaven and on earth."²²

73 Aḥmad [b. Ḥanbal] said: "The source of this tradition as well as the various chains of authority on which it is based are disturbed (*muḍṭariba*)."²³ Dāraquṭnī said: "[According to one version] Mu'ādh [b. Jabal]²⁴ is said to have received it from the Prophet, but all of its chains are disturbed and cannot be trusted. [According to another chain] Qatāda²⁵ received it from

²¹ A Quranic expression (S. 37: 8; and 38: 69) which occurs several times in versions of the tradition cited by Ibn al-Jawzī in this section. See *Zād al-Masīr*, VII, 48 and 154, where Ibn al-Jawzī explains the expression as referring to an angelic council (cf., Zamakhsharī, *Kashshāf*, III, 336, and 381-382).

²² Among the canonical collections, the tradition is found in the following: Dārimī, *Sunan*, *ru'ya*, 12 (from Ibn 'Ā'ish); *Musnad*, I, 368 (Ibn 'Abbās); IV, 66 (Ibn 'Ā'ish from "from one of the *aṣḥāb*"); V, 243 (Mālik b. Yakhāmīr from Mu'ādh b. Jabal); and V, 378 (Ibn 'Ā'ish from "one of the *aṣḥāb*"). Cf., Bukhārī, *tafsīr*, *surat* 9, 15 (from Samura b. Jundub); and *ta'bir*, 48 (Samura b. Jundub). For discussions of the tradition in its various forms, see Ibn Qutayba, *Ta'wīl*, 272; Bayhaqī, *Asmā'*, 298-301; Ibn Khuzayma, *Tawḥīd*, 215-216; Abū Ya'ālā, *Mu'tamad*, 85-86; Ibn Fūrak, *Mushkil*, 69-73; and Ibn al-Jawzī, *al-Ilal al-Mutanāhiya*, I, 29-37.

²³ When applied to the *isnād*, the term *muḍṭariba* refers to defects resulting from the erroneous addition or suppression of names, or to the attachment of *isnāds* to texts to which they do not belong (cf., Dozy, II, 7/1).

²⁴ Abū 'Abd ar-Raḥmān Mu'ādh b. Jabal b. 'Amr, a Companion who died in 18/639. For biographical details and his role in the transmission of *ḥadīth*, see Ibn Sa'd, *Ṭabaqāt*, VII, 387-389.

²⁵ Abū'l-Khaṭṭāb Qatāda b. Di'āma (d. 117/735), a pupil of Ḥasan al-Baṣrī, Anas b. Mālik and others, and who is said to have embraced the doctrine of free-will, though he apparently renounced his Qadarī views later in life. Although highly respected in certain circles, opinions varied as to his reliability as a transmitter of Prophetic sayings (cf., *Mīzān*, III, 385). For more on him, see Ibn Sa'd, *Ṭabaqāt*, VII, 229-231; *Shadharāt*, I, 153-154;

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²⁸ Hishām b. Abī 'Abd Allāh
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and *Mīzān*, IV, 300.

²⁹ Anas Qatāda 'Abd ar-Raḥmān
Basra who later settled in Syria.
him, see the substantial notice in I

³⁰ *Tahdhīb al-Tahdhīb*, III, 115

³¹ Ibn Sa'd gives his *nishā* as:
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VII, 438). Dhahabī, who devotes:
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³² Also read Yakhāmīr in son
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(685-705). On his reliability as a t

³³ Cf., *al-Ilal al-Mutanāhiya*, I,

³⁴ Cf., *Kaṣ*, §12 where Ibn al-Ja

³⁵ Bayhaqī, *Asmā'*, p. 298ff., bu

Anas [b. Mālik]—though doubts have been expressed regarding Qatāda²⁶—and Yūsuf b. ʿAṭīya²⁷ passed it on from Qatāda, but he too had reservations regarding him. Hishām²⁸ also transmitted it from Qatāda in a chain that went back from Qatāda to Abū Qilāba²⁹ and from him to Khālīd b. al-Lajlāj³⁰ and finally to Ibn ʿAbbās, but [Hishām] expressed doubts about whether indeed it was received from Ibn ʿAbbās. As a matter of fact, Khālīd did not receive it [from Ibn ʿAbbās] but rather from ʿAbd ar-Raḥmān b. ʿĀʾish³¹ who, in turn, got it, not from the Prophet, but from Mālik b. Yukhāmīr³² who received it from Muʿādh.”³³

74 I have already indicated that this tradition is not sound.³⁴ Abū Bakr al-Bayhaqī pointed out that it circulated in a number of versions, all of which are weak.³⁵ [According to him,] the best of these different versions are the [two] which suggest that [the tradition] has to do with a dream experience. [In one of these] Abū Hurayra is reported to have related that

and *ET*², IV, 748, where the main sources on him are listed.

²⁶ Cf., *Mizān*, III, 385, 2-4, where the charge of *tadlīs* is mentioned.

²⁷ Yūsuf b. ʿAṭīya Abū Sahl aṣ-Ṣaffār al-Bāhilī (d. 187/802). Among traditionists generally he was regarded as a weak authority (cf., Ibn al-Jawzī, *Kitāb aḍ-Ḍuʿafāʾ*, III, 22; and *Mizān*, IV, 468-470, where much the same assessment is given).

²⁸ Hishām b. Abī ʿAbd Allāh Abū Bakr ad-Dastūwāʾī (d. 153/770), a transmitter of *ḥadīth* from Qatāda; for assessments of his merits as a transmitter, see *Shadharāt*, I, 235; and *Mizān*, IV, 300.

²⁹ Abū Qilāba ʿAbd ar-Raḥmān b. Zayd al-Jarmī, a respected jurist and transmitter from Basra who later settled in Syria and died there in 104 or 105/722 or 723). For more on him, see the substantial notice in Ibn Saʿd *Ṭabaqāt*, VII, 183-185; also *Shadharāt*, I, 126.

³⁰ *Tahdhīb at-Tahdhīb*, III, 115. The date of his death is not mentioned.

³¹ Ibn Saʿd gives his *nisba* as al-Ḥaḍramī and reports that he claimed to have received traditions from the Prophet—a claim which Ibn Saʿd appears not to take seriously (*Ṭabaqāt*, VII, 438). Dhahabī, who devotes a notice to him, declares him to be unreliable in matters of *ḥadīth* (*Mizān*, II, 571; cf., also *Tahdhīb at-Tahdhīb*, VI, 204-205). Somewhat surprisingly, Ibn al-Jawzī makes no mention of him in his *Kitāb aḍ-Ḍuʿafāʾ*. The date of his death is not reported and apparently was unknown.

³² Also read Yakhāmīr in some sources. Ibn Saʿd gives his full name as Mālik b. Yukhāmīr al-Alhānī as-Saksakī (*Ṭabaqāt*, VII, 441). According to Ibn Saʿd, he received traditions from Muʿādh and died sometime during the reign of ʿAbd al-Malik b. Marwān (685-705). On his reliability as a transmitter, Ibn Saʿd is non-committal.

³³ Cf., *al-ʿIlal al-Mutanāhiya*, I, 33-34.

³⁴ Cf., *KAS*, §32 where Ibn al-Jawzī explicitly declares the tradition to be unreliable.

³⁵ Bayhaqī, *Asmāʾ*, p. 298ff., but especially 300-301.

the Messenger of God said: "Someone approached me in a most beautiful form and said to me: 'About what is the High Council debating?' I replied: 'I do not know'. Then he placed his hand on my shoulders and I felt its coolness against my breast, whereupon I knew everything about which he was asking."³⁶ In the other version Thawbān³⁷ reported as follows: "The Messenger of God came out to meet us one morning after the prayers and said: 'My Lord approached me during the night in the most beautiful form and said to me: "O Muḥammad, about what is the High Council in dispute?" I said: "O my Lord, I do not know." [fol.19a] Thereupon He placed His hand between my shoulders until I felt the coolness of His finger-tips on my breast, and suddenly everything between heaven and earth was revealed to me.'"³⁸ In still another version going back to Abū 'Ubayda b. al-Jarrāḥ, the Prophet said: "During the night I was taken on a journey and I saw my Lord in the most beautiful form."³⁹

75 [The various versions of] this tradition differ from each other and are open to question. One version reads "someone came to me", which would [if established] remove the problem,⁴⁰ whereas in another the Prophet is quoted as saying "I saw my Lord." It has been reported, however, that the Prophet was in a dream state when the experience in question occurred. Now what is seen in dreams has to do with "mental" images (*wahm*) [prompted by God] in order to draw [the dreamer's] attention to something that either has occurred or will occur. The images (*awhām*) that occur while in that state are not to be confused with external reality, for [in a dream] one may suppose that he is a bird in flight or that he is an animal.⁴¹ If

³⁶ Cf., *al-ʿIlal al-Mutanāhiya*, I, 34, where a slightly different *matn* is traced back to Abū Hurayra.

³⁷ His *kunya* is given as Abū 'Abd Allāh, a *mawlā* of the Prophet, who, following the Prophet's death, moved to Homs where he remained until his death in 54/673 (Ibn Sa'd, *Ṭabaqāt*, VII, 400). Ibn al-ʿImād credits him with having transmitted 172 traditions from the Prophet (*Shadharāt*, I, 63).

³⁸ Cf., Ibn Khuzayma, *Tawḥīd*, 219, 8ff.

³⁹ Cf., *al-ʿIlal al-Mutanāhiya*, I, 30, 9-15; and *Taʾrīkh Baghdād*, VII, 153, 1-7, where the first part of the *ḥadīth* is cited.

⁴⁰ Since the term *ṣūra* is applied to the "someone" referred to in the expression *atānī ātīn*, it presumably refers to someone other than God.

⁴¹ "Or that he is in a different location." See, Ibn Fūrak, *Mushkil*, 72-73, where essentially the same interpretation of the dream experience is given though in somewhat more detail.

someone should say that our response is that the es to be equated with the fo Prophet said: "He who b what he meant is that the value and beneficial, not t (*ṣūra*), for that lies buried though he were alive when seen by the physical eye. Some people have seen G seen in such a state was expressing His concern an reference in [the tradition Lord], while I was in the b

76 It is surprising that s regarding the rite of ablat this tradition—notwithstan them to establish the divin

Almad b. Hanbal sets forth ما ليس هو متعقبا لتقصيها على علم الرضا حنيفة حق وقد كنت اريها يا وزعم انها ليست بشي وبقي التي على الله عليه وسلم واين راي وقال: واين الرضا عن الله عز وجل. the one who has this experience learned man, and tells the truth, and does not distort. In that case by prophets is divinely inspired visions and claims they are not such a claim does not approve th It has been related that the Prop spoken to him by God." He als 28-30 cf. *Sayid al-Khatir*, 6087.

For the sake of translation I impersonal form. Cf., Ibn Fūrak,

"Some of the longer versions If the tradition will not bear the v allow for affirming the divine a

someone should say that dreams experienced by prophets are true (*ḥaqq*), our response is that the essential meaning conveyed [in such dreams] is not to be equated with the forms or images apprehended.⁴² It is true that the Prophet said: "He who has seen me in a dream has seen me indeed," but what he meant is that the content of the dream experience was of positive value and beneficial, not that what was seen was the Prophet's actual form (*ṣūra*), for that lies buried in Medina. One may see a person in a dream as though he were alive when in fact he is deceased. The point is that the body seen by the physical eye is not what is apprehended in the dream state. Some people have seen God in their dreams, but the essence of what was seen in such a state was the best of His qualities (*ṣifāt*), especially those expressing His concern and His acceptance.⁴³ If it should be said that the reference in [the tradition] is to the Prophet, then it means: "I saw [my Lord], while I was in the best of form."

76 It is surprising that someone does not seek to establish a legal ruling regarding the rite of ablutions (*wuḍūʿ*) on the basis of certain versions of this tradition—notwithstanding their confused state—for Ibn Ḥāmid used them to establish the divine attributes.⁴⁴ [In connection with his discussion

⁴² Aḥmad b. Ḥanbal sets forth his position on the vision of God in dreams as follows: والرؤيا من الله عز وجل وهي حق إذا رأى صاحبها شيئاً في منامه ما ليس هو ضغث فقصها على عالم وصدق فيها وأولها العالم على أصل تأويلها الصحيح ولم يحرف. فالرؤيا حينئذ حق. وقد كانت الرؤيا من الأنبياء عليهم السلام وحى. فأى جاهل أجهل ممن يطعن في الرؤيا ويزعم أنها ليست بشئ. وبلغني أن من قال هذا القول لا يرى الاغتسال من الاحتلام. وقد روي عن النبي صلى الله عليه وسلم «إن رؤيا» (The vision of God is true when the one who has this experience sees it in a dream that is not muddled and reports it to a learned man, and tells the truth, and the learned man interprets it in a manner that is sound and does not distort. In that case the vision is to be taken seriously. The vision experienced by prophets is divinely inspired [*waḥy*]). Who is more ignorant than the one who scoffs at visions and claims they are nothing? It has been reported to me that the one who makes such a claim does not approve the performance of ablutions following a nocturnal emission. It has been related that the Prophet said: "The vision experienced by a believer is a word spoken to him by God." He also said: "Visions are from God" [*Ṭabaqāt al-Ḥanābila*, I, 29-30; cf., *Ṣayd al-Khaṭīr*, 618]).

⁴³ For the sake of translation I have chosen to recast the first person of the Arabic in the impersonal form. Cf., Ibn Fūrak, *Mushkil*, 71, 3-4, where a similar point is made.

⁴⁴ Some of the longer versions of this tradition contain a reference to the rite of ablution. If the tradition will not bear the weight of a ruling on *wuḍūʿ*, how much less can it serve as a basis for affirming the divine attributes? That some members of his own school had used

of the divine attributes] Ibn Ḥāmid cited a version of this tradition whose *isnād* went back to Ibn ʿAbbās. In it the Prophet said: "When I was taken on a night journey I saw the All-Merciful in the most beautiful form of a beardless young man [whose face] glistened—indeed, I was instructed not to describe him to you—and I asked my Lord [fol.19b] that He allow me a vision (*ruʾyā*) of Him, and behold He was like a groom at the time of his unveiling, sitting on His Throne (*ʿarsh*)."⁴⁵ This tradition is a grotesque fabrication; it was never transmitted among sound traditions, and not even among the false traditions was it well known. May God be protected from such things!⁴⁶ We have already shown that such things belong to the realm of the dream experience—hence, the reference to the "night journey." May God reward [the Prophet], but may He punish those with Hell who liken God to a groom! [Of such people] he will not say [on the day of judgment]: "These are Muslims." As for the reference to the coolness [of His hand] in the tradition mentioned above, it should be observed that coolness is an accident (*ʿaraḍ*) which may not be ascribed to God. In his *Kitāb al-Kifāya*, the *Qāḍī* [Abū Yaʿlā] mentions that Aḥmad held that the tradition "I saw my Lord in the most beautiful form" meant "in the most beautiful place (*mawḍiʿ*)."⁴⁷

The Third Tradition

77 According to Umm Ṭufayl, wife of Ubayy [b. Kaʿb], the Prophet reported that he saw his Lord in a dream in the form (*ṣūra*) of a most handsome, dignified young man (*shābb muwaqqar*); His legs were covered by a green garment, He had gold sandals on His feet and His head was surrounded by moths of gold.⁴⁸

the tradition for precisely that purpose was a matter of embarrassment to Ibn al-Jawzī; he does not hide his anger at the absurdity of such a procedure. Cf., KAS, §33 where he identifies those conditions that must be met if attributes are to be applied to God properly.

⁴⁵ See *al-ʿIlal al-Mutanāhiya*, I, 35-36, where several versions of the tradition, all ascribed to Ibn ʿAbbās, are cited; cf., also *Taʾrikh Baghdād*, XI, 214, 13-19.

⁴⁶ That is, from such things as are ascribed to Him in the tradition attributed to Ibn ʿAbbās.

⁴⁷ The term *mawḍiʿ* can also mean position, rank or occasion.

⁴⁸ Ibn Qutayba, *Taʾwīl*, 273-274 (cf., Lecomte, *Le traité*, 242); Bayhaqī, *Asmāʾ*, 446-447; Abū Yaʿlā, *Muʿtamad*, 85, 11-13; *Taʾrikh Baghdād*, XIII, 311, 12-18; *Mizān*, IV, 269,

78 This tradition was transmitted by Nuʿaym b. Ḥammād, whom Ibn ʿAdī described as a fabricator of traditions.⁴⁹ Yaḥyā b. Maʿīn said that Nuʿaym was not to be trusted in matters of tradition. Among his *isnāds* one finds the names of Marwān b. ʿUthmān and ʿUmāra b. ʿĀmir. Of the former, Abū ʿAbd ar-Raḥmān an-Nasāʾī said: “Who is this Marwān that he can be counted on to relate the truth about God?” Muhannaʾ b. Yaḥyā⁵⁰ said: “When I asked Aḥmad about this tradition, he turned his head away from me and said: ‘This is a *munkar*.’⁵¹ tradition and this man, that is, Marwān b. ʿUthmān, is unknown (*majhūl*).’”⁵² [Aḥmad] added: “ʿUmāra is also unknown.”

79 ʿUbayd Allāh b. Abī Salama⁵³ reported that Ibn ʿUmar once sent a

3-6; *DST*, 31, 11-14; *Kitāb al-Mawḍūʿāt*, I, 125, 11-18; and *al-ʿIlal al-Mutanāhiya*, I, 29-30.—If the expression *farāsh min dhahab* (“moths of gold”) is to be taken literally, it may mean moths made of gold and worn as ornaments. If they are real moths, i.e., live, gold-colored moths, one must picture them as having been drawn by the light of His face, circling it as if it were a lamp.

⁴⁹ Nuʿaym b. Ḥammād b. Muʿāwiya Abū ʿAbd Allāh al-Khuzāʿī al-Marwazī was a Ḥanafite jurist (d. 228/842). For notices on him, see Ibn Saʿd, *Ṭabaqāt*, VII, 519; *Taʾriḫ Baghdad*, XIII, 306-314; and *Shadharāt*, II, 67. For a full list of biographical sources, see *GAS*, I, 104-105; and *EF*, VIII, 87-88. Ibn Saʿd and al-Khaṭīb both report that he was imprisoned during the reign of al-Muʿtaṣim because of his refusal to endorse the Muʿtazilī view of the Quran. Despite his orthodox views on the Quran, however, he was widely regarded as suspect in matters of *ḥadīth* and was accused by Nasāʾī and Dāraqutnī of having fabricated traditions in support of Sunnī orthodoxy, of which he was a vigorous defender. For a review of opinions on his reliability as a traditionist, see *Kitāb al-Ḍuʿafāʾ*, III, 164 (3543); and *Mizān*, IV, 267-270 (9102).

⁵⁰ Known also as Abū ʿAbd Allāh ash-Shāmī, he was a student and close associate of Aḥmad (cf., *Ṭabaqāt al-Ḥanābila*, I, 345-381; and *Taʾriḫ Baghdad*, XIII, 266-268). The date of his death is not reported, but since he was a contemporary of Aḥmad, we can assume that he died soon after his visit to Mecca in 298/910.

⁵¹ The definitions given by traditionists vary; Dozy (II, 722) defines a *munkar* tradition thus: “A tradition coming from a reporter of weak authority.” Other definitions given by Dozy: “blameworthy,” “prohibited,” or “absurd” (cf., Burton, *Introduction to the Ḥadīth*, 200). Some *ḥadīth*-critics were ready to reject traditions regarded as *munkar* more or less outright, while others were at least prepared to give them a hearing.

⁵² A name identified as *majhūl* (unknown) raises the suspicion that the name may have been a fabrication inserted into an *isnād* by a forger in a form which could not be traced or identified.

⁵³ Ibn Khuzayma (*Tawḥīd*, 198), al-Bayhaqī (*Asmāʾ*, 443), and Dhahabī (*Mizān*, III, 473) give his name as ʿAbd Allāh b. Abī Salama. Ṭabarī also mentions him as a *rāwī* in his *Taʾriḫ*, II, 13, 16; III, 68. I have not so far found a biography devoted to him in any of the *ṭabaqāt* works.

message to 'Abd Allāh b. 'Abbās asking him whether Muḥammad had seen his Lord. He replied in the affirmative, whereupon [Ibn 'Umar] sent inquiring of the details. [Ibn 'Abbās] replied: "He saw Him in the form of a young man sitting on a Throne of gold born by four angels."⁵⁴ This tradition [fol.20a] was transmitted [in the generation after 'Ubayd Allāh] by a sole reporter, namely, [Ibn] Ishāq,⁵⁵ whom a number of 'ulamā' [also] accused of having fabricated the following tradition in the name of Ibn 'Abbās: "[The Prophet] saw [his Lord], and it appeared that His legs were covered with a green garment and that He was shielded by a screen made of pearls."⁵⁶ Among the transmitters of this tradition was Ibrāhīm b. al-Ḥakam b. Abān,⁵⁷ whom Yaḥyā b. Ma'īn and others declared to be weak as a traditionist. In still another tradition traced back to Ibn 'Abbās, the Prophet is reported as having said: "I saw my Lord, and He had short, curly hair, was beardless and wore a green-colored garment."⁵⁸ Both Ḥammād b. Salama and Ibn Abī'l-Awjā,⁵⁹ Ḥammād's step-son, who was also a *zindīq*,

⁵⁴ Ibn Khuzayma, *Tawḥīd*, 198, 15-22; cf., also Bayhaqī, *Asmā'*, 443-444; and *Mizān*, III, 473, 18-22.

⁵⁵ The authorities cited in the preceding note all identify this person as Muḥammad b. Ishāq b. Yasār Abū Bakr al-Makhrāmī, author of the well known biography of the Prophet (for an English translation, see A. Guillaume, *The Life of Muhammad* [Oxford 1955]). For an assessment of his work as a traditionist as well as numerous biographical details, see *Mizān*, III, 468-475.

⁵⁶ Bayhaqī, *Asmā'*, 445, 5-7.

⁵⁷ *Asmā'*, 444; cf., Ibn Sa'd, *Ṭabaqāt*, V, 548; and *Mizān*, I, 27.

⁵⁸ *Mizān*, I, 593, 18-19.

⁵⁹ 'Abd al-Karīm b. Abī'l-'Awjā' (d. 155 A.H.), alleged to have been a crypto-Manichean, was expelled from Basra on account of his heretical views and subsequently made his home in Kufa. He is said to have been a part of the circle around Ja'far aṣ-Ṣādiq and to have raised particularly difficult questions regarding the justice of God; e.g., if God is good, why are there catastrophes and epidemics and, especially, why do children suffer? He advocated a dualistic cosmology (perhaps as a way of dealing with the problem of evil) and held to the doctrine of metempsychosis. His views finally caught up with him, and he was executed in 155/772 on the orders of Muḥammad b. Sulaymān, the 'Abbāsīd governor of Kufa. Ṭabarī reports that he was the uncle of the famous Ma'īn b. Zā'ida (*Ta'rikh*, VIII, 47-48). Near the end of his life he is reported to have confessed that he fabricated four thousand traditions. For more on this interesting figure, see the very useful article on him by G. Vajda in *EI*², III, 682. In addition to the sources cited by Vajda, see also Ibn al-Jawzī, *Kitāb al-Mawḍū'āt*, I, 122; Ṭabarī, *Ta'rikh*, VIII, 47-48; Dhahabī, *Mizān*, II, 644; and Massignon, *Passion*, III, 112, n. 104. Cf., also KAS, §152.

were among its transmitters. Traditions of this sort into such traditions deserve attention, and since dreams and visions cannot serve as a basis for belief. Thus it is not possible to find evidence in support of ruling.

The Qāḍī [Abū Ya'fā], ascribing attributes to God: 'beardless' (*amrad*), 'short, curly' (*ṣa'īl*), and 'crown' (*ṣāḥib*) to God, although we do not use it for this purpose. What more than an approximation of the *al-muḥaddith min al-qadīm*, which [the Prophet] said: 'that is, He will bring him [the Prophet]'.⁶⁰ Those who establish or fabricated traditions—[a] such as 'youth' (*shūb*) 'beardless' mean what they do in or who say: 'So and so stood or sitting.'

80 Ibn 'Aqīl said: "This is a tradition of this kind composed of reliable authentic transmitters is pointless if it

⁶⁰ See *Muḥammad*, 34-35, where context of a discussion of the *ṣa'īl* used as a basis for establishing the *ṣa'īl* in the *Muḥammad* so far as I have been able to find above are apparently based upon traditions attributed to Abū Ya'fā (clearly temporal significance) to God and the eternal and, in doing so, to the more accessible to ordinary people. This paragraph, this is an illegitimate way of meaning.

were among its transmitters. The latter was in the habit of introducing traditions of this sort into the writings [of Ḥammād]. To the extent that such traditions deserve attention they are to be taken as referring to dream experiences, and since dreams have to do with the imaginary (*khayāl*), such traditions cannot serve as a basis for anything [pertaining either to practice or belief]. Thus it is not proper that such traditions be adduced as canonical evidence in support of rulings on the rite of ablutions.

The Qāḍī [Abū Yaʿlā], however, used such traditions as a basis for ascribing attributes to God. He said: "Terms such as 'young man' (*shābb*), 'beardless' (*amrad*), 'short, curly' (*jaʿad wa qaṭaṭ*), 'moths' (*farāsh*), 'sandals' (*naʿlān*), and 'crown' (*tāj*) have been established as designations that apply to God, although we do not claim to know their precise meaning [when used for this purpose]. What is affirmed in the use of such terms is nothing more than an approximation of the temporal to the eternal (*min taqrīb al-muḥdath min al-qadīm*). This is permissible since there is a tradition in which [the Prophet] said: '[God] will draw His servant near to Himself', that is, He will bring him into proximity with Himself (*yuqarribuhu ilā dhātihi*)."⁶⁰ Those who establish the divine attributes on the basis of dreams or fabricated traditions—[and then add:] "we know of course that terms such as 'youth' (*shābb*) 'beardless' (*amrad*), etc., [when applied to God] do not mean what they do in ordinary speech or experience"—are like persons who say: "So and so *stood* or *sat*, but he is not to be described as standing or sitting."

80 Ibn ʿAqīl said: "This tradition is obviously a fabrication. Those who invent traditions of this kind make every effort to provide them with chains composed of reliable authorities, but [the addition of names of reliable] transmitters is pointless if the text of the tradition (*matn*) lacks credibility.

⁶⁰ See *Muʿtamad*, 84-86, where Abū Yaʿlā cites the tradition of Umm Ṭufayl within the context of a discussion of the *ruʿya Allāh* in the dream state. Whether such traditions can be used as a basis for establishing the divine attributes is not taken up either here or elsewhere in the *Muʿtamad* so far as I have been able to determine. Ibn al-Jawzī's comments on Abū Yaʿlā above are apparently based on one of Abū Yaʿlā's lost works. The point of the quotation attributed to Abū Yaʿlā above seems to be that the application of terms (having a clearly temporal significance) to God is an attempt to narrow the gulf between the temporal and the eternal and, in doing so, to make the reality of God's existence more tangible and thus more accessible to ordinary people. As Ibn al-Jawzī points out in the last sentence of this paragraph, this is an illegitimate use of language, for in such cases words cease to have any real meaning.

This would be like attributing to a group of reputable persons a report that the camel of a cloth merchant passed through the eye of a tailor's needle. There is no reason to regard such persons as credible transmitters given the absurdity of their report."⁶¹

The Fourth Tradition

81 [fol.20b] It was reported [on the authority of Anas] that the Prophet once said: "When I was taken on the night journey I saw everything pertaining to my Lord, even a crown studded with pearls."⁶²

82 Among the transmitters of this tradition was Abū'l-Qāsim b. Muḥammad b. al-Yasa⁶³ who received it from Qāsim b. Ibrāhīm.⁶⁴ Al-Azharī⁶⁵ reported that he used to sit with Ibn al-Yasa^c for periods of an hour, and he would say at the end of the hour: "I have completed reciting the whole of the Quran since you took your seat."⁶⁶ This man was not reliable in matters of tradition. Indeed, Dāraquṭnī claimed that he was a habitual liar. May God recompense to the full people who make up *ḥadīths* like this.

⁶¹ See G. Makdisi, *Ibn 'Aqīl* (1997), 103-104, where a somewhat different interpretation of "the third tradition" and its variants is ascribed to Ibn al-Jawzī and Ibn 'Aqīl on the basis of Yūsuf b. 'Abd al-Hādī's *Tuḥfat al-Wuṣūl ilā 'Ilm al-Uṣūl*.

⁶² For other citations of this *ḥadīth*, see especially *Ta'rikh Baghdād*, X, 135, 6-12; *Kitāb al-Mawḍū'āt*, I, 115, 5-11; and *DST*, 32. A slightly different version of the tradition is found in *Mizān*, III, 367, 17-19.

⁶³ 'Abd Allāh b. Muḥammad b. al-Yasa^c Abū'l-Qāsim al-Qārī³ al-Anṭākī, who died in 385/995 or, according to some, 387/997. For a notice on him, see *Ta'rikh Baghdād*, X, 134-135 (cf., *Mizān*, II, 497, for his reputation as a traditionist).

⁶⁴ His name is given as Qāsim b. Ibrāhīm b. Aḥmad al-Malaṭī aṣ-Ṣūfī (no *kunya* is mentioned). Al-Khaṭīb calls him a "raving liar" and a prolific fabricator of traditions (cf., *Ta'rikh Baghdād*, XII, 446). For other assessments of him, see *Mizān*, III, 367-368. The date of his death is not given, but based on the list of his associates it would appear that he probably died sometime during the latter part of the 4th century.

⁶⁵ That is, 'Ubayd Allāh b. Abī'l-Faṭḥ, known also as Abū'l-Qāsim aṣ-Ṣayrafī al-Azharī, originally from Iskāf (Iraq), who later settled in Baghdād and died there in 435/1043. For notices on him, see *Ta'rikh Baghdād*, X, 385; and *Muntaẓam*, VIII, 117-118 (based largely on al-Khaṭīb). Ibn Athīr reports that he was the best known of al-Khaṭīb's teachers in the science of *ḥadīth* (cf., *Lubāb fī Tahdhīb al-Ansāb*, I, 48).

⁶⁶ Cf., *Ta'rikh Baghdād*, X, 135, 16-17. Also see *Kitāb al-Mawḍū'āt*, I, 115, 14-16, where a slightly different reading is given.

The Fifth Tradition

83 In their respective *Ṣaḥīḥs*, Bukhārī and Muslim cite a tradition on the authority of Abū Hurayra according to which the Prophet said: "God will gather the people together [on the day of judgment] and will say to them: 'Let each of you follow what he used to worship'.⁶⁷ And so they will follow what they used to worship, but [only] this Community, among which there are hypocrites,⁶⁸ will remain. Then God will come to them in a *form* (*ṣūra*) which they will not recognize, and he will say to them: 'I am your Lord'. They will respond: 'We ask God's protection against the likes of you! We shall remain here until our Lord Himself comes, for we will recognize Him [when He comes]!' Then He will come to them in a *form* which they will recognize and He will say to them: 'I am your Lord.' They will answer: 'You are our Lord indeed.'"⁶⁹

84 According to another tradition cited in the two *Ṣaḥīḥs* on the authority of Abū Saʿīd [al-Khudrī], the Prophet said: "[On the day of judgement] the Almighty will approach [the believers] in a *form* (*ṣūra*) different from the one in which they saw Him the first time, and He will say to them: 'I am your Lord'. Only the prophets will speak to Him directly, and they will ask [the people]: 'Is there a sign by which you will recognize Him?' They will answer: 'The leg (*sāq*)!'⁷⁰ When God uncovers His leg every believer will prostrate himself before Him."⁷¹

85 It is essential for every Muslim to believe that God is beyond *form*

⁶⁷ The fuller version found in Bukhārī, *riqāq*, 52 reads: "Let each of you follow what he used to worship. Let those who worshipped the sun follow the sun; and let those who worshipped the moon, follow it; and let those who worshipped idols, follow them."

⁶⁸ Cf., Muslim, *īmān*, 302; and Bukhārī, *tawḥīd*, 24.

⁶⁹ Muslim, *īmān*, 299; Bukhārī, *adhān*, 129 (cf., Houdas and Marçais, *Les traditions islamiques*, I, 268-270); *riqāq*, 52 (Houdas, IV, 313-315); *tawḥīd*, 24 (Houdas, IV, 600-605); and *DST*, 33. For references to this tradition and a discussion of the theological problems involved, see Ibn Qutayba, *Taʿwīl*, 257-260 (Lecomte, 228-230); Bayhaqī, *Asmāʾ*, 291-294; Ibn Khuzayma, *Tawḥīd*, 174, 5-11; Ibn Fūrak, *Mushkil*, 86-9; and Abū Yaʿlā, *Muʿtamad*, 82-86.

⁷⁰ In his translation of Bukhārī's *Ṣaḥīḥ*, *tawḥīd*, 24 (*Les traditions islamiques*, IV, 602, note 2), Houdas adds the following note on the term *sāq*: "Il s'agit d'une expression métaphorique qui équivaut à la puissance éclatante."

⁷¹ Bukhārī, 97 (*tawḥīd*), 24 (Houdas, IV, 600-605); Muslim 1 (*īmān*), 302; and *DST*, 33, 7-11.

(*ṣūra*) in so far as it implies shape (*hay'a*) and composition (*ta'līf*). Abū Sulaymān al-Khaṭṭābī said: "The expression 'God will come to them' means in effect that He will remove the veil in such a way that they will see Him with their eyes (*ʿiyān*) just as [in this life] they had known Him [fol.21a] inferentially through reason (*istidlālān*).⁷² And so they will see Him with their eyes for the first time as if someone whom they had not seen before were coming to them. As for the term form [*ṣūra*], it may be interpreted in two ways. In the first place, it may be taken metaphorically to mean the essential character (*ṣifa*) of something, as in the expression 'this is the *form* of the matter (*ṣūrat al-amr*).'⁷³ Secondly, the objects of worship mentioned in the first part of the tradition,⁷⁴ viz., the sun, moon, idols, etc., are, in effect, forms (*ṣuwar*) and bodies (*aḥsām*). Now when God was associated with them⁷⁵ [through the application of the term *form* to Him in the tradition] the expression was meant to be taken as a kind of *muṭābaqa* (antithesis).⁷⁶ The words of the Prophet: '[God will come to them] in a *form* more fitting (*adnā ṣūratin*) than that in which they had "seen" Him [before]'⁷⁷ are

⁷² "Just as they had known Him in this life through knowledge (*ʿilm*) and through inferential reason (*istidlāl*)" (DST, 33).

⁷³ Meaning "this is the substance (or heart) of the matter."

⁷⁴ For the text of the tradition, see the first note to §83.

⁷⁵ Literally, "coupled with...."

⁷⁶ As al-Khaṭṭābī uses the term, *muṭābaqa* denotes a word that contains two contrasting or opposed meanings. In the full text of al-Khaṭṭābī's discussion of this tradition (as preserved in Bayhaqī's *Asmāʾ*, 296-297), he gives a number of examples of *muṭābaqa*: thus, for example, the term *aswad*, he says, may be used to mean either serpent or scorpion (cf., Lane 1463/3), and *ʿasr* may mean either night or day, morning or evening, etc. (Lane 2062/2). The point of al-Khaṭṭābī's argument is that the term *ṣūra* in this tradition falls into the category of this kind of *muṭābaqa* usage; when applied to the various objects of pagan worship (the *maʿbūdāt* mentioned in the tradition), the term is used in its literal sense of form, image or shape (i.e., something external) whereas when applied to God it is used metaphorically to mean attribute or nature (i.e., something internal). On the use of the term *muṭābaqa* in literary theory, see the article "*Ṭibāq*" by W. Heinrichs in *EL*², X, 450-452. On the distinction between *muṭābaqa* and *muqābala*, see the brief comments by W. Heinrichs in *EL*², VII, 491b (cf., also *Glossary and Index of Technical Terms*, a supplement to vols. I-VII of *EL*² [Leiden 1995], 257; and Qudāma b. Jaʿfar, *Naqd ash-Shiʿr*, ed. Bonebakker [Leiden 1956], 93, 13-16).

⁷⁷ These words form part of a much longer tradition cited by Bukhārī, Muslim, and others. See, for example, Bukhārī, *tafsīr sūra* 4, 8; Muslim, *imān*, 302; and Bayhaqī, *Asmāʾ*, 297, 6-7. For a somewhat different rendering of the expression *adnā ṣūratin* (cf.,

evidence that the term for essential nature (*ṣifa*), for t should understand that the which they previously kne

86 Another authority ma them" should be taken to m terms connected with the other such things as have such conditions that they w our Lord comes we will reo things as what we will be being the form which they leg." that is, He will mani calamities, whereupon peop inside. Still another authori (ṣūrat) in order to test the ex the sending of Dajjāl.⁸⁶ It is refuge in God from you."⁸⁷

87 In a tradition reported l said: "(On the day of judgm whom we used to worship. Will you be able to recogni "Yes!" They will then be as having seen Him before?" T lāhū!) Then [the Lord] wi prostrate themselves before l

88 Ibn ʿAqīl said: "Taken that category of things that characteristics of bodies. We

Heinrichs, *Le traditio*, III, 297).

⁸⁹ Cf. Bayhaqī, *Asmāʾ*, 297, 6-7.

⁹⁰ For the full text of al-Khaṭṭābī on Bayhaqī, *Asmāʾ*, 296, 15ff. (cf.

⁹¹ See notes to §217 for more on

⁹² Cf. Ibn Fāris, *Maṣnūʿ*, 90, 1 responsibility.

⁹³ DST, 34, 5-8; cf. KAS, §46-48

evidence that the term *form* was meant to be taken here in the sense of essential nature (*ṣifa*), for they in fact had not seen Him previously.⁷⁸ You should understand that the term *form* means the essential character (*ṣifa*) which they previously knew Him to possess.”⁷⁹

86 Another authority maintained that the expression “[God] will come to them” should be taken to mean that He will come to them in or through the terrors connected with the resurrection, the forms (*ṣuwar*) of the angels and other such things as have not yet been experienced in this life. It is from such conditions that they will seek God’s protection. The expression “when our Lord comes we will recognize Him” should be taken to mean “when He brings us what we will be able to recognize of His blessing”—this latter being the *form* which they will recognize—and then He will “uncover his leg,” that is, He will manifest His might (*shidda*) so as to put an end to calamities, whereupon people will prostrate themselves before Him in gratitude. Still another authority maintained that [God] will manifest a *form* (*ṣūra*) in order to test the extent of their understanding as He will do also in the sending of Dajjāl.⁸⁰ It is for these reasons that they will say: “We take refuge in God from you.”⁸¹

87 In a tradition reported by Abū Mūsā [al-Ash‘arī] the Messenger of God said: “[On the day of judgment] people will say: ‘There was a Lord (*rabb*) whom we used to worship during our lifetime.’ Then they will be asked: ‘Will you be able to recognize Him when you see Him?’ They will answer: ‘Yes!’ They will then be asked: ‘But how will you recognize Him, never having seen Him before?’ They will reply: ‘He is utterly unique (*lā shabīha lahu*)!’ Then [the Lord] will remove the veil and they will see Him and prostrate themselves before Him.”⁸²

88 Ibn ‘Aqīl said: “Taken literally (*‘alā’l-ḥaqīqa*) *form* (*ṣūra*) belongs to that category of things that possesses size and shape—the distinguishing characteristics of bodies. We refuse to conceive God in bodily terms (*jisman*),

Houdas, *Les traditions*, III, 297).

⁷⁸ Cf., Bayhaqī, *Asmāʿ*, 297, 6-7.

⁷⁹ For the full text of al-Khaṭṭābī’s discussion of the term *ṣūra* as used in this tradition, see Bayhaqī, *Asmāʿ*, 296, 15ff. (cf., Ibn Fūrak, *Mushkil*, 94, 12-17).

⁸⁰ See notes to §217 for more on this figure.

⁸¹ Cf., Ibn Fūrak, *Mushkil*, 90, 1-5; and 94, 2-7, where a similar interpretation is given as a possibility.

⁸² *DST*, 34, 5-8; cf., *KAS*, §46 (the latter part) and notes to the translation.

for there is convincing scriptural proof [indicating the unacceptability of such language] in the verse 'There is nothing like unto Him,'⁸³ and because reason too tells us that if God were a body His form would be an accident (*ʿaraḍ*). If He were a substratum in which accidents inhere, [fol.21b] it would be possible to ascribe to Him what is predicated of bodies (*ajṣām*), and He would then require a creator (*ṣāniʿ*). If He were a body and at the same time eternal, we also would admit of being eternal. The evidence requires that we assign to the term *form* a meaning that may appropriately be applied to Him. That meaning is found precisely in the term 'condition' (*ḥāl*) which lexicographers use to explain the term *form* (*ṣūra*). Thus people say: 'How is your *form* (*ṣūra*) with so and so?' or, 'so and so is in a *form* of poverty'.⁸⁴ The condition [or *form*] which they⁸⁵ reject [when speaking of God] is the one associated with injustice (*ʿaṣf*), and the one they recognize is that expressive of blessing (*luṭf*); hence [the reference to] the unveiling has His power (*shidda*) as its object. Changes (*taghayyurāt*) [ascribed to God] are to be predicated of His action; as for His essence, it is beyond change. God forbid that we should interpret this tradition after the fashion of corporealists (*mujassima*) who construe the term *form* as referring to His essence, for that entails both the attribution of change to Him and His [materialization] in an outward *form*.⁸⁶ Whether [that *form*] be something concrete and particular—incredible as that might be—or whether it is an idea in the mind, that [*form*] is not He, and so what they apprehend is other than He."⁸⁷

⁸³ S. 42: 11.

⁸⁴ Ibn ʿAqīl's point is that if the term *ṣūra* is stripped of connotations of corporeality (which he proposes to do by construing it tropically), it may appropriately be predicated of God. For an important and fuller discussion of the problems posed by the term *ṣūra*, see Ibn Fūrak, *Mushkil*, 86-94, who approaches the issue from an Ashʿarite perspective. There is nothing in Ibn Fūrak's treatment of the term, however, that Ibn ʿAqīl (or Ibn al-Jawzī) would have found problematic.

⁸⁵ That is, lexicographers.

⁸⁶ Or perhaps, his association with an external form.

⁸⁷ According to Ibn ʿAqīl there can be no thought of an exact correspondence between the *form* of God conjured up in the mind (whether that be conceived as something concrete or an abstraction of some sort) and God himself. The value of a metaphorical interpretation of *form*, for Ibn ʿAqīl, is that it assumes a certain disjunction between the mental construct and the reality of the divine essence.

The Sixth Tradition

89 The *Ṣaḥīḥ* of Muslim contains a tradition traced back to al-Mughīra [b. Shuʿba] in which the Messenger of God is reported to have said: "No 'person' (*shakhṣ*)⁸⁸ is more jealous (*aghya*) than God; no 'person' (*shakhṣ*) is more pleased to grant pardon than He; and no 'person' (*shakhṣ*) loves praiseworthy conduct more than He."⁸⁹

90 Although some transmitters use the term *shakhṣ* in reporting this tradition, others follow the reading: "no being (*shayʾ*) is more jealous than God."⁹⁰ In the case of traditions [containing the expression *lā shakhṣa*], transmitters simply added the term *shakhṣ* [in place of *shayʾ*] because they supposed that to be the meaning of the text, but it should be noted that the use of this expression represents a change introduced by the transmitters. The term *shakhṣ* implies the existence of a body composed of parts, for one terms something a *shakhṣ* because it possesses corporeality (*shukhūṣ*) and height (*irtifāʿ*). The truth of the matter is that the term *shakhṣ* is to be taken as referring to creatures; it is not appropriate that the term be applied to the

⁸⁸ "Person" is not an entirely satisfactory rendering of the Arabic word *shakhṣ*, for as the best lexicons of the language point out repeatedly, the term *shakhṣ* connotes "the bodily or corporeal form or figure or substance (*suwād*) of a man," or something possessing height (*irtifāʿ*) and visibility (*zuhūr*)—something, in short, that can be perceived from a distance (Lane, 1517/1; cf., also *Lisān*, VII, 45, 4-11). The term *shakhṣ* is entirely devoid of anything comparable to the Western notion of personhood. Because of the inadequacy of the English term "person" I have chosen for the most part to retain the Arabic in the translation of this section of KAS.

⁸⁹ For that version of the tradition in which the reading لا شخص (no person) occurs, see Muslim, *liʿān*, 17; *Musnad*, IV, 248; and Nasāʾī, *nikāḥ*, 37, 3. In most occurrences of the tradition, however, لا أحد (no one) is clearly the preferred reading (cf., Muslim, *tawba*, 32, 33, 34, 35, 36; Bukhārī, *kusūf*, 2; *tawhīd*, 15, 20; and *Musnad*, I, 381, 426).—For references to the tradition, and discussions of the theological problem posed by the expression لا شخص, see Bayhaqī, *Asmāʾ*, 286-289, 482-483; Abū Yaʿlā, *Muʿtamad*, 58-59; and Ibn Fūrak, *Mushkil*, 95-97.

⁹⁰ See Bukhārī, *nikāḥ*, 107, 3; *tafsīr surah* 6, 7; *Musnad*, VI, 348, and 352. Cf., also Lane, 1517/1; and *Lisān*, VII, 45, 10 where the words لا شيء أغير من الله are cited and the significance of لا شيء (no thing/being) is discussed. On the theological significance of the term *shayʾ*, see Frank, "The Neoplatonism of Ḡahm b. Safwān", *Muséon*, 78(1965), 399ff., and J. van Ess, "The Logical Structure of Islamic Theology," *Logic in Classical Islamic Culture*, 33.

Creator. Hence, the tradition should be taken to mean: there is no jealous "person" among you but that God is more jealous than he. [The tradition should not be construed in such a way that the term *shakhṣ* applies to God], for when the general class (*al-kull*) is assimilated to [a single] expression, any of the terms included in the general class may be designated [by the general term], and so [in the Quran] the punishment for an act of ridiculing (*istihzā*) is also called "ridiculing" (*istihzā*),⁹¹ and the punishment for [fol.22a] an act of plotting (*makr*) is called "plotting" (*makr*).⁹² Another example [of the same linguistic phenomenon] is to be found in a saying attributed to Ibn Mas'ūd: "God did not create a Paradise or a Hell more awesome than (*a'zam min*) the 'Throne verse' (*āyatu'l-kursī*)."⁹³ Aḥmad b. Ḥanbal said: "The act of creation referred to in this statement applies only to the created realm (*makhlūq*), not to the Quran."⁹⁴ A similar usage is to be found in the verse: "On that day the inhabitants of Paradise will occupy the best dwelling (*mustaqarr*) and the most wonderful place of rest (*maqīl*)."⁹⁵ It is well known, however, that the people of Hell will not occupy either a "dwelling" or "a place of rest." It is thus possible to maintain that [the term *shakhṣ*] pertains to that from which the exception was made (*mustathnā*

⁹¹ An allusion to S. 2: 14-15 where both the misdeed and its punishment are designated by the same term. For Ibn al-Jawzī's discussion of this verse, see *Zād al-Masīr*, I, 35-36.

⁹² An allusion to S. 3: 54 and 27: 50. In both sets of Quranic references, the general term embraces two quite different categories, viz., an infringement and its punishment. For Ibn al-Jawzī's discussion of 3: 54 and 27: 50, see *Zād al-Masīr*, I, 395 and VI, 182 (cf., also *Lisān*, V, 183).

⁹³ S. 2: 255 is generally referred to as the Throne verse. Cf., Bayhaqī, *Asmā*, 288, 6-7, and 15-16, where several different versions of the saying are cited and their implications discussed.

⁹⁴ Aḥmad's point is that the saying (or its context) contains within itself an implied exception (*istithnā*). In Bayhaqī's *Asmā* (288, 8-9), the commentary of the well known traditionist Abū Bakr al-Ismā'īlī (d. 371/981) is quoted as follows: فليس فيه إثبات خلق آية الكرسي، لا أن آية الكرسي مخلوقة الكرسي وليس فيه إلا أن لا خلق في العظم كآية الكرسي، لا أن آية الكرسي مخلوقة (there is nothing in his statement that can be taken as affirming the creation of the Throne verse; all that is said is that there is nothing comparable to the Throne verse in greatness, not that the Throne verse was created). The background of this discussion was of course the Mu'tazilī doctrine of the created Quran, one of the principal issues at stake in the Miḥna.

⁹⁵ S. 25:24. This verse taken as it stands implies that there will be more than one *mustaqarr* and *maqīl*, and that the people of Hell will also occupy such places, though presumably places of a lesser quality.

mir) within the category of (of him except to follow the

90 Some authorities permit that is an error for reason jealousy (*ghayra*), the experience of something is so because acts (*fawā'id*) and threats attributed jealousy to him.

92 Abū Mūsā [al-Ash'arī] Adam from a 'handful' (*qub* of the earth."⁹³

93 The meaning [of the something you take in hand not suppose that the handful is beyond such associations. Him only in the sense that master as, for example, in the case the act of blinding was Muhammad b. Sa'd reported this to take [a handful of

"What Ibn al-Jawzī has in mind *istithnā* *munqat*, the exception the general term (*mustathnā minhu*) [cf. al-Jawzī's point is that in the tradition excluded from the general class de

"S. 4:157. As the context indicates *al-Masīr*, II, 24; and Zamakhsharī,

"See Abū Dāwūd, *Sunan*, *sam* 400; Ibn Sa'd, *Tabaqāt*, I, 26; and 127; Ibn Khuzayma, *Tawḥīd*, 63-64 (1198).

"S. 54:37. For a more detailed discussion, see W. Thacke especially 158).

min) within the category of genus,⁹⁶ as in the verse: "They have no knowledge of him except to follow their own suppositions."⁹⁷

91 Some authorities permit the application of the term *shakhṣ* to God, but that is an error for reasons we have already given. As for the question of jealousy (*ghayra*), the experts maintain that one who is jealous on account of something is so because he loathes it. It was because God forbade immoral acts (*fawāḥish*) and threatened punishment for such that his Messenger attributed jealousy to him.

The Seventh Tradition

92 Abū Mūsā [al-Ash'arī] reported that the Prophet said: "God created Adam from a 'handful' (*qubḍa*) [of clay] which he gathered from every part of the earth."⁹⁸

93 The meaning [of the term *qubḍa* or "handful"] is the measure of something you take in hand. [When the term is applied to God] one ought not suppose that the handful known to finite creatures is intended, for God is beyond such associations. The taking of a "handful" may be predicated of Him only in the sense that the actions of a servant may be ascribed to his master as, for example, in the verse "We blinded their eyes"⁹⁹ [for in that case the act of blinding was carried out by Gabriel]. In his *Kitāb at-Ṭabaqāt* Muḥammad b. Sa'd reported [on the authority of Ibn Mas'ūd] that God sent Iblīs to take [a handful of clay] from the surface of the earth, and He

⁹⁶ What Ibn al-Jawzī has in mind here is the "severed (or radical) exception," i.e., the *istithnā' munqati'*, the exception that is severed from, or wholly different in kind from, the general term (*mustathnā minhu* [cf., Wright, *Arabic Grammar*, II, 335D-336A]).—Ibn al-Jawzī's point is that in the tradition cited at the beginning of this section God is implicitly excluded from the general class designated by the term *shakhṣ* on the basis of an implied *istithnā'*.

⁹⁷ S. 4:157. As the context indicates, the reference in the verse is to Jesus (cf., *Zād al-Masīr*, II, 24; and Zamakhsharī, *Khashshāf*, I, 580).

⁹⁸ See Abū Dāwūd, *Sunan, sunna*, 16; Tirmidhī, *Sunan, tafsīr sūra* 2, 1; *Musnad*, IV, 400; Ibn Sa'd, *Ṭabaqāt*, I, 26; and Ṭabarī, *Ta'rīkh*, I, 91-92. Cf., also, Bayhaqī, *Asmā'*, 327; Ibn Khuzayma, *Tawḥīd*, 63-64; Ibn Fūrak, *Mushkil*, 98-104; and *Kitāb al-Mawḍū'āt*, I, 190.

⁹⁹ S. 54:37. For a more detailed gloss on this text, see *Zād al-Masīr*, VIII, 98-99 (cf., IV, 135-140; and also W. Thackston, *The Tales of the Prophets of al-Kisa'*, 155-159, especially 158).

created Adam from it. It was for this reason that [Iblīs refused to prostrate himself before Adam] saying: "Should I bow before someone You made from clay?"¹⁰⁰

94 The *Qāḍī* [Abū Yaʿlā] said: "It is possible to attribute [the expression] 'the taking of a handful' (*qabḍ*) to God, but such an attribution is not to be taken as implying that he possesses a limb (*jāriḥa*), or in the sense of exerting himself (*muʿālaja*) or making an effort (*mumārasa*) [to achieve an end]."¹⁰¹ [Abū Yaʿlā] should be told: "You make statements [about God], but you do not understand [the full import of what you say]."

The Eighth Tradition

95 [fol.22b] Salmān¹⁰² is reported to have said: "God kneaded the clay of which Adam was formed and shaped it with His hands, whereupon all that is good (*ṭayyib*) appeared in His right [hand] and all that is evil (*khabiṭh*) in the other hand. He then mixed the two of them together, and so He caused the living (*al-ḥayy*) to come forth from the dead (*al-mayyit*) and the dead from the living."¹⁰³

96 This tradition, it should be noted, goes back only to a Follower;¹⁰⁴

¹⁰⁰ S. 17:61. Cf., *Zād al-Masīr*, V, 56-57. For the reference in the *Ṭabaqāt* of Ibn Saʿd, see vol. I, 26 (cf., Ṭabarī, *Taʾriḫ*, I, 90-91).—For other interpretations of the term *qubḍa*, some of which are explicitly metaphorical, see Ibn Fūrak, *Mushkil*, 97-104. It is interesting that Ibn al-Jawzī chooses not to offer a metaphorical interpretation of the term.

¹⁰¹ I have found no reference to the question of *qubḍa* in the *Muʿtamad*.

¹⁰² Apparently Salmān al-Fārisī, an early convert to Islam and a Companion who is said to have died during the reign of ʿUthmān (644-656). For more on Salmān and a list of early sources on him, see *SEI* (500-501). Among Sunnī traditionists there was some uncertainty as to the source of the tradition here cited by Ibn al-Jawzī: Ṭabarī traces it back to Salmān al-Fārisī (*Taʾriḫ*, I, 93); Ibn Saʿd, on the other hand, traces it back through Salmān to Ibn Masʿūd (*Ṭabaqāt*, I 27). Al-Bayhaqī frankly acknowledges his uncertainty, merely noting that it was either from Salmān or Ibn Masʿūd (*Asmāʾ*, 327). Judging from his comments in the following paragraph, Ibn al-Jawzī regarded both attributions as problematic, for he declares the tradition to be *mursal*; that is, one that went back no further than a second generation source, that is, to a Follower (*tābiʿ*).

¹⁰³ Cf., Ibn Saʿd, *Ṭabaqāt*, I, 27, 6-10; Ibn Fūrak, *Mushkil*, 102-108; and *DST*, 36. The last part of the tradition comes directly from the Quran: S. 10: 31; 30: 19, etc. For Ibn al-Jawzī's gloss of the Quranic expression, see *Zād al-Masīr*, I, 369-370.

¹⁰⁴ Ibn al-Jawzī, unfortunately, gives no basis for this classification of the tradition. It is

moreover, as we have already seen, God cannot be described as reliable, it must be taken as operations of the divine de-

97 The *Qāḍī* [Abū Yaʿlā] of one part of it with another was created."¹⁰⁶ This, however, is a *tashbih mahḍ*!

98 ʿUbayd b. Ḥunayn reports [Medina] Qatāda b. Nuʿmān [in conversation] he said: "Let me have heard that he is ill." Saʿd (*mustalqiyān*), with his right hand seated, whereupon Qatāda Saʿd cried out: "O son of ʿUbayd!" He responded: "I did that intention." God finished creation, he said: "This is something new." "You are right, I shall never

clear from the last sentence of this tradition.

¹⁰⁰ Cf., Ibn Fūrak, *Mushkil*, 102-108.

¹⁰¹ I have found no such statement.

¹⁰² Saʿd b. Malik b. Sinān Abū ʿUbayd (d. 74/693). He is said to have been present at the Battle of Uhud, but he was more than a young lad. For his biography, see Ibn Saʿd, *Shuʿab al-Imām*, I, 81.

¹⁰³ This prohibition is found in many places, e.g., *Masnad*, III, 299-300; and *Masnad*, IV, 100-101. It has to do with the concern for mod-

¹⁰⁴ Cf., *DST*, 36-37; Bayhaqī, *Shuʿab al-Imām*, I, 81. 1) notes that the tradition is *mursal*. For a discussion of the tradition, see Ibn al-Jawzī, *Shuʿab al-Imām*, I, 81.

moreover, as we have already shown, it has been established that the living God cannot be described as having contact with anything. If this tradition is reliable, it must be taken as a metaphorical reference (*ḍarb mathal*) to the operations of the divine decrees (*aqḍār*).¹⁰⁵

97 The *Qāḍī* [Abū Yaʿlā] said: "The kneading of the clay and the mixing of one part of it with another may be ascribed to the hand by which Adam was created."¹⁰⁶ This, however, is a thoroughly anthropomorphist interpretation (*tashbīh maḥḍ*)!

The Ninth Tradition

98 ʿUbayd b. Ḥunayn reported that while he was sitting in the mosque [of Medina] Qatāda b. Nuʿmān came and spoke with him. [In the course of the conversation] he said: "Let us go and visit Abū Saʿīd [al-Khudrī],¹⁰⁷ for I have heard that he is ill." So we went to his house and found him reclining (*mustalqiyān*), with his right leg placed over his left. He greeted us and had us seated, whereupon Qatāda reached up and pinched his leg so that Abū Saʿīd cried out: "O son of Adam, you have caused me pain!" [Qatāda] responded: "I did that intentionally, for the Messenger of God said: 'When God finished creation, he reclined and placed one leg over the other, saying: "This is something my creatures ought not do."'"¹⁰⁸ Abū Saʿīd said: "You are right, I shall never do this again!"¹⁰⁹

clear from the last sentence of this paragraph that he was not certain of the reliability of the tradition.

¹⁰⁵ Cf., Ibn Fūrak, *Mushkil*, 102-108, where a similar interpretation of the tradition is given.

¹⁰⁶ I have found no such statement in the *Muʿtamad*.

¹⁰⁷ Saʿīd b. Mālik b. Sinān Abū Saʿīd al-Khudrī, a prominent Companion, who died in 74/693. He is said to have been present at the Battle of the Trench, but he could hardly have been more than a young lad. For notices on him, see Ibn Saʿīd, *Ṭabaqāt*, III, 624; and *Shadharāt*, I, 81.

¹⁰⁸ This prohibition is found in a number of traditions with quite different *matns* (cf., e.g., *Musnad*, III, 299-300; and Muslim, *libās*, 72, 73, 74) in each of which the prohibition has to do with the concern for modesty.

¹⁰⁹ Cf., *DST*, 36-37; Bayhaqī, *Asmāʿ*, 355; and *Mizān*, III, 365-366. Bayhaqī (*Asmāʿ*, 356, 1) notes that the tradition is not to be found in either Bukhārī or Muslim. For a discussion of the tradition, see Ibn Fūrak, *Mushkil*, 120-124; also Gimaret, "Deux dits de Muḥammad (Mahomet) sur les 'jambes' de Dieu," *Comptes Rendus de l'Académie des*

⁹⁹ The preceding tradition was transmitted by the following authorities:¹¹⁰ ‘Abd Allāh b. Aḥmad¹¹¹ from Abū Bakr Muḥammad b. Ishāq aṣ-Ṣāghānī¹¹² from Ibrāhīm b. al-Mundhir¹¹³ from Muḥammad b. Fulayḥ¹¹⁴ [from his father, Fulayḥ b. Sulaymān]¹¹⁵ from Sa‘īd b. al-Ḥārith¹¹⁶ from ‘Ubayd b. Ḥunayn.¹¹⁷ I have not seen this tradition cited in any [fol.23a] of the collections of ḥadīth worthy of trust.¹¹⁸ Aḥmad b. Ḥanbal was critical of Ibrāhīm b. al-Mundhir and censured him [publicly]. Zakariyā’ as-Sājī¹¹⁹

Inscriptions et Belles-Lettres (1996), 14ff.

¹¹⁰ They are listed as they appear in the *isnād*, i.e., in reverse chronological order.

¹¹¹ That is, ‘Abd Allāh the son of Aḥmad b. Ḥanbal, who died in 290/902. For the more important biographical notices on him along with a list of his extant writings, see *GAS*, I, 511; cf., also *GAL*, Suppl. I, 311.

¹¹² Died 270/883. A respected traditionist who travelled widely and who (according to al-Khaṭīb) studied under some of the leading experts of his time. It is also from al-Khaṭīb that we learn of his close association with Aḥmad b. Ḥanbal’s son ‘Abd Allāh (*Ta’rīkh Baghdād*, I, 240-241). Although Ibn al-Jawzī’s notice on him is based on al-Khaṭīb, it is clear that he shared the latter’s assessment of Ṣāghānī (*Muntaẓam*, V, 7; cf., *Shadharāt*, II, 160).

¹¹³ Ibrāhīm b. al-Mundhir Abū Ishāq al-Ḥizāmī al-Madanī, who died in 236/850 (cf., *Ta’rīkh Baghdād*, VI, 179-181).

¹¹⁴ The date of his death is generally given as 197/812. For notices on him, see *Shadharāt*, I, 349; and *Tadhīb*, IX, 406-407 (see *KDM*, III, 92, for Ibn al-Jawzī’s assessment of his work as a transmitter). As Dhahabī’s notice on him makes clear, not all authorities shared Ibn al-Jawzī’s critical appraisal (*Mizān*, IV, 10).

¹¹⁵ Cf., Bayhaqī, *Asmā’*, 355, 14. His name is given as Fulayḥ b. Sulaymān Abū Yaḥyā b. Abī’l-Mughīra (d.168/784), a *mawlā* of Banū Khaṭṭāb. For a list of the more important notices on him see *GAS*, I, 93. Opinions as to his trustworthiness in matters of tradition varied. For Ibn al-Jawzī’s views, see *KAS*, 98 (especially the later part) and *KDM*, III, 10. While noting a number of critical opinions regarding Fulayḥ, Dhahabī does point out that both Bukhārī and Muslim cite ḥadīths in which the name of Fulayḥ b. Sulaymān occurs (*Mizān*, III, 365-366; cf., also *Shadharāt*, I, 266).

¹¹⁶ I have not been able so far to establish the identity of Sa‘īd.

¹¹⁷ Abū ‘Abd Allāh ‘Ubayd b. Ḥunayn, a *mawlā* of the Banū Khaṭṭāb, who died in 105/723. According to Ibn Sa‘d, he was a reliable transmitter though he actually transmitted very little. Ibn Sa‘d also notes that he was the paternal uncle of Fulayḥ b. Sulaymān (*Ṭabaqāt*, V, 285-286).

¹¹⁸ Cf., Bayhaqī, 355-356, where a similar assessment of this *isnād* is to be found.

¹¹⁹ Zakariyā’ b. Yaḥyā b. Khallād Abū Ya‘lā as-Sājī, died 307/919 (cf., *Ta’rīkh Baghdād*, VIII, 459-460; and *Shadharāt*, II, 250-251). On as-Sājī’s judgment, see *Mizān*, I, 67, 7 (cf., *Ta’rīkh Baghdād*, 180-181).

reported that the traditions transmitted by him (munākīr). Speaking of Fulayḥ, al-Khaṭīb notes that his traditions are not to be used as a basis for canonical rulings on any occasion [Yaḥyā] referred to him as a weak tradition was not to be trusted as a basis for canonical rulings. He noted that his traditions were not to be used as a basis for canonical rulings in Medina. Abū Bakr al-Bayhaqī reported an opinion among the experts that Fulayḥ serving as evidence for canonical rulings should not be used as a basis for canonical rulings as the one under consideration.

“The above tradition is also reported by al-Khaṭīb who is alleged to have received it from the caliphate of ‘Umar b. al-Khaṭṭāb (105 A.H.)¹²¹ at the age of seven years. It is also in the *isnād* of the tradition reported by al-Khaṭīb as having said ‘Let us not have been ‘Ubayd b. Ḥunayn report it to him. If we refuse to accept it as a basis for legal rulings in matters [of doctrine] are at stake, this tradition were reliable, but he had passed it on from one of his predecessors, refusing them but that Qatāda reported it.”

¹²⁰ The problem of the tradition involving Zubayr [b. al-‘Awwām] relating a tradition which, he said, God. Zubayr listened until the Prophet died.

¹²¹ Several sources report that Qatāda died in the year of ‘Umar’s reign (Ibn Sa‘d, *Ṭabaqāt*, I, 30). According to the information provided, he died 30 A.H., seven years later.

¹²² A.D. 723.

¹²³ Traditions so termed are those which report something from the Prophet or a Companion or a Follower received it. Such traditions are of great importance in the chain of transmission.

reported that the traditions transmitted by [Ibrāhīm] were lacking in credibility (*munākīr*). Speaking of Fulayḥ [b. Sulaymān], Yaḥyā b. Maʿīn said that his traditions are not to be admitted (*bi'l-jāʿiz*) [as evidence], and on one occasion [Yaḥyā] referred to him as a weak traditionist. Nasāʾī said that he was not to be trusted as a traditionist. As for ʿUbayd b. Ḥunayn, Bukhārī noted that his traditions were not regarded as sound by the experts of Medina. Abū Bakr al-Bayhaqī said: "Whenever there is a difference of opinion among the experts as to the permissibility of the traditions of Fulayḥ serving as evidence (*fī jawāz al-iḥtiāj [bihi]*), his texts should not be used as a basis for canonical decisions, especially in a matter as important as the one under consideration.

"The above tradition is also defective in another respect: Qatāda b. Nuʿmān, who is alleged to have received it from ʿUbayd b. Ḥunayn, died during the caliphate of ʿUmar b. al-Khaṭṭāb¹²⁰ whereas ʿUbayd b. Ḥunayn died in 105 A.H.¹²¹ at the age of seventy according to al-Wāqidī. There is thus a gap in the *isnād* of the tradition as it stands. The person who is quoted in the tradition as having said 'Let us go and visit Abū Saʿīd' cannot, therefore, have been ʿUbayd b. Ḥunayn but rather an unnamed individual who related it to him. If we refuse to accept traditions with incomplete *isnāds* (*marāsīl*)¹²² as a basis for legal rulings then how can we accept them when important matters [of doctrine] are at stake?" [Al-Bayhaqī] continued: "If the chain of this tradition were reliable, one might suppose that the Messenger of God had passed it on from one of the 'People of the Book' for the purpose of refuting them but that Qatāda had failed to understand his purpose."

100 The problem of the above tradition is illustrated by an incident involving Zubayr [b. al-ʿAwwām], who reported that he heard a man relating a tradition which, he claimed, had come from the Messenger of God. Zubayr listened until the man had finished and then said to him: "Did

¹²⁰ Several sources report that Qatāda died in the year 23 A.H. (A.D. 643-4), the very last year of ʿUmar's reign (Ibn Saʿd, *Ṭabaqāt*, III, 452; Ibn Ḥajar, *Tahdhīb*, VIII, 357-8). According to the information provided above by Ibn al-Jawzī, ʿUbayd was born in the year 30 A.H., seven years later.

¹²¹ A.D. 723.

¹²² Traditions so termed are those whose *isnāds* are traced back to a Follower who reports something from the Prophet without indicating the Companion through whom the Follower received it. Such traditions are regarded as defective because they omit a link (and a critically important one) in the chain of authorities.

you receive this tradition from the Prophet?" He replied: "Yes." [Zubayr] then added: "People like this make us reluctant to report sayings attributed to the Prophet, for I myself heard [fol.23b] these words from him; however, he prefaced them with the qualification: 'I heard the following from one of the People of the Book.' If one had arrived after this introductory remark and the reference to the People of the Book, one would naturally have assumed that the Prophet himself had been the source of this tradition."¹²³ It is most likely that Zubayr actually had in mind the tradition reported by Qatāda, for the People of the Book do indeed maintain that after God created the heavens and the earth, He rested. God, however, has said: "We were not affected by fatigue."¹²⁴ It is entirely possible that the Prophet did pass the above tradition on from [the People of the Book], but that Qatāda did not hear the Prophet's initial qualifying statement.

101 [Abū] ʿAbd Allāh b. Aḥmad reports in his *Kitāb as-Sunna*¹²⁵ that Abū Sufyān said: "I saw al-Ḥasan [sitting] with his right leg placed over his left, and so I said to him: 'O Abū Saʿīd, sitting in such a position is not proper'. Ḥasan replied: 'God combat the Jews, for [the Quran] states: "We created the heavens and the earth and what is between them in six days, and We were not affected by fatigue."'"¹²⁶ [Abū Sufyān later said:] "I knew what troubled him and so I did not respond." What Ḥasan was alluding to [in his outburst] was precisely the saying of the People of the Book which we mentioned above.¹²⁷ According to another tradition which we have reported [elsewhere] al-ʿAwwām b. Ḥawshab asked Abū Mijlīz about a man who sat with his legs crossed, and he replied: "There is nothing wrong with this practice; only Jews condemn it, for they claim that God created the heavens and the earth and what is between them in six days after which he rested. God, however, has said: 'We were not affected by fatigue.'"¹²⁸

102 One scholarly authority has interpreted the above tradition in a

¹²³ This appears to be the end of the quotation from Zubayr. Clearly, the following sentence cannot be a part of the quotation since Zubayr is referred to in the third person.

¹²⁴ S. 50: 38. For exegetical commentary, see *Zād al-Masīr*, VIII, 22 and note 2; Zamakhsharī, *Kashshāf*, IV, 12.

¹²⁵ On this work and its author, see *GAS*, I, 511 (no. 8); cf., also *GAL*, Suppl. I, 311.

¹²⁶ S. 50: 38.

¹²⁷ What precisely Ibn al-Jawzī is referring to here (if, indeed, these are the words of Ibn al-Jawzī) is not clear.

¹²⁸ S. 50: 38.

metaphorical fashion (*taʾlāw* in fact reliable. He argued means in effect that He comp builds a house, we say " meaning that nothing rema the words "He placed one placed some parts of creati Yaʿlā), however, maintained attribute (*ṣūfū*) of God and though not in the sense in According to him, this tradi legs (*rijlān*), despite confes Attributes may not be ascrib like the one under considera an attribute may not be ascr from a single authority (*akhlā [ṣūfū]* were not understoo for human beings [to sit or was not proscribed in the p between two "acts." ¹³² It ha God as well as Abū Bakr an other. Such a practice was c wearing of drawers.

¹²⁹ Cf. Ibn Furak, *Mashkūl*, 121.

¹³⁰ Or, it might be rendered: "H Construed in this way, the interpre order. See Ibn Furak (*Mashkūl*, 121) (Cf. also Bayhaqī, *Asmaʿī*, 359-360).

¹³¹ Cf. §33/3.

¹³² God's reclining with His legs act of reclining with crossed legs. and human action, this reference c be the point Ibn al-Jawzī wishes to

metaphorical fashion (*ta'awwala*), on the assumption that the tradition was in fact reliable. He argued that the expression "[God] reclined (*istalqā*)" means in effect that He completed the work of creation. Thus, when someone builds a house, we say "he reclined on his back (*istalqā 'alā ṣahrihi*)," meaning that nothing remained to be done.¹²⁹ [According to this scholar] the words "He placed one leg [fol.24a] over the other" means that He placed some parts of creation over certain other parts.¹³⁰ The *Qāḍī* [Abū Ya'lā], however, maintained that reclining (*istilqā*) is to be regarded as an attribute (*ṣifa*) of God and that He indeed placed one leg over the other, though not in the sense in which we ordinarily understand such things. According to him, this tradition, however, does establish that God has two legs (*rijlān*), despite confessing his ignorance as to what this might mean. Attributes may not be ascribed to God on the basis of a defective tradition like the one under consideration; even if [the tradition] were not defective, an attribute may not be ascribed to God on the basis of a tradition derived from a single authority (*akhbār āḥād*).¹³¹ And if the meaning of the expression [*istilqā*] were not understood, how could he say that it is not permissible for human beings [to sit or recline with their legs crossed]? Such behavior was not proscribed in the past, for a prohibition presupposes a likeness between two "acts."¹³² It has been reliably reported that the Messenger of God as well as Abū Bakr and 'Umar used to recline with one foot over the other. Such a practice was objected to only when it was done without the wearing of drawers.

¹²⁹ Cf., Ibn Furak, *Mushkil*, 121, 3-5.

¹³⁰ Or, it might be rendered: "He placed some creatures over certain other creatures." Construed in this way, the interpretation becomes a justification for a hierarchical social order. See Ibn Fūrak (*Mushkil*, 121, 15-18) where just such an interpretation is suggested (Cf., also Bayhaqī, *Asmā*, 359-360).

¹³¹ Cf., §33/3.

¹³² God's reclining with His legs crossed can have nothing in common with the human act of reclining with crossed legs. Since there can be no connection between God's action and human action, this reference cannot serve as the basis for a prohibition. This seems to be the point Ibn al-Jawzī wishes to make here.

The Tenth Tradition

103 The *Qāḍī* [Abū Yaʿlā] cited a report going back to Ḥassān b. ʿAṭīya¹³³ that one of the *mushrikīn* cursed the Messenger of God whereupon a Muslim attacked the man and killed him. [When the Prophet heard what had happened] he said [to the people]: "Why should you be surprised at the assistance of God, for His Messenger met God while He was reclining (*muttakiʿan*) and [the Messenger] was invited to sit down with him."¹³⁴

104 There is, however, a gap (*maqtūʿ*) in [the *isnād* of] this tradition and [its *matn*] is far from credible. If [the text] had any merit at all, it would mean that God showed favor and bestowed blessing [on the Prophet].

The Eleventh Tradition

105 In the *Ṣaḥīḥs* of Bukhārī and Muslim there is a tradition in which Anas b. Mālik reports that the Prophet said: "[The damned] will continue to be flung into Hell (*jahannam*) until finally the latter says: 'Are there any more?' The Almighty will push His foot (*qadam*) into Hell so as to force them in, one upon the other. And so it will be filled."¹³⁵

106 It is essential that we affirm that God's essence is not a composite entity, existing within the limits of a particular place, subject to change or characterized by movement. According to Abū ʿUbayd al-Harawī, Ḥasan [fol.24b] al-Baṣrī maintained that the term *qadam* [in the tradition reported by Anas] refers to those whom God causes to advance toward (*qaddama*) Hell because of their evil deeds and compels them to enter it. The *imām* Ibn

¹³³ According to Dhahabī, he belonged to the generation of the *tābiʿūn* and was considered by some *ḥadīth* experts to have been a Qadarī, but Dhahabī makes it clear that this was a matter of suspicion, not an established fact (*Mizān*, I, 479).

¹³⁴ Cf., *DST*, 39; and *BA* (Beirut), 82-83. This report is not to be found in any of the standard collections of *ḥadīth*. Although Abū Yaʿlā is cited as a transmitter, neither the name Ḥassān nor the report appear in the *Muʿtamad*.

¹³⁵ For citations of this tradition in more or less the form given above by Ibn al-Jawzi, see Muslim, *janna*, 37 and 38 (for versions of the tradition that go back to Abū Hurayra, see *janna*, 35 and 36); Bukhārī, *tawḥīd*, 76 (cf., Houdas, *Les traditions*, IV, 583); *Musnad*, III, 134, 141 and 234. For discussions of this tradition, see Bayhaqī, *Asmāʿ*, 348ff.; Ibn Khuzayma, *Tawḥīd*, 88, and 95-99; *DST*, 39-41; and *BA* (Beirut), 83.

al-Aʿrābi¹³⁶ said: "The word *maqaddim*." According to [the tradition] that the term *qadam* in this [tradition] is God's foreknowledge, [the tradition] is [correct]. al-Azhari said: "The *qadam* [in the tradition] advances on ahead to Hell [and] may be taken in two ways [either] advance or move forward [or] what you destroy (*hadama*) [the tradition] is called a *qab* [the tradition] text of the tradition in which [the tradition] God will create people for [the tradition] agreement in that both Para [the tradition] required to meet the number [the tradition] Since Hell was promised the [the tradition] cast into it does not fill it, [the tradition] number, for you promised [the tradition] send forth into it people upon [the tradition]

107 The second possible [the tradition] plural of *qādim*¹⁴² in the [the tradition] Some transmitters of the [the tradition] instead of *qadam* on the [the tradition]

¹³⁶ Muḥammad b. Ziyād Abū ʿAlī [the tradition] lexicographer and an authority on [the tradition] sources on him see GAS, VIII, 12.

¹³⁷ *Kitāb al-Asmāʿ*, 352, 1-2.

¹³⁸ An-Naḍr b. Shumayl b. Khaṭṭab [the tradition] school of lexicography and student [the tradition] among them a work on *ḥadīth* [the tradition] see GAS, VIII, 58-59. See Yāqūt, [the tradition]

¹³⁹ "What is sent ahead." The [the tradition] participle, *maqaddam*.

¹⁴⁰ "What is destroyed" = *mahdūm*.

¹⁴¹ "What is seized" = *maqbiḍ*. [the tradition] grammar, cf., *Lisān al-ʿArab*, VII, [the tradition]

¹⁴² That is, one who arrives, [the tradition]

¹⁴³ *Ghāʾir*: something absent, [the tradition]

al-Aʿrābī¹³⁶ said: "The word *qadam* means those who advance ahead (*mu-taqaddim*)." According to Abū Bakr al-Bayhaqī,¹³⁷ Naḍr b. Shumayl¹³⁸ held that the term *qadam* in this tradition refers to unbelievers (*kuffār*), who, in God's foreknowledge, will be among those to enter Hell. Abū Maṣṣūr al-Azharī said: "The *qadam* are those concerning whose final destiny word advances on ahead to Hell." It would appear then that the term [*qadam*] may be taken in two ways. According to the first, anything you cause to advance or move forward (*qaddamtahu*) is a *qadam*¹³⁹ in the same way that what you destroy (*hadamtahu*) is called a *hadam*¹⁴⁰ or what you seize (*qabaḍtahu*) is called a *qabaḍ*.¹⁴¹ This interpretation is supported by the full text of the tradition in which the following words appear: "As for Paradise, God will create people for it." Thus the two parts of the tradition are in agreement in that both Paradise and Hell will be augmented by the amount required to meet the number promised to each, and so they will be filled. Since Hell was promised that it would be filled, when the number of people cast into it does not fill it, it will cry out: "Are there more? Increase the number, for you promised me that I would be filled." And so [God] will send forth into it people upon people until it finally says: "It is enough!"

107 The second possible interpretation is that *qadam* is to be taken as the plural of *qādim*¹⁴² in the same way that *ghayab* is the plural of *ghāʾib*.¹⁴³ Some transmitters of the tradition, however, have adopted the reading *rijl* instead of *qadam* on the assumption that the two terms are synonymous.

¹³⁶ Muḥammad b. Ziyād Abū ʿAbd Allāh b. al-Aʿrābī (d. 231/846), a celebrated grammarian, lexicographer and an authority on genealogy. For a brief biographical notice and a list of sources on him see GAS, VIII, 126-129; and *EP*, III, 706-707.

¹³⁷ *Kitāb al-Asmāʾ*, 352, 1-2.

¹³⁸ An-Naḍr b. Shumayl b. Kharasha at-Tamīmī (d. 203/819), a member of the Basran school of lexicography and student of al-Khalīl. He was the author of a number of works, among them a work on *ḥadīth* entitled *Gharīb al-Ḥadīth*. For a brief biographical sketch, see GAS, VIII, 58-59. See Yāqūt, *Irshād*, VIII, 218-222, for an important notice.

¹³⁹ "What is sent ahead." The argument here is that *qadam* carries the force of the passive participle, *muqaddam*.

¹⁴⁰ "What is destroyed" = *mahdūm*.

¹⁴¹ "What is seized" = *maqbuḍ*. See Lane, 2483 for more on this phenomenon in Arabic grammar; cf., *Lisān al-ʿArab*, VII, 214, and XII, 604.

¹⁴² That is, one who arrives, advances forward, or precedes.

¹⁴³ *Ghāʾib*: something absent, concealed or invisible.

Thus in the various versions of the tradition cited by Dāraqutnī the term *qadam* sometimes occurs while in others the term *rijl* is used. This indicates that [some of] the transmitters of this tradition took the term *rijl* to mean a group or multitude (*jamā'a*), since in literary Arabic the expression *rijl min jarād*¹⁴⁴ is sometimes used. If the term *rijl* is used in this sense, the tradition might mean: "a throng (*jamā'a*) whose number resembles an 'army' of locusts will enter Hell rushing headlong to their destruction."

108 The *Qāḍī* [Abū Ya'ālā] said: "The term *qadam*¹⁴⁵ is to be taken as an attribute of the divine essence (*ṣifa dhātīya*)." I myself heard Ibn Zāghūnī say: "[God] will place His *qadam* in Hell to demonstrate to the damned that they and their kind [fol.25a] will burn in Hell but that He Himself will not [be affected]." Such statements are tantamount to an admission of multiplicity in the being of God—a most repugnant doctrine! I have also seen a work written by Abū Bakr b. Khuzayma on the divine attributes, among whose chapter headings were the following: "Affirming the 'Hand' [as a Divine Attribute]," "[God's] Holding the Heaven and Earth on His Fingers," "Affirming the 'Foot' (*rijl*) [as a Divine Attribute] Contrary to the Mu'tazila." [At the beginning of this last chapter] he quotes the verse: "Do [idols] have feet (*arjul*) with which to walk or hands with which to grasp?"¹⁴⁶ And then he adds: "Indeed, our Lord has informed us that those who have neither hands nor feet are like cattle."¹⁴⁷ I am amazed that this man, notwithstanding his great learning in scripture (*naql*), should utter such words, for he

¹⁴⁴ A swarm or "army" of locusts.

¹⁴⁵ Here construed as meaning "foot."

¹⁴⁶ S. 7: 195. The full verse reads: "Do [idols] have feet with which to walk, or hands with which to grasp, or eyes with which to see, or ears with which to hear?"

¹⁴⁷ There is no reference to cattle in the full text of the S. 7:195. There is such a reference, however, in verse 184 of this same *surah*, and it seems likely that this verse is the background of the reference to cattle. Verse 184 reads as follows: "We have created for Hell many of the jinn and of mankind; hearts have they but they understand not with them; eyes have they but they see not with them; ears have they but they hear not with them; they are like the cattle, nay, they are further astray." It is interesting that in this verse it is jinn and men, not idols or the gods, who are compared to cattle, whereas in Ibn Khuzayma's statement it is the idols/gods that are compared to cattle. The editor of the 1968 Cairo edition of Ibn Khuzayma's work argues in a footnote to this passage that in this sentence Ibn Khuzayma is in fact comparing the idolaters, not the idols, to cattle. Even when his statement is examined in context in *Kitāb at-Tawhīd* there is nothing to indicate that Ibn Khuzayma had idolaters (as opposed to idols) in mind. One can only conclude that Ibn Khuzayma is here piecing parts of two separated verses together to make a point.

ascribes [attributes] to God having, viz., a hand that grasped [to God] an ear!¹⁴⁸ such things. It should be observed that the tradition of the ascription of idols was directed to the saying to them: "How can you have neither hands capable of grasping nor feet with which to walk?"¹⁴⁹ Ibn 'Aqil said: "God is not in space. Indeed, such a notion is absurd (ḡalib), for God is not made of members by which He carries out His creative power (*al-kawm*). He does not seek the assistance of some one to do His will on it¹⁵⁰ through or about to be consumed by fire and peace!"¹⁵¹ How absurd!

¹⁴⁸ In S. 7: 195, for example.

¹⁴⁹ For Ibn al-Jawzi there are several things which the idols do not possess, viz., hands, feet, etc. He attributes an ear to God since it is the ascription of God what the idols lack to establish the divine attributes since al-Jawzi's contention throughout *Kitāb at-Tawhīd* is that the idols are not from scripture interpreted in a sound manner.

¹⁵⁰ For the full verse also mention that among the attributes predicated of God are: "He is not like anything created." Following Ibn Khuzayma's lead, al-Jawzi also has assigned to God an ear.

¹⁵¹ That is, on Hell.

¹⁵² S. 21: 68. The background of this verse is the story of the attempt to burn him alive because of his rejection of the idolatry of the time. According to the tradition, he was built an enclosure which was filled with fire and was so intense that birds flying over it were burnt. From a catapult specially constructed for the purpose, a fire was shot at him. He coolness and peace for him. He was not touched by the fire. Ibn al-Jawzi explains the effect that Abraham remained in the fire for fifty days during which he

ascribes [attributes] to God which the idols were condemned¹⁴⁸ for not having, viz., a hand that grasps and a foot that walks.¹⁴⁹ He should also have ascribed [to God] an ear!¹⁵⁰ If he had understood he would not have uttered such things. It should be observed that [in the above verse] God's condemnation of idols was directed to those who worshipped them. He was, in effect, saying to them: "How can you who have hands and feet worship what has neither hands capable of grasping or feet capable of walking?"

109 Ibn 'Aqīl said: "God is beyond having the attribute of occupying space. Indeed, such a notion is the very essence of anthropomorphism (*tajsīm*), for God is not made up of parts nor does He possess bodily members by which He carries out his actions. Thus, His authority (*amr*) and His creative power (*takwīn*) do not act on Hell in such a way that He must seek the assistance of some part of Himself (*bi-shay' min dhātihi*) or work His will on it¹⁵¹ through one of His attributes, for [when Abraham was about to be consumed by fire God merely] said to it: 'O fire, be coolness and peace!'¹⁵² How absurd is the view [advocated by the *mujassima*] and

¹⁴⁸ In S. 7: 195, for example.

¹⁴⁹ For Ibn al-Jawzī there are several problems with this procedure: 1) Ascribing to God what the idols do not possess is a thoroughly anthropomorphist act since what are denied to idols are literal hands, feet, etc. Ibn al-Jawzī wonders why Ibn Khuzayma did not go on to attribute an ear to God since this is among the things denied to idols in S. 7: 195. 2). Ascribing to God what the idols lack is a methodologically insufficient basis upon which to establish the divine attributes since it is to make negation the basis of predication. It is Ibn al-Jawzī's contention throughout *KAS* that the divine attributes be based on positive statements from scripture interpreted in a sound fashion.

¹⁵⁰ For the full verse also mentions that idols do not have ears. Ibn al-Jawzī has observed that among the attributes predicated of God in *Kitāb at-Tawhīd* no mention is made of an ear. Following Ibn Khuzayma's logic of assigning to God what the idols lack, he should also have assigned to God an ear.

¹⁵¹ That is, on Hell.

¹⁵² S. 21: 69. The background of these words is the story of how Abraham's people had attempted to burn him alive because he had destroyed their idols and called for the worship of the true God. According to the details supplied by *Zād al-Masīr* (V, 366-367), they had built an enclosure which was filled with wood and set to fire (a fire which became so intense that birds flying over it were burned to a crisp). When Abraham reached the fire from a catapult specially constructed for the occasion, God issued His command to the fire "O fire, be coolness and peace for Abraham"—as a result of which Abraham was left untouched by the fire. Ibn al-Jawzī quotes Ka'b [al-Aḥbar] and Wahb [b. al-Munabbih] to the effect that Abraham remained in the enclosure for six days (according to some authorities forty or fifty days) during which he was visited by Gabriel, who brought him a garment

how foreign to One who is the Creator of angels and the celestial spheres! The Quran itself repudiates those who hold such views when it says: 'If these had been truly gods, they would not have gone down [to Hell]'.¹⁵³ How then is it possible to suppose that the Creator Himself will descend to Hell? He is indeed beyond the fanciful notions of the *mujassima*."

The Twelfth Tradition

110 According to a report from Abū Hurayra, the Prophet said: "[In Hell] the tooth of the unbeliever will be like Mount Uḥud [in size], and his skin will be the measure of forty-two forearms (*dhirāʿ*) in thickness, each the length of the forearm of *al-Jabbār* (*dhirāʿ al-jabbār*)."¹⁵⁴

111 [fol.25b] Abū ʿAmr az-Zāhid¹⁵⁵ maintained that the term *jabbār* here is [not a reference to God but] to the long forearm as in the expression: *nakhla jabbāra*, "the tall palm-tree."¹⁵⁶ According to Ibn Qutayba, the term *jabbār*, whose plural form is *jabābira*, means "king" (*malik*).¹⁵⁷ The *Qāḍī* Abū Yaʿlā, however, wrote: "We maintain that [the expression *dhirāʿ al-jabbār*] is to be taken in its literal sense (*ẓāhir*), for *al-jabbār* is God."¹⁵⁸ However, we do not attribute to God a forearm (*dhirāʿ*) understood as a bodily organ (*jāriḥa*)." How astonishing it is that reason can forsake a man to such a degree! [Abū Yaʿlā] went on to say: "It is possible that the forearm will be increased forty fold until it reaches [the thickness] of the unbeliever's skin; [nonetheless] it is to be ascribed [to God] as an attribute of the divine

and a carpet from Paradise. Ibn ʿAqīl quotes this verse to show that God does not need to be present in Hell literally in order to effect his will in or on it. For additional details on this verse, see *Zād al-Masīr*, V, 366-367; also Zamakhsharī, *Kashshāf*, II, 578.

¹⁵³ S. 21: 99. For Ibn al-Jawzī's exegesis of this verse, see *Zād al-Masīr*, V, 391.

¹⁵⁴ For references to this tradition along with commentary, see Ibn Qutayba, *Taʾwīl*, 270-271 (cf., Lecomte, 239); Bayhaqī, *Asmāʾ*, 341-343 (esp. 342); *DST*, 41-42; and *BA* (Beirut), 86-87. For variant forms of this tradition, see Muslim, *janna*, 44; Tirmidhi, *janna*, 3; and *Musnad*, II, 26, 328, 334, 537; and III, 29.

¹⁵⁵ On the identity of this person, see notes to §47.

¹⁵⁶ Cf., Lane 375, 1-2, where the expression is said to mean "the tall and young" palm tree, or one "tall and above the reach of the hand."

¹⁵⁷ A *dhirāʿ jabbār* would be a "king-size" forearm (Ibn Qutayba, *Taʾwīl*, 270-271; cf., Lecomte, *Le traité*, 239; also Bayhaqī, *Asmāʾ*, 342, 20ff.).

¹⁵⁸ *Al-Jabbār* is indeed one of the ninety-nine names of God.

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Nuʿaym, III, 279-310; Yāqūt, *Irs*
41-42; Ibn al-Jawzī, *Ṣafwa*, II, 117-
are raised regarding his reliability.

¹⁶¹ See *DST*, 42-43; and *BA* (Be
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¹⁶² That is, this saying may wel
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moral authority of the *ṭābiʿūn*. This

essence, though not in the sense of an actual limb.”¹⁵⁹ However, if he did not have in mind a limb, how could it be increased forty fold?

The Thirteenth Tradition

112 The *Qāḍī* [Abū Ya‘lā] reported that Mujāhid¹⁶⁰ said: “On the day of judgment David will acknowledge his sin, and God will say to him: ‘Take a place in front of me (*amāmī*)!’ Then David will say: ‘O Lord, my sin!’ God will reply: ‘Take a place behind me (*khalḥī*)!’ Then David will say again: ‘O Lord, my sin!’ Thereupon God will say: ‘Take my foot (*qadamī*)!’” In the version of this saying transmitted by Ibn Sīrīn, the following is added: “Then God will draw near to David so that he will be able to place his hand on [God’s] thigh (*fakhidh*).”¹⁶¹

113 It is astonishing that anyone should attempt to base the divine attributes on statements derived from the Followers (*tābi‘īn*); [furthermore, this saying] may not actually reflect their views though it may meet the criteria of sound transmission,¹⁶² for they may merely have been passing on what they had derived from the *Ahl al-Kitāb*, as in the case of Wahb b. Munabbih. The *Qāḍī* [Abū Ya‘lā] said: “We take the [above] saying in its literal sense (*‘alā ṣāḥih*) although we do not construe the terms ‘foot’ and ‘thigh’ to mean actual bodily members, nor do we take ‘in front of’ in a spatial sense.” It is

¹⁵⁹ The question of the *dirā‘ al-jabbār* is not taken up in the *Mu‘tamad* so far as I have been able to determine. Ibn al-Jawzī is undoubtedly quoting from one of the lost works of Abū Ya‘lā.

¹⁶⁰ Mujāhid b. Jabr Abū’l-Ḥajjāj, the “leading” expert on *tafsīr* of his generation, who, despite Ṭabarī’s frequent use of his glosses on the Quran, was often criticized in later biographical works for having relied unduly on Jewish and Christian sources. For a list of biographical sources on him, see *GAS*, I, 29; and *EL*², VII, 293. Cf., also the *Ḥilya* of Abū Nu‘aym, III, 279-310; Yāqūt, *Irshād*, VI, 242-243; Ibn al-Jazarī, *Ghayat an-Nihāya*, II, 41-42; Ibn al-Jawzī, *Ṣafwa*, II, 117-119; and Dhahabī, *Mizān*, III, 439-440, where questions are raised regarding his reliability.

¹⁶¹ See *DST*, 42-43; and *BA* (Beirut), 87-88, where this saying is cited and glossed. Also see Ibn Fūrak, *Mushkil*, 338, where a slightly different version of this tradition is cited and discussed. The tradition is not cited in the *Mu‘tamad*.

¹⁶² That is, this saying may well have been transmitted by the *tābi‘ūn*, but it may not reflect their views since some of what they passed on came from the *ahl al-Kitāb*. Such sayings meet the formal requirements for sound transmission, but they do not carry the moral authority of the *tābi‘ūn*. This seems to be Ibn al-Jawzī’s point.

astonishing that [in enumerating the divine attributes] such persons produce a complete bodily form replete with a thigh (*fakhidh*), a leg (*sāq*), a foot (*qadam*), a face (*wajh*), two hands (*yadayn*), fingers (*aṣābīʿ*), even a little finger (*khinṣir*) and a thumb (*ibhām*), a side (*janb*) and a waist (*ḥaqw*), [along with such movements as] ascending (*ṣuʿūd*) and descending (*nuzūl*). They say: "We take these attributes in their literal meaning (*ʿalā ḡāhir*), though not in the sense of bodily members (*jawāriḥ*)." How is it possible for an intelligent person to attribute to God a back or a front or a thigh [literally though not in the sense of a bodily member]? We ought to avoid discussing [matters of this sort] with such persons, [fol.26a] for we already know¹⁶³ that the thigh [ascribed to God in the *ḥadīth*] is not a thigh, nor the back a back. People like this should not discourse [on such matters], for they treat the principles of reason with disdain as though they were speaking to children.

The Fourteenth Tradition

114 According to a tradition reported by Abū Hurayra, which is cited by Bukhārī and Muslim in their respective *Ṣaḥīḥs*, the Messenger of God said: "God will laugh at two men [as they approach Paradise]; although one of them killed the other, both will enter Paradise."¹⁶⁴ Among those traditions found only in Muslim's collection there is one reported by Ibn Masʿūd in which the Prophet is said to have laughed when he spoke of the last person to enter Paradise. Someone then asked him why he was laughing and he replied: "Because the Lord of the worlds will laugh when [the last person to

¹⁶³ And hence we do not need to be told.

¹⁶⁴ For the full tradition, see Muslim, *imāra*, 128 and 129; Bukhārī, *jihād*, 28 (cf., Houdas and Marçais, *Les traditions*, II, 294); Nasāʾī, *jihād*, 38; Ibn Māja, *Muqaddima*, 13; and Mālik, *Muwaṭṭaʿ*, *jihād*, 21. In the full tradition, the portion quoted by Ibn al-Jawzī is followed by these words: "[Those listening to the Prophet] said: 'O Messenger of God, how can this be?' He replied: 'One of them will fight in the way of God and will die a martyr's death. God will then turn to his killer and guide him aright so that he embraces Islam. Then when he is fighting in the way of God he too will die a martyr's death.'" For discussions of the question of God's laughing, see Bayhaqī, *Asmāʿ*, 467-469; Ibn Khuzayma, *Tawḥīd*, 230-241; Ibn Qutayba, *Taʿwīl*, 266-267 (cf., Lecomte, 235-236); and Ibn Fūrak, *Mushkil*, 474-477.

enter Paradise] says: 'Are you

115 The term "laughing" of becoming evident or manifest was previously concealed. The earth laughs when vegetation appears. Similarly, it is said that the

Every time a new came

The earth laughs as he

The act of laughing [in the teeth, is impossible for should be taken to mean kindness (*fadl*). Thus, when Lord's laughing," he merely express God's kindness and line reads]: "We will not [Abū Razīn] was, in effect, hereafter] between himself hope of receiving good from This [kind of] metaphori

¹⁶⁵ For the full text of this *ḥadīth* 411; Bayhaqī, *Asmāʿ*, 474; Ibn K

¹⁶⁶ See Ibn Fūrak, *Mushkil*, 47 commentary (cf., also Bayhaqī, 47

¹⁶⁷ Cf., Ibn Fūrak, *Mushkil*, 477

¹⁶⁸ This last line is actually Abū given in the first part of the tradit (*muqaddima* 13/181) reads: رَبُّنَا كَرِيمٌ قَالَ: نَعَمْ. قُلْتُ: لَنْ نَعْلَمَ مِنْ رَبِّ الْوَحِيدِ الْوَحِيدِ (The Messenger of God and the imminence of the change Messenger, will the Lord laugh?" a Lord who laughs" [cf., also Ibn Khuzayma, *Tawḥīd*, 235, and note. He laughs, not in the sense of mal despair will soon be replaced by jo

¹⁶⁹ See Bayhaqī, *Asmāʿ*, 467-47 this interpretation (cf., *Mushkil*, 47

enter Paradise] says: 'Are You making sport of me?'"¹⁶⁵

115 The term "laughing" [in Arabic usage] carries with it the connotation of becoming evident or manifest. Thus when someone brings to light what was previously concealed, it is said that he laughed. It is also said that the earth laughs when vegetation appears and flowers break forth in blossom. Similarly, it is said that the heavens weep, as the poet has said:

Every time a new camomile [appears],
The earth laughs as heaven weeps.¹⁶⁶

The act of laughing [in the literal sense], which for humans involves baring the teeth, is impossible for God. [When applied to God] the expression should be taken to mean that He manifests His generosity (*karam*) and kindness (*faḍl*). Thus, when the Prophet said: "I laughed on account of my Lord's laughing," he merely meant that he opened his mouth in order to express God's kindness and generosity.¹⁶⁷ In another *ḥadīth* [whose concluding line reads]: "We will not fail to receive good from a Lord who laughs,"¹⁶⁸ [Abū Razīn] was, in effect, expressing his pain over the separation [in the hereafter] between himself and those "persons" (*ajsām*) who will have no hope of receiving good from God.¹⁶⁹

This [kind of] metaphorical interpretation (*ta'wīl*) was employed by a

¹⁶⁵ For the full text of this *ḥadīth*, see Muslim, *īmān*, 310b; cf., also *Musnad*, I, 392 and 411; Bayhaqī, *Asmāʾ*, 474; Ibn Khuzayma, *Tawḥīd*, 231; Ibn Fūrak, *Mushkil*, 476, 9-10.

¹⁶⁶ See Ibn Fūrak, *Mushkil*, 476, 5, where the last part of this line is cited with a brief commentary (cf., also Bayhaqī, 474, 11-12).

¹⁶⁷ Cf., Ibn Fūrak, *Mushkil*, 477, 7-12.

¹⁶⁸ This last line is actually Abū Razīn al-ʿUqaylī's response to the words of the Prophet given in the first part of the tradition. The full text, as recorded in the *Sunan* of Ibn Māja (*muqaddima* 13/181) reads: عَنْ وَكَيْعِ بْنِ حُدَسٍ عَنْ عَمِّهِ أَبِي رَزِينَ قَالَ: قَالَ رَسُولُ اللَّهِ: ضَحَكَ رَبُّنَا: مِنْ قُنُوطِ عِبَادِهِ وَقُرْبِ غَيْرِهِ. قَالَ، قُلْتُ: يَا رَسُولَ اللَّهِ، أَوْ يَضْحَكُ الرَّبُّ؟ قَالَ: نَعَمْ. قُلْتُ: لَنْ نَعْدَمَ مِنْ رَبٍّ يَضْحَكُ خَيْرًا (The Messenger of God said: "Our Lord laughs at the despair of His servants and the imminence of the change He will shortly bring about." I (Abū Razīn) said: "O Messenger, will the Lord laugh?" He replied: "Yes." I said: "We will never lack good from a Lord who laughs" [cf., also *Musnad*, IV, 11-12; Bayhaqī, *Asmāʾ*, 473, 2-6; and Ibn Khuzayma, *Tawḥīd*, 235, and note 3]). In the prophetic saying "God laughs at the despair..." He laughs, not in the sense of making-fun or belittling, but out of relief knowing that the despair will soon be replaced by joy.

¹⁶⁹ See Bayhaqī, *Asmāʾ*, 467-474, where a number of authorities are cited in support of this interpretation (cf., *Mushkil*, 474ff.).

number of *‘ulamā* [in dealing with this tradition]: al-Khaṭṭābī maintained that references to God’s laughing are to be taken as expressing His satisfaction (*riḍā*) and the excellence of the reward.¹⁷⁰ In another tradition whose words are those of a Companion (a *ḥadīth mawqūf*), it is reported that “[the Prophet] laughed so heartily that the inside of his mouth and molars were visible.” Al-Khallāl¹⁷¹ quoted this tradition in his *Kitāb as-Sunna*, [and he observed that] al-Marwazī¹⁷² once asked [fol.26b] Abū ‘Abd Allāh¹⁷³ what he thought about this tradition and that he replied: “It is objectionable (*bashī‘*).” He continued:¹⁷⁴ “[If we assume the report to be true] the reference to laughing may be interpreted in two ways. In the first place, it may be construed as referring to the Prophet; that is, upon being informed that God laughed, [the Prophet himself] laughed so heartily that the inside of his mouth and molars were visible, just as it is reported in another tradition that [the Prophet] laughed until his teeth could be seen. This would be the correct interpretation were the tradition to be accepted as a reliable report. As a matter of fact, however, [its *isnād*] does not go back to the Prophet himself.¹⁷⁵ The second possibility is that ‘laughing’ is to be taken metaphorically (*tajawwuzan*) as a way of expressing God’s abundant generosity (*karam*) and satisfaction (*riḍā*), in the same way he expressed himself in metaphor when he said: ‘To him who approaches Me walking I will come running’.”

116 The *Qāḍī* [Abū Ya‘lā] said: “It is not impossible to take these traditions [which refer to God’s laughing] in their literal sense (*ẓāhir*), that is, by taking them as they are, without subjecting them to metaphorical

¹⁷⁰ Cf., Bayhaqī, *Asmā*, 469, 7-9; and 470, 2-5.

¹⁷¹ Aḥmad b. Muḥammad b. Hārūn Abū Bakr al-Khallāl (d. 311/923), a student of Abū Bakr al-Marwazī and a leading figure in the early history of the Ḥanbalī school. For valuable accounts of his life and work, see *Ṭabaqāt al-Ḥanābila*, II, 12-15; and *Taʾrīkh Baghdād*, V, 112-113. For a more complete list of sources on him, see *GAS*, I, 511-512. His *Kitāb as-Sunna* appears to be lost.

¹⁷² Aḥmad b. Muḥammad b. al-Ḥajjāj Abū Bakr al-Marwazī (d. 275/888), credited with a number of important works, among them an abridgement of the *Masāʾil* of Aḥmad. For a rather detailed account of his life, see *Ṭabaqāt al-Ḥanābila*, I, 56-63; also see *Taʾrīkh Baghdād*, IV, 423-425 and *GAS*, I, 507.

¹⁷³ Aḥmad b. Ḥanbal.

¹⁷⁴ A comparison of the text of *KAS* with the wording found in *DST* (44) and *BA* (fol. 29a) indicates that what follows is a continuation of the commentary of Abū ‘Abd Allāh b. Aḥmad.

¹⁷⁵ That is, it is a *ḥadīth maqṭū‘*.

interpretation (*taʾwīl*). We laughs in the sense of open movement of other bodily have ascribed attributes to slender documentary base serious question. If he did with the principles of reas expression metaphorically so.¹⁷⁶ How astonishing it is an expression referring to [the term “molars” how is i were to be found [ascribed to reject it. How much m occurs] does not rest on a n the tradition “If only the pe rulers (*umarāʾ*), he later sa sound traditions].”¹⁷⁷ Now t much more rigorous should established [and] which run who affirm the molars (*ad understand Islam.*

¹⁷⁶ Despite Abū Ya‘lā’s insistence does end up, in Ibn al-Jawzī’s view complaint seems to be Abū Ya‘lā doing. Ibn al-Jawzī, of course, of tradition as an appropriate basis for

¹⁷⁷ According to his son ‘Abd A finally declared this saying to be i that it be stricken from the record Allāh’s comments on this tradition *حَدَّثَ عَنْ النَّبِيِّ صَلَّى اللَّهُ عَلَيْهِ وَسَلَّمَ* (My father said to me shortly before it is in conflict with [other] *ḥadīths*

¹⁷⁸ See Bukhārī, *manāqib*, 25; and

interpretation (*ta'wīl*). We do not, however, take them to mean that God laughs in the sense of opening his mouth or [that his laughing entails] the movement of other bodily organs." It is astounding that this man should have ascribed attributes to God on the strength of traditions that have a slender documentary base (*aḥādīth āḥād*) and contain expressions open to serious question. If he did not attribute to God a laughing in accordance with the principles of reason (*ma'qūlan*) he did nonetheless interpret the expression metaphorically (*ta'awwala*) without realizing that he was doing so.¹⁷⁶ How astonishing it is that he could take the expression "laughing" as an expression referring to [God's] favor (*faḍl*) and blessing (*in'ām*). As for the term "molars" how is it to be taken? By God, if [such an expression] were to be found [ascribed to God] in the two *Ṣaḥīḥs* it would be necessary to reject it. How much more if [the tradition in which the expression occurs] does not rest on a reliable base (*aṣl*)! After Aḥmad had transmitted the tradition "If only the people would keep aloof from them," that is, the rulers (*umarā'*), he later said: "Strike this tradition [from the record of sound traditions]." ¹⁷⁷ Now this tradition is found in the two *Ṣaḥīḥs*.¹⁷⁸ How much more rigorous should one be in the case of a tradition which is not established [and] which runs counter to both revelation and reason! Those who affirm the molars (*aḍrās*) as a divine attribute (*ṣifa*) do not really understand Islam.

¹⁷⁶ Despite Abū Ya'la's insistence on taking "laughing" in its literal (*ẓahir*) sense, he does end up, in Ibn al-Jawzī's view, adopting a quasi-figurative interpretation. Ibn al-Jawzī's complaint seems to be Abū Ya'la's inconsistency and his failure to recognize what he is doing. Ibn al-Jawzī, of course, objected to Abū Ya'la's willingness to consider an *āḥād* tradition as an appropriate basis for a discussion of the divine attributes.

¹⁷⁷ According to his son 'Abd Allāh, it was not until the very end of his life that Aḥmad finally declared this saying to be in conflict with the teaching of the Prophet and ordered that it be stricken from the record of sound traditions (cf., *Musnad*, II, 301, 23-27). 'Abd Allāh's comments on this tradition (as reported in the *Musnad*) are as follows: قال أبي في مرضه الذي مات فيه: اضرب على هذا الحديث فإنه خلاف الأحاديث عن النبي صلى الله عليه وسلم (My father said to me shortly before his death: "Remove this *ḥadīth* [from the *Musnad*], for it is in conflict with [other] *ḥadīths* that go back to the Prophet").

¹⁷⁸ See Bukhārī, *manāqib*, 25; and Muslim, *ḥītan*, 74.

The Fifteenth Tradition

117 In a saying classified as *mawqūf* (that is, one going back to a Companion), the *Qāḍī* [Abū Yaʿlā] reported that ʿAbd Allāh b. ʿUmar once said: "God created the angels from the light of [His] two forearms and breast (*dhirāʿayn wa ṣadr*)."¹⁷⁹

118 On the basis of this tradition the *Qāḍī* [Abū Yaʿlā] attributed two forearms and a breast to God as attributes, although he qualified it by saying that these are not to be thought of as parts of the body. This is [fol.27a] reprehensible, for the saying does not in fact go back to the Prophet (*laysa bi-marfūʿ*) nor is what it states true. Is it conceivable that finite creatures were made from [the light of] God's eternal essence? This is even more offensive than what Christians teach!

The Sixteenth Tradition

119 In the following tradition reported by Ibn ʿUmar and cited in the *Ṣaḥīḥs* of Bukhārī and Muslim, the Prophet is quoted as saying: "[On the day of resurrection] God will bring the believer near [to Himself] and will cover him with His side (*kanaf*). And God will ask: 'Do you acknowledge [having committed] such and such a sin?'"¹⁸⁰

¹⁷⁹ Since no mention is made of the Prophet, it would appear that Ibn ʿUmar is speaking for himself and not presuming to speak for the Prophet though that is not entirely clear. This saying is not cited in the *Muʿtamad*. See Ibn Fūrak (*Mushkil*, 143, 5) and Bayhaqī (*Asmāʾ*, 342, 23-343, 1-5) where the saying is attributed to ʿAbd Allāh b. ʿAmr [b. al-ʿĀṣ]. In addition to the version of the saying cited above by Ibn al-Jawzī, Ibn Fūrak cites an interesting variation: *خلق الله تعالى الملائكة من شعر ذراعيه وصدره أو من نورهما* (God created the angels from the hair of His forearms and His chest, or from their light [cf., also 144, 4]). Ibn Fūrak notes, however, that the saying in its various forms is problematic for several reasons: 1) it does not go back to the Prophet and thus must be taken as reflecting nothing more than the views of Ibn ʿAmr, and 2) it contains a number of grossly anthropomorphic expressions. For references to the creation of angels from light, see the *Musnad*, VI, 153 and 168 (cf., also Muslim, *zuḥd*, 60; and Ibn Qutayba, *Taʾwīl*, 8 [Lecomte 6, n. 3]).

¹⁸⁰ For the full text of this tradition, see: Bukhārī, *maʿālim*, 2; *tafsīr surah* 11; *adab*, 60; *tawḥīd*, 36; Muslim, *tawba*, 52; Ibn Māja, *muqaddima*, 13 (183); *Musnad*, II, 74 and 105; *DST*, 44; and *BA*, 29a. See also Ibn al-Jawzī's *Gharīb al-Ḥadīth*, II, 302-303, where the tradition is cited and briefly discussed. Although Ibn al-Jawzī presents essentially the same point of view in this latter work, the authorities cited in support of that view differ from

120 The ʿulamāʾ maintain [the believer] near to His 'His side' (*kanafuhu*) is to be care' (*hiyāṭa*) and 'His protection' another person [with protection]. Whatever covers a thing is carried in battle (*nurs*) is called to its bearer."

121 The *Qāḍī* [Abū Yaʿlā] bring [the believer] near to one who does not comprehend spatial terms is not applicable draws near to [the believer] draws near in His mercy (*la*

122 In a tradition cited in single authority, Muʿāwiyah young slave girl who tended and discovered that a wolf became angry and beat her. I me for that, and I asked him "Bring her to me!" When I had

those used here in KAS. For an As see Ibn Fūrak, *Mushkil*, 154-157.

¹⁸¹ Muḥammad b. al-Qāsim Ab school of lexicography and grammar His *Kitāb Gharīb al-Ḥadīth* (no quotation above. For a summary writings, see *GAL*, I, 118; Suppl. al-Anbārī is not cited by Ibn al-Jawzī *al-Ḥadīth* (I, 302-303).

¹⁸² I have found no reference to

¹⁸³ Ibn al-Jawzī's point seems necessarily from an affirmation of

¹⁸⁴ See §34 where the Prophet's

120 The *‘ulamā’* maintain that the tradition means that God will bring [the believer] near to His mercy. Ibn al-Anbārī¹⁸¹ said: “The expression ‘His side’ (*kanafuhu*) is to be taken [metaphorically] as meaning ‘His attentive care’ (*ḥiyāṭa*) and ‘His protection’ (*ṣatr*). When someone surrounds or covers another person [with protection], it is said that he has given him his side. Whatever covers a thing is said to give it its side (*kanaf*). Thus a shield carried in battle (*turs*) is called a *kanīf* since it provides a protective covering to its bearer.”

121 The *Qāḍī* [Abū Ya‘lā] said: “[This tradition] means that God will bring [the believer] near to Himself (*dhātihi*).”¹⁸² These are the words of one who does not comprehend God¹⁸³ or realize that nearness defined in spatial terms is not applicable to Him. Thus when the Prophet said: “[God] draws near to [the believer] on the day of ‘Arafa,” he meant that [God] draws near in His mercy (*lutf*) and His pardon (*‘afw*).

The Seventeenth Tradition

122 In a tradition cited in [the *Ṣaḥīḥ* of] Muslim, and transmitted by a single authority, Mu‘āwiya b. al-Ḥakam reported the following: “I had a young slave girl who tended my sheep. One day I went out [to the herd] and discovered that a wolf had seized one of the lambs. Being human I became angry and beat her. Afterward when I met the Prophet he reprimanded me for that, and I asked him whether I should set her free. He replied: ‘Bring her to me!’ When I had fetched her he said to her: ‘Where is God?’¹⁸⁴

those used here in *KAS*. For an Ash‘arite view on the proper interpretation of this tradition, see Ibn Fūrak, *Mushkil*, 154-157.

¹⁸¹ Muḥammad b. al-Qāsim Abū Bakr al-Anbārī (d. 328/940), a member of the Kufan school of lexicography and grammar, and the author of important works in both disciplines. His *Kitāb Gharīb al-Ḥadīth* (no longer extant) is perhaps the source of Ibn al-Jawzī’s quotation above. For a summary of biographical details and a list of his most important writings, see *GAL*, I, 118; Suppl. I, 182-183; *GAS*, VIII, 151-154; and *EL*², I, 485b. Ibn al-Anbārī is not cited by Ibn al-Jawzī in his discussion of the term *kanaf* in his own *Gharīb al-Ḥadīth* (I, 302-303).

¹⁸² I have found no reference to the question of God’s *kanaf* in the *Mu‘tamad*.

¹⁸³ Ibn al-Jawzī’s point seems to be that Abū Ya‘lā failed to appreciate what follows necessarily from an affirmation of divine transcendence.

¹⁸⁴ See §34 where the Prophet’s question is referred to and discussed briefly.

She answered: 'He is in heaven.'¹⁸⁵ Then he asked: 'Who am I?' She replied: 'You are the messenger of God'. He then [turned to me and] said: 'Free her, for she is a believer,'¹⁸⁶

123 We have already pointed out in an earlier part of this work that the Prophet was concerned [above all] to establish the fact of God's existence (*ithbāt al-wujūd*) [in the consciousness of his people].¹⁸⁷ Consequently, he spoke to them in terms with which they were familiar and emphasized [only] what was essential to the establishment [of God's existence]. He was satisfied to speak to them [**fol.27b**] in generalities (*jumal*) since elaborating on the details (*tafṣīl*) might cause confusion in the minds of the untutored.¹⁸⁸ However, it has been established among the *ʿulamāʾ* that heaven and earth do not contain Him nor is He located within the bounds of particular places (*aqṭār*). [The girl's statement that God is "in heaven"] is to be understood simply as her way of exalting the Creator.¹⁸⁹

¹⁸⁵ Cf. §60.

¹⁸⁶ For the full text of this tradition, see Muslim, *masājid*, 7 (33); Abū Dāwūd, *ṣalāt*, 167; *aymān*, 16 (1); Nasāʾī, *sahw*, 20; *Musnad*, II, 291; V, 447, 448; and Dārimī, *nudhūr*, 10. For discussions of the tradition, see *DST*, 45; *BA* (Beirut), 93-94; Bayhaqī, *Asmāʾ*, 421-422; Ibn Fūrak, *Mushkil*, 157-169; and Abū Yaʿlā, *Muʿtamad*, 56. See Gimaret, *Image*, 66-67, where other versions of this tradition are cited and their sources given.

¹⁸⁷ See especially §34.

¹⁸⁸ What Ibn al-Jawzī seems to mean here is that in his conversation with the slave girl, the Prophet was satisfied with the general statement that God is in heaven and refused to get into a discussion of the details of what that might mean (cf., *Talbīs*, 83, 4, where *jumal* is contrasted with *tafāṣīl*). In §34 Ibn al-Jawzī seems to be saying something slightly different in regard to the approach of the Prophet—viz., emphasizing the concrete and the particular so as to make God's existence something real.

¹⁸⁹ It is clear from this last line that Ibn al-Jawzī again opts for a metaphorical interpretation of the reference to God's being in the heaven—an interpretation advanced quite commonly in Ashʿarite circles (cf., the *Mushkil* of Ibn Fūrak [p. 159-160] where the view is supported by both theological and philological arguments; and Gimaret, *Image*, 68-69). For al-Ghazzālī's use of this tradition, see Frank, *al-Ghazzālī and the Ashʿarite School*, 39.—It is curious that Ibn al-Jawzī makes no mention of Abū Yaʿlā in connection with this tradition even though the latter held views which Ibn al-Jawzī would clearly have found problematic. Indeed, it is on the basis of a version of the above tradition that Abū Yaʿlā argues that it is possible to speak of God's location in space, or as he puts it, God's "whereness" (*aynīya*): ويجوز عليه سبحانه الأينية فيقال: أين هو؟ خلافاً للمعتزلة والأشعرية في منعهم ذلك، والدلالة على جوازه ما روي عن معاوية بن الحكم قال... وروى أبو رزين قال: قلت: يا رسول الله أين كان ربنا قبل أن يخلق السماوات والارضين؟ قال: كان في عماء ما فوقه هواء وما تحته هواء ثم خلق العرش على الماء (It is possible to

124 The following tradition who reported: "I asked [th God before He created H *ʿamāʾ*); below them¹⁹¹ then there was empty space. T waters."¹⁹³

125 [As for the *isnād*] Ya saying from Wakīʿ b. Hud Indeed, Yaʿlā is the only p Wakīʿ.¹⁹⁵ [As for the text *(ṣahāb)*.¹⁹⁶ It should be not *(ṣahāb)* have "clouds," not th

attribute "whereness" (*aynīya*) [He?"]—his in contrast to the Mu language [in relation to God]. The comes from a tradition related by asked the Prophet: "O Messeng heavens and the earth?" He repli and below them there was nothing: 56, 10-19]].

¹⁹⁰ Ibn Saʿd, *Ṭabaqāt*, V, 518.

¹⁹¹ On the antecedent of the pro

¹⁹² See Lane (3046/3) where k empty, space; a vacant, or an emp *Image*, 62-65.

¹⁹³ Among the many occurrence 13 (182); Tirmidhī, *tafsīr sūra* 11 9-12; and also his *Taʾriḫ*, I, 37, 6 on questions of cosmology, gener various of Ibn al-Jawzī's works (*al-Hadīth*, I, 81-82; and *Gharīb a* Qutayba, *Taʾwil*, 221-222 (Lecor Yaʿlā, *Muʿtamad*, 56, 18-20 (cf., additional references as well as an

¹⁹⁴ In some sources, his name i 520; Dhahabī, *Mizān* IV, 335). He died in 209/824 (*Tahdhīb*, XI, 403

¹⁹⁵ Cf., al-Bayhaqī, *Asmāʾ*, 377.

¹⁹⁶ Cf., Ibn al-Jawzī, *Gharīb al-*

The Eighteenth Tradition

124 The following tradition was handed down from Abū Razīn [al-ʿUqaylī]¹⁹⁰ who reported: “I asked [the Prophet]: ‘O Messenger of God! Where was God before He created His creatures?’ He replied: ‘He was in clouds (fī ʿamāʾ); below them¹⁹¹ there was empty space (hawāʾ)¹⁹² and above them there was empty space. Then He created His Throne (ʿarsh) above the waters.’”¹⁹³

125 [As for the *isnād*] Yaʿlā b. ʿAṭāʾ was the only person to transmit this saying from Wakīʿ b. Ḥudus¹⁹⁴ [who in turn had gotten it from Abū Razīn]. Indeed, Yaʿlā is the only person known to have received traditions from Wakīʿ.¹⁹⁵ [As for the text of this tradition], the term ʿamāʾ means clouds (*saḥāb*).¹⁹⁶ It should be noted that the terms “above” (*fawq*) and “below” (*taḥt*) have “clouds,” not the Creator, as their point of reference. Further,

attribute “whereness” (*aynīya*) [to God] for [the Prophet] was once asked: “Where is He?”—his in contrast to the Muʿtazilites and the Asharites who refuse to use that kind of language [in relation to God]. The evidence supporting the permissibility [of such language] comes from a tradition related by Muʿāwiya b. al-Ḥakam...going back to Abū Razīn, who asked the Prophet: “O Messenger of God, where was our Lord before he created the heavens and the earth?” He replied: “He was in the clouds; above them there was nothing and below them there was nothing; then He created the Throne above the waters” [*Muʿtamad*, 56, 10-19]).

¹⁹⁰ Ibn Saʿd, *Ṭabaqāt*, V, 518.

¹⁹¹ On the antecedent of the pronoun, cf., Lane 2161/3.

¹⁹² See Lane (3046/3) where *hawāʾ* is defined as “a vacancy; vacuity; a vacant, or an empty, space; a vacant, or an empty, thing.” For other possible interpretations, see Gimaret, *Image*, 62-65.

¹⁹³ Among the many occurrences of this saying, see the following: Ibn Māja, *muqaddima*, 13 (182); Tirmidhī, *tafsīr sūra* 11 (1); the *Musnad*, IV, 11, 12; Ṭabarī, *Tafsīr*, XV, 246, 9-12; and also his *Taʾrīkh*, I, 37, 6-10. This tradition, like other prophetic sayings bearing on questions of cosmology, generated intense debate. In addition to discussions found in various of Ibn al-Jawzī’s works (e.g., *DST*, 45-46; *BA* [Beirut], 94-95; *al-Ḥadāʾiq fī ʿIlm al-Ḥadīth*, I, 81-82; and *Gharīb al-Ḥadīth*, II, 128), see also Bayhaqī, *Asmāʾ*, 376ff.; Ibn Qutayba, *Taʾwīl*, 221-222 (Lecomte, 246-247); Ibn Fūrak, *Mushkil*, 168-175; and Abū Yaʿlā, *Muʿtamad*, 56, 18-20 (cf., also notes to the preceding tradition here in *KAS*). For additional references as well as an analysis of the saying, see Gimaret, *Image*, 61-65.

¹⁹⁴ In some sources, his name is given as Wakīʿ b. ʿUdus (e.g., Ibn Saʿd, *Ṭabaqāt*, V, 520; Dhahabī, *Mizān* IV, 335). He is said to have been a nephew of Abū Razīn and to have died in 209/824 (*Tahdhīb*, XI, 403-404).

¹⁹⁵ Cf., al-Bayhaqī, *Asmāʾ*, 377, 1-2 (cf., *Mizān*, IV, 335, 16-17).

¹⁹⁶ Cf., Ibn al-Jawzī, *Gharīb al-Ḥadīth*, II, 128.

the preposition “in” (*fī*) has the force of “above” in this expression and indicates that God is “above the clouds” by virtue of His sovereignty (*tadbīr*) and power (*qahr*).¹⁹⁷ Since people are familiar with the world of created things (*makhlūqāt*), it is natural for them to inquire about it, including the clouds (*saḥāb*), which are part of His creation. If [the Prophet] had been asked about what existed before the clouds, he would have said that only God existed. Indeed, ‘Imrān b. Ḥuṣayn reported that the Prophet once said: “[In the beginning] God existed and there was nothing apart from Him.”¹⁹⁸ Abū’l-Ḥusayn b. al-Munādī¹⁹⁹ said—indeed, I transcribed his words from a document written in his own hand: “Describing the *hawā’*²⁰⁰ as being above or below Him is abhorrent to the learned (*ahl al-‘ilm*) because it implies containment [within space] and posits something like a receptacle (*wi‘ā*) for Him who is not like [other] beings (*asyā*). We are in agreement that no part of creation is above the Almighty in any sense, and that He neither indwells things in His essential being nor is He separate from them. If He were present in things He would be part of them, and if He were separate from them He would be absent from them.²⁰¹ Agreement amongst us on this point is not limited to this text in regard to what is an objectionable

¹⁹⁷ Cf., Ibn Fūrak, *Mushkil*, 173-174.

¹⁹⁸ Cf., Ṭabarī, *Ta’rīkh*, I, 38, 10; also his *Tafsīr*, XV, 248, 10-11. In both cases, ‘Imrān, a Companion, is cited as the source of the report. Little is known of him except that he took a special interest in those sayings of the Prophet that had cosmological implications, apparently enjoyed expensive clothing, and died sometime during the reign of Mu‘āwiya (cf., Ibn Sa‘d, *Ṭabaqāt*, IV, 287-291).

¹⁹⁹ Aḥmad b. Ja‘far b. Muḥammad Abū’l-Ḥuṣayn b. al-Munādī (256-336/869-947), a Ḥanbalī traditionist and the author of a number of works on the Quran and the *ḥadīth* (cf., GAS, I, 44). According to Ibn Kathīr (*Bidāya*, XI, 233), Ibn al-Jawzī had a high opinion of his works and recommended them to others as sources of reliable instruction. For additional notices on him, see *Ta’rīkh Baghdād*, IV, 69-70; *Ṭabaqāt al-Ḥanābila*, II, 3-6; and *Muntaẓam*, VI, 357-358.—I have not so far been able to locate the statement attributed above to Ibn al-Munādī in any other source.

²⁰⁰ It is possible perhaps that the reading of the MS (الهوى) is a garbled form of the Arabic root *لج*, and not *hawā’* as I have tentatively read it.

²⁰¹ For Ibn al-Munādī God’s relationship to the world of finite existence cannot be defined in spatial terms, and so he appeals to a kind of dialectic of presence and absence. God’s relationship to the world is not an either/or but rather a both/and kind relationship. What is worth noting is that Ibn al-Munādī (d. 336/947) was a Ḥanbalī, indeed, a contemporary of ‘Abd Allāh b. Aḥmad, and appears to have been conversant with the language of *kalām*. *Kalām* appears to have had an influence on Ḥanbalism, or at least some Ḥanbalīs, as early as the first part of the 10th century—a century before Abū Ya‘lā.

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and explanation of this tradition

²⁰³ See the following for this t
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Masnad, II, pp. 302, 406, 448; B
580); and Bayhaqī, *Asma’*, p. 47

interpretation [of it]. A metaphorical interpretation (*taʿwīl*) [of this tradition], however, is the [most] reliable one.”

The Nineteenth Tradition

126 [fol.28a] In the *Ṣaḥīḥ* of Bukhārī and Muslim there is a tradition in which Abū Hurayra reported the following: “A man came to the Messenger of God one day and said: ‘I am tired and hungry!’ The Prophet then called out: ‘Who will show this man hospitality tonight?’ One of the Anṣār responded: ‘I will’. When he had arrived home with his guest he said to his wife: ‘Is there any food in the house?’ She replied: ‘Only enough for my sons!’ He said to her: ‘Entertain them by whatever means you can, and if they ask for food send them to bed. When our guest (*ḡayf*) sits down to eat extinguish the lamp and make it appear to him that we are eating!’ And so they sat while the guest ate. The following morning when [the Anṣārī] went out the Prophet said to him: ‘God was amazed (*ʿajība*) at your treatment of your guest last evening.’”²⁰²

127 Among the traditions unique to Bukhārī there is one in which the Prophet is reported by Abū Hurayra to have said: “Your Lord is amazed (*ʿajība*) at people who are brought in chains and made to enter Paradise.”²⁰³

128 The *ʿulamāʾ* maintain that amazement (*ʿajab*) has to do only with what occasions surprise in a person, and so it strikes his fancy because of what he did not know. Such a response, however, is not appropriate for the Creator. [When applied to God the term “amazement”] simply means that He regards the thing or event as significant, for the one who is amazed at something regards it as significant. The expression “in chains” [in the second tradition cited above] was intended to suggest that people are sometimes constrained to submit to God and that it is on this account that they will

²⁰² For this tradition in its variant forms, see: Muslim, *ashriba*, 172; Bukhārī, *tafsīr šūra* 59, 6 (Houdas, *Les traditions*, III, p. 468); Bukhārī, *manāqib al-anṣār*, 10 (Houdas, *Les traditions*, III, pp. 7-8); Bayhaqī, *Asmāʾ*, p. 469; Ibn Qutayba, *Taʿwīl*, 267 (Lecomte, *Le traité*, 235); Ibn Fūrak, *Mushkil*, 191-194; and *DST*, p. 48-49. For a lengthy paraphrase and explanation of this tradition by Ibn al-Jawzī, see his *Zād al-Masīr*, VIII, 213-214.

²⁰³ See the following for this tradition in its various forms: Bukhārī, *jihād*, 144 (Houdas, *Les traditions*, II, p. 350); Abū Dāwūd, *jihād*, 114 (see Lane, 1956/3, for a translation); *Musnad*, II, pp. 302, 406, 448; Ibn Fūrak, *Mushkil*, 191; *DST*, p. 49; Ibn Manẓūr, *Lisān*, I, 581/1; and Bayhaqī, *Asmāʾ*, p. 476.

enter Paradise. Ibn al-Anbārī²⁰⁴ held that the expression “your Lord is amazed” [in the second tradition is a metaphorical way of saying] that He will grant them His blessing (*in‘ām*) and favor (*iḥsān*). It was this that the Prophet meant when he referred to God’s amazement.

129 Ibn ‘Aqīl said: “In its most basic sense the term amazement (*‘ajab*) denotes a response to something that is deemed to be unusual or extraordinary (*istighrāb*), that is, a response to the discovery of something not known previously, for with things that are commonplace amazement is inconceivable. Thus, when a person observes for the first time a magnet attracting iron he will [naturally] be amazed. But how can the Creator, from whose knowledge nothing is hidden, be amazed [in this sense]? The only plausible explanation of the traditions in question is that they refer to events whose occurrence occasioned ‘delight’ in Him, in the same way that laughing can [fol.28b] only be the expression of someone who is pleased as, for example, in the words of the Prophet: ‘God is filled with more joy when one of His creatures repents,’²⁰⁵ that is, he is pleased. God himself said: ‘Each party rejoices (*farīhūna*) in what they have,’²⁰⁶ that is, they are pleased.”

130 The *Qāḍī* [Abū Ya‘lā] said: “[The Prophet] did not attribute ‘amazement’ to God [metaphorically] as a way of indicating the importance of something to Him. On the contrary, we affirm [*‘ajab*] to be a divine attribute.”²⁰⁷ This point of view has nothing to commend it.

The Twentieth Tradition

131 This tradition has already been discussed in the preceding section.²⁰⁸

²⁰⁴ On Ibn al-Anbārī, see notes to §120.

²⁰⁵ The full sentence reads: “God is filled with more joy when one of his creatures repents than you are when you find an animal lost in the desert.” For the full text of this tradition, see Muslim, *tawba*, 1-8 (esp. 1); Bukhārī, *da‘wāt*, 4/2 (Houdas, *Les traditions*, IV, 241); Ibn Māja, *zuhd*, 30; Tirmidhī, *birr wa’s-sīla*, 49, and 98; *Musnad*, I, 383; II, 316, 500, 524, 534; III, 83, 213; IV, 273, 275, 283. Cf., *DST*, 49-50.

²⁰⁶ S. 23: 53.

²⁰⁷ Although Abū Ya‘lā discusses God’s “rejoicing and laughing” in the *Mu‘tamad* (p. 59), I have found no mention of the problem of God’s “amazement”.

²⁰⁸ The tradition Ibn al-Jawzī has in mind here is: “God is filled with more joy when one of His creatures repents than one of you is at finding an animal lost in the desert.” For references, see notes to §129.

132 Bukhārī and Muslim rec by Abū Hurayra in which t to the nearest heaven wh says: ‘Who will call upon M

133 This tradition concer some twenty of the Prophe however, that such things as (*taghayyur*) are not to be as of view regarding the mean reference to God’s descent] draw near, for He has spe “descending” as, for exam even though its source is im states: “Of the cattle He ser not understand the reference [of things, in a metaphoric coming down]?”²¹² The sec

²⁰⁹ In both Bukhārī and Muslim grant his request; and he who se text, see Muslim, *ṣalāt al-muṣāfir* and Marçais, *Les traditions*, I, 3 Tirmidhī, *mawāqit aṣ-ṣalāt*, 211, 504. For other citations of this tr *Aṣmaʿī*, 449-457; Ibn Qutayba, *T Taymīya*, *Wāsiṭīya*, 17 (English tr *Divine Word*, 177-178; and Laoc 104-105 (translation). For version his *Kitāb al-Mawāqit*, I, 122-123

²¹⁰ S. 57:25.

²¹¹ S. 39:6 (cf., also vs. 7). It is S. 6: 143-145: sheep, goats, came these texts in *Zād al-Masir* (VII, Zamakhsharī, *Kashshaf*, III, 388, 1

²¹² My rendering of the last part of the Arabic. The argument here: nation of “sending down” or “de construed metaphorically as a refer where “sending down” is equated

The Twenty-First Tradition

132 Bukhārī and Muslim record in their respective *Ṣaḥīḥs* a tradition reported by Abū Hurayra in which the Prophet said: "Our Lord descends each night to the nearest heaven while the last third of the night still remains, and He says: 'Who will call upon Me so that I might answer him?'"²⁰⁹

133 This tradition concerning God's "descent" (*nuzūl*) was reported by some twenty of the Prophet's Companions. We have already pointed out, however, that such things as motion (*ḥaraka*), movement (*nuqla*) and change (*taghayyur*) are not to be ascribed to God. The authorities are of two points of view regarding the meaning of this tradition. One group construes [the reference to God's descent] metaphorically as meaning that His mercy will draw near, for He has spoken [metaphorically in the Quran] of things "descending" as, for example, the verse: "We caused the iron to descend" even though its source is in the earth below.²¹⁰ In another verse [the Quran] states: "Of the cattle He sent down to you eight in pairs."²¹¹ Those who do not understand the reference to "the coming down" of these various classes [of things, in a metaphorical sense] how can they make sense [of their coming down]?²¹² The second group holds that one should refuse even

²⁰⁹ In both Bukhārī and Muslim, the following is added: "He who asks of Me, I will grant his request; and he who seeks forgiveness of Me, him will I forgive." For the full text, see Muslim, *ṣalāt al-musāfirin*, 168, 169, 170 and 171; Bukhārī, *tahajjud*, 14 (Houdas and Marçais, *Les traditions*, I, 371); Abū Dāwūd, *sunna*, 19; Ibn Māja, *iḳāma*, 182; Tirmidhī, *mawāqit aṣ-ṣalāt*, 211, and *daʿwāt*, 78; *Musnad*, II, 264, 268, 282, 419, 487 and 504. For other citations of this tradition, see Ibn Khuzayma, *Tawḥīd*, 125-136; Bayhaqī, *Asmāʿ*, 449-457; Ibn Qutayba, *Taʿwīl*, 238; Abū Bakr al-Ājurri, *Sharḥa*, 306-314; Ibn Taymīya, *Wāsiṭiyya*, 17 (English trans. *Humaniora Islamica*, I, 112 and note 14); Graham, *Divine Word*, 177-178; and Laoust, *La Profession de foi d'Ibn Baṭṭa*, 57 (Arabic text), 104-105 (translation). For versions of this tradition judged apocryphal by Ibn al-Jawzī, see his *Kitāb al-Mawḍūʿāt*, I, 122-123.

²¹⁰ S. 57:25.

²¹¹ S. 39:6 (cf., also vs. 7). It is a question of four pairs, presumably those mentioned in S. 6: 143-145: sheep, goats, camels and oxen. Unfortunately, Ibn al-Jawzī's discussion of these texts in *Zād al-Masīr* (VII, 163) throws little light on the question of *nuzūl*. Cf., Zamakhsharī, *Kashshāf*, III, 388, and II, 56.

²¹² My rendering of the last part of this sentence is admittedly something of a paraphrase of the Arabic. The argument here is somewhat strained perhaps, but it seems to be that the notion of "sending down" or "descent (*nuzūl*)," as used in this Quranic verse, is to be construed metaphorically as a reference to the act of creating (cf., *Zād al-Masīr*, VIII, 174, where "sending down" is equated with "creating").

to attempt an explanation [of the reference to God's descent]. Abū 'Īsā at-Tirmidhī reported that Mālik b. Anas, Sufyān b. 'Uyayna and Ibn al-Mubārak all insisted that such traditions be allowed to stand as they are and that no attempt be made to explain them.²¹³

134 It is essential that human beings acknowledge God's transcendence (*tanzīh*) and refuse the attribution of movement (*nuqla*) to Him, for descending, construed as movement from one place to another, presupposes three things: firstly, an elevated body, and a place (*makān*) whose occupant reposes therein; [fol.29a] secondly, a body in an inferior position;²¹⁴ and thirdly, a body which moves from the former to the latter. It is absolutely impossible to conceive God in these terms. If an uneducated person should ask what [the Prophet] meant by his reference to God's descending, it should be maintained that He intended only what is consistent with His transcendent majesty (*bi-jalālihi*). It is not incumbent on you to pursue the matter further. If someone should ask how one can suppress what one does not understand, my response is that since you already know that the one who descends to you is near you, be satisfied with [the thought of God's] nearness, but do not suppose that this nearness is to be likened to the proximity of finite bodies.

135 Ibn Hāmid said: "God is on the throne in His very essence (*bi-dhātihi*) and is in contact with it (*mumāss lahu*). Since He descends from the place wherein He reposes,²¹⁵ His descending entails (actual) change of location (*intiḳāl*)."²¹⁶ This man did not understand what is required by the transcendence of God. The *Qāḍī* [Abū Ya'ḷā] said: "Descending (*nuzūl*) is an attribute of the divine essence (*ṣifa dhātiya*), although it does not entail movement from one place to another (*intiḳāl*)."²¹⁶ Such a statement is pure sophistry! There are some among them who maintain that God's descending does entail

²¹³ Cf., Bayhaqī, *Asmā*, 453.

²¹⁴ That is, the "nearest heaven."

²¹⁵ That is, according to the tradition, His celestial Throne.

²¹⁶ See the *Mu'tamad* p. 55 (§90) where Abū Ya'ḷā sets forth his position on the question of the *nuzūl*. Although he does not state that *nuzūl* is an attribute of essence, he clearly regards it to be one of the divine attributes. What Ibn al-Jawzī says about him above does appear to square with what Abū Ya'ḷā himself has to say in the *Mu'tamad*. He tries to stake out a middle-of-the-road position between literalists and those who interpret the *nuzūl* as a metaphor. His view is that God's descending (*nuzūl*) is real but that it does not entail motion or movement (*ḥaraka* and *intiḳāl*).

motion (*yataḥarraku*). They is not appropriate to the [Hanbal] held the above view. If God's descending were anew everyday.²¹⁹ In truth, changing].

²¹⁷ One of Ibn al-Jawzī's cle spatialized conception of God is writes: ينزل الحسن كقول قائلهم: ينزل من مكان إلى مكان ويوجب ذلك كون كذا وكل ذلك محال على الحق عز وجل texts pertaining to the divine attrib such that one of them will say: " such a way so as to entail moven representing God], for the one wh turn] implies that the being [or exi since it necessitates His movement terms]]. Not only does the applica on Him, it makes God dependent space. For Ibn al-Jawzī that which of space itself. Hence, God's ex presuppose space as a condition God must be conceived as being expressing such a notion pushes la

²¹⁸ Ahmad b. Hanbal is quoted بصر ويضحك ويفرح ويحب ويتكبر sees. He laughs, He rejoices, He 6-7). The editor of *DST* (47, n. statement attributed by al-Īṣṭakhri far regarding it so. He also expre statement from Ahmad without about spatial contingency, the la al-Jawzī was equally concerned wi

²¹⁹ By denying *nuzūl* (descendin would appear to be placing himself this question.

motion (*yataḥarraku*). They do not understand, however, that motion (*ḥaraka*) is not appropriate to the Creator.²¹⁷ Some have alleged that Aḥmad [b. Ḥanbal] held the above view, but this is a misrepresentation of his position.²¹⁸ If God's descending were a divine attribute then it would be one created anew everyday.²¹⁹ In truth, however, God's attributes are eternal [and unchanging].

²¹⁷ One of Ibn al-Jawzī's clearest statements regarding the problematic posed by a spatialized conception of God is to be found in his *Ṣayd al-Khāṭir*, 614, 16-19 where he writes: ينزل أقباماً يسمعون أخبار الصفات فيحملونها على ما يقتضيه الحس كقول قائلهم: ينزل بذاته إلى السماء وينتقل. وهذا فهم رديء لأن المنتقل يكون من مكان إلى مكان ويوجب ذلك كون المكان أكثر منه ويلزم منه الحركة وكل ذلك مُحال على الحق عز وجل (You will see people studying texts pertaining to the divine attributes and interpreting them in the light of sense experience such that one of them will say: "[God] descends in His essence to the [lowest] heaven in such a way so as to entail movement." This is a reprehensible way of understanding [and representing God], for the one who moves exchanges one location for another, and that [in turn] implies that the being [or existence] of space is a more [basic form of reality] than He, since it necessitates His movement within space. Now it is absurd to think of God [in these terms]). Not only does the application of spatial categories to God necessarily impose limits on Him, it makes God dependent on a more fundamental concept, viz., that of place or space. For Ibn al-Jawzī that which occupies space is by definition secondary to the concept of space itself. Hence, God's existence must be conceived in such a way so as not to presuppose space as a condition or category essential to His existence. For Ibn al-Jawzī God must be conceived as being "outside" space. He seems to have been aware that expressing such a notion pushes language to its very limits.

²¹⁸ Aḥmad b. Ḥanbal is quoted (on the authority of al-Iṣṭakhrī) as having said: ويتحرك ويتكلم وينظر ويبصر ويضحك ويفرح ويحب ونكره... (He moves, He speaks, He reasons, He sees, He laughs, He rejoices, He loves and He loathes.... [*Ṭabaqāt al-Ḥanābila*, I, 29, 6-7]). The editor of *DST* (47, n. 1), however, sides with Ibn al-Jawzī and declares the statement attributed by al-Iṣṭakhrī to Aḥmad to be a fabrication, though he gives no reasons for regarding it so. He also expresses surprise that Ibn Taymīya should quote a similar statement from Aḥmad without denying or refuting it.—Although he has much to say about spatial contingency, the last two sentences of §135 make it quite clear that Ibn al-Jawzī was equally concerned with the notion of temporal contingency.

²¹⁹ By denying *nuzūl* (descending) as an attribute, as he plainly does here, Ibn al-Jawzī would appear to be placing himself squarely in the Ash'arī-Mu'tazilī camp, particularly on this question.

*The Twenty-Second Tradition*²²⁰

136 Muslim cites a tradition, reported only by Abū Mūsā [al-Ashʿarī],²²¹ according to which the Messenger of God rose up one day [and delivered a homily] which included the following: "God does not sleep, nor is it appropriate that He should sleep. He lowers the Balance (*qisṭ*) and He raises it."²²² Light (*nūr*)—or fire (*nār*), according to the version [related by Abū Bakr b. Abī Shayba]—is His veil (*ḥijāb*). If He were to remove [the veil], the splendors of His face (*subuḥāt wajhihi*) would consume every creature within reach of His sight."²²³

137 The meaning of the phrase "He lowers the Balance (*qisṭ*) and He raises it" is that He abases [people] with justice (*bi'l-ʿadl*) and raises [others] with justice. In connection with the phrase "light...is His veil," it should be noted that the veil here has human beings as its object, not God, for it is not possible that God should be veiled since [the veil] must be greater than what is veiled. It is preposterous that God should be thought of as a body (*jism*) or an atom (*jawhar*) or a finite being existing alongside others, for all such things are marks of temporal existence (*ḥadath*). People know bodies to be contingent precisely because of their origination in time, their spatially limited character, and their susceptibility to the vicissitudes of time (*ḥawādith*). It is impossible [to suppose] that God's existence has [fol. 29b] a beginning or an end, nor is it permissible [to imagine] that His essence has limits.²²⁴ The veil referred to [in the above tradition] pertains only to

²²⁰ Although the question of the *ruʿya* is not addressed directly in this tradition or the discussion that follows, it is the question lurking in the background. It is entirely possible that the question of God's veiling was meant to provide the basis for a discussion of the *ruʿya*, which is more directly taken up in connection with the following tradition. If this is the case, it would indicate that the traditions of this chapter are not organized haphazardly but in groups and in accordance with some principle of organization.

²²¹ Or perhaps: related from Abū Mūsā al-Ashʿarī by a single transmitter.

²²² For a discussion of this expression, see Lane, 773/1; and the remarks of Muḥammad F. ʿAbd al-Bāqī in Muslim, *īmān*, 79, 162 (notes 2 and 3); also Ibn Māja, *muqaddima*, 13, 195.

²²³ This tradition in various forms is found in the following collections: Muslim, *īmān*, 293, 295; Ibn Māja, *muqaddima*, 13: 195, 196; *Musnad*, IV, 401 and 405; Ibn Khuzayma, *Tawḥīd*, 19-20, 75-76; Bayhaqī, *Asmāʾ*, 180-181; Ibn Fūrak, *Mushkil*, 212-218; Ājurri, *Sharʿa*, 304-305; *DST*, 50-51; and *BA* (Beirut), 100-102. Cf. also, *Lisān*, II, 473/1, 6-26; and Lane, 1290/2.

²²⁴ Cf., Ibn Fūrak, *Mushkil*, 213, 4-214, 2, where the same view is expressed in language that is strikingly similar.

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138 As for the term *subuḥāt*
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²²⁸ Cf. Bayhaqī, *Asmāʾ*, 402, 12
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Creator); also Ibn Fūrak, *Mushkil*.

²²⁹ The full text of the version am
no. 58). For other references to this
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and Ibn Khuzayma, *Tawḥīd*, 20-2
parallels Ibn al-Jawzī's thinking, s
72H.

²³⁰ Cf. Bayhaqī, *Asmāʾ*, 180; and

²³¹ The chapter heading given is
"On the Form of Our Lord" (رَبَّنَا
wording given in *KAS* (حزب) and the
is understandable given the orthog
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²³² This work appears to be lo
510-512, for a list of of his works
(58) regarded the *Kitāb at-Sunna*
doctrine.

²³³ Probably Aḥmad b. Yahyā
lensigrapher who spent some time
al-Khallāl (d. 311/923). Cf., *GAS*, D
Yahyā Abū Jaʿfar al-Hulwānī (d. 27
teachers (*Tabaqāt al-Ḥanābila*, I, 8;

finite creatures; it is they who are veiled from Him.²²⁵ According to Sahl b. Saʿd, the Prophet once said: “[On the day of resurrection] God will be concealed from view by seventy thousand veils of light and darkness.”²²⁶ This tradition is not reliable. If it were, the veils mentioned therein would have to be taken as pertaining to finite creatures, not to God.

138 As for the term *subḥāt* (splendors), it is the plural of *subḥa*. Abū ʿUbayd said: “I have never seen this word (*ḥarf*) except in this tradition. It is sometimes said that the term *subḥa* denotes the splendor (*jalāl*) of His face and, like the related expression *subḥān* Allāh, was meant to express only God’s majesty (*taʿẓīm*) and His transcendence (*tanzīh*).”²²⁷ [In his book *Kitāb at-Tawḥīd*], one of whose chapters is entitled “The Glow (*ḍawʿ*) of Our Lord’s Face,”²²⁸ Ibn Khuzayma cites the tradition of the *subḥāt* because he regarded the term as referring to light (*nūr*) of the sort known [in human experience]. The Creator, however, is beyond the kind of light associated with bodies (*nūr jismānī*). Abū Bakr al-Khallāl reported in his *Kitāb as-Sunna*²²⁹ that he once asked Aḥmad b. Yaḥyā²³⁰ about the expression “the

²²⁵ Cf., Bayhaqī, *Asmāʿ*, 402, 12-13: الحجاب المذكور في الأخبار يرجع إلى الخلق لا إلى الخالق (The veils mentioned in the traditions on this subject apply to human beings, not to the Creator); also Ibn Fūrak, *Mushkil*, 462f., where a similar view is set forth.

²²⁶ The full text of the version attributed to Sahl b. Saʿd is cited in §238 of *KAS* (tradition no. 58). For other references to this tradition along with assessments of its authenticity, see Ibn al-Jawzī, *Kitāb al-Mawḍūʿāt*, I, 116; Bayhaqī, *Asmāʿ*, 402; Dhahabī, *Mizān*, III, 191; and Ibn Khuzayma, *Tawḥīd*, 20-21. For an analysis of this tradition, which in many ways parallels Ibn al-Jawzī’s thinking, see Ibn Fūrak, *Mushkil*, 462-465. Cf., Gimaret, *Image*, 72ff.

²²⁷ Cf. Bayhaqī, *Asmāʿ*, 180; and Ibn al-Jawzī, *Gharīb al-Ḥadīth*, I, 454.

²²⁸ The chapter heading given in the Cairo edition of *Kitāb at-Tawḥīd* (1387/1968) is “On the Form of Our Lord” (باب ذكر صورة ربنا [19, 1]). The discrepancy between the wording given in *KAS* (ضوء) and that found in the printed edition of *Kitāb at-Tawḥīd* (صورة) is understandable given the orthographic similarities of the two words, undoubtedly the result of variant readings in the manuscript tradition.

²²⁹ This work appears to be lost. See *EP*, IV, 989-990; *GAL*, I, 183; and *GAS*, I, 511-512, for a list of his works and sources on his life. Ibn Taymiya (*Kitāb al-Īmān*, 158) regarded the *Kitāb as-Sunna* to be one of the most important works on Ḥanbalī doctrine.

²³⁰ Probably Aḥmad b. Yaḥyā Abūʿl-ʿAbbās Thaʿlab (d. 291/904), the great Kufan lexicographer who spent some time in Baghdad and who was a contemporary of Abū Bakr al-Khallāl (d. 311/923). Cf., *GAS*, IX, 140-141. Less likely, but a possibility, is Aḥmad. b. Yaḥyā Abū Jaʿfar al-Ḥulwānī (d. 276), who is mentioned as one of Abū Bakr al-Khallāl’s teachers (*Ṭabaqāt al-Ḥanābila*, I, 83) and considered by some to have been a member of

splendors (*subuḥāt*) of His face," and he replied: "The term *subuḥāt* refers [in the first instance] to the place on which one prostrates oneself [when performing the *ṣalāt*]." ²³¹ This would suggest that [in his use of the term *subuḥāt* the Prophet] was expressing himself in language that was familiar [to his audience] as he did when he said: "The hearts of His creatures are between the two fingers [of *Raḥmān*]." ²³²

139 Ibn Ḥāmid said: "It is essential to believe that the veil belongs to God and that He is behind it." The *Qāḍī* [Abū Yaʿlā] said: "One should not refuse to attribute a veil to God, but it should not be taken as indicating a limit (*ḥadd*) or thought to be something existing alongside Him." ²³³ This is a confused statement meant to satisfy the masses (*ʿawāmm*). ²³⁴

The Twenty-Third Tradition

140 Ibn ʿAbbās reported that the Prophet said: "The people of Paradise will see their Lord every week in the sands of *Kāfūr*,²³⁵ and those sitting nearest Him will be the first to reach Him on the day of assembly (*yawm al-jumʿa*)." ²³⁶

the Ḥanbalī school. On him, see also *Taʾrīkh Baghdād*, V, 212-213; and *Shadharāt*, II, 224.

²³¹ See *Lisān*, II, 473/1, 25-26, where this definition of *subuḥāt* is cited along with others. Cf., also Lane, 1290/2.

²³² See §§143-146 for a discussion of God's fingers. For the full text of this tradition, see Muslim, *qadar*, 17; Ibn Māja, *muqaddima*, 13(199); Tirmidhī, *qadar*, 7; *daʿwāt*, 89; *Musnad*, II, 168, 173; VI, 182, 251, 302, 315. Cf., Ibn Qutayba, *Taʾwīl*, 263 (Lecomte, *Le Traité*, 233). The text given by Muslim might be translated as follows: "The Messenger of God said: 'The hearts of all persons are between the two fingers of *Raḥmān* as though they were a single heart, and he turns them as he wishes.' The Messenger of God added: 'O God, disposer of hearts, dispose our hearts to give obedience to you!'" See §145 where the tradition is quoted.

²³³ This statement is not to be found in the *Muʿtamad*.

²³⁴ "Confused" because Abū Yaʿlā again equivocates: he clearly has problems with a literal interpretation of the veil but cannot bring himself to accept a metaphorical interpretation.

²³⁵ "Kāfūr" is said to be the name of one of the springs of Paradise (*Lisān*, V, 149, 17; Lane 2622/3), or the water from that spring said to resemble camphor (*kāfūr*) in its taste. The word occurs once in the Quran (S. 76:5) and has been the subject of much speculation by the commentators. For a summary of the views found in the *tafsīr* literature, see *Zād*, VIII, 430; Ṭabari, *Tafsīr*, XXIX, 128-129; and Zamakhshari, *Kashshāf*, IV, 195-196 (cf., also *EF*, IV, 417-418).

²³⁶ That is, Friday. See Ājurri, *Sharʿa*, 265, 1-6, where the tradition in a slightly longer

141 The expression "in people of Paradise], for the [not God]! The expression [relationship] but means the tradition [reported by ʿAbbās] the day of judgment those w hand of *Raḥmān* on *minbar* referred to as] "the traditi said]: "There will be no one not speak [fol.30a] face to version of this tradition cit "[There will be no one in t hand in hand with him (*khāṣa* however, that this version of Allāh ²⁴¹ on the authority of S

form is cited with a complete *isnād* tradition as it appears in *KAS*). I variant form of the the tradition w substance: كاقور فيكونون في القرب إلى الجمعة ألا فسارعو إلى الخيرات people of Paradise, in the sands of early they arrived at the place of t for the good [transmitted on the a by Ibn Fūrak]). Ibn Fūrak, who re the *matn* of the tradition to be auth (221-222).

²³⁷ For the full text, see : Muslim and Bayhaqī, *Asmāʿ*, 324. Cf., also

²³⁸ In the full text of the traditi described as a part of Paradise—a believers will be invited after ent surrounded by angels and in it b converse with God face-to-face. It i market of Paradise.

²³⁹ For the various versions of the *Dürimī*, *riqāq*, 92; and Muslim, *jan*

²⁴⁰ *Asmāʿ*, 460, 14-15.

²⁴¹ Given as Sayf b. ʿUbayd Allāh in *DST*, 51.

²⁴² Cf., Bayhaqī, 460, 18.

141 The expression “in the sands of Kāfūr” has as its reference [the people of Paradise], for they are the ones who are “in the sands of Kāfūr”, [not God]! The expression “those nearest Him” [does not imply a spatial relationship] but means those who most enjoy God’s favor. In another tradition [reported by ‘Abd Allāh b. ‘Amr b. al-‘Āṣ] the Prophet said: “On the day of judgment those who have acted justly [will be seated] at the right hand of *Raḥmān* on *minbars* of light.”²³⁷ In a prophetic saying [sometimes referred to as] “the tradition of the market of Paradise”²³⁸ [the Prophet said]: “There will be no one in the celestial assembly with whom God will not speak [fol.30a] face to face (*ḥāḍarahū muḥāḍaratan*).”²³⁹ In another version of this tradition cited by Abū Bakr al-Bayhaqī, the Prophet said: “[There will be no one in the celestial assembly] but that God will walk hand in hand with him (*khāṣarahū mukhāṣaratan*).”²⁴⁰ [Al-Bayhaqī] observed, however, that this version of the tradition was transmitted by Sayf b. ‘Abd Allāh²⁴¹ on the authority of Salama b. al-‘Ayyār²⁴² and is not to be found in

form is cited with a complete *isnād* (cf., also *DST*, 50; and *BA*, 30b, both of which give the tradition as it appears in *KAS*). Ibn Fūrak (*Mushkil*, 221, 15-17 [cf., 219, 3-4]) cites a variant form of the tradition which, despite certain differences, is essentially the same in substance: *إِنَّ اللَّهَ جَلَّ ذِكْرَهُ يَنْزِلُ كُلَّ يَوْمٍ جُمُعَةً لِأَهْلِ الْجَنَّةِ عَلَى كَثِيبٍ مِنْ كَافُورٍ فَيَكُونُونَ فِي الْقَرَبِ* (God will descend every Friday to the people of Paradise, in the sands of Kāfūr, and their nearness [to Him] will depend on how early they arrived at the place of the Friday prayers. Alas, they will race ahead in striving for the good [transmitted on the authority of al-Minhāl b. ‘Amr, according to sources cited by Ibn Fūrak]). Ibn Fūrak, who regards the transmitter as “very weak,” nonetheless holds the *matn* of the tradition to be authentic, but he does insist on a metaphorical interpretation (221-222).

²³⁷ For the full text, see : Muslim, *imāra*, 18; Nasā’ī, *ādāb al-quḍāt*, 1; *Musnad*, II, 160; and Bayhaqī, *Asmā*, 324. Cf., also Ibn Fūrak, *Mushkil*, 115; and *Mu’tamad*, 53.

²³⁸ In the full text of the tradition (see Ibn Māja, *zuhd*, 39, e.g.), the *sūq al-janna* is described as a part of Paradise—a place of unimaginable luxury and abundance—to which believers will be invited after entering Paradise. It is said that the *sūq al-janna* will be surrounded by angels and in it believers will mingle freely with each other and will converse with God face-to-face. It is also said that there will be no buying and selling in the market of Paradise.

²³⁹ For the various versions of this tradition, see Ibn Māja, *zuhd*, 39; Tirmidhī, *janna*, 15; Dārimī, *riqāq*, 92; and Muslim, *janna*, 5. Cf., Bayhaqī, *Asmā*, 460-461.

²⁴⁰ *Asmā*, 460, 14-15.

²⁴¹ Given as Sayf b. ‘Ubayd Allāh by Bayhaqī (*Asmā*, 460, 18-19); as Yūsuf b. ‘Abd Allāh in *DST*, 51.

²⁴² Cf., Bayhaqī, 460, 18.

the canonical collections of traditions (*ṣaḥāḥ*). He further noted that sayings of this sort are not strengthened by having such men as transmitters, pointing out that the term *mukhāṣara* spelled with a *khā* means to join hands (*muṣāfaḥa*).²⁴³

142 The *Qāḍī* [Abū Yaʿlā] said: "It is not impossible that God will actually be present in the sands of Kāfūr." [By making such a statement] he has accepted [the idea of God's] location in a particular place, though he added: "Not in such a way as to entail movement." This is meaningless and misleading [talk]. He also said: "It is not impossible to conceive [of the people of Paradise] as being near to the divine essence (*ad-dhāt*)."²⁴⁴ Since he lacked a tradition to support this point, he cited the words of the Prophet: "There is not one of you but his Lord will be alone with Him."²⁴⁴ [In his gloss on these words] he pointed out that the idea of "being alone with" (*khalwa*) implies nearness (*qurb*) and that nearness to the divine essence (*ad-dhāt*) is therefore possible. I have already refuted this view earlier [in the present work].²⁴⁵

The Twenty-Fourth Tradition

143 In a tradition included in the *Ṣaḥīḥs* of Bukhārī and Muslim, Ibn Masʿūd reports that a [*rabbi*]²⁴⁶ once came to the Messenger of God and said to him: "O Muḥammad, [on the day of judgement] God will place the heavens on one of His fingers, the earths on another finger, the mountains on another, the trees and rivers on another, all living creatures on another, and—according to one version of this tradition—the water and land on a finger. And then God will shake them." [Upon hearing these words] the Prophet laughed and recited the verse: "They do not comprehend the power

²⁴³ *Asmāʾ*, 460, 18-20.

²⁴⁴ Cf., Ibn Fūrak, *Mushkil*, 224. The tradition as found in Ibn al-Jawzī and Ibn Fūrak does not appear in the canonical collections; the version found in these latter reads سبكه في place of سبكه (see Ibn Māja, *muqaddima*, 185; *zakāt*, 28; Muslim, *zakāt*, 68; Bukhārī, *manāqib*, 25; etc. Cf., also Ājurri, *Sharīʿa*, 269-270).

²⁴⁵ An issue that is taken up repeatedly in *KAS*. See, e.g., tradition no. 16 (§§119-121).

²⁴⁶ The Arabic text of *KAS* simply reads *rajulun min al-Yahūd*; other versions of the tradition, however, use the term *ḥabr* (*DST*, 51). The nature of the conversation in question does, I think, justify the term *rabbi* here.

of God in its full measure laughing was meant to con his concurrence [with his w

144 Abū Sulaymān al- except by reference to the on the Quran or prophetic What is in conflict with the or should be interpreted (*uṣūl*) agreed upon by con rejection of anthropomorphi [only] canonical sources on silent on the question of C designate a divine attribute, a way that by affirming it or contrary, the correct approach God in accordance with the or comparing them to hum tradition was transmitted by of them [apart from ʿUbayd affirmed (*taṣḍīqan*) [the wor to the tradition by one of i opinion. It is not permissible the supposition of a transmi fact, as an expression of hi

²⁴⁷ A verse-fragment taken from S. 6: 19, and S. 22: 74.

²⁴⁸ See the following for some *uṣūl*, 19 (4, 5) [*Les traditions*, IV *traditions*, IV, 629 (5)]; *tafsīr*, 39 (2) 19, 20, 21, 22; Tirmidhī, *tafsīr*, 39 333-337; Ibn Fūrak, *Mushkil*, 238-24 III, 408; and Ibn Qutayba, *Taʿwīl*, 28 fingers generated much discussion at others. In 13th-century Sicily, for exa ling, Frederick II, as well as others, and Sicilian Christians. For more on *of Islamic Sicily* (Edinburgh 1975), 9

²⁴⁹ Cf., Bayhaqī, *Asmāʾ*, 337, 3 6 Muslim *ḥifẓ al-munāfiqīn*, 19, 20, 22

²⁵⁰ That is, these words regarding t

of God in its full measure.”²⁴⁷ According to one version, the Prophet’s laughing was meant to convey his astonishment at the [*rabbi*’s] words and his concurrence [with his words].²⁴⁸

144 Abū Sulaymān al-Khaṭṭābī said: “Do not ascribe attributes to God except by reference to the Quran or to reliable reports, that is, reports based on the Quran or prophetic sayings whose genuineness is beyond question! What is in conflict with these [two sources] should not be ascribed [to God] or should be interpreted (*yuta’awwal*) in accordance with the principles (*uṣūl*) agreed upon by competent authorities (*ahl al-‘ilm*), along with a rejection of anthropomorphism (*tashbīh*). Now the Quran and the Sunna—the [only] canonical sources on which the divine attributes are to be based—are silent on the question of God’s fingers. The term ‘hand’, when used to designate a divine attribute, is not to be construed as a [literal] hand in such a way that by affirming it one is also affirming that God has fingers. On the contrary, the correct approach (*tawqīf sharī‘*) [fol.30b] is to apply terms to God in accordance with the Quran without probing their modality (*takyīf*) or comparing them to human qualities (*tashbīh*). Although the [above] tradition was transmitted by a number of the students of Ibn Mas‘ūd, none of them [apart from ‘Ubayda al-Salmānī] mentioned the Prophet’s having affirmed (*taṣdīqan*) [the words of the *rabbi*].²⁴⁹ These words²⁵⁰ were added to the tradition by one of its [later] transmitters and expresses his own opinion. It is not permissible that we should derive a divine attribute from the supposition of a transmitter. The Prophet’s laughing is to be taken, in fact, as an expression of his displeasure with Jews on account of their

²⁴⁷ A verse-fragment taken from S. 39: 67. The same wording, however, is also found in S. 6: 19, and S. 22: 74.

²⁴⁸ See the following for some of the more common forms of this tradition: Bukhārī, *tawhīd*, 19 (4, 5) [*Les traditions*, IV, 592 (4, 5)], 36 [*Les traditions*, IV, 609], 39 (5) [*Les traditions*, IV, 629 (5)]; *tafsīr*, 39 (2) [*Les traditions*, III, 432(2)]; Muslim, *ṣifāt al-munāfiqīn*, 19, 20, 21, 22; Tirmidhī, *tafsīr*, 39 (2); Ibn Khuzayma, *Tawhīd*, 76-79; Bayhaqī, *Asmā’*, 333-337; Ibn Fūrak, *Mushkil*, 238-245; *DST*, 51-52; and *BA*, 30b. Cf. Zamakhsharī, *Kashshāf*, III, 408; and Ibn Qutayba, *Ta’wīl*, 264 (Lecomte, 234). Perhaps because the tradition of the fingers generated much discussion among medieval Muslims, it also attracted the interest of others. In 13th-century Sicily, for example, the tradition came to the attention of the Norman king, Frederick II, as well as others, and became the focus of debates involving Muslims and Sicilian Christians. For more on this interesting development, see A. Ahmad, *A History of Islamic Sicily* (Edinburgh 1975), 91-92.

²⁴⁹ Cf., Bayhaqī, *Asmā’*, 337, 3 (cf., 334, 17); also see Bukhārī, *tawhīd*, 19, 39; and Muslim *ṣifāt al-munāfiqīn*, 19, 20, 22.

²⁵⁰ That is, these words regarding the Prophet’s having concurred with the *rabbi*.

anthropomorphist tendencies. The revelation of this verse²⁵¹ is proof of the Prophet's condemnation of them."

145 Ibn 'Aqīl said: "[The words] 'they do not comprehend the power of God in its full measure' [were revealed because the Jews] supposed that God's attributes are related to each other as are those of His creatures.²⁵² The reference to *shirk* in the verse is in fact a refutation of them.²⁵³ The meaning [of the term 'fingers'] in the traditions of the Prophet [is apparent] in another of the Prophet's sayings: 'The hearts of human beings are between the two fingers of God; He turns them [between His fingers] as He pleases.'²⁵⁴ Since what is turned between two fingers is under the control [of another], it points to the fact that the hearts [of human beings] are under the power and authority of the One who 'turns them.'²⁵⁵

146 The *Qādī* [Abū Ya'la] said: "It is possible to interpret this tradition literally (*alā ṣāḥir*) and to regard 'the fingers' as attributes referring to (*rāji'a ilā*) the divine essence (*adh-dhāt*).²⁵⁶ However, we do not take the term 'fingers' to imply that God has limbs or that He is divided into parts." Such statements reflect confusion. Either we must take the term as implying the existence of bodily members or interpret it metaphorically. If the expression

²⁵¹ "They do not comprehend the power of God in its full measure" (S. 39: 67).

²⁵² Hence (following the logic ascribed to the Jews), if God possesses a hand, He must also possess fingers.

²⁵³ See the last part of S. 39: 67, where the reference to *shirk* occurs: "Glory be to Him, and exalted be He far above what they associate (*yushrikūna*) [with Him]."

²⁵⁴ For the full text of this tradition, see Muslim, *qadar*, 17; Ibn Māja, *muqaddima*, 13 (199); Tirmidhī, *qadar*, 7; *da'wāt*, 89; *Musnad*, II, 168, 173; VI, 182, 251, 302, 315. Cf., Ibn Qutayba, *Ta'wīl*, 263 (Lecomte, *Le Traité*, 233). The text given by Muslim reads as follows: "The Messenger of God said: 'The hearts of all persons are between the two fingers of *Rahmān* as though they were a single heart, and He turns them as He wishes.' The Messenger of God added: 'O God, Disposer of hearts, dispose our hearts so as to render obedience to You!'" Cf., Ājurī, *Sharī'a*, 316.

²⁵⁵ For a quite different approach to the tradition of the fingers, see R. Frank's discussion of al-Ghazzālī's interpretation of the tradition (*al-Ghazzālī and the Ash'arite School*, 23 n. 34 [p. 112]).

²⁵⁶ Is the expression صفات راجعة إلى الذات to be taken as an equivalent of صفات الذات or does Abū Ya'la wish to make a distinction? Unfortunately, Abū Ya'la does not take up the question of the "fingers" in the *Mu'tamad*; it is clear, however, from Ibn al-Jawzī's quotation that Abū Ya'la did regard the أصابع (fingers) as *ṣifāt*. Beyond this, it is difficult to say more on the basis of KAS. For a summary of Ḥanbalī views on the question of the "fingers," see Laoust, *Profession*, 103 and n. 1.

is interpreted literally (*alā ṣāḥir*) notwithstanding [Abū Ya'la's] statements. These statements reflect vacillations in the attitude of people who say such things.

147 In a tradition recorded in *Sahih* Ibn 'Umar reports that the Prophet said: "God will roll up the heavens in His [right] hand and will crush the oppressors and those who exalt themselves with His left hand and will crush the arrogant and those who exalt themselves with His right hand." Muslim and, of the various versions, in another version, also found in *Sahih* Ibn 'Umar. Miqdam observed 'Abd Allāh bin 'Umar, Messenger of God related that the Prophet said: "He will roll up the earths in His hands and He will crush the arrogant [with these words] he closed his hands."

148 It has already been established that the "hand" of God is not a *qabḍa* (*qabḍahu*) does not involve *qabḍ* (*kaff*). In using such expressions the Messenger merely sought to figure out what was known through sense experience. The hand was intended merely to

²⁵⁷ Literally: "these are the statements of the Prophet."

²⁵⁸ See Muslim, *ṣifāt al-munāfiqīn*, 13 (198); Abū Dāwūd, *sunna*, 19, 70-73; Ibn Fūrak, *Mushkil*, 243; *al-Masir*, VII, 196-197.

²⁵⁹ See Muslim, *ṣifāt al-munāfiqīn*, 13 (198). It seems to imply that, in relation to the Prophet's gestures.

is interpreted literally (*‘alā zāhiriḥā*), it necessarily means bodily members, notwithstanding [Abū Ya‘lā’s] insistence that it does not imply composition. These statements reflect vacillation and equivocation [on his part];²⁵⁷ speaking to people who say such things is a waste [of time].

The Twenty-Fifth Tradition

147 In a tradition recorded by Bukhārī and Muslim in their respective *Ṣaḥīḥs* Ibn ‘Umar reports that the Prophet said: “On the day of judgment God will roll up the heavens [like a scroll], [fol.31a] and He will take them in His [right] hand and will cry out: ‘I am the King (*malik*)! Where are the oppressors and those who exalt themselves?’ Then He will roll up the earth with His left hand and will cry out: ‘I am the King! Where are the oppressors and those who exalt themselves?’” This version of the tradition is found in Muslim and, of the various forms of this tradition, is the most complete.²⁵⁸ In another version, also found in Muslim, it is reported that ‘Ubayd Allāh b. Miqṣam observed ‘Abd Allāh b. ‘Umar [indicating by gesture] how the Messenger of God related the words: “God will take His heavens and His earths in His hands and He will say: ‘I am God!—[as the Prophet related these words] he closed his hand and opened it—I am the King!’”²⁵⁹

148 It has already been established on the basis of peremptory evidence that the “hand” of God is not a limb and that His act of “taking in hand” (*qabḍahu*) does not involve contact (*mubāshara*) or imply the existence of a palm (*kaff*). In using such expressions [as “hand” or “taking hold of”], the Messenger merely sought to facilitate understanding by reference to what is known through sense experience. His [gesture] in closing and opening his hand was intended merely to call attention to the “similarity” (*shabah*)

²⁵⁷ Literally: “these are the statements of one who cannot [decide whether to] stand or sit.”

²⁵⁸ See Muslim, *ṣiḥāṭ al-munāfiqīn*, 24; Bukhārī, *riqāq*, 44; *tawḥīd*, 6; Ibn Māja, *muqaddima*, 13 (198); Abū Dāwūd, *sunna*, 19; Bayhaqī, *Asmāʾ*, 323-324; Ibn Khuzayma, *Tawḥīd*, 71-73; Ibn Fūrak, *Mushkil*, 243; Ājurri, *Sharʿa*, 320; *DST*, 52-53; *BA*, 31a; and *Zād al-Masīr*, VII, 196-197.

²⁵⁹ See Muslim, *ṣiḥāṭ al-munāfiqīn*, 25; cf., also Bayhaqī, *Asmāʾ*, 339, 17-340, 3. The *isnād* seems to imply that, in relating the tradition, ‘Abd Allāh b. ‘Umar repeated the Prophet’s gestures.

between two acts of "taking in hand" (*qabḍatyn*).²⁶⁰ Both of these involve the notion of seizing or taking possession of, just as [in another tradition the Prophet] called attention to the outward similarity (*shabah*) between the seeing (*ru'ya*) of God [in the hereafter] and the seeing of the moon²⁶¹—a comparison intended to call attention to the outward similarities between the [two] acts of seeing (*ru'ya*), but a comparison that does not imply any likeness (*tashbīh*) between the objects seen (*al-mar'īy*).

149 As for the term "left hand," it occurs only in that version of the tradition which Muslim received from Ibn 'Umar in a report transmitted by 'Umar b. Hamza and Sālim [b. 'Abd Allāh b. 'Umar]. However, in the version received from Ibn 'Umar through the transmission of Nāfi' and others, the expression "left hand" is not to be found. Likewise, in the versions reported by Abū Hurayra and others from the Prophet there is not a single reference to the "left hand." The expression does appear in one other tradition, but that tradition has an entirely different text and is weak, for it was transmitted by an authority suspected of falsehood (*ba'd al-matrūkīn*).²⁶² Since it has been reliably established that the Prophet said: "Both of His hands are right hands,"²⁶³ the reference to God's left hand must be regarded as weak.²⁶⁴ Abū Bakr al-Bayhaqī has suggested that the person who introduced this expression did so out of habit since the left hand is the natural counterpart of the right hand.²⁶⁵

150 The *Qāḍi* said: [fol.31b] "It is possible to ascribe the closing and opening of the hand (*al-qabḍ wa'l-baṣṭ*) to [God as an attribute of] His essence." We have already explained our reasons for rejecting such a view.²⁶⁶

²⁶⁰ That is, God's action in taking in hand the heavens and the earth (as related in the tradition) and the Prophet's illustrative gesture.

²⁶¹ There are numerous occurrences of this tradition; see, e.g., Ibn Māja, *muqaddima*, 13 (177 and 179); Muslim, *imān*, 299 and 302.

²⁶² Cf., Bayhaqī, *Asmā*, 324, 5-6, where the same point is made in language that is nearly identical.

²⁶³ For the full text of this tradition in its various forms, see Muslim *imāra*, 18; Nasā'ī, *ādāb al-quḍāt*, 1; and *Musnad*, II, 160. Cf., Bayhaqī, *Asmā*, 324, 12; Ibn Qutayba, *Ta'wīl*, 264-265 (Lecomte, 234-235); Ibn Fūrak, *Mushkil*, 109-114, and 441; and Ājurri, *Sharḥa*, 323.

²⁶⁴ Cf., *Mu'tamad*, 53, 2-4; 56, 2-8.

²⁶⁵ Cf., Bayhaqī, *Asmā*, 324, 8-9.

²⁶⁶ See §§92-94; also §§41-42 where the question of God's "hand" is discussed.

151 In the *Musnad* of Ahma reported that the Prophet re Himself to the mountain He a swoon]"²⁶⁷ and then added: by extending the tip of His fir from Thābit al-Bunānī who h at-Ṭawīl said: "O Abū Muḥa Then [Thābit] struck him on What right do you have to qu the authority of the Prophet, s tradition?" In another versio that the Prophet recited the w the mountain," and then ad the mountain] collapsed."²⁶⁸ In s Ibn Hāmid, [the Prophet is r verse]: "He extended his fing

²⁶⁷ S. 7: 143. The full verse: "W spoke to him, he said: 'O Lord show not see Me; but behold the mountai when his Lord manifested Himself Moses collapsed." For Ibn al-Jawzī, *Ṭabarī, Tafsīr*, XIII, 97-100; and Za

²⁶⁸ For the full text of this traditio and Ibn Fūrak, *Mushkil*, 245-248 (c tradition are found in Ṭabarī, *Tafsīr* Dhahabī, *Mizān*, I, 593; and Ibn al-J

²⁶⁹ In place of the Arabic text foun given transmitters some difficulty), tradition: ! تَحَدَّثَ بِمَثَلِ هَذَا (Dhahabī, M تَحَدَّثَ بِمَثَلِ هَذَا (Ibn Khuzayma, *Taw تَحَدَّثَ بِمَثَلِ هَذَا (Ibn Khuzay*

²⁷⁰ See the *Musnad*, III, 209; Ṭaba CH. *Lisān*, III, 27.

²⁷¹ Cf. Ibn Khuzayma, *Tawhīd*, 11: occurrences of the Quranic verse is pr in each case indicates that it is a q clearly assumes it to be so and seeks

The Twenty-Sixth Tradition

151 In the *Musnad* of Aḥmad there is a tradition from Anas [b. Mālik] who reported that the Prophet recited the verse "And when his Lord manifested Himself to the mountain He caused it to turn to powder [and Moses fell into a swoon]"²⁶⁷ and then added: "He illustrated [these words spoken to Moses] by extending the tip of His finger (*khinṣir*)."²⁶⁸ [Upon receiving this tradition from Thābit al-Bunānī who had previously received it from Anas], Ḥumayd aṭ-Ṭawīl said: "O Abū Muḥammad, why are you relating this tradition?"²⁶⁹ Then [Thābit] struck him on the chest and said: "Who are you O Ḥumayd? What right do you have to question this tradition? Anas reported it to me on the authority of the Prophet, so how can you say: 'Why are you relating this tradition?'" In another version of the tradition on this verse [it is reported that the Prophet recited the words:] "When his Lord manifested Himself to the mountain," and then added: "He gestured with his finger and [the mountain] collapsed."²⁷⁰ In still another version of this tradition cited by Ibn Ḥāmid, [the Prophet is reported to have said upon reciting the above verse]: "He extended his finger up to the first joint."²⁷¹

²⁶⁷ S. 7: 143. The full verse: "When Moses arrived at his appointed time and his Lord spoke to him, he said: 'O Lord show me so that I may behold Thee!' He replied: 'You shall not see Me; but behold the mountain—if it stays in its place, then you shall see Me.' And when his Lord manifested Himself to the mountain, He caused it to turn to powder, and Moses collapsed." For Ibn al-Jawzī's gloss on this verse, see *Zād al-Masīr*, III, 257; cf., Ṭabarī, *Tafsīr*, XIII, 97-100; and Zamakhsharī, *Kashshāf*, II, 114.

²⁶⁸ For the full text of this tradition, see the *Musnad*, III, 125; also *DST*, 53-54; *BA*, 31a; and Ibn Fūrak, *Mushkil*, 245-248 (cf., also 393-395, and 465-467). Other versions of the tradition are found in Ṭabarī, *Tafsīr*, XIII, 97-100; Ibn Khuzayma, *Tawḥīd*, 113-114; Dhahabī, *Mizān*, I, 593; and Ibn al-Jawzī, *Kitāb Mawḍūʿāt*, I, 120-122.

²⁶⁹ In place of the Arabic text found in the *Musnad* ما تريد إلى هذا؟ (which seems to have given transmitters some difficulty), one finds the question recast in other renderings of the tradition: تحدث بمثل هذا؟ (Dhahabī, *Mizān*, I, 593, 16; Ibn al-Jawzī, *al-Mawḍūʿāt*, I, 122, 7), أتحديث بمثل هذا؟ (Ibn Khuzayma, *Tawḥīd*, 114, 6), تقول هذا؟ (Ṭabarī, *Tafsīr*, XIII, 99, 4), and دَعُ هذا، ما تريد إلى هذا؟ (Ibn Khuzayma, 113, 5).

²⁷⁰ See the *Musnad*, III, 209; Ṭabarī, *Tafsīr*, XIII, 98; and Ibn Khuzayma, *Tawḥīd*, 113. Cf. *Lisān*, III, 27.

²⁷¹ Cf. Ibn Khuzayma, *Tawḥīd*, 113, 12.—The subject of the sentence following the three occurrences of the Quranic verse is problematic (from a theological perspective); the context in each case indicates that it is a question of God's finger, not the Prophet's. Ibn Fūrak clearly assumes it to be so and seeks a way around the theological problem by suggesting a

152 Those traditionists who have expressed their views on this tradition have observed that Ḥammād b. Salama²⁷² was the only person to receive it from Thābit [al-Bunānī]. Further, Ibn Abī'l-ʿAwjā,²⁷³ the *zindīq*, is known to have tampered with [the traditions collected by] Ḥammād and during his later years passed them on to others. This explains why the collectors of sound traditions sometimes avoided those [with chains in which the name of Ḥammād appears]. The questions raised by the above tradition are not difficult to explain. The Prophet was attempting to encourage a better understanding [of the verse] among his listeners through an appeal to sense experience. Thus [the Prophet] placed his hand on his finger (*kinṣir*) as a way of indicating that God had manifested only a small part of His mystery (*āyāt*).²⁷⁴

153 Ibn ʿAqīl said: “[This tradition means that God] manifested of the light which He possesses only what might be compared to the tip of the small finger (*khinṣir*)—that is, only to a degree that is commensurate with the finite limits of our understanding. We do not suppose that what pertains to God can be measured or that the divine essence can be described as light [of the sort we know]. If someone should ask why Ḥumayd objected to Thābit’s [transmission of this tradition], our answer is that he may have assumed that the [reference to the small finger] concerned the question of the divine attributes.”

154 Indeed, the *Qāḍi* ascribed a small finger to God on the basis of this defective tradition.²⁷⁵ [fol. 32a] As I have already said, the reference to the finger in the tradition was meant to apply to the Prophet [not to God].²⁷⁶

metaphorical interpretation of “the small finger” (393ff.). See §154, however, where Ibn al-Jawzī insists that the reference is to the Prophet, not to God.

²⁷² Ḥammād b. Salama b. Dīnār Abū Salama, a Basran traditionist (d. 167/783), was the nephew of Ḥumayd al-Ṭawīl and was generally regarded as reliable in matters of tradition, although some critics raised questions about certain traditions transmitted in his name. Dhahabī notes that while Muslim included some of Ḥammād’s traditions in his *Ṣaḥīḥ*, Bukhārī avoided them (Dhahabī, *Mizān*, I, 594). For the details of his life and his extraordinary piety, see: Ibn Saʿd, *Ṭabaqāt*, VII, 282; Dhahabī, *Mizān*, I, 590-595; Abū Nuʿaym al-Iṣbahānī, *Hilya*, VI, 249-252; and Massignon, *Essai*, 168, 201, 234-235. Cf. KAS, §§ 8 and 79.

²⁷³ For more on ʿAbd al-Karīm b. Abī'l-ʿAwjā (d. 155 A.H.), see notes to §79.

²⁷⁴ Cf., Ibn Fūrak, *Mushkil*, 246-247, where the same point is made.

²⁷⁵ The *Muʿtamad* makes no reference to the small finger (*khinṣir*) as a divine attribute.

²⁷⁶ Cf., the last part of §152. In his *Kitāb al-Mawḍūʿāt* (I, 122), Ibn al-Jawzī refers to this tradition (though in a slightly different form) and, after a brief analysis, pronounces it a

155 According to the *Qāḍi*, “He manifested Himself [fully] in the hearts of His creatures (baʿḍihī) to the earth and it qu...”

156 The *Qāḍi* said: “The phrase taken in its literal sense (ʿalā) such a way as to imply that G says that [God] manifests a part (baʿḍ) utters nonsense.²⁷⁹ of a report deriving from a contradict what the majority agreement that the Creator is (yatabaʿḍu). The words [cite manifests some of His signs nothing more.²⁸⁰

fabrication. Although he does decl (§154), he seems unwilling to declar

²⁷⁷ A *mawla* of Ibn ʿAbbās and a l exegetical work. He travelled widely and the Maghrib), apparently in sup 105/723 (or, according to some, in 107 of ʿIkrima’s reliability as a transmitt I, 93-97; the *Hilya* of Abū Nuʿaym (I a modern perspective on ʿIkrima an Schacht in *El*², III, 1081-1082 (cf., M

²⁷⁸ Cf., *DST*, 54; and *BA*, 31b. See different form of the tradition is cited It seems evident from §156 (where al-Jawzī regarded this tradition as orig

²⁷⁹ The verb يَكْمَل might be construe (u) but in this case, too, one is forced l

²⁸⁰ Ibn Fūrak glosses the expression خَوْفَةً وَمَحْذَرَةً كَمَا قَالَ تَعَالَى: «وَمَا تُرِيبُ بِالْآيَاتِ إِلَّا تُخْرِيفُ» (By the expression have meant: [He manifests] some (ba caution, for the Most High has said: “ Fūrak, 254, 6-7; cf., 255, 16-17; S, 17

The Twenty-Seventh Tradition

155 According to the *Qāḍī*, 'Ikrima²⁷⁷ said: "When God decides to put fear in the hearts of His creatures, He manifests a part of Himself (*abdā 'an ba'ḍihi*) to the earth and it quakes; but when He wishes to destroy a people, He manifests Himself [fully] to it."²⁷⁸

156 The *Qāḍī* said: "The phrase 'He manifests a part of Himself' is to be taken in its literal sense (*'alā ṣāhirihi*) as referring to His essence, but not in such a way as to imply that God is divided into parts (*tab'īḍ*)." Now he who says that [God] manifests a part (*ba'ḍ*) of Himself that is *not in reality a part* (*ba'ḍ*) utters nonsense.²⁷⁹ To apply the term *part* [to God] on the basis of a report deriving from a Follower, even if it were authentic, is to contradict what the majority of Muslims have affirmed, for they are in agreement that the Creator is not to be thought of as divisible into parts (*yataba'ḍu*). The words [cited in the saying of 'Ikrima] mean that God manifests some of His signs or wonders (*ba'ḍ āyātihi*) [to the earth], nothing more.²⁸⁰

fabrication. Although he does declare the form reproduced here in *KAS* to be defective (§154), he seems unwilling to declare it a fabrication (*mawḍū'a*).

²⁷⁷ A *mawḷā* of Ibn 'Abbās and a leading (though controversial) transmitter of the latter's exegetical work. He travelled widely throughout the Umayyad empire (including Khurasān and the Maghrib), apparently in support of the Khārijī cause, and is said to have died in 105/723 (or, according to some, in 107/725). For a review of the widely divergent assessments of 'Ikrima's reliability as a transmitter and the soundness of his views, see Dhahabī, *Mīzān*, I, 93-97; the *Hilya* of Abū Nuaym (III, 326-347); and Ibn al-Jawzī's *Ṣafwa* (II, 58-59). For a modern perspective on 'Ikrima and a list of the sources on him, see the article by J. Schacht in *El*², III, 1081-1082 (cf., Massignon, *Lexique technique*, 171, 289).

²⁷⁸ Cf., *DST*, 54; and *BA*, 31b. See also Ibn Fūrak, *Mushkil*, 254, 3-5, where a slightly different form of the tradition is cited (reported by 'Ikrima on the authority of Ibn 'Abbās). It seems evident from §156 (where he refers to the saying as a *kalām tābī'i*) that Ibn al-Jawzī regarded this tradition as originating with 'Ikrima.

²⁷⁹ The verb يَكَلِّم might be construed as a passive (he should not be addressed or spoken to) but in this case, too, one is forced to assume an ellipsis.

²⁸⁰ Ibn Fūrak glosses the expression as follows: «أبدي» اعلم أنه يحتمل أن يكون المراد بقوله «أبدي» عن بعضه» أي عن بعض آياته وعلاماته مما تكون منذرة ومخوفة ومحذرة كما قال تعالى: «وَمَا تُرْسِلُ إِلَّا تَخْوِيفًا» (By the expression "He manifests a part (*ba'ḍ*) of Himself" He may well have meant: [He manifests] some (*ba'ḍ*) of His signs so as to warn, to instill fear and to caution, for the Most High has said: "We sent signs for the purpose of instilling fear" [Ibn Fūrak, 254, 6-7; cf., 255, 16-17; S. 17: 59]).

The Twenty-Eighth Tradition

157 Abū'l-Aḥwaṣ al-Jushamī reported the following: "The Messenger of God once said [to my father, Mālik b. Naḍla]: 'Is it true that you take a razor and cut off the ear of one of [your female camels] and then say: "This is a *baḥīra*"?' And do you slit the ear of another and say: "This one is a *ṣarīma*"?'²⁸¹ He replied: 'Yes'. [The Prophet] responded: 'Stop this practice, for God's razor (*mūsā*) is sharper than yours and His forearm (*sā'id*) is stronger than yours.'"²⁸²

158 The *Qāḍī* [Abū Ya'fā] said: "On the basis of a literal interpretation of this text it is possible to ascribe a forearm to God as an attribute of the divine essence (*ṣifa li-dhātihi*)." However, the predication of a divine attribute on the basis of a questionable tradition ignores the normal understanding of such expressions in Arabic usage. When [Arabs] speak thus they mean it only to be taken as a figure of speech (*tajawwuz*) or metaphor (*isti'āra*), for the term "forearm" (*sā'id*), in such usage, is meant to connote

²⁸¹ On the various definitions of the terms *baḥīra* and *ṣarīma*, See Lane (157/2-3) and *Lisān* (IV, 43/2-44/1). Also, the article by Wensinck in *El*², I, 922.

²⁸² See *DST*, 54; *BA*, 31b; Bayhaqī, *Asmā*², 341-342; Ṭabarī, *Tafsīr*, XI, 122; *Musnad*, IV, 136-137; and Ibn Sa'd, *Ṭabaqāt*, VI, 28. The longer version of this tradition (*Musnad*, III, 473) reads as follows: "Abū'l-Aḥwaṣ related the following on the authority of his father, Mālik b. Naḍla: 'The Prophet came to me while I was in an unkempt state, and he said: "Do you own livestock (*māl*)?" I said: "Yes!" The Prophet said: "What kind?" [Mālik] said: "I have every kind, i.e., camels, cattle, horses, and sheep." [The Prophet] said: "Since God gave them to you, they are yours. Do the camels of your people give birth with sound ears and you then take a razor and cut them off, and say: 'These are *baḥīras*?' Do you slit the ears [of others], and then say: 'These are *ṣarīmas*?' And you forbid these to yourself and your people?" [Mālik] said: "Yes." [The Prophet] said: "Accept what God has given you, for the forearm of God is stronger and the razor of God is sharper"' (cf., Ṭabarī, *Tafsīr*, XI, 122). Lengthy discussions of this tradition are to be found in the standard commentaries on S. 5: 106 (cf., also S. 6: 140): e.g., *Zād al-Masīr*, II, 436-440; Ṭabarī, *Tafsīr*, XI, 121-122; and Zamakhsharī, *Kashshāf*, I, 649. For a literary analysis of a version of this *ḥadīth*, see S. Stetkevych, "Toward a Redefinition of 'Badī' Poetry," *Journal of Arabic Literature*, 12 (1981), 1-29. For more on the pre-Islamic background of the practice of slitting the ears of animals, see the article "*Baḥīra*" in *El*², I, 922 (Wensinck); R. Paret, *Kommentar*, 130-136; Wellhausen, *Reste arabischen Heidentums*, 112f.; Henninger, "Die unblutige Tierweihe der vorislamischen Araber in ethnologischer Sicht," in *Paideuma, Mitteilungen zur Kulturkunde*, IV, 179-190; and Gräf, *Jagdbeute und Schlachtvieh im islamischen Recht; eine Untersuchung zur Entwicklung der islamischen Jurisprudenz* (Bonn 1959), 58ff.

power (*quwwa*) precisely because of ignoring [of this distinction] the uneducated (*ʿammīya*) and a understanding rests. [If one] would also be necessary to as

The

159 [fol.32b] According to a said: "When a believer performs eyes of *Raḥmān*."²⁸⁵

160 In the preceding chapter "eyes" as applied to God in the above tradition is [not that God] who prays and so the latter on the occasion. It was for this

²⁸³ Ibn al-Jawzī here alludes to a *Furak* (*Mushkil*, 257, 12-14): *سَمَتَ* the substratum (locus) of a thing to so seeing is termed an eye and hear the forearm is a substratum or locus. the same argument is made.

²⁸⁴ The syntax of the Arabic text owing to the fact that a long parenthetical constructed complex sentence. Because into an understandable English form, at the same time, aiming to remain as

²⁸⁵ That is, before (or in front of) canonical collections. In addition to the same form as we have it in *KAL* 12-259, 2), albeit in a somewhat long *يَتَوَلَّى بَيْنَ عَيْنِي الرَّحْمَنِ فَإِذَا التَفَتَ قَالَ لَهُ أَتَقْبِلُ إِلَيَّ فَإِنِّي خَيْرُ لَكَ مِمَّنْ تَلْتَفِتُ إِلَيْهِ* (The Messenger of God said: "When the two eyes of] *Raḥmān*; and when you turn? Is it to one who is better than whom you turn").

power (*quwwa*) precisely because a person's power is in his forearm.²⁸³ The ignoring [of this distinction between modes of speech] is typical of the uneducated (*‘āmmīya*) and a violation of the conditions on which [true] understanding rests. [If one were to accept a literalist point of view] it would also be necessary to ascribe a razor (*mūsā*) [to God].²⁸⁴

The Twenty-Ninth Tradition

159 [fol.32b] According to a tradition reported by Abū Hurayra, the Prophet said: “When a believer performs his prayers (*ṣalāt*) he is before the two eyes of *Raḥmān*.”²⁸⁵

160 In the preceding chapter, we have already discussed the question of “eyes” as applied to God in certain verses of the Quran. The point of the above tradition is [not that God has two eyes, but] that He observes the one who prays and so the latter ought to conduct himself in a manner befitting the occasion. It was for this reason that the Prophet said: “[When one of

²⁸³ Ibn al-Jawzī here alludes to a hermeneutic principle spelled out more fully by Ibn Fūrak (*Mushkil*, 257, 12-14): العرب تسمي محل الشيء باسم ما فيه من طريق القرب كما سُمّت البصر عيناً والسمع أذنًا فسُمي القدرة ساعداً وإن كان الساعد محلاً للقدرة (Arabs give the name of the substratum (locus) of a thing to the latter on account of the proximity [of the two], and so seeing is termed an eye and hearing an ear; so also power is termed a forearm because the forearm is a substratum or locus of power). Cf., Bayhaqī, *Asmā*, 342, 12-17, where the same argument is made.

²⁸⁴ The syntax of the Arabic text of the last part of the paragraph is rather involved, owing to the fact that a long parenthetical statement is embedded in a rather loosely constructed complex sentence. Because of the difficulty of rendering such a long sentence into an understandable English form, I have broken it down into several smaller units—while, at the same time, aiming to remain as close as possible to the overall sense of the Arabic.

²⁸⁵ That is, before (or in front of) *Raḥmān*. This tradition does not appear in any of the canonical collections. In addition to *DST* (55) and *BA* (31b), where it appears in essentially the same form as we have it in *KAS*, it is also cited in the *Mushkil* of Ibn Fūrak (258, 12-259, 2), albeit in a somewhat longer form: روى عطاء بن إبي رباح عن أبي هريرة قال: قال رسول الله صلى الله عليه وسلم: إذا قام العبد إلى الصلاة فإنه بين عيني الرحمن فإذا التفت قال له الرب تعالى ذكره: إلى من تلتفت؟ أ إلى من هو خير مني؟ أقبل إليّ فيأتي خير لك من تلتفت إليه (The Messenger of God said: “When a believer performs the *ṣalāt* he faces [lit. is before the two eyes of] *Raḥmān*; and when he turns [away], the Lord says to him: ‘To whom do you turn? Is it to one who is better than I? Draw near to Me for I am better for you than he to whom you turn’ ”).

you says his prayers] God is in front of him (*qibala wajhihi*)."²⁸⁶ The real point of these words is [not to locate God in a particular place but to underscore the point] that God sees [the one who prays].

The Thirtieth Tradition

161 Bukhārī and Muslim cite a tradition in their respective *Ṣaḥīḥs* in which ʿĀʾisha reports that the Prophet once came to visit her while another woman was in the house, and he said to ʿĀʾisha: "Who is this woman?" ʿĀʾisha replied: "She is so and so," and [ʿĀʾisha] went on speaking of [the woman's] dedication to her prayers.²⁸⁷ The Prophet responded: "Enough said! You are responsible *only* for what you are capable of doing. By God, the Most High will not turn away (*yamallu*) [from you] until you first turn away from Him."²⁸⁸ In another version of this tradition it reads: "God will not turn away [from you] in disgust (*yasaʿmu*) until you turn away [from Him] in disgust."²⁸⁹

162 The *ʿulamāʾ* maintain that this tradition means that He will not turn away (*yamallu*) even though you turn away. This is the view of Ibn

²⁸⁶ These words are part of a tradition in which worshippers are warned against spitting in front of them during the *ṣalāt* since God's face is in front of the believer when he prays (see Muslim, *masājid*, 50; *zuhd*, 74; Bukhārī, *ṣalāt*, 33; *adhān*, 94; *adab*, 75; Ibn Māja, *masājid*, 10 [763]; Abū Dāwūd, *ṣalāt*, 22; Nasāʾī, *masājid*, 31; *Musnad*, II, 6, 29, 53, 66, 72). The text given by Ibn Māja reads as follows: 'Abd Allāh b. ʿUmar said: "The Messenger of God saw phlegm on the *qibla* of the mosque while he was saying his prayers, and he rubbed it off. After he had finished his prayers, he said [to those present]: 'When you say your prayers God is before your face. Therefore, let none of you spit in front of him during the prayers.'" Cf., Bayhaqī, *Asmāʾ*, 465, 16ff.; also Ibn Fūrak, 263, 4, and 265, 10-12.

²⁸⁷ One version has ʿĀʾisha saying that the woman was in the habit of spending the whole of the night in prayer (Bayhaqī, *Asmāʾ*, 483; cf., Ibn Māja, *zuhd*, 28 [4239]).

²⁸⁸ In slightly varying forms, this tradition appears in virtually all of the canonical collections. See, for example: Bukhārī, *īmān*, 32 (Houdas and Marçais, *Les Traditions*, I, 24); Muslim, *ṣalāt al-musāfirīn*, 221; Nasāʾī, *qiyām al-layl*, 17; *īmān*, 29. See also Bukhārī, *tajāhhud*, 18; *ṣawm*, 52; *libās*, 43; Muslim, *ṣalāt al-musāfirīn*, 215; *ṣiyām*, 177; Nasāʾī, *qibla*, 13; Ibn Māja, *zuhd*, 28; *Musnad*, VI, 40, 51, 61, 84, 122, 189, 199, 212, 231, 233, 241, 244, 250, and 268. Cf., also *Lisān*, XI, 629/1, 19-21; Ibn Qutayba, *Taʾwīl*, 375 (Lecomte, 325); Bayhaqī, *Asmāʾ*, 483, 8-11; and Ibn Fūrak, *Mushkil*, 272.

²⁸⁹ Muslim, *ṣalāt al-musāfirīn*, 220; and *Musnad*, VI, 247.

Qutayba and al-Khaṭṭābī²⁹⁰ as is a consensus.²⁹¹ Some scho (malla) from something abe tradition would mean that you] as long as you have no [the kind of] "turning away" (istithqāl), aversion (nufūr) a since He is not subject to chang world (ḥulūl al-ḥawādith) is r

163 The *Qāḍī* [Abū Yaʿlā] 'turning away' (*malal*) to God in disgust' (*saʿāma*). Such a known to the science of lexic is consistent with His being expression "turning away in di

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164 Khawla bint Ḥakīm report trampled [the idolaters] under f

165 Now Wajj is the name God inflicted defeat [fol.33a] c life. The reference [to trampling

²⁹⁰ See Bayhaqī, *Asmāʾ*, 483, 12ff. fully.

²⁹¹ Cf. *Lisān*, XI, 629/1, 19ff.

²⁹² See Ibn Fūrak, 272, 7-9, where beyond the world of change, *malal* m Cf., his *Gharīb al-Ḥadīth* (II, 373, interpretations of the verb *malla*, each

²⁹³ The *ḥadīth* fragment cited here i citations by Ibn al-Jawzī in *DST* (56- also Ibn Qutayba, *Taʾwīl*, 268-269 (Bayhaqī, *Asmāʾ*, 461; and *Lisān*, I, 1; *Musnad*, VI, 409; and Bayhaqī, 461 (c

²⁹⁴ According to some authorities, W cf. *Marāṣid*, III, 1426).

Qutayba and al-Khaṭṭābī²⁹⁰ as well as the lexicographers among whom there is a consensus.²⁹¹ Some scholars (*qawm*) say that the one who turns away (*malla*) from something abandons it (*tarakahu*). [In line with this] the tradition would mean that God will not abandon (*yatraku*) His reward [to you] as long as you have not ceased rendering Him obedience. However, [the kind of] “turning away” (*malal*) that entails dislike (*karāhiya*), irritation (*istithqāl*), aversion (*nufūr*) and loathing (*saʿāma*) is impossible for [God] since He is not subject to change (*taghayyur*); participation in the phenomenal world (*ḥulūl al-ḥawādith*) is not possible for Him.²⁹²

163 The *Qāḍī* [Abū Yaʿlā] said: “It is possible to attribute a [literal] ‘turning away’ (*malal*) to God, though not the kind that is a ‘turning away in disgust’ (*saʿāma*).” Such a statement, however, is contrary to what is known to the science of lexicography and [does not take into account] what is consistent with His being or what is a violation of that being. The expression “turning away in disgust” (*saʿāma*) may not be applied to Him.

The Thirty-First Tradition

164 Khawla bint Ḥakīm reported that the Prophet said: “The last time God trampled [the idolaters] under foot (*ākhiru waṭʾatin waṭʾahā*) was at Wajj.”²⁹³

165 Now Wajj is the name of a valley in the vicinity of Ṭāʾif²⁹⁴ where God inflicted defeat [fol.33a] on the idolaters near the end of the Prophet’s life. The reference [to trampling under foot] appears in another tradition in

²⁹⁰ See Bayhaqī, *Asmāʾ*, 483, 12ff., where the views of al-Khaṭṭābī are reported more fully.

²⁹¹ Cf. *Lisān*, XI, 629/1, 19ff.

²⁹² See Ibn Fūrak, 272, 7-9, where almost identical language is used. Because God is beyond the world of change, *malal* may be applied to God only if construed as metaphor. Cf., his *Gharīb al-Ḥadīth* (II, 373, 11-13) where Ibn al-Jawzī offers three possible interpretations of the verb *malla*, each metaphorical or quasi-metaphorical.

²⁹³ The *ḥadīth* fragment cited here is quoted in a number of sources; in addition to the citations by Ibn al-Jawzī in *DST* (56-57); *BA* (32a); and *Gharīb al-Ḥadīth* (II, 473); see also Ibn Qutayba, *Taʾwīl*, 268-269 (Lecomte, 237-238); Ibn Fūrak, *Mushkil*, 279-280; Bayhaqī, *Asmāʾ*, 461; and *Lisān*, I, 197/1, 25ff. For the full text of the tradition, see the *Musnad*, VI, 409; and Bayhaqī, 461 (cf., also *Musnad*, IV, 172; and Lane, 2949/2).

²⁹⁴ According to some authorities, Wajj was another name for Ṭāʾif itself (*Lisān*, II, 397; cf., *Marāṣid*, III, 1426).

which the Prophet prays: "O God, make severe your trampling (*waṭʾataka*) of Muḍar."²⁹⁵ [What we have here is a metaphorical expression] involving the term "foot" (*qadam*); this was the view of Ibn Qutayba and a number of other authorities.²⁹⁶ In his commentary on this tradition, Sufyān b. ʿUyayna maintained that it refers to the last campaign—that is, against Ṭāʾif—undertaken by the Prophet.

166 The *Qāḍi* said: "It is permissible, on the basis of our principles (*uṣūl*), to interpret this tradition literally (*ʿalā ṣāhirihi*), for the meaning of the text refers to the divine essence itself (*adh-dhāt*), not to God's actions; thus we interpret [the term foot] in the prophetic saying 'God will descend and place His foot in Hell' as applying to the divine essence."²⁹⁷ The principles to which this man alludes lead inevitably to the attribution of corporeality (*tajsim*), locomotion (*intiqāl*), and movement (*ḥaraka*) to God. Not only is this position anthropomorphist (*tashbīh*), it violates literary usage (*luḡha*) and contravenes both [sound] historical method (*maʿrifat at-tawārīkh*) and the proofs of reason (*adilla al-ʿuqūl*). [Abū Yaʿlā] was misled by a tradition in which Kaʿb²⁹⁸ is reported to have said: "Wajj is [the name of] a sacred (*muqaddas*) place from which the Lord ascended to heaven after He had completed²⁹⁹ the creation of the earth."³⁰⁰ Even if these

²⁹⁵ The tradition containing these words occurs frequently in the canonical collections; for a sampling of these, see the following: Bukhārī, *adhān*, 128; *istiḳāʿ*, 2; *jihād*, 98; *anbiyāʾ*, 19; *tafsīr*, 3 (9); *adab*, 110; Muslim, *masājid*, 294, 295; Abū Dāwūd, *ṣalāt*, 216; *witr*, 10; Nasāʾī, *taḥḥiq*, 27; Ibn Māja, *iḳāma*, 145; *Musnad*, II, 239, 255, 271, 418, 470, 502, and 521. Bukhārī, *adhān*, 128 (*Les traditions*, I, 267), adds the following explanation at the end of the tradition: "The people of Muḍar who lived to the east [of Medina] were at that time hostile to him (the Prophet)."

²⁹⁶ See Ibn Qutayba, *Taʾwīl*, 269; cf., also Bayhaqī, *Asmāʾ*, 461-462; and Ibn Fūrak, *Mushkil*, 279-280. Ibn Fūrak's interpretation of this expression is based almost entirely on Ibn Qutayba; in contrast to Ibn Qutayba, however, Ibn Fūrak goes on to work out the theological implications of the tradition. It is worth noting that all three authors cite the view of Sufyān in support of their own position, as Ibn al-Jawzī himself will do in the following sentence.

²⁹⁷ On this tradition and its interpretation, see §§105-109.

²⁹⁸ Kaʿb al-Aḥbār b. Mātiʿ, a Yemenite Jew who converted to Islam during the reign of ʿUmar and is said to have been the source of many reports of Jewish origin that found their way into early Islam. He reportedly died in Hims near the end of ʿUthmān's reign, possibly in 32/652.

²⁹⁹ The expression *yawma qaḍā* used here might also be rendered: "on the day when He decreed the creation of the earth" (cf., Lecomte, 239).

words go back to Kaʿb, it is *al-Kitāb*, for we know that h we were to conclude that the the place at which [God] creation was completed.³⁰¹ H only in the sense that He turn of the heavens, as the Qura *ilā*)³⁰² the heavens which then reported by Abū Hurayra tha Gabriel came and led me to the and said: 'This is the place fr This saying, however, was t fabricate traditions and claim transmitter.³⁰⁶ If someone sh Quranic expression] *istawā ilā*

³⁰¹ This tradition, with a full *isnād*, as an example of a tradition that is prob For other instances of the tradition, 1306].

³⁰² According to this interpretation created, and thus the place from whi their creation.

³⁰³ I take *ʿamada ilā* primarily as a

³⁰⁴ Or perhaps: turned His attention

³⁰⁵ Also translated "smoke" or "mi 40:11) and the problem posed by t especially I, 58; Zamakhsharī, *Kash 429-437; R. Paret, Kommentar*, 433- order of creation, Ibn al-Jawzī (follo the view that the earth was created bef

³⁰⁶ For a longer version of this sayi *isnād*); cf., *Mizān*, I, 345, where a s Zayād al-Buhārī from Ibn al-Mubārak reject the tradition as a fabrication (*ma*

³⁰⁷ In his *Kitāb ad-Duʿafāʾ* (I, 149), statement and notes that the latter regan (*Mizān*, I, 345) where the same charge Baḥr in time, but it would appear from 8th century.

words go back to Ka'b, it is possible that he received them from the *Ahl al-Kitāb*, for we know that he transmitted numerous sayings from them. If we were to conclude that the saying does go back to [Ka'b, Wajj] refers to the place at which [God] "ascended" (*istawā*) from the earth after its creation was completed.³⁰¹ He then went up (*ʿaraja*) [to the heavens], but only in the sense that He turned His attention to (*ʿamada ilā*)³⁰² the creation of the heavens, as the Quran itself says: "Then He 'went up to' (*istawā ilā*)³⁰³ the heavens which then consisted [only] of vapor (*dukhān*)."³⁰⁴ It was reported by Abū Hurayra that the Prophet said: "During my night journey Gabriel came and led me to the Rock of Jerusalem (*ṣakhra bayt al-muqaddas*) and said: 'This is the place from which your Lord ascended to heaven.'"³⁰⁵ This saying, however, was transmitted by Bakr b. Ziyād, who used to fabricate traditions and claim that he had received them from a reliable transmitter.³⁰⁶ If someone should point out that Ibn ʿAbbās said: "[The Quranic expression] *istawā ilā as-samāʾ* means that He ascended (*ṣaʿida*) to

³⁰⁰ This tradition, with a full *isnād*, is cited by Ibn Qutayba (*Taʿwīl*, 270 [Lecomte, 239]) as an example of a tradition that is problematic on account of its anthropomorphist implications. For other instances of the tradition, see *Lisān* (II, 397); and *Tāj al-ʿArūs*, (II, 270 [Cairo, 1306]).

³⁰¹ According to this interpretation, Wajj was the name of the last part of the earth to be created, and thus the place from which God ascended to the heavens in order to attend to their creation.

³⁰² I take *ʿamada ilā* primarily as a gloss on *istawā*, not on the verb *ʿaraja*.

³⁰³ Or perhaps: turned His attention to...

³⁰⁴ Also translated "smoke" or "mist" by some. For further discussion of this verse (S. 41:11) and the problem posed by the verb *istawā*, see *Zād al-Masīr*, VII, 245, and especially I, 58; Zamakhsharī, *Kashshāf*, III, 445 (also I, 270-271); Ṭabarī, *Tafsīr*, I, 429-437; R. Paret, *Kommentar*, 433-434; and KAS, §§49 to 59. On the question of the order of creation, Ibn al-Jawzī (following Mujāhid, Ḥasan al-Baṣrī, Ibn ʿAbbās) favored the view that the earth was created before the heavens (*Zād al-Masīr*, I, 58).

³⁰⁵ For a longer version of this saying, see: *Kitāb al-Mawḍūʿāt*, I, 113 (with a complete *isnād*); cf., *Mizān*, I, 345, where a slightly different *matn* and *isnād* are given (Bakr b. Ziyād al-Bāhilī from Ibn al-Mubārak from Ibn Ḥibbān). Both Ibn al-Jawzī and Dhahabī reject the tradition as a fabrication (*mawḍūʿa*).

³⁰⁶ In his *Kitāb aḍ-Ḍuʿafāʾ* (I, 149), Ibn al-Jawzī cites Ibn Ḥibbān as the source of this statement and notes that the latter regarded Bakr as a "charlatan" (*dajjāl*). Also, see Dhahabī (*Mizān*, I, 345) where the same charges are made. Neither Ibn al-Jawzī nor Dhahabī locate Bakr in time, but it would appear from the two notices that he must have lived during the 8th century.

the heavens," we would insist that it rather means "His command (*amruhu*) ascended," since God does not admit of movement or change.

167 Scholars fall into three [fol.33b] classes in regard to texts bearing on the divine attributes (*akhbār aṣ-ṣifāt*). The first group allows such texts to stand as they are without gloss (*tafsīr*) or metaphorical interpretation (*taʿwīl*), unless there is no other recourse. Thus, for example, in the case of the verse "Your Lord comes" ³⁰⁷—they take it to mean that His command (*amr*) comes. This was the approach followed by the *salaf*. The second group [consists of those who advocate] a metaphorical interpretation (*taʿwīl*), though it is a position fraught with some risk, ³⁰⁸ as we have noted previously. The third group takes sense experience as its point of departure in determining the meaning of the text. Ignorance is widespread among those [in this group] who specialize in the transmission of texts (*nāqilīn*), since they are not familiar with the rational sciences (*ʿilm al-maʿqūlāt*) by which one can know what may be ascribed to God and what may not, for the rational sciences (*ʿilm al-maʿqūlāt*) ³⁰⁹ safeguard such texts from being construed in

³⁰⁷ S. 89:22

³⁰⁸ Cf., §36 (and elsewhere in ch. 1) where Ibn al-Jawzī concedes that when practiced in a public setting metaphorical interpretation can undermine the faith of rank and file believers by raising doubts as to the adequacy and reliability of scripture. But Ibn al-Jawzī seems equally firm that *taʿwīl*, when practiced by competent authorities, need not have harmful consequences. Indeed, he argues frequently that it is the only sure way of protecting the unity and transcendence of God. It is a question of where and by whom *taʿwīl* is practiced.

³⁰⁹ Apart from the two occurrences in §167, Ibn al-Jawzī uses the expression *ʿilm al-maʿqūlāt* nowhere else in *KAS* (the term *maʿqūlāt* does appear in §245, and in §115 *maʿqūl* occurs, but neither passage throws any light on his use of *ʿilm al-maʿqūlāt*). If, by this expression, he is referring to a specific science or a group of sciences, exactly what he has in mind is unclear since there is no elaboration of the expression. It is clear that he could not have had metaphysics in mind even though the expression is sometimes used in that sense. It is also possible, however, that he is not referring to a science or set of sciences at all but rather to a set of principles based on reason or a method of reasoning. In any case, it is clear from his repeated references to reason (*ʿaql*), especially in chapter 1, that Ibn al-Jawzī had a fairly robust faith in the essential goodness of reason and its powers (cf., e.g., his *Dhamm al-Hawā*, 5-11, where he takes up the question of *ʿaql*, its nature, and its virtues. In the same chapter he cites a number of prophetic traditions celebrating the virtues of *ʿaql*, among them the following: "A man may be among those who observe the fast, the *ṣalāt*, the *ḥajj*, and the *jihād*, but on the day of judgment he will be recompensed only in accordance with the degree to which he followed the dictates of reason" [*Dhamm*, 7, 6-7]). From the references to reason in *KAS*, it is clear that *ʿaql* is a faculty that has access to a truth independently of sense experience and revelation. It is on the basis of *ʿaql* that we can know that God is beyond the categories of time and place, and that He is not

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³¹⁰ Cf., *Ṣayd al-Khāṭir*, 428-432

³¹¹ See the first several lines of §

³¹² In his notice on Ibn Kādīsh in
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anthropomorphic terms. When people lack [a knowledge of these sciences] they are prone to construe sacred texts by reference to sense experience.³¹⁰ It was this [very tendency] that the *Qāḍi* exemplified when he said: "On the basis of our principles, it is possible to interpret the expression 'trampling under foot'³¹¹ as applying to God, and to relate it to the divine essence itself (*adh-dhāt*)." By his own admission their principles take the senses as their point of reference. If only they had understood that movement (*ḥaraka*), locomotion (*intiḳāl*), and change (*taghayyur*) are not to be predicated of God, they would not have taken sense experience as their starting point.

168 It is astounding that [Abū Yaʿlā] could make the [above] statement and then turn around and say: "...but not in the sense of movement or change," thereby contradicting himself. One of the strangest things I have come across is a report from Abū'l-ʿIzz b. Kādish³¹² according to which

capable, therefore, of being localized in space, or subject to movement or to change of any sort. Ibn al-Jawzī's conception of reason clearly owed much to Muʿtazilī and Ashʿarī *kalām* and beyond these to the Aristotelian and Neoplatonic conceptions of reason, though we can be fairly certain that he had only the vaguest idea of the historical roots of the notion of *ʿaql* as he understood it. As for the Greeks and the medieval *mutakallimūn*, reason has a double function: it is the source of truth regarding the nature and being of God, but it is also a moral force in that it is through reason that human beings exercise control over the desires and passions of the carnal soul (*nafs*).

³¹⁰ Cf., *Ṣayd al-Khāṭir*, 428-432 (*faṣl* 236).

³¹¹ See the first several lines of §164.

³¹² In his notice on Ibn Kādish in the *Muntaẓam* (X, 28), Ibn al-Jawzī gives his name as Aḥmad b. ʿUbayd Allāh b. Muḥammad b. Aḥmad Abū'l-ʿIzz b. Kādish al-ʿUkbarī (d. 526/1131), which he says, he copied down from a document written in the hand of Ibn Kādish himself. Ibn al-Jawzī acknowledges having studied *ḥadīth* under him and even having received an *ijāza* (permission) to transmit the traditions of Ibn Kādish. It is evident from the notice in the *Muntaẓam*, however, that Ibn al-Jawzī's attitude toward him was mixed. On the one hand, he notes that his knowledge of the *ḥadīth* was extensive and that he was highly regarded by a number of scholars, among them the Ḥanbalī polymath Abū Muḥammad b. al-Khashshāb (d. 567/1171), but Ibn al-Jawzī also notes that the highly respected *ḥadīth* expert, Muḥammad b. Nāṣir [d. 550/1155]), viewed him with suspicion because, on at least one occasion, he had fabricated a tradition and placed it in the mouth of the Prophet—something which Ibn Kādish later acknowledged and sincerely regretted. Ibn al-Jawzī does not include Ibn Kādish in his *Mashyakha* despite the fact that the latter was one of his first teachers in the science of *ḥadīth*. No mention is made in the biographical literature of Ibn Kādish's legal affiliation. In addition to the *Muntaẓam*, notices on Ibn Kādish can be found in the following: *Bidāya*, XII, 219; *Shadharāt*, IV, 78; *Kāmil*, X, 683; and *Mizān*, I, 118 (cf., *Mirʾāt az-Zamān*, 344, and 455).

Abū Jaʿfar Muḥammad b. ʿUthmān b. Abī Shayba³¹³ is said to have written the following in his *Kitāb al-ʿArsh*: “God informed me that He went (*ṣāra*) from the earth to heaven, and then from heaven to His Throne upon which He then seated Himself.”³¹⁴ We are thankful to God that He has not diminished our portion of a knowledge that is based on both revelation and reason. We keep ourselves aloof from those who have brought shame on our school (*madhhabanā*), for people would otherwise censure *us* because of what *they* teach.

The Thirty-Second Tradition

169 [fol.34a] According to Abū Umāma, the Prophet said: “[God’s] servants

³¹³ The full *isnād* reads: Ibn Kādīsh from Abū Ṭālib al-ʿUshārī from Abūʾl-Faṭḥ b. Abīʾl-Fawāris from Abū ʿAlī b. aṣ-Ṣawwāf from Abū Jaʿfar Muḥammad b. ʿUthmān b. Abī Shayba. The latter, the source of the report, was a Kufan traditionist who later settled in Baghdad where he died in 297/910. He was regarded by many as an exceptionally learned individual who composed a number of valuable works (*tawālif mufīda*) in the science of *ḥadīth*, among them a biographical work on traditionists (Ibn Athīr, *Lubāb*, II, 315), and several other works on the science of tradition. In addition to these, he was the author of several more popular works, including the *Kitāb al-ʿArsh* (referred to above by Ibn al-Jawzī) and a short work entitled *Kitāb Fihi Dhikr Khalq ʿĀdam wa Khaṭṭatihi* (GAS, I, 164). His work as a traditionist was vigorously defended by a number of contemporaries (among them Abū ʿAlī Ṣāliḥ Jazara, ʿAbdān and Ibn ʿAdī); some traditionists, however, considered him unreliable, and some even accused him of the deliberate fabrication of traditions. Among the severest of his critics were ʿAbd Allāh b. Aḥmad b. Ḥanbal, Abū Muḥammad b. Khirāsh, Dāraquṭnī, Abū Bakr al-Barqānī, and, above all, Abū Jaʿfar al-Ḥaḍramī (known to his contemporaries under the nickname Muṭayyan). As his notice on Ibn Abī Shayba indicates, Ibn al-Jawzī tended to side with the critics (*Muntaẓam*, VI, 95-96; cf., also his *Kitāb aḍ-Ḍuʿafāʾ*, III, 84-85). For a detailed account of the conflict between Ibn Abī Shayba and Muṭayyan, see *Taʾrīkh Baghdād*, III, 43-44; and *Mīzān*, III, 642-643. Cf., also *Bidāya*, XI, 118-119; and *Shadharāt*, II, 226.

³¹⁴ A manuscript of the work is fortunately extant under the title *Kitāb al-ʿArsh wa Mā Ruwiya Fihi* (Zahiriya Library, Damascus, Ḥadīth no. 297, fol. 105b—119a [cf., GAS, I, 164, where the title is given as *Kitāb al-ʿArsh wa Mā Warada Fihi*]). The sentence cited above by Ibn al-Jawzī is an exact quote of what appears near the bottom of fol. 106b of the manuscript. Whether this relatively short manuscript of *Kitāb al-ʿArsh* is the complete work or merely an abridgment of a longer original remains to be determined, however. Though undated, the evidence furnished by the manuscript would indicate that it was copied sometime in the early part of the 7th century A.H.

do not approach Him with *minhu*), namely the Quran.”

170 In a tradition reported of the Quran to other forms over His creatures, for the will return to Him.”³¹⁵ The (*waṣāla*) to us from Him moreover, [the saying] is t Prophet.³¹⁷

³¹⁵ According to Tirmidhī, the v of its transmitters (viz., Abūʾn-Na regarded as a gloss (Tirmidhī, *tha* it appears above in KAS (cf., also *Mushkil*, 286; and *Taʾrīkh Baghdād* the following variant: *من خرج منه* not approach Him with anything [cited in *DST*, 60, n. 1]). For o Bayhaqī, *Asmāʾ*, 241, 4-5, 9-10, a

³¹⁶ See Tirmidhī, *ṭhawāb al-Qaʿ* “*Aqida*” (edited by H. Daiber with c 108, 20-21 (Arabic text; 116 [com *Asmāʾ*, 237-239, where several ne Frank, *Beings and their Attributes* debates concerning the origin of th *ويعود إليه*, see Madelung, “Origins Koran” in *Orientalia Hispanica* Madelung suggests that the saying counter the Muʿtazilī (and earlier *(خلق في غيره)* and separate from Hi lists, by contrast, maintained that essence, for “it proceeded from Hi source, the Quran stands apart from not God it is qualitatively different

³¹⁷ That is, it is to be taken as reported by a Companion (cf., Bay though Ibn al-Jawzī does not ind construed by Hanbalis, his comm Umāma again, suggest that there process of revelation in ways that ha on the *من خرج منه* as follows: *وَجَلَّ*

do not approach Him with the like of what proceeded from Him (*kharaja minhu*), namely the Quran.”³¹⁵

170 In a tradition reported by ‘Uthmān, the Prophet said: “The superiority of the Quran to other forms of speech is comparable to God’s superiority over His creatures, for the Quran proceeded from Him (*minhu kharaja*) and will return to Him.”³¹⁶ The point of the saying is that the Quran has come (*waṣala*) to us from Him (*min ‘indahū*) and will return to Him again; moreover, [the saying] is to be taken as resting on the authority of the Prophet.³¹⁷

³¹⁵ According to Tirmidhī, the words القرآن يعني at the end were added to the *matn* by one of its transmitters (*viz.*, Abū’n-Naḍr Hāshim b. Qays al-Kinānī [d. 207/822]) and are to be regarded as a gloss (Tirmidhī, *thawāb al-Qur’ān*, 17). In addition to Tirmidhī, the *matn* as it appears above in KAS (cf., also §237) is found in *DST*, 60; *BA*, fol. 32b; Ibn Fūrak, *Mushkil*, 286; and *Ta’rikh Baghdād*, VII, 88, 19-21. In his *al-Jāmi’ al-Kabīr*, Suyūfī cites the following variant: ما تقرب العباد إلى الله بشيء أحب إليه مما خرج منه ([God’s] servants do not approach Him with anything more pleasing to Him than what proceeded from Him [cited in *DST*, 60, n. 1]). For other variations on the tradition, see *Musnad*, VI, 256; Bayhaqī, *Asmā’*, 241, 4-5, 9-10, and 236, 13-14.

³¹⁶ See Tirmidhī, *thawāb al-Qur’ān*, 25; Dārimī, *faḍā’il al-Qur’ān*, 6 (2); Ibn Qudāma, *‘Aqīda* (edited by H. Daiber with commentary) in *Studia Arabica et Islamica* (Beirut 1981), 109, 20-21 (Arabic text; 116 [commentary]); Ibn Fūrak, *Mushkil*, 288, 6-7; and Bayhaqī, *Asmā’*, 237-239, where several nearly identical versions of the tradition are cited; also R. Frank, *Beings and their Attributes* (Albany 1978), 9 and n. 2. For a detailed study of early debates concerning the origin of the Quran and the significance of the expression خرج منه, see Madelung, “Origins of the Controversy Concerning the Creation of the Koran” in *Orientalia Hispanica sive studia F. M. Pareja octogenario dicata*, 513-516. Madelung suggests that the saying was an attempt by early (pre-*miḥna*) traditionalists to counter the Mu’tazilī (and earlier Jahmī) claim that the Quran was created outside God (خلق في غيره) and separate from Him since His essence is beyond change. Sunnī traditionalists, by contrast, maintained that the Quran enjoys a special relationship to the divine essence, for “it proceeded from Him and will return to Him.” Hence, by virtue of its divine source, the Quran stands apart from the world of created things. Even though the Quran is not God it is qualitatively different from those entities that make up the created order.

³¹⁷ That is, it is to be taken as *marfū‘*, *viz.*, a tradition going back to the Prophet and reported by a Companion (cf., Bayhaqī, *Asmā’*, 237, 15, 20; 238, 19; and 239, 8). Even though Ibn al-Jawzī does not indicate here how the two sayings of this section were construed by Ḥanbalīs, his comments in §237, where he cites the tradition from Abū Umāma again, suggest that there was a tendency in Ḥanbalī circles to understand the process of revelation in ways that had anthropomorphic implications. In §237 he comments on the خرج منه as follows: المعنى ظهر عنه ولا يجوز أن يظن أنه خروج جسم من جسم لأن الله عز وجل

The Thirty-Third Tradition

171 Abū Hurayra reported that the Messenger of God said: "God recited [the surahs] *Ṭāḥā* and *Yāṣīn* for a thousand years before He created Adam."³¹⁸ When the angels heard [the recitation of these surahs from] the Quran, they said: 'Blessed be the community to whom these words shall be revealed; blessed be the hearts that shall memorize them and the tongues that shall recite them.'"³¹⁹

172 This tradition, which Ibrāhīm b. Muhājir³²⁰ transmitted from 'Umar b. Ḥaṣṣ³²¹ is apocryphal (*mawḍūʿ*). Ibn 'Adī remarked that among the traditions

مسموعه ليس بجسم ولا [خرج منه] كلامه جسم means that it became manifest from Him, but one should not suppose that it was like the going out of one body from another, for God is not a body nor is His word a body). Ibn al-Jawzī's paraphrase of the tradition in the last sentence of §170 seems to accent the destination of revelation (its reception by humankind) as opposed to the Quran's origins, though without neglecting entirely the question of origin. It is worth noting, however, that the origin of revelation is no longer described as a "going out" but rather as an "arriving to...from..." (وصل إلينا من عنده). The terminology and word order of this sentence does seem to indicate a shift of emphasis away from origin (and particularly a literalistic conception of origin) to an emphasis on reception. For a more detailed discussion of the theological implications of the two sayings of this section, see Ibn Fūrak, *Mushkil*, 286-289. There is little, if anything, in Ibn Fūrak's discussion that Ibn al-Jawzī would have objected to. For a Ḥanbalī perspective on the question of the Quran's eternity, see Arberry, "A Hanbalite Tract on the Eternity of the Qurʾān," *Islamic Culture*, III (1956), 23ff.

³¹⁸ The surahs in question are 20 and 36, respectively.

³¹⁹ In addition to *DST*, 61; and *BA*, 32b; see also, Bayhaqī, *Asmāʾ*, 232, 8-11; Ibn Fūrak, *Mushkil*, 289, 11-12; *Kitāb al-Mawḍūʿāt*, I, 109, 2-5; and al-Ghazzālī, *Iḥyāʾ*, I, 273, 3-5. This *ḥadīth* is not to be found in any of the canonical collections. For a translation of the text of the saying, see Madelung, "Origins of the Controversy Concerning the Creation of the Koran" in *Orientalia Hispanica sive studia F. M. Pareja octogenario dicata*, 515.

³²⁰ Ibrāhīm b. Muhājir b. Mismār, a Medinese traditionist who, according to Madelung, flourished during the first half of the 2nd/8th century (Madelung, "Origin," 515, n. 2). This dating, however, seems too early since in several sources (including *KAS*) Ibrāhīm is said to have studied *ḥadīth* under 'Umar b. Ḥaṣṣ b. Dhakwān who, according to al-Khaṭīb, died in 198/813 (*Taʾrīkh Baghdād*, XI, 192-194). It seems more likely that Ibrāhīm belongs to the late 8th century (or perhaps early 9th). The only two notices I have found on him (Ibn al-Jawzī's *KDM*, I, 54-55; and Dhahabī's *Mizān*, I, 67) focus almost entirely on his work as a traditionist and provide virtually no information on the details of his life.

³²¹ 'Umar b. Ḥaṣṣ b. Dhakwān Abū Ḥaṣṣ al-'Abdī, a native of Basra who settled in Baghdad and died there in 198/813. The sources are virtually unanimous in declaring him to be unreliable in matters of *ḥadīth*. For notices on him, see Ibn Saʿd, VII, 344; *Taʾrīkh*

reported by this Ibrāhīm none than this one, for he was [Ḥaṣṣ].³²² Bukhārī himself po authority whose traditions f in their entirety (*munkar al-ḥadīth*) said: "We burn his traditions! reported by him] are not to be set aside (*matruk al-ḥadīth*) Ḥubbān said: "The text (*matruk*

The

173 In the *Ṣaḥīḥs* of Bukhārī Abū Hurayra that the Prophet of humankind, kinship (*raḥi*) refuge from the severing [of] you not pleased that I strengthen those who weaken you?"³²⁷

Baghdād, XI, 192-194; *KDM*, II, 20

³²² A *munkar* tradition is one the authority whose reputation is insuff (*EF*, III, 26b; Dozy, II, 722/2; cf., G

³²³ If a transmitter is classified as a (*cf.*, *EF*, III, 26b).

³²⁴ Or "we tear them up" (e.g., *Taʾrīkh*

³²⁵ See *Taʾrīkh Baghdād*, XI, 193; Ḥaṣṣ. A tradition designated as *ma* single transmitter who is suspected is guilty of much carelessness or fre

³²⁶ Cf., *Mizān*, I, 67. Although Ibrāhīm, it is likely that his real object what this was. He may have found anthropomorphist implications) trouble of the Quran's pre-eternity, which se was a problem for him, he was not th Madelung, "Origins," 523-525).

³²⁷ Literally, "I join (or unite) those you." Among the numerous citations

reported by this Ibrāhīm none fits the definition of a *munkar* tradition better than this one, for he was the only one to transmit it [from ‘Umar b. Ḥaḥṣ].³²² Bukhārī himself pointed out that Ibrāhīm b. Muhājir was a weak authority whose traditions fall into the class of those that are to be rejected in their entirety (*munkar al-ḥadīth*).³²³ Of ‘Umar b. Ḥaḥṣ, Aḥmad b. Ḥanbal said: “We burn his traditions!”³²⁴ Yaḥyā b. Ma‘īn maintained [that traditions reported by him] are not to be trusted. Nasā’ī said that his traditions are to be set aside (*matrūk al-ḥadīth*).³²⁵ Finally, the traditionist Abū Ḥātim b. Ḥibbān said: “The text (*matn*) of this tradition is a fabrication (*mawḍū‘*).”³²⁶

The Thirty-Fourth Tradition

173 In the *Ṣaḥīḥs* of Bukhārī and Muslim it is reported on the authority of Abū Hurayra that the Prophet said: “When God had completed the creation of humankind, kinship (*raḥim*) stood up and said: ‘This is the place of refuge from the severing [of kinship ties]!’ [God] replied: ‘Yes indeed! Are you not pleased that I strengthen those who strengthen you and weaken those who weaken you?’”³²⁷ In another tradition recorded by Bukhārī, the

Baghdād, XI, 192-194; *KDM*, II, 206; and *Mizān*, III, 189-190.

³²² A *munkar* tradition is one that is objectionable because it is transmitted by a single authority whose reputation is insufficient to offset the fact of his being its only transmitter (*El*², III, 26b; Dozy, II, 722/2; cf., Guillaume, *Traditions of Islam*, 181).

³²³ If a transmitter is classified as *munkar al-ḥadīth*, all of his traditions are to be rejected (cf., *El*², III, 26b).

³²⁴ Or “we tear them up” (e.g., *Taʾrīkh Baghdād*, XI, 193).

³²⁵ See *Taʾrīkh Baghdād*, XI, 193, where the same charge is levelled against ‘Umar b. Ḥaḥṣ. A tradition designated as *matrūk* is to be “abandoned” because it comes from “a single transmitter who is suspected of falsehood..., or is openly wicked in deed or word or is guilty of much carelessness or frequent wrong notions” (*El*², III, 26b).

³²⁶ Cf., *Mizān*, I, 67. Although Ibn al-Jawzī’s discussion of this tradition is limited to its *isnād*, it is likely that his real objection had to do with its *matn*, though he does not tell us what this was. He may have found the portrayal of God as reciting the Quran (with its anthropomorphist implications) troubling, but he also may have been troubled by the notion of the Quran’s pre-eternity, which seems to be at least implied in the tradition. If this latter was a problem for him, he was not the only Ḥanbalī to be exercised over this question (cf., Madelung, “Origins,” 523-525).

³²⁷ Literally, “I join (or unite) those who join (or unite) you and I sever those who sever you.” Among the numerous citations of this tradition, see esp., Muslim, *al-birr wa’ṣ-ṣīla*,

Prophet is reported to have said: "The term kinship (*raḥim*) is derived from the same root (*shajna*) as the term *Raḥmān* (the All-Merciful)."³²⁸

174 Abū 'Ubayd states that the term *shajna*, also pronounced *shujna* [or *shijna*], denotes the branches of a tree. [fol.34b] In the above tradition, then, the term *shajna* refers to an intimate relationship of interconnection like the roots and branches of a tree that are intertwined with each other.³²⁹

175 This tradition may be construed in one of two ways. It may mean that God shows special regard for kinship (*raḥim*); and so He strengthens those who strengthen it, weakens those who weaken it, and sees to it that its rights are respected—in the same way that one shows special regard for one's kinfolk over those to whom one is not related by blood. Or it may mean that the term *raḥim* is derived from [the same root as] the name *Raḥmān*, as if to emphasize [*raḥim's*] importance by calling attention to the derivation of the term. This latter interpretation is supported by a tradition in which 'Abd ar-Raḥmān b. 'Awf reports, on the authority of the Prophet, that God said: "I am *Raḥmān*! I have created *raḥim* and have derived its name from mine. Hence those who strengthen it, I will strengthen them, and those who sever it, I will scatter them."³³⁰ In another tradition, not cited in the canonical collections, the following words are found: "*Raḥim* is a branch (*shajna*) which is joined to the loin (*ḥaqw*) of *Raḥmān*."³³¹ A variant of this tradition reads: "When God created humankind, *raḥim* stood

16; Bukhārī, *tafsīr al-Qur'ān*, 47 (*Les traditions*, III, 445); *adab*, 13 (*Les traditions*, IV, 143-144); *tawḥīd*, 35 (*Les traditions*, IV, 624); *Musnad*, II, 330, 383, 406; Bayhaqī, *Asmā*², 368-369; and Graham, *Divine Word*, 134ff. Cf., also Ibn Fūrak, *Mushkil*, 301-303, where several related traditions are cited and discussed.

³²⁸ The tradition in Bukhārī (*adab*, 13 [2]) reads: عن أبي هريرة عن النبي قال: إنَّ الرحم شجنة من أصلك وصلته ومن قطعك قطعته. من الرحمن، فقال الله: من وصلك وصلته ومن قطعك قطعته. Cf., also Tirmidhī, *al-birr wa's-ṣīla*, 16; *Musnad*, I, 190, 321; II, 160, 295, 383, 406, 455; and Bayhaqī, *Asmā*², 370, 8-13; also Ibn Fūrak, *Mushkil*, 301; and Graham, *Divine Word*, 135.

³²⁹ On the Kufan grammarian Abū 'Ubayd al-Qāsim b. Sallām (d. 224/838), see *EF*², I, 157. See also Ibn al-Jawzī, *Gharīb al-Ḥadīth*, I, 523, where Abū 'Ubayd's comments on *shajna/shujna* are cited.

³³⁰ For this tradition, see Abū Dāwūd, *zakāt*, 45; *Musnad*, I, 191, 194; II, 160, 498; Tirmidhī, *al-birr wa's-ṣīla*, 9; Ibn Fūrak, *Mushkil*, 301; Bayhaqī, *Asmā*², 370; and Graham, *Divine Word*, 134.

³³¹ *DST*, 62; Bayhaqī, *Asmā*², 368, 369; and Ibn Fūrak, *Mushkil*, 301.

up and seized the loin of Ra
the severing [of kinship ties

176 Since [the above] say
meaning we have already
the loin of *Raḥmān* also on
request for aid (*istijāra*) an
tradition in the two *Ṣaḥīḥ*
"*Raḥim* is suspended (*muḥ*
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me, God will weaken the
(*ḥaqw*) is equated with loin
raḥim's attachment to God's
protection of] God's power (

177 Ibn Hāmid said: "It is
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side (*janīb*)."³³² This man is
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loin] does not imply bodily

³³² Bukhārī, *tafsīr al-Qur'ān*, 47.

³³³ Cf. Ibn Fūrak, *Mushkil*, 302.

³³⁴ Muslim, *al-birr wa's-ṣīla*, 17
388 Cf. also *Liḥāḥ*, XIV, 189, 10.

³³⁵ A metaphor for power.

³³⁶ In short, God's power or might
(*ḥalluq*). Ibn al-Jawzī's "quote" here
will best read: *الرحم بعز من الطقة*
(*ḥam*², 368, 8-9).

³³⁷ S. 39-56. See *K&L*, 961, for m

³³⁸ I have not found this saying
Muslim belief and piety, see *EF*², II.

up and seized the loin of *Raḥmān* and said: 'This is the place of refuge from the severing [of kinship ties].'³³²

176 Since [the above] sayings contain figures of speech (*amthāl*), whose meaning we have already explained, the reference to [*raḥim's*] clinging to the loin of *Raḥmān* also ought to be construed [metaphorically], viz., as a request for aid (*istijāra*) and protection (*it'isām*).³³³ This is born out by a tradition in the two *Ṣaḥīḥs* in which 'Ā'isha reports that the Prophet said: "Raḥim is suspended (*mu'allaqa*) from the throne (*'arsh*), and it says: 'Those who strengthen me, God will strengthen them, and those who weaken me, God will weaken them.'"³³⁴ Abū Bakr al-Bayhaqī said: "The loin (*ḥaqw*) is equated with loin cloth (*izār*);³³⁵ hence the tradition [referring to *raḥim's* attachment to God's loin] means that it is attached to [or seeks the protection of] God's power (*'izz*)."³³⁶

177 Ibn Ḥāmid said: "It is essential to affirm that God does have a loin and that *raḥim* actually attaches itself to it. We also believe that God has a side (*janb*), for the Quran states: 'Alas for me, for I have neglected God's side (*janb*).'"³³⁷ This man is utterly bereft of understanding! How can one be neglectful of someone's "side"? He then went on to maintain that attachment (*ta'alluq*) implies proximity and even contact (*mumāssa*) with [God's] loin, since it is reported in a tradition that God permitted [fol.35a] David to draw near enough as to be able to touch a part of Him.³³⁸ The *Qāḍī* went even further [in his commentary] on this saying, but he added the caveat: [the reference to God's loin] does not mean that He [literally] possesses such an organ or that He is made up of parts; *raḥim's* taking hold of [God's loin] does not imply bodily organs or a multiplicity of parts, nor does it

³³² Bukhārī, *tafsīr al-Qur'ān*, 47.

³³³ Cf., Ibn Fūrak, *Mushkil*, 302, 1-3, 11-12; and Bayhaqī, *Asmā'*, 369, 6-8.

³³⁴ Muslim, *al-birr wa'ṣ-ṣila*, 17; *Musnad*, II, 163, 190, 193, 209; and Bayhaqī, *Asmā'*, 369. Cf., also *Lisān*, XIV, 189, 10.

³³⁵ A metaphor for power.

³³⁶ In short, God's power or might is the place of refuge from the severing of kinship ties (*raḥim*). Ibn al-Jawzī's "quote" here is actually a paraphrase of al-Bayhaqī's statement. The full text reads: وقيل: الحق الإزار وإزاره عزّه بمعنى أنّه موصوف بالعزّ فلاذت الرحم بعزّه من القطيعة (Asmā', 369, 8-9).

³³⁷ S. 39: 56. See KAS, §61, for more on this verse and its "proper" interpretation.

³³⁸ I have not found this saying cited elsewhere. For more on Dāwūd and his place in Muslim belief and piety, see *EP*², II, 182.

imply union (*ittiṣāl*) or contact (*mumāssa*). [Abū Yaʿlā] then went on to contradict these confused comments by adding: "The expression *raḥim* (kinship) is an ellipsis that stands for *dhū'r-raḥim* (one devoted to kinship);³³⁹ it is [*raḥim*] who clings to the loin of *Raḥmān*. [Thus, in the text of the tradition] the governing word (*muḍāf*) of the construct phrase is suppressed and the object of the phrase (*muḍāf ilayhi*) stands by itself, for it makes no sense to attribute an act of 'clinging to' or 'attaching oneself to' (*ta'alluq*) *raḥim*. Rather, what is meant is that the person devoted to kinship (*dhū'r-raḥim*) attaches himself to the loin [of God]."³⁴⁰

178 [The net result of Abū Yaʿlā's approach] is to give added weight to anthropomorphic and corporealist interpretations [of the tradition]. Discussion with such persons is useless, for as the saying goes: "Without reason (*ʿaql*) there can be no meeting [of minds] (*qirān*)."³⁴¹ If the one possessing *raḥim*—being a body (*jism*)—is attached (*ta'alluq*), then to what is it attached?³⁴¹ We seek God's protection against errors of understanding!

The Thirty-Fifth Tradition

179 In his *Ṣaḥīḥ*, Muslim reports [from Abū Hurayra] that the Prophet said: "God says: 'Invincible power (*al-ʿizz*) is My loin cloth (*izārī*) and majesty (*al-kibriyā*) is My cloak (*ridāʾī*). Whoever challenges Me in respect of either of them, him will I punish.'"³⁴²

180 Abū Sulaymān al-Khaṭṭābī said: "This saying means that majesty (*kibriyā*) and power (*ʿazama*) are attributes unique to God. No one is comparable to God in respect of these qualities. It is not appropriate for

³³⁹ Literally, "the one possessing *raḥim*" which I take to mean: the one devoted to filial ties or virtues.

³⁴⁰ In the sense of taking refuge in, or seeking the protection of. One of Ibn al-Jawzī's problems with this kind of analysis is that it does not tackle the central problem of the tradition, viz., the question of the loin.

³⁴¹ Despite Abū Yaʿlā's grammatical analysis of the saying, the central problem remains: what is to be made of the reference to the loin?

³⁴² The tradition may be found in the following in substantially the same form cited by Ibn al-Jawzī: Muslim, *al-birr wa's-ṣila*, 136; Abū Dāwūd, *libās*, 28; Ibn Māja, *zuhd*, 16 (2, 3); *Musnad*, II, 248, 376, 414, 427, 442; VI, 19; and Munāwī, *Iṭḥāfāt*, 45 (90-92). Also see Bayhaqī, *Asmāʾ*, 133, 12-13; 138, 21-22; Ibn Fūrak, *Mushkil*, 316; and Graham, *Divine Word*, 162-163. Most versions of this tradition are traced back to Abū Hurayra.

anyone to presume to possess modesty and self-abasement are used above as figures of emphasis that just as no one also no creature may share.

181 In the *Ṣaḥīḥ* of Bukhārī, the authority of Abū Hurayra, present [fol.35b] when My s he mentions Me; if he ment him in My soul (*fī nafsi*). mention him before an even handbreadth (*shabr*), I will he draws near to Me by a fathom (*bāʿ*); and if he comes

182 The *Qāḍī* [Abū Yaʿlā] it is an attribute over and above the words of an innovator (*m tawḥīd*); no distinction is to

³⁴⁰ See Bukhārī, *Tawḥīd*, 15, 3; *al-ʿizz*, 2a, 2b, also 19 and 20; and see Ibn Māja, *adab*, 58; Tirmidhī, 516, 517, 524, 534, 539; III, 210, 2 with commentary, are found in Bayhaqī, 317-322; Ibn Khyzayma, *Tawḥīd*, 1; Lacombe, 249; and Graham, *Divine Word*, 162-163. The last part of this saying is cited.

³⁴¹ The statement attributed to A is read in the light of §44 where the clearly: *قلت: وهذا قول لا يستند إلا بوجوب أن الذات شيء، والنفس غير ذات* *raḥim* is an attribute over and above perspective, for it assumes that [God distinct from it]. To affirm that son question is separate from the divi adopting an anthropomorphist or co

anyone to presume to possess them, for the qualities befitting a creature are modesty and self-abasement. The terms cloak (*ridāʾ*) and loin cloth (*izār*) are used above as figures of speech (*mathalan*) and, as such, were meant to emphasize that just as no one may share [God's] 'cloak' or 'loin cloth' so also no creature may share in His majesty or power."

The Thirty-Sixth Tradition

181 In the *Ṣaḥīḥs* of Bukhārī and Muslim there is a tradition, cited on the authority of Abū Hurayra, in which the Prophet says: "God said: 'I am present [fol.35b] when My servant thinks of Me and I am with him whenever he mentions Me; if he mentions Me in his soul (*fī nafsihi*), I will mention him in My soul (*fī nafsī*). If he mentions Me before an assembly, I will mention him before an even better assembly. If he draws near to Me by a handsbreadth (*shibr*), I will draw near to him by an arm's length (*dirāʾ*); if he draws near to Me by an arm's length, I will draw near to him by a fathom (*bāʿ*); and if he comes to Me walking, I will come to him running.'"³⁴³

182 The *Qāḍī* [Abū Yaʿlā] maintained that God has a soul (*nafs*) and that it is an attribute over and above His essence (*zāʾida ʿalāʾdh-dhāt*). These are the words of an innovator (*mubtadiʿ*) and reflect an anthropomorphist stance (*tashbīh*); no distinction is to be made between God's *dhāt* and His *nafs*.³⁴⁴

³⁴³ See Bukhārī, *tawḥīd*, 15, 3 (Houdas, *Les traditions*, IV, 588); Muslim, *dhikr wa duʿāʾ*, 2a, 2b, also 19 and 20; and Muslim, *tawba*, 1. For other references to this tradition, see Ibn Māja, *adab*, 58; Tirmidhī, *daʿawāt*, 31; *Musnad*, II, 251, 315, 391, 413, 445, 480, 516, 517, 524, 534, 539; III, 210, 277, 491; and IV, 106. Other references to this tradition, with commentary, are found in Bayhaqī, *Asmāʾ*, 457ff.; Ibn Fūrak, *Mushkil*, 222-223 and 317-322; Ibn Khyzayma, *Tawḥīd*, 7; Qushayrī, *Risāla*, 322; Ibn Qutayba, *Taʾwīl*, 284 (cf., Lecomte, 249); and Graham, *Divine Word*, 127-128. Cf., also KAS, §§33/6 and 222 where the last part of this saying is cited.

³⁴⁴ The statement attributed to Abū Yaʿlā and Ibn al-Jawzī's comments above should be read in the light of §44 where the meaning of the expression زائدة على is stated quite clearly: وقد ذهب القاضي على أن لله نفساً وهي صفة زائدة على ذاته. قلت: وهذا قول لا يستند إلا إلى التشبيه لأنه يوجب أن الذات شيء والنفس غيرها (The Qāḍī [Abū Yaʿlā] held that God's *nafs* is an attribute over and above His essence. But this view is derivative of a corporealist perspective, for it assumes that [God's] essence is a 'thing' and that [His] *nafs* is something distinct from it). To affirm that something is زائدة على الذات is to assert that the thing in question is separate from the divine essence, which for Ibn al-Jawzī is tantamount to adopting an anthropomorphist or corporealist stance since it introduces multiplicity into the

There is no reason not to accept the interpretation referred to above in connection with our discussion of the verses of the Quran.³⁴⁵ Expressions such as “drawing near” (*qurb*) and “running” (*harwala*) occur frequently in Arabic, as e.g., in the Quranic verse where it speaks of “...those who ‘march’ against our signs [so as to thwart them].”³⁴⁶ It is clearly not a question of literal or physical movement (*mashy*).³⁴⁷

The Thirty-Seventh Tradition

183 Abū Saʿīd [al-Khudrī] reported a tradition in which the Prophet said: “God is beautiful (*jamīl*) and He loves beauty (*jamāl*).”³⁴⁸

184 According to the experts (*ʿulamāʾ*), the term *jamīl* here has the special sense of *mujmil*, viz., one whose beauty is expressed in his actions. [When applied to God, it refers to] His creation of beauty of form (*ṣūra*), of character (*akhlāq*), and of deeds (*iḥsān*).³⁴⁹ One judges to be beautiful

being of God. See *Mushkil*, 319-320, where Ibn Fūrak argues that the term *nafs*, when applied to God, must be construed as being identical with the divine essence. On the question of the *nafs*, see *EP*², VII, 880-884; and Lane, 2827/1-2828/2.

³⁴⁵ See esp. §44, where Ibn al-Jawzī maintains that references to God's *nafs* in the Quran are to be construed as referring to his *dhāt* (essence).

³⁴⁶ S. 22: 51 and 34: 5.

³⁴⁷ Cf., Ibn Fūrak, *Mushkil*, 318, 10-16.

³⁴⁸ Lane (461/1) reads the last word of this saying as *jimāl* and translates it “and He loves those of like character.” The standard *ḥadīth* collections, however, read it as *jamāl*, as does Ibn Manẓūr (*Lisān*, XI, 126/2). For references to the saying, see Muslim, *īmān*, 147; and *Musnad*, IV, 133, 134, 151. The same text is cited by Ibn Manẓūr in *Lisān*, XI, 126/1, 20-21; and Lane, 461/1, respectively, in their discussion of *jamīl*. Cf., also al-Ghazzālī, *Ihyāʾ*, IV, 298; Bayhaqī, *Asmāʾ*, 42; and Ibn Fūrak, *Mushkil*, 329. A slightly different version is found in Tirmidhī, *birr wa ṣila*, 61; and *Musnad*, I, 399. See Bayhaqī, *Asmāʾ*, 41-42, 311-312; and especially Ibn Fūrak, *Mushkil*, 329-331, where the meaning of *jamīl* as applied to God is discussed in some detail. For other interpretations of the tradition, especially those offered by al-Ghazzālī and Ibn ʿArabī, see Ormsby, *Theodicy*, 104ff.

³⁴⁹ Cf., Lane, 461/1; Bayhaqī, *Asmāʾ*, 42; and Ibn Fūrak, *Mushkil*, 330, 10ff., where he insists that *jamīl* here must be understood in the sense of *mujmil*. He writes: *إن أهل اللغة قد يستعملون مثل هذا اللفظ من فعيل على معنى مُفَعِّل كوصفنا الله جلّ ذكره بأنه حكيم والمراد به مُحَكِّم لما فعله، وكذلك يجوز أن يقال: الله تعالى جميل بمعنى مُجَمِّل وإجماله المضاف إليه على وجهين: أحدهما أن يكون يحسّن الصور والخلق.... الوجه الثاني من الإجمال المضاف إلى الله عزّ وجلّ وهو بمعنى الإحسان والفضل، أي وهو المظهر للنعمة والفضل* (Lexicographers sometimes use expressions of

(*jamīl*) what is characterized
The *Qāḍī* [Abū Yaʿlā's] exp
with the notion of divine
describe God as beautiful
divine essence itself; the exp
and beauty (*ḥusn*) referred
in the most beautiful form
(*ṣubūt*) in its purest form.

185 The *Qāḍī* [Abū Yaʿlā]
al-ʿArīz: “When God has
Paradise and Hell, He will c
the angels.³⁵⁰ He will stop a
the people of that level. Afte
[what you wish]!” But they
Because of Your power, You
if You were to divide [fol. 3
jinn (*ṭhāqalayn*)³⁵¹ we would

the *ṣif* pattern [act. part. of form I
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[one who acts wisely or judicious
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³⁵⁰ Following an Ashʿarite line of
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III, 5). When applied to God it can

³⁵¹ An allusion to S. 2: 210 (“W
shadow of the clouds with the ange
I, 225-226; Tabari, *Tafsīr*, IV, 260-2

³⁵² By “the first level” is presumab

³⁵³ The term occurs once in the C
most medieval exegetes as meaning

(*jamīl*) what is characterized by perfection and goodness (*tāmma mustahsana*). The *Qāḍī* [Abū Yaʿlā's] explanation [of beauty], however, is not in keeping with the notion of divine [transcendence]. He said: "It is permissible to describe God as beautiful and to regard that quality as an attribute of the divine essence itself; the expression *jamāl* denotes that quality of perfection and beauty (*ḥusn*) referred to by the Prophet when he said: 'I saw my Lord in the most beautiful form (*fī aḥsani šūratin*).'" This is anthropomorphism (*tashbīh*) in its purest form.³⁵⁰

The Thirty-Eighth Tradition

185 The *Qāḍī* [Abū Yaʿlā] reported the following from ʿUmar b. ʿAbd al-ʿAzīz: "When God has finished [deciding the fate of] the people of Paradise and Hell, He will come walking in the shadow of the clouds with the angels.³⁵¹ He will stop at the first level [of Paradise]³⁵² and will greet the people of that level. After being greeted by them He will say: 'Ask Me [what you wish]!' But they will respond: 'What shall we ask of You? Because of Your power, Your majesty, and Your exalted position (*makān*), if You were to divide [fol. 36a] among us the provisions for both men and jinn (*thaqalayn*)³⁵³ we would give them to eat and drink, and what would

the *faʿīl* pattern [act. part. of form I] in the sense of the *muʿīl* pattern [act. part. of form IV] as, for example, when we refer to God as *ḥakīm* [wise or judicious] in the sense of *muḥkim* [one who acts wisely or judiciously]. Thus it is permissible to speak of God as *jamīl* [beautiful] in the sense of *muḥmil* [one whose actions are beautiful or characterized by beauty]. Beauty of action [*ijmāl*] may be predicated of God in one of two senses: 1) in the sense of producing beautiful forms and qualities, or 2) in the sense of doing deeds of goodness and generosity). Ibn Fūrak's point is that *jamīl*, when applied to God, is an attribute of action (*fīʿl*), not of essence (*dhāt*). This is precisely the point Ibn al-Jawzī insists on above.

³⁵⁰ Following an Ashʿarite line of reasoning, Ibn al-Jawzī emphatically denies that *jamīl* can be applied to God as an attribute of the divine essence (cf., Ibn Fūrak, 329, 12, and 331, 5). When applied to God it can only be one of the *ṣifāt al-fīʿl* (attributes of action).

³⁵¹ An allusion to S. 2: 210 ("What, do they expect that God will come to them in the shadow of the clouds with the angels?"). For a discussion of this verse, see *Zād al-Masīr*, I, 225-229; Ṭabarī, *Tafsīr*, IV, 260-274; and Zamakhsharī, *Kashshāf*, I, 353-354 (cf., §64).

³⁵² By "the first level" is presumably meant "the lowest level or rank."

³⁵³ The term occurs once in the Quran in its dual form (S. 55: 31) and is regarded by most medieval exegetes as meaning "humankind and the jinn" (cf., Zamakhsharī, *Kashshāf*,

remain with us would not be decreased.' He will reply: 'So make your request!' They will answer: 'We ask for Your acceptance (*riḍā*).'³⁵⁴ He will respond: 'It is because of My acceptance that you will be invited to dwell in the house of My honor.' [God] will do this to the people of each rank [among the people of Paradise] until He reaches His court (*ilā majlisihi*)."³⁵⁴

186 This tradition is a fabrication placed in the mouth of 'Umar. [But even if it were to be accepted as one of 'Umar's sayings], how would it be possible to establish a divine attribute on the basis of what 'Umar said? Ibn Ḥāmid said: "On the day of resurrection He will *come* to the place of judgment (*maḥshar*), for [the Quran] says 'Your Lord will come..., '³⁵⁵ [that is,] at the time of His descent to [the nearest] heaven." The *Qāḍī* [Abū Ya'ālā] said: "The verse 'God will come to them in the shadow of the clouds' ³⁵⁶ is a confirmation of what 'Umar said." [Abū Ya'ālā], however, did not understand that this verse means that God will bring them the shadow [of the clouds as protection].³⁵⁷ [Abū Ya'ālā] went on to say: "It is possible to take the text [of 'Umar's saying] in its literal sense (*alā ḡāhirihi*) though we do not construe His walking (*mashy-ahu*) and His arrival at His court to mean movement (*intiqāl*)."³⁵⁷ How can a person who says he interprets these terms in a literal fashion turn around and say "but not in the sense of movement"? He added this

IV, 47, e.g. Also see Paret, *Der Koran* [translation], 447, and note 14; and *Les traditions*, I, 431). For a summary of the meanings of the term *thaqal*, see Lane 344/2.

³⁵⁴ See *DST*, 64, where the saying is quoted in full. Although Ibn al-Jawzī cites Abū Ya'ālā as his source, the saying does not appear in the *Mu'tamad*. Indeed, apart from Ibn Fūrak, where the middle portion of the saying is cited in a slightly different form (*Mushkil*, 334, 3-4), I have so far not found it cited elsewhere. The saying as quoted by Ibn Fūrak reads: *إِنَّ اللَّهَ يَمْشِي فِي ظِلِّلٍ مِنَ الْغَمَامِ وَالْمَلَائِكَةُ وَيَقِفُ عَلَى أَدْنَى أَهْلِ الْجَنَّةِ دَرَجَةً، فَيَسَلِّمُ عَلَيْهِمْ* (God will come walking in the shadow of the clouds and will stop at the lowest rank of the people of Paradise. He will greet them and they will reciprocate the greeting whereupon He will return to His 'Place').

³⁵⁵ S. 6: 158 (cf., also 9: 24). On 6: 158, see *Zād al-Masīr*, III, 156; Zamakhsharī, *Kashshāf*, II, 63. Cf., also KAS, §64.

³⁵⁶ S. 2: 210.

³⁵⁷ As he explains elsewhere (see, e.g., §64; also *Zād al-Masīr*, I, 226), *fi* in this verse carries the force of the preposition *bi* so that the verse should be construed as meaning: God will bring them the shadow (*bi-ḡulal*) of the clouds as an act of mercy, not that God will come to them literally in the shadow. In the former sense God is portrayed as exercising His power; in the latter He is portrayed as engaging in an act of movement.

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187 'Ā'isha is reported to
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³⁵⁸ The Arabic expression *maḡ*
it does, however, occur in a num
maḡ, 84; and Bukhārī, *asfār*, 17,
as a reference to the Prophet's
judgment. In a lengthy discussion
argues in favor of this interpreta
view. Tāḥiri does concede, howe
cregate. Mujaḥid (d. ca. 104/722)
the *maḡm* *muḥimād* is a referenc
the Prophet to sit with Him on the
little support until the late 9th cen
Almal'ā. Ḥanbal and made into a
question. The first Ḥanbali know
al-Marwāf (d. 275/888). Later in
vernal crusade in support of the v
Tāḥiri himself came under attack
and Ibn Kāṭir, *Bidāya*, XI, 174. F
controversy, see Rosenthal's intr
68-70). Other Ḥanbalis who are
Ḥakīm al-Najād (d. 348/960), Ibn Ba
is Ibn al-Jawzī) Abū Ya'ālā (d. 458
collectors without making reference
20-21). Clearly this was an issue a
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agreed by the mid-12th century (c
the case of Ibn Qudāma). So far as
561/1165) was the last prominent
and Ḥanbalī position on the *maḡm*

³⁵⁹ See *DST*, 66, and BA, fol. 338
'Ā'isha. The saying, reported by
al-Marwāf, I, 71-72. 'Abd al-Qāṣir also
and 'Abd. Allāh b. Sallām, according

qualification merely to please the uninformed, for how can walking (*mashy*) [taken in its literal sense] mean anything other than movement (*intiqāl*)?

The Thirty-Ninth Tradition

187 ʿĀʾisha is reported to have said: “When The Messenger of God was asked about ‘the place of honor’ (*maqām maḥmūd*),³⁵⁸ he said: ‘My Lord promised me that I would sit on the Throne (*ʿarsh*).’”³⁵⁹

³⁵⁸ The Arabic expression *maqām maḥmūd* appears only once in the Quran (S. 17: 79); it does, however, occur in a number of traditions (e.g., *Musnad*, I, 398; III, 456; Dārimī, *riqāq*, 80; and Bukhārī, *tafsīr*, 17, 11). Sunnīs generally seem to have regarded the expression as a reference to the Prophet’s role as intercessor for the Community on the day of judgment. In a lengthy discussion of the expression in his *Tafsīr* (XV, 97-100), Ṭabarī argues in favor of this interpretation and cites a long list of authorities in support of this view. Ṭabarī does concede, however, that the alternative view set forth by the first-century exegete, Mujāhid (d. ca. 104/722), cannot be dismissed entirely. Mujāhid had argued that the *maqām maḥmūd* is a reference to the fact that on the day of judgment God will invite the Prophet to sit with Him on the Throne (*ʿarsh*). Mujāhid’s interpretation apparently won little support until the late 9th century when it was taken over by some of the disciples of Aḥmad b. Ḥanbal and made into a kind of Ḥanbalī slogan, despite Aḥmad’s silence on the question. The first Ḥanbalī known to have defended the view of Mujāhid was Abū Bakr al-Marwazī (d. 275/888). Later it was taken up by Barbahārī (d. 329/941) who organized a virtual crusade in support of the view, leading to a series of public demonstrations in which Ṭabarī himself came under attack (Yāqūt, *Irshād*, VI, 242-243; *Muntaẓam*, VI, 159, 172; and Ibn Kathīr, *Bidāya*, XI, 174. For an interesting account of Ṭabarī’s involvement in this controversy, see Rosenthal’s introduction to his translation of Ṭabarī’s *Taʾrīkh* [vol. I, 69-78]). Other Ḥanbalīs who are known to have defended the view of Mujāhid are Abū Bakr an-Najjād (d. 348/960), Ibn Baṭṭa (d. 387/997), Ibn Ḥāmid (d. 403/1012), and (according to Ibn al-Jawzī) Abū Yaʿlā (d. 458/1065). Ibn Abī Yaʿlā reports that Barbahārī never gave a lecture without making reference to the *maqām maḥmūd* (*Ṭabaqāt al-Ḥanābila*, II, 43, 20-21). Clearly this was an issue about which some Ḥanbalīs felt deeply. It is interesting and perhaps significant that the issue appears to have been dropped from the Ḥanbalī agenda by the mid-12th century (cf., Laoust, *La Profession de foi d’Ibn Baṭṭa*, cxxxiv, on the case of Ibn Qudāma). So far as I have been able to determine ʿAbd al-Qādir al-Jilānī (d. 561/1165) was the last prominent Ḥanbalī of the 12th century to take up a defense of the old Ḥanbalī position on the *maqām maḥmūd* (*Ghunya*, I, 71-72).

³⁵⁹ See *DST*, 66, and *BA*, fol. 33b, where the saying is cited, in both cases traced back to ʿĀʾisha. The saying, reported by ʿĀʾisha, is also cited by ʿAbd al-Qādir al-Jilānī in his *Ghunya*, I, 71-72. ʿAbd al-Qādir also quotes another saying, attributed to ʿUmar b. al-Khaṭṭāb and ʿAbd Allāh b. Sallām, according to which God will have the Prophet seated in front of

came to the Messenger of God and said to him: "Pray to God that He might allow me to enter Paradise!" [Upon hearing these words, the Prophet] praised God and then added: "His *kursī*³⁶³ encompasses the heavens and the earth;³⁶⁴ [when God occupies his *kursī*] it creaks like a new saddle when ridden."³⁶⁵

191 This tradition exists in a large number of different versions. Sometimes it is cited with an *isnād* going back through ʿAbd Allāh b. Khalīfa³⁶⁶ and ʿUmar, respectively, to the Messenger of God, and sometimes with an *isnād*

³⁶³ Following Ṭabarī (*Tafsīr*, V, 397-403), Ibn al-Jawzī states in his commentary on the *āyat al-kursī* (S. 2: 255 [*Zād al-Masīr*, I, 403, 2-4]) that exegetes differ over the meaning of the term *kursī*: 1) some maintain that it refers to God's knowledge (*ʿilm*); thus when S. 2: 255 says that God's "*kursī* encompasses the heavens and the earth," it means, in effect, that His knowledge comprehends all things. 2) Some hold that it refers to God's footstool. 3) Finally, some maintain that the *kursī* is a synonym for *ʿarsh* (throne). While Ṭabarī declares himself in favor of the first interpretation of the term, Ḥanbalīs, following Aḥmad (cf., *Ṭabaqāt al-Ḥanābila*, I, 28, 14-16), traditionally preferred the second (cf., e.g., the *Muʿtamad* of Abū Yaʿlā, 177, 19; al-Jilānī's *Ghunya*, I, 56, 7-9; and Laoust, *La Profession de foi d'Ibn Baṭṭa*, 88, n. 2; for a non-Ḥanbalī, but still traditionalist, point of view, see Bayhaqī, *Asmāʾ*, 403-405). In his commentary on the *āyat al-kursī*, Ibn al-Jawzī does not indicate which of the three views is to be preferred. Indeed, from remarks made below in §192, one has the impression that he personally inclined toward a fourth view not mentioned in the *Zād* or by Ṭabarī, but noted by Zamakhsharī (*Kashshāf*, I, 385-386), viz., one that sees the Quranic reference to the *kursī* (and the *ʿarsh*) as metaphorical language designed to express God's greatness and His power. In any case, it is clear from the discussion below in KAS, §§192-194, that the traditional Ḥanbalī view, indeed any view that smacks of literalism, is out of the question for Ibn al-Jawzī. For a similar approach to the question of the terms *kursī* and *ʿarsh*, see Ibn Fūrak, *Mushkil*, 341-342, and 387-390 (cf., *El*², V, 509).

³⁶⁴ Cf., S. 2: 255.

³⁶⁵ For citations of this tradition in other works, see *DST*, 66; *BA*, fol. 34a; Ibn Fūrak, *Mushkil*, 389, 7-8; and Ibn Khuzayma, *Tawḥīd*, 106, 5-9. For similar or closely related texts, see Ṭabarī, *Tafsīr*, V, 400, 1-6; *Muʿtamad*, 177, 17-19; *Asmāʾ*, 403-404; and Ibn al-Jawzī's, *ʿIlal*, I, 22-23. See also Gimaret, *Images*, 77, where still other references may be found. In spite of Ibn al-Jawzī's reference above to Dāraqūṭnī, I have not found the saying in the latter's *Kitāb as-Sunan*; perhaps it is a question of his *Kitāb aṣ-Ṣifāt*.

³⁶⁶ An early Kufan transmitter about whom little is known; he is said to have received traditions from ʿUmar and to have been regarded as a reliable transmitter by a number of 9th century scholars, among them: Ibn Ḥibbān, Ṭabarī, Ibn Māja, and others (*Mizān*, II, 414; Ṭabarī, *Tafsīr*, V, 400 and n. 1). Although his dates are not given, he is identified as a member of the *tābiʿī* generation.

going back through Abū Ishāq³⁶⁷ and ‘Abd Allāh b. Khalīfa but stopping with ‘Umar. [In one such version] ‘Umar [is reported to have] said: “When God sits on the *kursī* it is heard to creak like a camel’s saddle.”³⁶⁸ According to Ibn Jarīr,³⁶⁹ ‘Abd Allāh b. Khalīfa reported [in still another version] that the Prophet said: “Verily [God’s] *kursī* encompasses (*wasī‘a*) the heavens and the earth; [when] He seats Himself upon it no part of it is left [unoccupied], not even a space the width of four fingers³⁷⁰—and as he spoke these words he made a sign with his fingers and joined them—and verily [the *kursī*] creaks like a saddle on account of the load it must bear when ridden.”³⁷¹ According to Abū Bakr al-Marwazī, however, Ibn Khalīfa reported that the Messenger of God said: “The *kursī* is that upon which the Lord sits and no part of it remains [unoccupied] except a space the width of four fingers.”

192 There is a conflict between the wording of this last version and that of the preceding one, a conflict that is a consequence of confusion and poor memory on the part of its transmitters. The preferred reading is: “No part of it remains [unoccupied], not even a space the width of four fingers.” These words, however, should be taken to mean that God fills [the *kursī*] with his power (*‘azama*) and majesty (*hayba*).³⁷² In short, this text resorts to figurative language in order to impress [upon the consciousness the reality of] the Creator’s majesty and power. The expressions “when He sits” (*idhā*

³⁶⁷ ‘Amr b. ‘Abd Allāh b. ‘Alī Abū Ishāq as-Sabī‘ī, a respected Kufan transmitter who died in 128/745 or in 130/747 (cf., Ibn Sa‘d, *Ṭabaqāt*, VI, 313-315). Dhahabī reports that Abū Ishāq, though a sincere and honest person, suffered from amnesia in his later years and sometimes inadvertently confused traditions he transmitted (*Mīzān*, III, 270).

³⁶⁸ I have not found this version of the tradition cited elsewhere except in *DST*, 67; and *BA*, fol. 34a.

³⁶⁹ The famous Ṭabarī (Muḥammad b. Jarīr Abū Ja‘far aṭ-Ṭabarī, d. 310/922), author of a justly celebrated commentary on the Quran. For the text of what follows, see his *Tafsīr*, V, 400, 1-6.

³⁷⁰ That is, the width of a palm. As the above translation indicates, I take the *mā* here as a negative. If it is taken as a pronoun (which seems feasible from a grammatical point of view), the results are quite different. In the former case, God occupies the whole of the *kursī* so that not even a space the width of a palm remains; in the latter case, He occupies the whole of it except the space of a palm.

³⁷¹ See Ṭabarī, *Tafsīr*, V, 400, 1-6; Dārimī, *ar-Radd ‘alā’l-Marīsī*, 432, 2-6; and Mu‘tamad, 178, 2-5. In Ṭabarī and Dārimī the *isnād* is given in full. For additional references, see Gimaret, *Images*, 77.

³⁷² Cf., Ibn Fūrak, *Mushkil*, 341-342; also Zamakhsharī, *Kashshāf*, I, 385, 6-9.

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195 The *Qāḍī* [Abū Ya‘lā

³⁷³ S. 7: 54.

³⁷⁴ See Ibn Fūrak, *Mushkil*, 389-3

³⁷⁵ My translation here is a tentati
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³⁷⁶ Perhaps the reference is to M
al-Zāghūnī al-Qunṭarī (d. 260/875), w
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al-Ḥadhālī in the *ṭabaqāt* literature. F
Biḥār al-‘Ulūm, III, 256; *Muntazam*, V, 25
389.

³⁷⁷ That is, that part of the *kursī* or

³⁷⁸ Cf., Ibn Butṭā, *Kitāb al-Idāra*, 6

³⁷⁹ Abū ‘Āmir b. Sharīḥ al-Sha
105/721 or, according to some, in 11
along with a list of sources, see Joynt

qa'ada) or "when He takes his seat" (*idhā jalasa*), used by [certain] transmitters, represent either an alteration [of the original text] or an interpretation based upon what they presumed the meaning [of the original text] to be. Similarly, some have construed [the Quranic verse] "He seated himself (*istawā*) on the Throne (*ʿarsh*)"³⁷³ to mean that He [literally] seated himself (*qa'ada*) [on the Throne]. The Creator, however, is not to be described as sitting on something so that part of the thing in question is left [unoccupied]. This is a characteristic of finite bodies (*ajsām*)!³⁷⁴ Ibn Zāghūnī said: "The meaning of this tradition is that the four fingers are deduced from the attribute of God's being on the Throne (*ṣifat al-istiwāʾ*)."³⁷⁵ Such [nonsense] can only leave [fol.37a] the unlettered masses (*al-ʿawāmm*) confused. Do his words have any meaning at all? [If not], then it should be said that the reference to four [fingers] does not imply contiguity or contact. All of this is clearly anthropomorphic and corporealist [in its conception of God]. Moreover, it entails the predication of divine attributes on the basis of what is not sound because it rests on defective traditions. Indeed, I have seen a report that Abū Bakr b. Muslim al-ʿĀbidī³⁷⁶ once said: "This is the space (*mawḍiʿ*)³⁷⁷ that will be left for Muḥammad so that he may seat himself on it."³⁷⁸ It would have been better had this pious man given himself exclusively to the worship of God and not taken up the discussion of such matters.

193 The *Qāḍī* [Abū Yaʿlā] reported that Shaʿbī³⁷⁹ said: "God fills the

³⁷³ S. 7: 54.

³⁷⁴ See Ibn Fūrak, *Mushkil*, 389-390, where similar views are expressed.

³⁷⁵ My translation here is a tentative attempt to render the Arabic of this sentence, but the point of Ibn az-Zāghūnī's statement is not entirely clear to me.

³⁷⁶ Perhaps the reference is to Muḥammad b. Muslim b. ʿAbd ar-Raḥmān Abū Bakr az-Zāhid al-Qanṭarī (d. 260/873), well known among his fellow Baghdādīs for his ascetic practices. Al-Qanṭarī is said to have practiced a brand of asceticism based on the teaching of Bishr al-Hāfī and to have counted al-Junayd among his students. Although he did count Ḥanbalīs (especially Abū Bakr al-Marwazī) among his close friends, he is not identified as a Ḥanbalī in the *ṭabaqāt* literature. For biographical notices on al-Qanṭarī, see esp., *Taʾrīkh Baghdād*, III, 256; *Muntaẓam*, V, 25-26; *Ṣafwa*, II, 221; and the *Ḥilya* of Abū Nuʿaym, X, 309.

³⁷⁷ That is, that part of the *kursī* or *ʿarsh* which God does not (or will not) occupy.

³⁷⁸ Cf., Ibn Baṭṭa, *Kitāb al-Ibāna*, 61 (trans., 113).

³⁷⁹ Abū ʿĀmir b. Sharāḥīl ash-Shaʿbī, a leading jurist and traditionist of Kufa (died in 103/721 or, according to some, in 110/728). For a critical discussion of his life and work, along with a list of sources, see Juynboll, *ET*², IX, 162-163; also GAS, I, 277. Among the

Throne (*‘arsh*) so completely that it creaks like a camel’s saddle.”³⁸⁰ This, however, is a saying falsely attributed to Sha‘bī. In commenting on the saying, [Abū Ya‘lā] said: “It is entirely permissible to construe this saying in its literal sense (*‘alā ṣāhirihi*) to mean that the divine essence fills (*tamlā‘u*) the Throne, but not, however, in the sense of occupying a place (*lā ‘alā shughli makānin*).” Those who spread this kind of confusion should not discourse on [matters of this sort in public]. How astonishing it is that something may fill a particular place but not occupy it!

194 The *Qāḍī* [Abū Ya‘lā] reported that Khālīd b. Ma‘dān³⁸¹ said: “The All-Merciful One is heavy for the carriers of the Throne (*‘arsh*) [to bear].” [Abū Ya‘lā] went on to say: “It is permissible to take this statement in its literal sense (*‘alā ṣāhiri*), for the weight [born by the carriers of the Throne] derives from the essence of Raḥmān,” but he added: “this interpretation does not imply actual contact.” Such persons ought to be more discreet in the statements they make!

The Forty-First Tradition

195 According to the *Ṣaḥīḥs* of Muslim and Bukhārī, Abū Sa‘īd [al-Khudrī] reported that the Messenger of God said: “On the day of resurrection God will say: ‘O Adam!’ and he will reply: ‘I am here at Your service ready to do Your bidding.’ Thereupon a voice (*ṣawt*) will cry out saying: ‘God commands that you send a group of your descendents to Hell.’”³⁸²

196 The term “voice” (*ṣawt*) is found only in traditions transmitted by

more important sources on him, see Ibn Sa‘d, *Ṭabaqāt*, VI, 246-256; *Ḥilya*, IV, 310-338; and *Ṣaḥīḥ*, III, 40-41.

³⁸⁰ Cited also by Ibn Fūrak (*Mushkil*, 341, 3-4). Abū Ya‘lā, however, makes no mention of the saying in his *Mu‘tamad*.

³⁸¹ Abū ‘Abd Allāh Khālīd b. Ma‘dān b. Abī Kurab (or Kurayb) al-Kalā‘ī, a prominent Syrian ascetic who died in 103/721. For an interesting account of this colorful figure, see *Ḥilya*, V, 210-221 (cf. *Ṣaḥīḥ*, IV, 188); and Ibn Sa‘d, *Ṭabaqāt*, VII, 455. J. van Ess (*IEP*, IV, 369) regards him as a man of Qadarī sympathies.

³⁸² Cf., *DST*, 67; and *BA*, fol. 34a. This tradition, including the reference to the *ṣawt*, appears twice in Bukhārī: *tawhīd*, 32 (3); and *tafsīr*, 22 (1), in both of which Ḥafṣ. b. Ghiyāth and his son ‘Umar are mentioned as among its transmitters. For versions of this tradition that omit reference to the *ṣawt*, see Bukhārī, *riqāq*, 45; Muslim, *imān*, 379; *Musnad*, I, 388; and II, 378. Despite Ibn al-Jawzī’s reference above to Muslim, I have not found this tradition (with its reference to the *ṣawt*) in his *Ṣaḥīḥ*.

Ḥafṣ b. Ghiyāth.³⁸³ *Wakīf*, al-A‘mash diverge [from the] of this tradition contains n once was asked about Ḥafṣ [fol.37b] contain errors.”

197 There is a sound tr ‘uttered’ His revelation (*idhā* heard [something] that sou One traditionist, relating v tradition in his own words heaven heard [God’s] voice Mas‘ūd reads: “When God heard a noise that sounded l wording is more acceptable containing the words “the i appear in any of the sound tr

³⁸³ Ḥafṣ b. Ghiyāth b. Ṭalq Abi who was appointed to the office Although he was equally well k mixed in their assessment of his n (among them Abū’l-Ḥasan al-‘Ijlī competence and reliability in this fi had reservations. Ibn Sa‘d accus 389-390); Aḥmad b. Ḥanbal and Y the trustworthiness of traditions n transmitted from memory. For mor *Kāmil*, VI, 237; Dhahabī, *Mizān*, I

³⁸⁴ Cf., Muslim, *imān*, 379.

³⁸⁵ Cf., *Mizān*, I, 567-568.

³⁸⁶ For the full text of this tradi *Ḥamīd*, 201-202 (in both, the tradit *IEP*; and Ibn Fūrak, *Mushkil*, 351.

³⁸⁷ See *Zād*, VII, 452ff., where I extended gloss on S. 34-23. Cf., a Wādeiling, “Origins of the Controv *Kutubma*, *Tawhīd*, 145-149; and I

³⁸⁸ Ibn al-Jawzī’s objection to th *Ṣaḥīḥ* is twofold, textual and theolo etc., Ḥafṣ b. Ghiyāth, it is not an ad

Ḥafṣ b. Ghiyāth.³⁸³ Wakī, Jarīr and others who received traditions from al-Aʿmash diverge [from the wording transmitted by Ḥafṣ] and their version of this tradition contains no reference to the voice.³⁸⁴ Aḥmad [b. Ḥanbal] once was asked about Ḥafṣ and he replied: "The traditions he transmitted [fol.37b] contain errors."³⁸⁵

197 There is a sound tradition [which reads as follows]: "When God 'uttered' His revelation (*idhā takallama...bi'l-waḥy*), the inhabitants of heaven heard [something] that sounded like a chain being dragged over rocks."³⁸⁶ One traditionist, relating what he presumed to be the meaning of the tradition in his own words, reported it as follows: "The inhabitants of heaven heard [God's] voice (*ṣawt*)."³⁸⁷ However, the version reported by Ibn Masʿūd reads: "When God 'uttered' his revelation the inhabitants of heaven heard a noise that sounded like a chain being dragged across rocks."³⁸⁷ This wording is more acceptable than that of the preceding one. The sentence containing the words "the inhabitants of heaven heard his voice" does not appear in any of the sound traditions.³⁸⁸

³⁸³ Ḥafṣ b. Ghiyāth b. Ṭalq Abū ʿUmar an-Nakhaʿī al-Kūfī (d. 194/809), an Iraqi jurist who was appointed to the office of *qāḍī* and held judgeships in both Baghdad and Kufa. Although he was equally well known in the field of *ḥadīth* studies, *ḥadīth* critics were mixed in their assessment of his reliability as a transmitter. According to al-Khaṭīb, some (among them Abū'l-Ḥasan al-ʿIjlī and Yaʿqūb b. Shayba) had words of high praise for his competence and reliability in this field (*Taʾrīkh Baghdād*, VIII, 197-198). Others, however, had reservations. Ibn Saʿd accused him of *tadlīs* or fraudulent reporting (*Ṭabaqāt*, VI, 389-390); Aḥmad b. Ḥanbal and Yaḥyā b. Maʿīn are said to have had serious doubts as to the trustworthiness of traditions received from him (*Mizān*, I, 568), especially when he transmitted from memory. For more on him, see *Taʾrīkh Baghdād*, VIII, 188-200; Ibn Athīr, *Kāmil*, VI, 237; Dhahabī, *Mizān*, I, 567-568; *Tahdhīb*, II, 415-418; and *Shadharāt*, I, 340.

³⁸⁴ Cf., Muslim, *imān*, 379.

³⁸⁵ Cf., *Mizān*, I, 567-568.

³⁸⁶ For the full text of this tradition, see Abū Dāwūd, *Sunan*, *sunna*, 20; and Bayhaqī, *Asmāʾ*, 201-202 (in both, the tradition is traced back to Ibn Masʿūd). Cf., Bukhārī, *tawḥīd*, 32f.; and Ibn Fūrak, *Mushkil*, 351, 403, and 450-451.

³⁸⁷ See *Zād*, VII, 452ff., where Ibn al-Jawzī discusses the tradition of Ibn Masʿūd in an extended gloss on S. 34:23. Cf., also Ṭabarī, *Tafsīr*, XVII, 87. In this connection see also Madelung, "Origins of the Controversy," 514f. For other versions of the tradition, see Ibn Khuzayma, *Tawḥīd*, 145-149; and Bahyaqī, *Asmāʾ*, 201-202.

³⁸⁸ Ibn al-Jawzī's objection to the tradition of the *ṣawt*, quoted above from Bukhārī's *Ṣaḥīḥ*, is twofold, textual and theological. Since the tradition is attested by a single authority, viz., Ḥafṣ b. Ghiyāth, it is not an adequate basis for the predication of a divine attribute, for

The Forty-Second Tradition

198 In a tradition reported by Jābir [b. ‘Abd Allāh], the Prophet [is alleged to have] said: “When God spoke to Moses on Mount Sinai, He addressed him in a language (*kalām*)³⁸⁹ different from the one He used when He [first] summoned Moses. [Moses asked: ‘O my Lord, is the language in which you addressed me Your language (*kalām*)?’]³⁹⁰ He replied: ‘O Moses, I spoke to you in ten thousand tongues (*lisān*) only, but I have the power to speak in all tongues. Indeed, I have a power greater even than that!’ When [Moses] returned to the Banū Isrā’īl, they said to him: ‘Describe the speech (*kalām*) of your Lord!’ He replied: ‘It is impossible for me.’ They said: ‘Describe it for us as best you can!’ He replied: ‘Imagine the sound (*ṣawt*) of thunder which comes in the clearest form you have ever heard.’”³⁹¹

Ibn al-Jawzī insists repeatedly (cf., §33, e.g.) that only those traditions that rest on multiple authorities (i.e., *ḥadīth mutawātir* or what he sometimes also calls *ḥadīth mashhūr*) constitute sufficient grounds for the assertion of a divine attribute. Important as these textual considerations are for Ibn al-Jawzī, if one views the above discussion in the context of KAS as a whole and its central concern, one must assume that Ibn al-Jawzī’s principal objection to the *ṣawt* tradition is based on the theological conviction that God’s speech, which is eternal and one, cannot be thought of as consisting of letters (*ḥurūf*) and articulated sounds (*aṣwāt muqatta‘a*), since these latter belong to the world of phenomenal existence (what he elsewhere refers to as the realm of the *shāhid*), and are therefore temporal and finite. Reliance on letters/words and sounds to express meaning is peculiar to finite corporeal beings. God, by contrast, has no need of temporally originated means to realize His purpose. To ascribe *ṣawt* to God is to fall prey to the error of *tajsim*. For an exceptionally clear exposition of the theological problem posed by the attribution of *ṣawt* to God, see Ibn Fūrak, *Mushkil*, 351-352; 403-405; and 450-451. Running through Ibn Fūrak’s discussion of the word or speech of God (*kalām Allāh*) is the distinction between God’s word in its eternal essence and its articulation in time and space. He repeatedly insists that the *kitāba* (the written text of revelation) and the *maktūb* (the meaning expressed through that text) are not to be confused, or as he sometimes puts it, the *‘ibāra* (expression) is not to be equated with the *mu‘abbar* (what is expressed), or the *dalāla* (indicator) with the *madlūl* (indicated). Although Ibn Fūrak was an Ash‘arite, the position he takes seems entirely consistent with the logic and general theological stance of KAS. Ibn al-Jawzī’s earlier writings, however, reflect a somewhat different position (cf., e.g., *Ṣayd al-Khāṭir*, 247-253).

³⁸⁹ See Ṭabarī, *Tafsīr*, IX, 404-407, where *kalām* and *lisān* are used interchangeably in several traditions similar to the one cited above.

³⁹⁰ Cf., Abū Nu‘aym, *Ḥilya*, VI, 210, 17-18.

³⁹¹ Found also in *DST*, 68; *BA*, fol., 34a; *Kitāb al-Mawḍi‘āt*, I, 112-113; and the *Ḥilya* of Abū Nu‘aym, VI, 210, 12-21. Slightly different versions of this tradition (with quite different *isnāds*) are given by Ṭabarī in his *Tafsīr* (IX, 404-407). For Ibn al-Jawzī’s gloss

199 This is a defective tradition of authority of Faḍl b. ‘Īsā.³⁹⁵ said: “He is worthless as a ‘Alī are to be rejected.”³⁹⁵ that he was given to deception said: “It would have been b. Ibn ‘Uyayna said: “Faḍl b. finally, Yahyā said: “He is a

on S. 4: 164, which must have been *Ṭab al-Masīr*, II, 256; cf., Golda 174-175.

³⁹² An Iraqi traditionist whose parentage and spent at least part of among the people of Wasit, and *al-Du‘afā’*, II, 195, 19), he was a defective memory. However, cf., are cited with approval. For a syn 446-458; also see *Mizān*, III, 135-

³⁹³ Al-Faḍl b. ‘Īsā b. Abīn Abū ‘ from Basra widely known for their Although Faḍl b. ‘Īsā’s dates are no to have lived toward the end of the see *Kitāb al-Du‘afā’*, III, 7; *Tahdhīb al-Awṭār*, *Muqillāt*, 118, 513-514; *V. muslimischer Theologie*, 243f. For the excellent article by J. van Ess in

³⁹⁴ Cf., *Mizān*, III, 136; and *Tahdhīb*

³⁹⁵ On the assessment of Nasīf *Kitāb al-Mawḍi‘āt*, I, 113.

³⁹⁶ Yuzid b. Harin Abū Khālid details; see Ibn Sa‘d, *Ṭabaqāt*, VII, II, 16. On his theological views, see “the Creation of the Quran,” 507.

³⁹⁷ See the following where these *Mizān*, III, 136; and *Kitāb al-Mawḍi‘āt*

³⁹⁸ Ibn al-Jawzī’s critique of this could. It is reasonably certain, however, of the tradition. Despite the fact their Qadiri sympathies, there see van Ess has pointed out, very few prominent: likely that Ibn al-Jawzī’s obje

199 This is a defective tradition which ʿAlī b. ʿĀṣim³⁹² transmitted on the authority of Faḍl b. ʿĪsā.³⁹³ [Speaking of ʿAlī b. ʿĀṣim], Yaḥyā [b. Maʿīn] said: "He is worthless as a traditionist."³⁹⁴ Nasāʾī said: "The traditions of ʿAlī are to be rejected."³⁹⁵ Yazīd b. Hārūn³⁹⁶ said: "We have always known that he was given to deception."³⁹⁷ As for al-Faḍl b. ʿĪsā, Ayyūb as-Sakhtiyānī said: "It would have been better for him had he been born dumb (*akhras*)."³⁹⁸ Ibn ʿUyayna said: "Faḍl b. ʿĪsā is of no account [as a traditionist]." And finally, Yaḥyā said: "He is an evil man!"³⁹⁸

on S. 4: 164, which must have been occasioned by the tradition attributed to Jābir, see his *Zād al-Masīr*, II, 256; cf., Goldziher, *Die Richtungen der islamischen Koranauslegung*, 174-175.

³⁹² An Iraqī traditionist who died in 201/816. He was born in Wasit of non-Arab parentage and spent at least part of his life in Baghdad. Despite his considerable standing among the people of Wasit, and his reputation as an honest man (Ibn al-Jawzī, *Kitāb ad-Ḍuʿafāʾ*, II, 195, 19), he was widely regarded as a weak traditionist on account of his defective memory. However, cf., *Talbīs*, 192 and 298, where *ḥadīths* transmitted by ʿAlī are cited with approval. For a sympathetic account of his life, see *Taʾrīkh Baghdād*, XI, 446-458; also see *Mizān*, III, 135-138; and *Shadharāt*, II, 2.

³⁹³ Al-Faḍl b. ʿĪsā b. Abān Abū ʿĪsā ar-Raqāshī, member of a family of Persian preachers from Basra widely known for their skill in the use of Arabic and their Qadarī sympathies. Although Faḍl b. ʿĪsā's dates are not given in the standard biographical works, he is known to have lived toward the end of the Umayyad period. For more on this interesting figure, see *Kitāb ad-Ḍuʿafāʾ*, III, 7; *Tahdhīb*, VII, 283-284; *Mizān*, III, 356; *Ḥilya*, VI, 206-210; Ashʿarī, *Maqālāt*, 118, 513-514; Watt, *Formative Period* (index); and J. van Ess, *Anfänge muslimischer Theologie*, 243f. For a detailed account of the early Qadarī "movement," see the excellent article by J. van Ess in *El*², IV, 368-372.

³⁹⁴ Cf., *Mizān*, III, 136; and *Taʾrīkh Baghdād*, XI, 450.

³⁹⁵ On the assessment of Nasāʾī, see *Taʾrīkh Baghdād*, XI, 456; *Mizān*, III, 136; and *Kitāb al-Mawḍūʿāt*, I, 113.

³⁹⁶ Yazīd b. Hārūn Abū Khālīd al-Wāsiṭī (d. 205/820 or 206/821). For biographical details, see Ibn Saʿd, *Ṭabaqāt*, VII, 314-316; *Taʾrīkh Baghdād*, XIV, 347; and *Shadharāt*, II, 16. On his theological views, see Madelung, "The Origins of the Controversy Concerning the Creation of the Quran," 507.

³⁹⁷ See the following where these words are quoted verbatim: *Taʾrīkh Baghdād*, XI, 456; *Mizān*, III, 136; and *Kitāb al-Mawḍūʿāt*, I, 113.

³⁹⁸ Ibn al-Jawzī's critique of this tradition here is based solely on the inadequacy of its *isnād*. It is reasonably certain, however, that he also had serious reservations regarding the *matn* of the tradition. Despite the fact that several transmitters of this tradition were known for their Qadarī sympathies, there seems nothing particularly Qadarī about this tradition. As van Ess has pointed out, very few pro-Qadarī *ḥadīths* have survived (cf., *El*², IV, 371a). It is more likely that Ibn al-Jawzī's objection has to do with the "anthropomorphism" implicit

The Forty-Third Tradition

200 According to the *Qāḍī* [Abū Yaʿlā], Ḥassān b. ʿAṭīya³⁹⁹ said: “The one who prostrates himself [in prayer] prostrates himself at the foot (*qadam*) of the All Merciful.”⁴⁰⁰

201 These are the words of a Follower (*tābiʿī*) who was attempting to express the nearness of God’s grace (*faḍl*) in the language of metaphor. The *Qāḍī* [Abū Yaʿlā], however, used this text as the basis for the attribution of a foot to God [but with this caveat: “The worshipper] prostrates himself at God’s foot literally (*ḥaqīqatan*) though this prostration does not entail contact (*mumāssa*).”⁴⁰¹

The Forty-Fourth Tradition

202 In the *Ṣaḥīḥs* of Muslim and Bukhārī there is a tradition in which Abū Mūsā reports that the Prophet said: “There are two Gardens [in Paradise] whose vessels and furnishings are of silver;⁴⁰² and there are two Gardens whose vessels and furnishings are of gold.”⁴⁰³ Nothing will prevent the

in its comparison of God’s speech with natural phenomena. This, in fact, is a point that Ibn al-Jawzī makes quite explicit in his *Kitāb al-Mawḍūʿāt* (I, 112-113) where he classifies and discusses the *ḥadīth* under the rubric of those traditions that are objectionable because they compare God’s speech to thunder (*ṣawāʿiq*). The “anthropomorphist” tendency can also be seen in the tradition’s portrayal of Moses as willingly complying with the popular demand that he describe God’s *kalām*.

³⁹⁹ I have found Ḥassān referred to in only two works, Dhahabī’s *Mīzān* (I, 479) and Ibn al-Jawzī’s *Talbīs Iblīs* (189 and 200). In the latter work, his name is mentioned only in two *isnāds* with no other information apart from the persons from and to whom he transmitted traditions. In his notice on Ḥassān, Dhahabī observes that he was reliable in matters of *ḥadīth* and one of the better known among the Followers, but Dhahabī adds that he was suspected of being sympathetic to the Qadarīs, a view supported by Yaḥyā b. Maʿīn. It is worth noting that Aḥmad b. Ḥanbal regarded him as a trustworthy traditionist.

⁴⁰⁰ For other references to this saying, see *DST*, 68; *BA*, fol. 34a; and Ibn Fūrak, *Mushkil*, 353, where the tradition appears in a slightly different form: إذا سجد أحدكم فإنما يسجد على قدم الرحمن.

⁴⁰¹ I have found no reference to this saying in the *Muʿtamad* of Abū Yaʿlā. For an Ashʿarite view, see the discussion in Ibn Fūrak, 353-355.

⁴⁰² Cf., S. 76: 15.

⁴⁰³ In another version of this tradition cited by Ibn al-Jawzī in his commentary (*Zād*

blessed from seeing their Lord of majesty (*ridāʾ al-kibriyāʾ*)

203 [fol.38a] [In the ab Paradise], not the One seen point in space. The *Qāḍī* [A of this tradition is that the O words clearly imply a corp majesty” is [a figure of spee grandeur. In other words, the of His majesty. If God show them.⁴⁰⁸

al-Masir, V, 199), the text reads gardens whose ornaments, vesse ornaments, vessels and furnishing commentary in *Zād al-Masir*, VIII

⁴⁰⁸ The expression *jannāt ʿadn* his *Zād al-Masir* (III, 469) Ibn al the highest part of Paradise where the description offered by Ibn ʿAb

وسقفا عرشه، خلقها بيده وقها عين التسيم والجنان حولها مَحْدَقَاتُ الماء-courses located in the middl has His dwelling; His Throne is the spring of Tasnim is to be found, an his insistence that God’s being is a made in §203, but also elsewhere definition in its literal sense.

⁴⁰⁹ Cf., *DST*, 69; and *BA*, fol. 34 Ibn al-Jawzī, may be found in the fi 55 (Hivulles, *Les trad.* III, 463-4); S. Ibn Māja, *muqaddima*, 13(186); see Bayhaqī, *Asmāʾ*, 302; Ibn Kh al-Masir, V, 199-200.

⁴¹⁰ That is, God.

⁴¹¹ For Abū Yaʿlā’s view on the 207-208.

⁴¹² The main point of this paragra of time and place, it is impossible places such as the Garden of ʿAdn the traditional Ḥanbalī view is dram

blessed from seeing their Lord *in* the Garden(s) of ʿAdn⁴⁰⁴ except the mantle of majesty (*ridāʾ al-kibrīyāʾ*) covering His face.”⁴⁰⁵

203 [fol.38a] [In the above tradition it is those “seeing” who are in Paradise], not the One seen,⁴⁰⁶ for He cannot be confined to a particular point in space. The *Qāḍī* [Abū Yaʿlā] said: “The apparent meaning (*ẓāhir*) of this tradition is that the One seen will be in the Garden of ʿAdn.”⁴⁰⁷ Such words clearly imply a corporealist view of God (*tajsīm*). “The mantle of majesty” is [a figure of speech] used to convey the idea of His majesty and grandeur. In other words, they will be prevented [from seeing Him] because of His majesty. If God should desire, however, He could be disclosed to them.⁴⁰⁸

al-Masīr, V, 199), the text reads: “In Paradise (*firdaws*) there are four [Gardens]—two gardens whose ornaments, vessels and furnishings are of silver; two Gardens whose ornaments, vessels and furnishings are of gold...” (cf., S. 55: 62ff., and Ibn al-Jawzī’s commentary in *Zād al-Masīr*, VIII, 124).

⁴⁰⁴ The expression *jannāt ʿadn* occurs frequently in the Quran (S. 9: 72; 13: 23, etc). In his *Zād al-Masīr* (III, 469) Ibn al-Jawzī cites Ibn ʿAbbās who defines the *jannāt ʿadn* as the highest part of Paradise where the All-Merciful has His dwelling (*dār*). The full text of the description offered by Ibn ʿAbbās reads as follows: جَنَّاتِ عَدْنٍ هِيَ أَعْلَىٰ دَرَجَةٍ فِي الْجَنَّةِ، وَهِيَ دَارُ الرَّحْمَنِ عَزَّ وَجَلَّ، وَسَقَفُهَا عَرْشُهُ، خَلَقَهَا بِيَدِهِ وَفِيهَا وَسْطُهَا، وَهِيَ أَعْلَىٰ دَرَجَةٍ فِي الْجَنَّةِ، وَهِيَ دَارُ الرَّحْمَنِ عَزَّ وَجَلَّ، وَسَقَفُهَا عَرْشُهُ، خَلَقَهَا بِيَدِهِ وَفِيهَا جَنَّاتُ عَدْنٍ هِيَ أَعْلَىٰ دَرَجَةٍ فِي الْجَنَّةِ، وَهِيَ دَارُ الرَّحْمَنِ عَزَّ وَجَلَّ، وَسَقَفُهَا عَرْشُهُ، خَلَقَهَا بِيَدِهِ وَفِيهَا (the Gardens of ʿAdn, [an expression that refers to] the water-courses located in the middle of Paradise, are its highest part; there the All-Merciful has His dwelling; His Throne is their ceiling, and He created them by His hand; in them the spring of Tasnīm is to be found, and the other Gardens of Paradise surround them). Given his insistence that God’s being is not defined by the categories of time and place (a point made in §203, but also elsewhere in *KAS*), Ibn al-Jawzī could hardly have taken this definition in its literal sense.

⁴⁰⁵ Cf., *DST*, 69; and *BA*, fol. 34b. This tradition, more or less in the form cited above by Ibn al-Jawzī, may be found in the following: Muslim, *imān*, 296; Bukhārī, *tafsīr al-Qurʾān*, 55 (Houdas, *Les trad.* III, 463-4); *tawhīd*, 24 (*Les trad.* IV, 606); Tirmidhī, *ṣifat al-janna*, 5; Ibn Māja, *muqaddima*, 13(186); and *Zād al-Masīr*, V, 199. For glosses on the tradition, see Bayhaqī, *Asmāʾ*, 302; Ibn Khuzayma, *Tawhīd*, 16; Ghazzālī, *Iḥyāʾ*, IV, 536; and *Zād al-Masīr*, V, 199-200.

⁴⁰⁶ That is, God.

⁴⁰⁷ For Abū Yaʿlā’s view on the vision (*ruʾya*) of God, see his *Muʿtamad*, 82-84, and 217-218.

⁴⁰⁸ The main point of this paragraph is that because God necessarily transcends categories of time and place, it is impossible to suppose that He will (or can) be seen in particular places such as the Garden of ʿAdn, for example. On this point, Ibn al-Jawzī’s break with the traditional Ḥanbalī view is dramatic. For statements expressing the view of Aḥmad, see

204 We have already discussed the question of God's face in the chapter on the Quran. Our view is that the term "face" [is a metaphorical way of] referring to God himself.⁴⁰⁹

The Forty-Fifth Tradition

205 In the respective *Ṣaḥīḥs* of Bukhārī and Muslim there is a tradition reported by Abū Hurayra in which the Messenger of God said: "When God completed the creation [of the world] He wrote in His Book which was with Him (*ʿindahū*) above the Throne: 'Verily, My mercy has triumphed over (*ghalabat*) My anger.'" In another version of this tradition, the text reads: "[My mercy] has outstripped (*sabaqat*) [My anger]."⁴¹⁰

206 The *Qāḍī* [Abū Yaʿlā] said: "The expression 'with Him' (*ʿindahū*), when taken in its apparent sense (*ẓāhir*), implies proximity (*qurb*) to the divine essence (*adh-dhāt*)." It is important to insist, however, that nearness to God should not be construed in spatial terms, for spatial relations apply

Ṭabaqāt al-Ḥanābila, I, 145, 7-9; 242, and 312. For similar statements by other Ḥanbalīs, see II, 23, 11-12; and 27, 7-9 (Barbahārī); *Kitāb ash-Sharʿa*, 275-276 (Ājurri); and *Ṭabaqāt al-Ḥanābila*, II, 298 (Abū Muḥammad at-Tamīmī). H. Laoust accurately sums up the position of the school as follows: "La vision (*ruʿya*) de Dieu par les hommes, lors du jugement dernier et par les élus au paradis, est affirmée par toutes les 'aqida ḥanbalites" (*La Profession de foi d'Ibn Baṭṭa*, 98, n. 3). Ibn al-Jawzī appears to have gone beyond the Ashʿarite position (which admitted a form of *ruʿya*) to one that was scarcely distinguishable from that of the Muʿtazilī school. It is clear, however, that Ibn al-Jawzī had not always held to the position set forth in *KAS*. In his *Ṣayd al-Khāṭir* (618, 11-13), apparently written earlier, he attacks the Muʿtazilī position and defends something very close to the standard Ḥanbalī view. Just when he adopted the position set forth in *KAS* and the reasons behind the change are questions that cannot yet be answered.

⁴⁰⁹ See §38.

⁴¹⁰ For occurrences of this saying, see *DST*, 69; *BA*, fol., 34b; Ājurri, *Sharʿa*, 290; Bukhārī, *badʿ al-khalq*, 1 (*Les trad.*, II, 423); *tawḥīd*, 15, 22, 28 and 55; Muslim, *tawba*, 14, 15, 16; Ibn Māja, *muqaddima*, 13 (189), 37(35); *Musnad*, II, 242, 258, 260, 313, 358, 381, 397, 433, 466; and Munāwī, *Ithāfāt*, 31-32 (no. 53); 41-42 (no. 80), 50 (no. 108). For glosses on the saying, with special reference to the meaning of *عنده فوق العرش*, see Bayhaqī, *Asmāʿ*, 395-396 (cf., *Asmāʿ*, 284); Ibn Fūrak, *Mushkil*, 455 (cf., also 228-231; 344-345; and 369-373); and Ibn Khuzayma, *Tawḥīd*, 8, and 58; cf., also Graham, *Divine Word*, 184-185. Ormsby points out that this saying was used by al-Ghazzālī to support the argument that God never wills evil per se, only good (*Theodicy*, 257). Evil is an accidental by-product (*al-Maqṣad al-Asnā* [Beirut, 1971] 68).

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⁴¹¹ S. 11: 83 (cf., also 51-34). Cf. argued that *ʿindahū* is to be taken in largely negative. Apart from sugges sense, Ibn al-Jawzī does not indica suggestions of how the expression Bayhaqī, *Asmāʿ*, 395-396.

⁴¹² Bayhaqī cites two slightly d attributed to the Prophet himself (As

⁴¹³ See *DST* (p. 70); *BA* (fol. 34b; also Ibn Fūrak, *Mushkil*, 372-373; cites two versions of the saying, but the two traditions reads: the Proph created Adam with His hand, he v gardens of] Firdaws with His hand.

⁴¹⁴ S. 38: 75. For the discussion c insists on a metaphorical interpreta saying were incorporated into severa Ibn Baṭṭa's *Jihāz*, 58, 16-18, where planted the garden of Firdaws with Baṭṭa, 108; and Ājurri, *Sharʿa*, 173.

⁴¹⁵ Al-Khaṭīb gives the *ismāʿ* as f Shāfiʿi, Waḥḥallad al-Fallās from

only to finite bodies (*ajsām*). God himself has spoken of “[clay stones] ‘with’ (*inda*) your Lord, marked [for the destruction of the wicked].”⁴¹¹

The Forty-Sixth Tradition

207 It was reported that one of the Followers said:⁴¹² “God created Adam with His hand; He wrote the Torah with His hand; and He planted [the trees (or gardens) of] Paradise with His hand.”⁴¹³

208 This is a tradition whose source has not been established. We have already taken up the question of God’s hands in our discussion of the verse: “What I created with My hands.”⁴¹⁴

The Forty-Seventh Tradition

209 It was reported on the authority of Ibn ‘Abbās⁴¹⁵ that in connection with

⁴¹¹ S. 11: 83 (cf., also 51:34). Cf., Ibn al-Jawzī’s *Zād al-Masīr*, IV, 145-146, where it is argued that *indaka* is to be taken in its metaphorical sense. The argument here in §206 is largely negative. Apart from suggesting that *indahu* be taken in some sort of metaphorical sense, Ibn al-Jawzī does not indicate precisely how the expression ought to be taken. For suggestions of how the expression might be construed, see Ibn Fūrak, *Mushkil*, 455; and Bayhaqī, *Asmāʾ*, 395-396.

⁴¹² Bayhaqī cites two slightly different versions of this tradition, both of which are attributed to the Prophet himself (*Asmāʾ*, 318).

⁴¹³ See *DST* (p. 70); *BA* (fol. 34b); and *Ṣayd al-Khāṭir*, 145, where this saying is cited; also Ibn Fūrak, *Mushkil*, 372-373; and Bayhaqī, *Asmāʾ*, 314ff., esp., 318, where Bayhaqī cites two versions of the saying, both of which are ascribed to the Prophet. The second of the two traditions reads: the Prophet said: “God created three things with His hand: He created Adam with His hand, he wrote the Torah with His hand, and he planted [the gardens of] Firdaws with His hand....” (p. 318).

⁴¹⁴ S. 38: 75. For the discussion of the hands of God, see §§41-43, where Ibn al-Jawzī insists on a metaphorical interpretation. It is interesting that two elements of the above saying were incorporated into several Ḥanbalī creeds as crucial points of doctrine. See, e.g., Ibn Baṭṭa’s *İbāna*, 58, 16-18, where he states: والإيمان بأن الله عز وجل خلق آدم بيده وغرس الجنة الفردوس بيده (It is important to believe that God created Adam with His hand and that He planted the garden of Firdaws with His hand). Cf., Laoust, *La Profession de foi d’Ibn Baṭṭa*, 108; and Ājurri, *Sharīʿa*, 173, 181.

⁴¹⁵ Al-Khaṭīb gives the *isnād* as follows: Aḥmad b. al-Ḥasan b. ‘Abd al-Jabbār from Shujāʿ b. Mukhallad al-Fallās from Abū ‘Āṣim from Sufyān from ‘Ammār ad-Duhnī from

the verse "His *kursī* encompasses the heavens and the earth,"⁴¹⁶ the Prophet said by way of commentary: "His *kursī* is His footstool, but the measure of the Throne (*ʿarsh*) is beyond determination."⁴¹⁷

210 A number of reliable traditionists transmitted this tradition, but they attributed it to Ibn ʿAbbās, not to the Prophet. Only one authority, Shujāʿ b. Mukhallad⁴¹⁸ by name, traced it back to the Prophet.⁴¹⁹ [Shujāʿ] was known for his differences with leading traditionists and for the commission of errors. The meaning of this tradition is that the *kursī* is smaller than the Throne (*ʿarsh*), in much the same way that the *kursī* connected with [fol.38b] the throne of a king (*sarīr*), being the place on which the throne's occupant places his feet, [is smaller than the throne].⁴²⁰ Ḍaḥḥāk said: "The *kursī* is

Muslim al-Baṭīn from Saʿīd b. Jubayr from Ibn ʿAbbās from the Prophet (*Taʾrīkh Baghdād*, IX, 251, 12-14).

⁴¹⁶ S. 2: 255. This verse was the object of endless discussion among medieval exegetes. For a range of views, see the following: Ṭabarī, *Tafsīr*, V, 397-403; also see *Zād al-Masīr*, I, 303-304, for Ibn al-Jawzī's view on the *kursī*; and *Kashshāf*, I, 385-386, for a Muʿtazilī perspective on the problem of the *kursī* and its relation to the *ʿarsh*.

⁴¹⁷ Cf., *DST*, 77; *BA*, fol. 34b; and Ṭabarī, *Tafsīr*, V, 398-399; Ibn Fūrak, *Mushkil*, 387; Ibn Kathīr, *ʿUmda*, II, 162; Ibn Khuzayma, *Tawḥīd*, 107-108; *Muʿtamad*, 177; and *Lisān*, VI, 194, 6-10. Al-Khaṭīb cites this tradition in his notice on Shujāʿ b. Mukhallad (*Taʾrīkh Baghdād*, IX, 251-252), along with several other versions attributed to Ibn ʿAbbās. For more on Shujāʿ, see the following note.

⁴¹⁸ Read by some as Shujāʿ b. Makhlad, known also as Abū'l-Faḍl al-Baghawī (150/767-235/849). Although a native of the district of Bagh in the province of Khurasan, he moved to Baghdad to pursue the study of *ḥadīth* and remained there until his death. Among his students were several Ḥanbalīs (e.g., Ibrāhīm al-Ḥarbī and Mūsā b. Hārūn). He is known to have been in contact with Bishr b. al-Ḥārith and may have been influenced by his mystical and ascetic views, although the evidence on this point is inconclusive. According to Ibrāhīm al-Ḥarbī, Bishr once criticized Shujāʿ for attending the meetings of the popular preacher Maṣṣūr b. ʿAmmār (*Taʾrīkh Baghdād*, IX, 253; also cited by Ibn al-Jawzī in his *Kitāb al-Quṣṣāṣ*, 134). Despite the criticisms levelled against Shujāʿ by certain traditionists for what they regarded as insufficient rigor in the transmission of *ḥadīths*, he was defended by Yahyā b. Maʿīn as being honest and trustworthy as a transmitter (*Taʾrīkh Baghdād*, IX, 252, 20-21; cf., also *Mizān*, 265, 2). Dhahabī reports that Muslim, the compiler of the *Ṣaḥīḥ*, received traditions from him (*Mizān*, II, 265, 2).

⁴¹⁹ Cf., *Taʾrīkh Baghdād*, IX, 251; and *Mizān*, II, 265.

⁴²⁰ In previous discussions of the *ʿarsh* (§§189-192, e.g.), Ibn al-Jawzī makes it clear that it is not an object (or a "body," as he prefers to say). If the *ʿarsh* is not an object and, therefore, not amenable to being described in spatial categories, what sense does it make to say that the *kursī* is smaller than the *ʿarsh*?

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⁴²³ Cf., *DST*, 70; and *BA*, fol.
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Buyhaqī, *Asmāʾ*, 399; Ibn Fūrak, *M*
al-Ḥanābila, I, 28, 12-15; and Āju

⁴²⁴ Abū ʿAmr Yahyā b. al-ʿAlī a
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Hammām al-Ḥimyari (d. 211/827)
(*Mizān*, IV, 397-398). Apart from l
addition to Dhahabī's *Mizān*, see a
al-Mawḍiʿāt, I, 253; and III, 213, f

⁴²⁵ These statements are also c
al-Mawḍiʿāt, III, 200).

that on which kings place their feet.”⁴²¹ The *Qāḍī* [Abū Yaʿlā] said: “The foot [ascribed to God in the *ḥadīth*] is an attribute of the divine essence; it is this that God will place in the Fire [on the day of judgment].”⁴²²

The Forty-Eighth Tradition

211 Al-ʿAbbās reported a tradition in which the Prophet said: “Above the seventh heaven there is a sea (*baḥr*); and [the distance] between the top [of the sea] and its bottom is equal to the distance between the [lowest] heaven and the earth. God, may He be exalted, is above [the sea].”⁴²³

212 This tradition, however, is not found in the canonical collections of *ḥadīth*, for Yaḥyā b. al-ʿAlāʾ⁴²⁴ was the only one of his contemporaries to transmit it. Aḥmad b. Ḥanbal said that [Yaḥyā] was a habitual liar who forged traditions. Yaḥyā b. Maʿīn held that he was not to be trusted in matters of *ḥadīth*, and Ibn ʿAdī said that his traditions are forgeries.⁴²⁵

213 We have already discussed the question of God’s being above His creation (*fawqīya*) in connection with the verse “God is above (*fawqa*) His

⁴²¹ The full text of this tradition as preserved by Ṭabarī (*Tafsīr*, V, 398) reads: “In response to the verse ‘His *kursī* encompasses the heavens and the earth’, Ḍaḥḥāk said: ‘His *kursī* is what is placed underneath the Throne (*taḥt al-ʿarsh*); it is that on which kings place their feet.’”

⁴²² An allusion to a prophetic tradition reported by Mālik b. Anas (cf., *KAS*, §§103-107). In the *Muʿtamad* (54, 3) Abū Yaʿlā advocates a slightly different view: the *qadam* (or *rijl*) is an attribute added (صفة زائدة) to the divine essence.

⁴²³ Cf., *DST*, 70; and *BA*, fol. 35a. As Ibn al-Jawzī himself notes in the following paragraph, the saying in this precise form does not occur in the canonical collections of *ḥadīth*. For relatively close approximations, see, e.g., Ibn Māja, *muqaddima*, 13 (193); Tirmidhī, *tafsīr al-Qurʾān*, 69; Abū Dāwūd, *sunna*, 18; *Musnad* I, 206-207. See also Bayhaqī, *Asmāʾ*, 399; Ibn Fūrak, *Mushkil*, 452; Ibn Khuzayma, *Tawḥīd*, 102 (cf., *Ṭabaqāt al-Ḥanābila*, I, 28, 12-15; and Ājurri, *Sharīʿa*, 290-293).

⁴²⁴ Abū ʿAmr Yaḥyā b. al-ʿAlāʾ al-Bajalī ar-Rāzī, who flourished during the latter half of the 8th century. Dhahabī reports that Yaḥyā received traditions from Zuhri (d. 124/742) and Zayd b. Aslam (d. 136/753), and that he transmitted *ḥadīths* to ʿAbd ar-Razzāq b. Hammām al-Ḥimyarī (d. 211/827) and Abū ʿUmar al-Ḥawḍī (d. 225/839), among others (*Mizān*, IV, 397-398). Apart from his activity as a *muḥaddith*, little is known of his life. In addition to Dhahabī’s *Mizān*, see also Ibn al-Jawzī’s *Kitāb aḍ-Ḍuʿafāʾ*, III, 200; his *Kitāb al-Mawḍūʿāt*, I, 253; and III, 213, for assessments of his work.

⁴²⁵ These statements are also cited by Dhahabī in his *Mizān*, IV, 397-398 (cf., *Kitāb aḍ-Ḍuʿafāʾ*, III, 200).

creatures.”⁴²⁶ The *Qāḍī* [Abū Yaʿlā] said: “The notion that God is above His creation (*fawqīya*) has its basis in the fact that God is on the Throne (ʿarsh) in His very essence (*adh-dhāt*). He is on the Throne in the sense that part of his essence is contiguous to the Throne and so is limited by it. However, that part [of the divine essence] that is not contiguous to the Throne, viz., the top, back, front and left sides, is not limited.” This statement is grounded in a corporealist view of God, for what is contiguous to something is larger or smaller [in relation to it]. Such qualifications (*maqāḍīr*) are applicable only to finite bodies (*aḥsām*).⁴²⁷

214 The *Qāḍī* said: “Since it has been established that God is on the

⁴²⁶ See especially KAS, §§55-56 where Ibn al-Jawzī takes up the question of *fawqīya*. The traditional Ḥanbalī view was that discussions of terms like *istiwāʾ* and *fawqīya* should be limited to a reiteration of what the Quran and the *ḥadīth* have to say, *bila kayfa*, that is, without further elaboration (cf., Laoust, *La Profession de foi d'Ibn Baṭṭa*, lxxiv-lxxv, and n. 175.). Ibn al-Jawzī knew, however, that Ḥanbalīs frequently went beyond the formulations of scripture in their discussion of such terminology. In the two sections of KAS where this question of *istiwāʾ* and *fawqīya* is taken up (§§55-56, and 213-214; cf., also §135), Ibn al-Jawzī cites statements from three prominent Ḥanbalīs (Ibn Ḥamid, Abū Yaʿlā and Ibn Zāghūnī) which are problematic, in his view, because they naively assume that God's relationship to the world can adequately be described in spatial and temporal terms. Aḥmad's position on the question is uncertain: some statements ascribed to him suggest a literalistic interpretation of *istiwāʾ* (e.g., *Ṭabaqāt al-Ḥanābila*, I, 28, 12-15); others seem to reflect discomfort with a literalistic interpretation. Abū Muḥammad at-Tamīmī quotes Aḥmad as follows: *ولا يجوز أن يقال: استوى بماسة ولا بملاقة، تعالى الله عن ذلك علواً كبيراً والله تعالى ولا يجوز أن يقال: استوى بماسة ولا بملاقة، تعالى الله عن ذلك علواً كبيراً والله تعالى... لم يلحقه تغير ولا تبدل... (It is not permissible to say that He sits [on the Throne] in such a way as to involve touching or contact. God the High and Mighty is beyond that, for He is not subject to change or alteration [Ṭabaqāt, II, 296, 21-297, 2]).* Ibn al-Jawzī's solution to the problems posed by the terms *istiwāʾ* and *fawqīya* is to construe them metaphorically, but with a particular twist that seems to reflect a Muʿtazilī influence (cf., §55, especially the last several sentences of the paragraph where he construes *fawqīya* in the qualitative terms of rank or status). Ibn Fūrak, an Ashʿarite whose views are often indistinguishable from those held by Muʿtazilīs on such questions, neatly summarizes the position defended above by Ibn al-Jawzī. In his commentary on the reference in S. 67: 17 to “Him who is in heaven,” he states: *معنى ذلك أنه فوق السماء لا على معنى فوقية المتمكن في المكان لأن ذلك صفة الجسم المحدود المحدث ولكن بمعنى ما وصف به أنه فوق من طريق الرتبة والمنزلة والعظمة والقدرة (He is above the heaven not in the sense of being located in a particular place, for that is an attribute of finite, contingent bodies; “above” is ascribed to Him rather in the sense of rank, standing, esteem and power [Mushkil, 392, 6-9]).*

⁴²⁷ Because they define the relationship between things in quantitative and/or spatial terms.

Throne, is it [not] possible t
(*qiyām*), for nothing has be
with this point?” In fact, nei
expression “sitting” (*qʿad*)
back to Ibn ʿAbbās, the traditi
“standing” (*qiyām*), on the o
through ʿIsā and Jābir⁴²⁸ to
Bukhārī, ʿUmar b. aṣ-Ṣubḥ h
istawāʾa.⁴²⁹ Ibn Ḥibbān said: “
construct *isnāds* for them ma
[fol. 39a] His books on *ḥadīth*
Dīraqūṭnī said that his traditi
callous liar.”⁴³⁰ Can a divine
man like this? ⁴³¹ What has
described as standing, that is
be described as standing only
such as] justice (*qāʾim biʾl-q*
for that is a condition peculiar

⁴²⁸ See Ibn al-Jawzī's *Kitāb al-M*
28, 14, for examples of traditions tha
all of which are rejected as apocrypha

⁴²⁹ Perhaps ʿIsā b. Mūsā Ghunjū
400.

⁴³⁰ Dhahabī gives his name as ʿUm
dates and gives very little biographic
VII, 463-4.

⁴³¹ In the *Wizān* this charge is attr
tion of having fabricated only the last

⁴³² Cf. *Kitāb al-Durafī*, II, 211, 1

⁴³³ On the statements by both Dīraq
100.

⁴³⁴ Or perhaps, on the basis of a tra

⁴³⁵ This sentence indicates that Ibn
could that also the content of its *matn*.

Throne, is it [not] possible to speak of Him as 'sitting' (*julūs*) or 'standing' (*qiyām*), for nothing has been found in the teaching of our *imām* dealing with this point?" In fact, neither of these terms is permissible. Although the expression "sitting" (*qu'ūd*), as applied to God, is found in a tradition going back to Ibn 'Abbās, the tradition in question is not authentic.⁴²⁸ The expression "standing" (*qiyām*), on the other hand, does occur in a tradition going back through 'Isā and Jābir⁴²⁹ to 'Umar b. aṣ-Ṣubḥ.⁴³⁰ However, according to Bukhārī, 'Umar b. aṣ-Ṣubḥ himself admitted that he had forged the Prophet's *khuṭba*.⁴³¹ Ibn Ḥibbān said: "[Umar] used to fabricate traditions and then construct *isnāds* for them made up of the names of reliable transmitters."⁴³² [fol.39a] His books on *ḥadīth* serve no useful purpose except to entertain." Dāraquṭnī said that his traditions are to be rejected. Al-Azdī said: "He was a callous liar."⁴³³ Can a divine attribute be established on the authority of a man like this?⁴³⁴ What has become of reason? God is too exalted to be described as standing, that is, [as a body] in an upright position.⁴³⁵ He can be described as standing only in the sense of "standing for" [something, such as] justice (*qā'im bi'l-qist*). He cannot be described as sitting (*qu'ūd*), for that is a condition peculiar to finite bodies.

⁴²⁸ See Ibn al-Jawzī's *Kitāb al-Mawḍi'āt*, I, 122, 18; also his *al-Ilal al-Mutanāhiya*, I, 20, 14, for examples of traditions that ascribe sitting (*julūs* and *qu'ūd*, respectively) to God, all of which are rejected as apocryphal.

⁴²⁹ Perhaps 'Isā b. Mūsā Ghunjār (*Mizān*, III, 206, 22; and 325, 3) and Jābir b. 'Abd Allāh.

⁴³⁰ Dhahabī gives his name as 'Umar b. Ṣubḥ Abū Nu'aym al-Khurāsānī but provides no dates and gives very little biographical information (*Mizān*, III, 206-7. Also see *Tahdhīb*, VII, 463-4).

⁴³¹ In the *Mizān* this charge is attributed to Aḥmad b. 'Alī as-Sulaymānī, who accuses him of having fabricated only the last part of the Prophet's *khuṭba*.

⁴³² Cf., *Kitāb aḍ-Ḍu'afā'*, II, 211, 17-18; *Mizān*, III, 206, 23.

⁴³³ On the statements by both Dāraquṭnī and al-Azdī, see the sources cited in the previous note.

⁴³⁴ Or perhaps, on the basis of a tradition like this.

⁴³⁵ This sentence indicates that Ibn al-Jawzī's problem with this tradition was not just its *isnād* but also the content of its *matn*.

The Forty-Ninth Tradition

215 There is a tradition in the two *Ṣaḥīḥs*, reported by Abū Hurayra, according to which the Messenger of God said: "Those who give as alms to God a measure of dates acquired honestly—for God accepts only what has been so acquired—He will receive the [dates] in His right hand and will nurture them, as one would do with a colt (*falūw*), until they become as large as a mountain."⁴³⁶ In the version of this tradition cited by Muslim, [the last sentence reads]: "[The dates] will grow in the palm of God's hand (*kaff*) until they are larger than a mountain."⁴³⁷

216 The *ʿulamāʾ* maintain that this saying was part of an address intended for the general public and so [the Prophet made use of terms which] they could comprehend—terms such as *akhdh* (accepting or receiving), *tarbīya* (increasing or causing increase), and *numūw* (multiplying).⁴³⁸ When [the Prophet] spoke of God receiving something with His hand or taking it in His palm, he was evoking experiences understood by his audience. The term "right hand" was used because it served to underscore the importance of the matter.⁴³⁹ The term *tarbīya* is synonymous with *mudāʿafa* (doubling or multiplying).

The Fiftieth Tradition

217 In the *Ṣaḥīḥs* of Bukhārī and Muslim there is a tradition from Anas b. Mālik in which it is reported that the Prophet said while discussing [the

⁴³⁶ See DST, 71; BA, fol. 35a, and *Kitāb al-Ḥadāʾiq*, II, 200 (where the tradition is listed under the rubric of *faḍl al-ṣadaqa*). The saying is cited frequently in the canonical collections of *ḥadīth*: Bukhārī, *zakāt*, 8 (Houdas, *Les traditions*, I, 459); *tawḥīd*, 23 (Houdas, *Les traditions*, IV, 596); Muslim, *zakāt*, 64; Tirmidhī, *zakāt*, 28; Nasāʾī, *zakāt*, 24, 28; Ibn Māja, *zakāt*, 28; *Musnad*, II, 268, 331, 381, 418, 419, 431, 538, 541, and VI, 24, 28. For glosses on the saying, see Bayhaqī (*Asmāʾ*, 328, 425); Ibn Khuzayma (*Tawḥīd*, 59-63); and Goldziher, *Die Zāhiriten*, 169.

⁴³⁷ See Muslim, *zakāt*, 63; Nasāʾī, *zakāt*, 48; Ibn Māja, *zakāt*, 28; and *Musnad*, II, 268, 538.

⁴³⁸ *Akhdh* and *numūw* do not appear in the particular text of the tradition cited by Ibn al-Jawzī, but they do appear in a number of the many variant forms of the tradition (e.g., *akhdh* in Ibn Māja, *zakāt*, 28; and *numūw* in Ibn Khuzayma, *Tawḥīd*, 59, 10).

⁴³⁹ Cf., Goldziher, *Die Zāhiriten*, 169. For Ibn al-Jawzī's analysis of the term "hand," see KAS, §§41-43, and 92-97, etc.

signs of] the Antichrist (*dajj*) Lord is not one-eyed."⁴⁴⁰

218 The *ʿulamāʾ* maintain God cannot be described being one-eyed is obviously not mean to ascribe to God in the attribution of such to

219 Ibn ʿAqil said: "The Prophet] denied that God is inferential reason (*dalil al-*

⁴⁴⁰ The *dajjāl* (or *al-masih ad-dajj*) one eye and with the word *kafir* medieval apocalyptic literature in person of the Antichrist figured s Christianity. On medieval Christ between Muslim and Christian repr *Dictionary of the Middle Ages*, I, Muslim literature on the subject, s (IEL 67) on the *dajjāl*. The subject (see Lanst, *La Profession de foi d* views and a preliminary list of sour

⁴⁴¹ See DST, 71; BA, fol. 35a; Antichrist as a one-eyed mythical *ḥadīth*. For the more commonly c Muslim, *ḥadīth*, 100. See also Bukhārī *ḥadīth*, *ḥadīth*, 26; Tirmidhī *ḥadīth*, 27, 149; and VI, 140. *Tawḥīd*, 43-44; Bayhaqī, *Asmāʾ*, 3 (Cf. also KAS, §40).

⁴⁴² The text of KAS here follow *ḥadīth* (*Musnad*, 253, 8-12).

⁴⁴³ Cf. KAS, §40, where the exp medieval jurisprudence, *dalil al-ḥ* indicator found in, or provided by present only by implication could (ḥadīth) furnished by the text. The application of a kind of inferential *ḥadīth* employed by some exegetes (s *ḥadīth* of classical jurisprudence when the use of *dalil al-ḥadīth*, what is *ḥadīth al-Faḥr* (edited by G. Makdisi

signs of] the Antichrist (*dajjāl*):⁴⁴⁰ "He will have one eye (*a'war*), but your Lord is not one-eyed."⁴⁴¹

218 The *‘ulamā* maintain that the chief aim of this saying is to assert that God cannot be described in any way that might imply imperfection, for being one-eyed is obviously an indication of imperfection. The Prophet did not mean to ascribe to God bodily organs, for there is nothing praiseworthy in the attribution of such to God.⁴⁴²

219 Ibn ‘Aqīl said: "The ill-informed sometimes assume that since [the Prophet] denied that God is one-eyed He meant to establish by a kind of inferential reason (*dalīl al-khiṭāb*)⁴⁴³ that God has two eyes. This is a

⁴⁴⁰ The *dajjāl* (or *al-masīh ad-dajjāl*), often described as a corpulent, red-faced man with one eye and with the word *kāfir* engraved on his forehead, played a prominent role in medieval apocalyptic literature in Islam, and undoubtedly for some of the same reasons the person of the Antichrist figured so prominently in the apocalyptic literature of medieval Christianity. On medieval Christian speculation on the subject as well as certain parallels between Muslim and Christian representations of the Antichrist, see R. Lerner, "Antichrist," *Dictionary of the Middle Ages*, I, 321-322 (cf. also, vol. X, 340-341). For a survey of Muslim literature on the subject, see the articles by Abel (*EI*², II, 76-77) and Wensinck (*SEI*, 67) on the *dajjāl*. The subject also attracted the attention (and interest) of Ḥanbalīs (see Laoust, *La Profession de foi d'Ibn Baṭṭa*, 106 and n. 3, for a brief survey of Ḥanbalī views and a preliminary list of sources).

⁴⁴¹ See *DST*, 71; *BA*, fol. 35a; and *Kitāb al-Ḥadāṭiq*, III, 376. The tradition on the Antichrist as a one-eyed mythical figure occurs frequently in the canonical collections of *ḥadīth*. For the more commonly cited forms of this tradition see: Bukhārī, *ḥadīth*, 26; and Muslim, *ḥadīth*, 101. See also Bukhārī, *jihād*, 178; *anbiyā* 3; *adab*, 77; Muslim, *ḥadīth*, 95; Abū Dāwūd, *malāḥim*, 26; Tirmidhī, *ḥadīth*, 56, 62; Ibn Māja, *ḥadīth*, 33; *Musnad*, I, 228, 250, 333; II, 27, 149; and VI, 140. For commentaries on the tradition, see Ibn Khuzayma, *Tawḥīd*, 43-44; Bayhaqī, *Asmā*, 312-313; Ibn Fūrak, *Mushkil*, 253; and *Mu'tamad*, 51. Cf., also *KAS*, §40.

⁴⁴² The text of *KAS* here follows almost verbatim Ibn Fūrak's commentary on this tradition (*Mushkil*, 253, 8-12).

⁴⁴³ Cf., *KAS*, §40, where the expression *dalīl al-khiṭāb* occurs. As a technical term in medieval jurisprudence, *dalīl al-khiṭāb* (literally "the indicator of the text"—that is, the indicator found in, or provided by, the text) designated a method by which meanings present only by implication could be derived from the text on the basis of "indicators" (*adilla*) furnished by the text. The method aimed to identify such indicators and, by the application of a kind of inferential reason (*qiyās*), to arrive at the intended meaning. The *qiyās* employed by some exegetes (such as Ibn ‘Aqīl, e.g.) in this process differed from the *qiyās* of classical jurisprudence where it was linked closely to the notion of "cause" or *‘illa*. In the case of *dalīl al-khiṭāb*, what is critical is the *dalīl*. In a short passage in his *al-Wāḍiḥ fī Uṣūl al-Fiqh* (edited by G. Makdisi [Beirut/Stuttgart, 1996] I, 17-18) Ibn ‘Aqīl provides

serious misunderstanding [of the saying], for by denying that God is one-eyed [the Prophet] merely intended to negate [the possibility of] imperfection in Him. The intention of the Prophet's words then is that your Lord does not possess creaturely organs, for He would then be subject to imperfection. [fol.39b] This is analogous to the refusal to ascribe to God a son on the grounds that He is indivisible. If this tradition were taken to mean that God's form is complete or perfect (*ṣūra kāmila*),⁴⁴⁴ that would *not* be sufficient to prove that He is divine or eternal, for this kind of perfection of form is a common occurrence. To those who say that [the words of the

a short, highly condensed, definition of the *dalīl al-khiṭāb* and cites several texts—one from the Quran and having to do with the question of divorce, the other from the *ḥadīth* bearing on the question of *zakāt*—to illustrate the method. In connection with S. 65: 6, *وَإِنْ أُولَاتُكُمْ حَمْلٌ فَأَنْفِقُوا عَلَيْهِنَّ* (If they be pregnant, then bear their expenses) he concludes on the basis of *dalīl al-khiṭāb* that in the case of women who are not pregnant at the time of divorce, no such support is required. Similarly, in connection with the prophetic saying, *فِي سَائِمَةِ الْغَنَمِ زَكَاةٌ* ([If it is a question of] freely grazing sheep, *zakāt* [is required]), one may conclude that in the case of stall-fed cattle, *zakāt* is not required. In his discussion, Ibn ʿAqīl does not lead us through the steps involved in the application of *dalīl al-khiṭāb* to these texts; all he provides is the conclusion. However, the examples he cites together with the conclusions reached are consistent with general practice among Shāfiʿite and Ḥanafite jurists. How widely the method was used by Ḥanbalīs to deal with legal questions is unclear, but it does seem likely that those Ḥanbalīs opposed to the use of *qiyās* would also have been opposed to *dalīl al-khiṭāb* applied in this way. It is known that Ibn Ḥazm, who was bitterly opposed to all forms of *qiyās* and who frequently sided with Ḥanbalīs on legal and theological questions, was vehemently opposed to any kind of *dalīl al-khiṭāb* that entailed the use of *qiyās* (for a more detailed treatment of Ibn Ḥazm's position on *dalīl al-khiṭāb*, see R. Arnaldez, *Grammaire et théologie chez Ibn Ḥazm de Cordoue*, 161-165 (cf., also Goldziher, *Die Zāhiriten*, 157-159; also al-Baghdādī, *Uṣūl ad-Dīn*, 223-224, for an Ashʿarite/Shāfiʿite perspective on the question). While Ibn ʿAqīl, in principle, had no objection to the use of *dalīl al-khiṭāb* in the realm of positive law, he does note in the passage cited here in KAS (§219) that its use can produce conflicting conclusions. In the same passage—especially from the last several sentences of §219—it is clear that Ibn ʿAqīl had serious reservations regarding the application of *dalīl al-khiṭāb* to theological questions, especially to questions having to do with the divine attributes, where only peremptory evidence (*adilla*) is acceptable; here presumptive analogy (*qiyās maẓnūn*) is not sufficient. It may be used in dealing with theological questions of less moment, but two conditions must be met: 1) the findings arrived at through *dalīl al-khiṭāb* must square with the teaching of scripture taken as a whole, and 2) they must be consistent with the findings of reason (cf., Ibn ʿAqīl, *Kitāb al-Jadal*, 41-42). This was also Ibn al-Jawzī's position.

⁴⁴⁴ That is, that he possesses two eyes, not one; or perhaps, that he possesses a full compliment of bodily organs.

Prophet] establish that God from the text (*dalīl al-khiṭāb*) inferential reasoning is the validity as evidence in *m* (*aḥkām al-fiqh wa-furūʿ al-ḥukm*) so when it is a matter of believe it to be valid evidence by the sense of the revelation presumptive reasoning (*qiyās*) of evidence when the evidence is?"⁴⁴⁵

220 Among the "unique" *Ṣaḥīḥ* there is one, reported "God says:"⁴⁴⁷ 'My servant d supererogatory prayers (*naṣiḥ* servant]. I am his ear (*samʿ*) sees, his hand (*yad*) by which walks. There is nothing mor

⁴⁴⁵ The translation given above meaning of the Arabic text. The longer text. Until the full text is open to question. Nonetheless, the reasonably clear: that while the use ought not be applied to texts that d

⁴⁴⁶ The term "unique" (*afīd*, transmitter. This tradition was said to have been the only one of h cf., also Bukhārī, *riqāq*, 38; and Al

⁴⁴⁷ The first part of the tradition treats My friend (*walī*) as an enemy to Me with nothing more dear to (*al-ḥabīb*). My servant does not cease

⁴⁴⁸ The Arabic word *taraddud* he or hesitating (and putting off or def

Prophet] establish that God has two eyes on the basis of an inference drawn from the text (*dalīl al-khiṭāb*), it should be pointed out that this kind of inferential reasoning is the subject of debate [among scholars] regarding its validity as evidence in matters of law based on the data of revelation (*aḥkām al-fiqh wa-furūʿ ad-dīn*). [And if that is true] then how much more so when it is a matter of a theology based on reason (*uṣūl*). Those who believe it to be valid evidence (*ḥujja*) are of the opinion that it is superseded by the sense of the revealed text (*maʿnā an-nuṭq*), when in reality it is presumptive reasoning (*qiyās maẓnūn*). How then can it have the authority of evidence when the evidence provided by reason condemns it by refuting it?" ⁴⁴⁵

The Fifty-First Tradition

220 Among the "unique" traditions (*afrād*)⁴⁴⁶ cited by Bukhārī [in his *Ṣaḥīḥ*] there is one, reported by Abū Hurayra, in which the Prophet said: "God says:⁴⁴⁷ 'My servant does not cease to draw near to Me through his supererogatory prayers (*nawāfil*) until I love him. Now when I love [My servant], I am his ear (*samʿ*) by which he hears, his eye (*baṣar*) by which he sees, his hand (*yad*) by which he grasps, and his foot (*rijl*) by which he walks. There is nothing more distasteful⁴⁴⁸ to Me than taking the life of a

⁴⁴⁵ The translation given above is an attempt to render what seems to me to be the meaning of the Arabic text. The passage quoted from Ibn ʿAqīl must have been part of a longer text. Until the full text is recovered the exact meaning of these sentences may be open to question. Nonetheless, the general sense of the passage cited by Ibn al-Jawzī is reasonably clear: that while the use of *dalīl al-khiṭāb* may be permissible, such a method ought not be applied to texts that deal with foundational theological questions (*uṣūl*).

⁴⁴⁶ The term "unique" (*afrād*, sing. *fard*) refers to reports passed on by a single transmitter. This tradition was designated *fard* because Sharīk b. ʿAbd Allāh b. Abī Nimr is said to have been the only one of his generation to transmit it (Dhahabī, *Mīzān*, I, 641-642; cf., also Bukhārī, *riqāq*, 38; and Abū Nuʿaym, *Hilya*, I, 4-5).

⁴⁴⁷ The first part of the tradition, omitted by Ibn al-Jawzī, reads: "God said: 'He who treats My friend (*walī*) as an enemy, I permit warfare against him; My servant draws near to Me with nothing more dear to Me than what I have prescribed as his duty (*iflārāḍtu ʿalayhi*). My servant does not cease to....'" (Bukhārī, *riqāq*, 38, 2).

⁴⁴⁸ The Arabic word *taraddud* here rendered "distasteful" includes the notion of wavering or hesitating (and putting off or deferring) in the face of what is distasteful.

[fol.40a] *The Fifty-Second Tradition*

223 Jubayr b. Muʿṭim reported that a Bedouin came to the Messenger of God and said: "O Messenger of God, [my] people are in difficult straits: their families are starving, their belongings are depleted and their herds are dying. Pray [to God] for rain! We beg that you intercede with God [on our behalf] and that God intercede with you." Then the Messenger of God replied: "Do you understand what you are saying?" Thereupon the Messenger began to praise God and he continued until his Companions perceived that [from the expression] on his face.⁴⁵⁴ Then [the Prophet] said: "God should not be asked to intercede with one of His creatures, for His station is too majestic for that! Do you understand what God is (*mā Allāh*)? Verily, His Throne (*ʿarsh*) is above (*ʿalā*) the heavens thus and so—and as he was saying these words he⁴⁵⁵ made a dome-like shape⁴⁵⁶ with his fingers⁴⁵⁷—and verily, it creaks like the creaking of a camel's saddle from [the weight of] the rider [and his gear]." ⁴⁵⁸

224 Muḥammad b. Ishāq⁴⁵⁹ was the only traditionist of his generation to

⁴⁵⁴ In addition to the problem of the numerous variant readings, none of which is entirely persuasive, there is the question of the antecedent of *dhālika*. Assuming that the reading given in KAS is the correct one, it is possible to see in *dhālika* a reference to the pain, even shock, the Prophet must have felt at the Bedouin's suggestion that God might intercede with one of His creatures.

⁴⁵⁵ See Bayhaqī, *Asmāʿ*, 417, 18-19, where the gesture in question is attributed to one of the transmitters of the tradition, not to the Prophet. The two possibilities noted by Bayhaqī are Wahb b. Jarīr and Abū'l-Azharī, both of whom appear in the *isnād* of the tradition.

⁴⁵⁶ Cf., Gimaret, *Image*, 76 and n. 4. Gimaret believes that "tent" is the correct rendering of *qubba* in the context of this tradition.

⁴⁵⁷ That is, in order to illustrate the Prophet's words. In his commentary on the tradition, Bayhaqī insists that the "dome" was meant to represent the Throne (*Asmāʿ*, 418).

⁴⁵⁸ Cf., *DST*, 73; and *BA*, fol. 35b. Among the standard collections of *ḥadīth*, this tradition appears only in Abū Dāwūd, *sunna*, 18. However, it is quoted in full by Ibn Khuzayma in his *Tawḥīd*, 103-104 (cf., Dārimī in his *Radd ʿalā'l-Jahmīya*, 272, 16-23; and Ājurri, *Sharʿa*, 293, 12-21); and by Bayhaqī in his *Asmāʿ*, 418, along with a lengthy commentary. For additional references to this tradition in its many variants, see Gimaret, *Image*, 76. On the last line of this tradition, see also KAS, §190 and notes.

⁴⁵⁹ Muḥammad b. Ishāq b. Yasār Abū ʿAbd Allāh, a *mawlā* of the Banū Muṭṭalib and author of the well known biography of the Prophet, who was born in Medina around 85/704 and died in Baghdad in 150/767 or 151/768. The biographical sources leave little doubt that he had both his defenders and his detractors (*Mīzān*, III, 469, 1). Zuhri referred

transmit this tradition from Ya'qūb b. 'Utba.⁴⁶⁰ The most competent authorities did not cite [traditions transmitted by] these two men as a basis for legal rulings. Abū Sulaymān al-Khaṭṭābī said: "This tradition, when taken in its literal sense (*alā ṣāhirihi*), is in its own way an attempt to define the modalities (*kayfiya*) of things, but such is forbidden when it is a question of God and His attributes. It should be observed that [this tradition] draws on the language of human experience (*kalām taqrīb*) for the purpose of expressing the might and majesty of God in such a way that those who hear it might understand, even when they are crude Bedouin who do not possess the means by which to grasp language that is subtle and intricate."⁴⁶¹

225 [Al-Khaṭṭābī continued:] "The question 'Do you understand what God is?' is another way of asking: 'Do you comprehend the greatness and majesty of God?' The expression 'it creaks because of Him' means that [the Throne] is unable [to bear] the might and majesty of God, for it is well known that a saddle creaks because of its occupant, that is, because of the weight, or because of its inability to sustain it. By using the kind of expression that was familiar to his listeners, [the Prophet] intended to clarify the measure of God's power and majesty so as to reinforce the point that the one who occupies a lofty position does not intercede with one who is below him in rank."

to him as one of the best informed historians of Medina in his day, and others (among them 'Aṣim b. Qatāda, Ibn Ma'īn and Ibn Sa'da) regarded him as reliable in matters of *ḥadīth*. The judgment of others, however, was not as kind. Aḥmad b. Ḥanbal, while accepting historical reports transmitted by him, refused to use *ḥadīths* related by him as a basis for deciding legal questions—reportedly because of Ibn Ishāq's use of the collective *isnād*, but there were others (such as Nasā'ī) who accused him of outright deception in matters of tradition. He was also accused of having Shī'ite sympathies (Yāqūt, *Irshād*, VI, 400) and of being crypto-Mu'tazilī in his theology (*Tahdhīb*, IX, 42, 6ff.; *Mizān*, III, 469, 11). For a sketch of his life and a list of the more important sources on him, see *EI*², III, 810-811 (J. M. B. Jone); and *GAS*, I, 288-290.

⁴⁶⁰ Ya'qūb b. 'Utba b. al-Mughīra ath-Thaqafī al-Madanī, who died in 128/745. He was a contemporary of Zuhri, an expert on the life of the Prophet and the transmitter of a number of reports on the Prophet that have been preserved by Ṭabarī in his *Ta'rikh* (see index). From these it is evident that he did not normally cite the informants on whom he depended. For accounts of his life see Ibn Hajar's *Tahdhīb* (XI, 392) as well as his *Taqrīb* (II, 376). For comments on Ya'qūb b. 'Utba as a source and transmitter of prophetic traditions, see A. Fischer, *Biographien von Gewährsmännern des Ibn Ishāq*, 87-88.

⁴⁶¹ For a discussion of al-Khaṭṭābī's interpretation of this tradition, see Gimaret, *Images*, 79.

226 We have already not
[The Throne] creaks on a
Now this is tantamount to
terms.

227 [fol. 40b] Abū Hurayra
"Verily, God is all-hearing
and his thumb on his eyes and

228 The 'alamī' maintain
affirm that God possesses the
the two organs which are the
order to make this point].
possesses such organs.⁴⁶⁵

229 Abū Dardī' reported t
during the last three hours of
Book of] Remembrance (al-
[what He wishes]. During t
'Adī'—it is His dwelling
says: 'Blessed is the one who
He descends to the lowest be
menting He cries out: 'Rise

⁴⁶² Cf. 88140-143.

⁴⁶³ S. 4: 58. For Ibn al-Jawzī's g
Ṭabarī, *Taqrīb*, VIII, 494-495; and

⁴⁶⁴ Cf. *DSI*, 74; and BA, fol. 35
(*Tahdhīb*, 43) cite this tradition alone

⁴⁶⁵ See Bayhaqī, *Asmā'*, 179-180.

⁴⁶⁶ For more on this expression, s

⁴⁶⁷ See *DSI*, 74; and BA, fol. 3
38-39, where a variant form of this
the canonical collections, but it is c
Tahdhīb, *Mizān*, II, I, 98; Ibn Khuz

226 We have already noted earlier that the *Qāḍī* [Abū Yaʿlā] once said: “[The Throne] creaks on account of the weight of the divine essence.”⁴⁶² Now this is tantamount to conceiving and representing God in corporeal terms.

The Fifty-Third Tradition

227 [fol.40b] Abū Hurayra reported that after the Prophet recited the verse “Verily, God is all-hearing and all-seeing,”⁴⁶³ he placed his index finger and his thumb on his eyes and ear.⁴⁶⁴

228 The *ʿulamāʾ* maintain that by this action [the Prophet] meant to affirm that God possesses the power to hear and see, and that he pointed to the two organs which are the respective seats of these human faculties [in order to make this point]. He did not mean to imply that God actually possesses such organs.⁴⁶⁵

The Fifty-Fourth Tradition

229 Abū Dardāʾ reported that the Prophet said: “Verily, God descends during the last three hours of the night. During the first hour He opens [the Book of] Remembrance (*dhikr*), and He erases what He wishes and records [what He wishes]. During the second hour He descends to the Garden of ʿAdn⁴⁶⁶—it is His dwelling (*dāruhu*), for He alone resides there—and He says: ‘Blessed is the one who enters you.’ And finally, during the third hour, He descends to the lowest heaven with His spirit (*rūḥ*) and the angels. And trembling He cries out: ‘Rise up before My majesty and power (*ʿizzatī*)!’”⁴⁶⁷

⁴⁶² Cf., §§192-193.

⁴⁶³ S. 4: 58. For Ibn al-Jawzī’s gloss on this verse, see *Zād al-Masīr*, II, 113-114. Cf., Ṭabarī, *Tafsīr*, VIII, 494-495; and Zamakhsharī, *Kashshāf*, I, 535.

⁴⁶⁴ Cf., *DST*, 74; and *BA*, fol. 35b. Both Bayhaqī (*Asmāʾ*, 179-180) and Ibn Khyzayma (*Tawḥīd*, 43) cite this tradition along with several others of a similar content.

⁴⁶⁵ See Bayhaqī, *Asmāʾ*, 179-180, where the same argument is made. Cf., *Muʿtamad*, 50.

⁴⁶⁶ For more on this expression, see §202 and the notes to the paragraph.

⁴⁶⁷ See *DST*, 74; and *BA*, fol. 35b (cf., also Ibn al-Jawzī’s *al-ʿIlal al-Mutanāhiya*, I, 38-39, where a variant form of this tradition is cited). The tradition does not occur in any of the canonical collections, but it is cited frequently in religious texts of the period. See, e.g., Dhahabī, *Mizān*, II, I, 98; Ibn Khuzayma, *Tawḥīd*, 135; and Ibn Fūrak, *Mushkil*, 399-400.

230 The text of the above report has come down to us through the transmission of Ziyāda al-Anṣārī.⁴⁶⁸ When this tradition was mentioned to Bukhārī by certain traditionists, he declared it to be objectionable (*munkar al-ḥadīth*).⁴⁶⁹ Abū Ḥātim b. Ḥibbān said: "[Ziyāda] transmitted faulty traditions (*manākīr*) on the authority of reputable persons [through the use of contrived *isnāds*]; his traditions ought to be avoided."⁴⁷⁰ Abū Jaʿfar b. Abī Shayba,⁴⁷¹ one of the transmitters of this tradition, erroneously recorded his name as Zāʿida. Ziyāda is the only correct spelling.

231 Assuming that [the above tradition] is sound, we offer the following interpretation: [In the tradition, the Garden of ʿAdn] is said to be "God's abode" (*dāruhu*) in the same way [the Quran] ascribes to God a house (*bayt*).⁴⁷² People frequently speak of this or that as being His abode (*maskan*), but we only use such language [as a figure of speech] because [we know] it is not possible to speak of God's having a place of abode (*suknā*) [in the literal sense of the term].⁴⁷³

The Fifty-Fifth Tradition

232 Abū Umāma reported that the Prophet said: "My Lord promised me that He would permit seventy thousand and three handfuls (*ḥathayāt*)⁴⁷⁴ [fol.41a] of My community to enter Paradise."⁴⁷⁵

⁴⁶⁸ Dhahabī gives his name as Ziyāda b. Muḥammad al-Anṣārī, but little else is known of him except that he was a traditionist of questionable character (*Mizān*, I, 95; cf., also Ibn Hajar, *Tahdhīb*, III, 392-393; and Ibn al-Jawzī's *Kitāb ad-Ḍuʿafāʾ*, I, 303). Judging from the dates of men from whom he received traditions, Ziyāda appears to have flourished during the latter half of the Umayyad period.

⁴⁶⁹ Cf., *EP*, III, 26, for a discussion of this term.

⁴⁷⁰ Cf., *Mizān*, I, 95; *Kitāb ad-Ḍuʿafāʾ*, I, 303; and *al-ʿIlal al-Mutanāhiya*, I, 39.

⁴⁷¹ Abū Jaʿfar Muḥammad b. ʿUthmān [b. Sulaymān] b. Abī Shayba, a *mawlā* of the Banū ʿAbs who died in 297/910. For a list of biographical sources and assessments of his work as a *muḥaddith*, see notes to §168. In addition to the sources cited there, see also *Muntaẓam*, VI, 95-96.

⁴⁷² An allusion to S. 2: 125; and S. 22:26, where the expression "My house" (*baytī*) occurs.

⁴⁷³ For a similar interpretation of the tradition, see Ibn Fūrak, *Mushkil*, 400.

⁴⁷⁴ The Arabic text specifies "His handfuls" thus implying that God has hands.

⁴⁷⁵ Cf., *DST*, 75; *BA*, fol. 36a; and Bayhaqī, *Asmāʾ*, 329. Versions of the tradition are

233 The term *ḥathya* (singular of *ḥathayāt*) means what fills the palm of the hand (*milʿ al-kaff*). The expression was used in the above saying as a way of making the meaning of the tradition accessible to human understanding. The term in any case is not to be taken literally (*lā ḥaqīqataʿl-ḥathya*).

The Fifty-Sixth Tradition

234 Abū Hurayra reported that the Prophet said: "On the day of judgment God will sit above the Bridge (*al-qanṭara al-wuṣṭā*) between Paradise and Hell."⁴⁷⁶

235 ʿUthmān b. Abī ʿĀtika,⁴⁷⁷ one of the transmitters of this tradition, was said by Yaḥyā [b. Maʿīn] to be worthless as a transmitter.⁴⁷⁸

also found in Ibn Māja, *zuhd*, 34; Tirmidhī, *qiyāma*, 12; and the *Musnad*, V, 268. Bayhaqī indicates that he regards the tradition as weak, though he does not specify precisely what is problematic in the tradition (*Asmāʿ*, 330).

⁴⁷⁶ See Ibn al-Jawzī, *Kitāb al-Mawḍūʿāt*, I, 127, where the tradition is cited along with a complete *isnād*. Cf., also *DST*, 75; *BA*, fol. 36a; and *Tahdhīb*, VII, 124. For additional references, see *BA*, (Beirut, 1987), 138, n. 5. The tradition does not appear in any of the canonical collections of *ḥadīth* and seems to have been regarded as apocryphal by most *ḥadīth* authorities. The *qanṭara*, however, is mentioned in several *ḥadīth* found in the canonical collections of *ḥadīth*. In the best known of these (cited by Bukhārī on the authority of Abū Saʿīd al-Khudrī), the Prophet is reported as saying: "The believers will be freed from Hell, but they will be held back at the Bridge (*qanṭara*) between Paradise and Hell; there they will be punished for the wrongs they did to each other in this life. After they have been corrected and purified they will be given permission to enter Paradise" (Bukhārī, *riqāq*, 48; cf., also *Musnad*, III, 13, 57, 63, 74; and H. Laoust, *La Profession de foi d'Ibn Baṭṭa*, 95, n. 1, where the *qanṭara* is related to the doctrine of the *ṣirāt*).

⁴⁷⁷ He was a popular preacher (*qāṣṣ*) and a Quran reciter from Damascus. Dhahabī gives his *kunya* as Abū Ḥaṣṣ and reports that he died in 155/771 (*Mīzān*, III, 40).

⁴⁷⁸ It is clear that Ibn al-Jawzī shared this judgment, though in his *Kitāb aḍ-Ḍuʿafāʾ* (II, 168) he does cite one authority (a certain Abū Saʿīd ad-Dimashqī known by the *laqab* Duḥaym) who had words of praise for Ibn Abī ʿĀtika. On the views of other scholars, see Dhahabī, *Mīzān*, III, 161-162; and *Kitāb al-Mawḍūʿāt*, I, 127. Despite the fact that Ibn al-Jawzī limits his criticism to the *isnād*, we can be certain that it was the *matn* that troubled him most, viz., its anthropomorphic portrayal of God as occupying a particular point in space.

The Fifty-Seventh Tradition

236 According to the Qāḍī [Abū Yaʿlā], Muḥammad b. Kaʿb al-Quraḏī said: “When the people heard the Quran from the mouth of Raḥmān (*min fīʾr-Raḥmān*) it was as if they heard nothing.”⁴⁷⁹

237 The Qāḍī said: “It is permissible to apply the term ‘mouth’ to God.” It is astonishing that he takes the term *fī* in the expression *min fīʾr-Raḥmān* to mean mouth [in its literal sense] and so asserts it to be one of God’s attributes on the basis of a statement made by a Follower—a statement which does not, in fact, go back to him.⁴⁸⁰ As for the prophetic tradition: “God’s servants do not approach Him with anything like what proceeds from Him,”⁴⁸¹ the expression “what proceeds from Him” (*mā kharaja minhu*) should be construed to mean what becomes manifest through Him (*ṣahara ʿanhu*). We are not to suppose that the expression implies one body coming out of another, for God is not a body (*jism*) and His word (*kalām*) is not a body (*jism*).⁴⁸²

⁴⁷⁹ The saying is found in *DST*, 75-76; and in *BA*, fol. 36a, though it is not among the sayings of Muḥammad b. Kaʿb collected by Abū Nuʿaym (*Hilya*, III, 212-221) or by Ibn al-Jawzī (*Ṣafwa*, II, 75-76). It is possible that Ibn al-Jawzī knew it only from the writings of Abū Yaʿlā, since it is this latter who is quoted as its source. My rendering of the saying above must be considered tentative.

⁴⁸⁰ It was apparently not uncommon for Ḥanbalīs to describe God as having a mouth. No less an authority than Aḥmad himself states in his most important creed: *وَكَلَّمَ اللَّهُ مُوسَى* (God spoke to Moses directly with his mouth [*Ṭabaqāt al-Ḥanābila*, I, 29, 18]). Barbahārī, a 10th century Ḥanbalī, writes: *والإيمان بأن الله هو الذي كلم موسى بن عمران يوم* (God spoke to Mūsā b. ʿImrān on Mt. Sinai, and he heard the sound of God’s speech—and no one else’s—with his own ears. Whoever says otherwise is an unbeliever [*Ibid.*, II, 26, 10-11]). Ibn Fūrak takes up the question of whether a *fam* (mouth) can be ascribed to God in connection with those traditions that speak of God’s laughing (*Mushkil*, 476-477).

⁴⁸¹ See §§169-170 where the saying is cited and discussed. For sources, see the notes to §169.

⁴⁸² See §§7, 29, and 34. Also *Mushkil*, 286-287, where Ibn Fūrak glosses the saying in terms that are virtually identical to those used here by Ibn al-Jawzī.

238 I heard the following in which Sahl b. Saʿd (n. judgment) God will be in darkness. No one will hear veils else he would perish.

239 This tradition, of without any basis whatever said: “In my view one should Yahyā [b. Maʿin] said: “He received it from ʿUmar b. being unreliable in matters

[fol.4]

240 Anas reported that the (lowly); one of its surfaces is is of light; by it He creates; brings death. He exalts and one day to the next.”⁴⁸⁷

241 This is an apocryphal

⁴⁸⁷ See *Kitāb al-Mawḍiʿāt*, I, 1; also *DST*, 76; *BA*, fol. 36a; *Dh* Khawaym, *Tawḥīd*, 20-21; and *I* glossed. Bayhaqī cites several traditions (*Al-sunna*, 402-403). The canonical collections of *ḥadīth*.

⁴⁸⁸ Mūsā b. ʿUbayda Abū ʿAbd (IV, 213; and *Kitāb al-Daʿaʾif*, III

⁴⁸⁹ ʿUmar b. al-Ḥakam al-Hud (period); *Mizān*, III, 191; and *Kitāb*

⁴⁹⁰ Here again Ibn al-Jawzī con deal with the anthropomorphic in his remarks in §§137-139 where *I* Frank (cf. *Mushkil*, 213-214; 292

⁴⁹¹ See *Kitāb al-Mawḍiʿāt*, I, 11; also *DST*, 76; *BA*, fol. 36a; and *M*

The Fifty-Eighth Tradition

238 I heard the following tradition [from ‘Abd al-Wahhāb b. al-Mubārak] in which Sahl b. Sa‘d reports that the Prophet said: “[On the day of judgment] God will be concealed by seventy thousand veils of light and darkness. No one will hear even the slightest sound from [behind?] those veils else he would perish.”⁴⁸³

239 This tradition, of which Mūsā b. ‘Ubayda was a transmitter, is without any basis whatever.⁴⁸⁴ [Speaking of Mūsā,] Aḥmad [b. Ḥanbal] said: “In my view one should not accept traditions handed down from him.” Yaḥyā [b. Ma‘īn] said: “He is not a reliable traditionist. Moreover, Mūsā received it from ‘Umar b. al-Ḥakam,⁴⁸⁵ a man whom Bukhārī described as being unreliable in matters pertaining to *ḥadīth*.”⁴⁸⁶

[fol.41b] *The Fifty-Ninth Tradition*

240 Anas reported that the Prophet said: “Verily, there is with God a Tablet (*lawḥ*); one of its surfaces is made of pearls, the other of sapphire. His pen is of light; by it He creates and gives sustenance, and by it He gives life and brings death. He exalts and brings low, and He does what He wills from one day to the next.”⁴⁸⁷

241 This is an apocryphal tradition transmitted by Muḥammad b. ‘Uthmān

⁴⁸³ See *Kitāb al-Mawḍū‘āt*, I, 166, where the saying appears with a complete *isnād*. See also *DST*, 76; *BA*, fol. 36a; Dhahabī, *Mizān*, III, 191; Ibn Fūrak, *Mushkil*, 291; Ibn Khuzayma, *Tawḥīd*, 20-21; and *KAS*, §137, where the first part of the saying is cited and glossed. Bayhaqī cites several variant, and less explicitly anthropomorphist, forms of the tradition (*Asmā’*, 402-403). The saying, as cited by Ibn al-Jawzī, does not appear in the canonical collections of *ḥadīth*.

⁴⁸⁴ Mūsā b. ‘Ubayda Abū ‘Abd al-‘Azīz ar-Rabadhī, who died in 153/770 (cf., *Mizān*, IV, 213; and *Kitāb aḍ-Ḍu‘afā’*, III, 147).

⁴⁸⁵ ‘Umar b. al-Ḥakam al-Hudhalī al-Baṣrī, who flourished during the late Umayyad period (*Mizān*, III, 191; and *Kitāb aḍ-Ḍu‘afā’*, II, 207).

⁴⁸⁶ Here again Ibn al-Jawzī confines his remarks to the *isnād*—perhaps because he has dealt with the anthropomorphic implications of the *matn* earlier in *KAS*. See, in particular, his remarks in §§137-139 where the analysis he offers is strikingly similar to that of Ibn Fūrak (cf., *Mushkil*, 213-214; 292, 8-12; and 460-465).

⁴⁸⁷ See *Kitāb al-Mawḍū‘āt*, I, 117-118, where the tradition is found with a full *isnād*. See also *DST*, 76; *BA*, fol. 36a; and *Mizān*, III, 641.

al-Ḥuddānī.⁴⁸⁸ [Al-Azdī said that] his traditions are to be discarded.⁴⁸⁹

The Sixtieth Tradition

242 Jābir⁴⁹⁰ reported that the Prophet said: "When you see the wind (*rīḥ*), do not curse it, for it is the *nafas*⁴⁹¹ of Raḥmān which brings both mercy and punishment. Rather ask God for the good things it brings and seek His protection against the harm it can cause."⁴⁹²

243 The term *nafas* as used here means that by which anxiety and distress are dispelled (*tanfīs* 'an *al-makrūb*).⁴⁹³ A similar use of this term is to be found in another tradition reported by Abū Hurayra. In it the Messenger of God is reported to have said: "I find the *nafas* of God coming from the direction of Yemen."⁴⁹⁴ By the term *nafas*, the Prophet was here referring to his escape from difficulty (*tanfīs* 'an *al-kurba*) through the aid given him by the people of Medina, whose ancestors had come from Yemen. This is a matter of [historical] fact on which all Muslims agree.

244 Ibn Ḥāmid said: "I have seen [statements in the writings of] some

⁴⁸⁸ Or perhaps al-Ḥarrānī (*Mizān*, III, 641, 8). Little is known of him except that he received traditions from Mālik b. Dīnār (d. 131/748) and probably flourished in the late Umayyad and early 'Abbāsīd periods. Cf., also *Kitāb aḍ-Ḍu'afā'*, III, 84.

⁴⁸⁹ Cf., *Kitāb al-Mawḍū'āt*, I, 118, 3; *Kitāb aḍ-Ḍu'afā'*, III, 84, 6; and *Mizān*, III, 641, 10.

⁴⁹⁰ See §198.

⁴⁹¹ Among the more common meanings of *nafas* is breath or gentle breeze (Lane, 2828/2). *Nafas* can also mean a liberation or freeing from something (*Lisān al-'Arab*, VI, 236/1-2; Lane, 2829/1).

⁴⁹² The saying is cited and glossed frequently in medieval sources: *DST*, 76f.; *BA*, fol. 36a; Ibn Qutayba, *Ta'wīl*, 267 (Lecomte, 236-237); Bayhaqī, *Asmā'*, 463; and Ibn Fūrak, *Mushkil*, 195-196, among others. Varying forms of the saying also appear in several canonical collections: Ibn Māja, *adab*, 29; Tirmidhī, *ḥitan*, 65; and the *Musnad*, II, 250, 268, 409, 437, 518; and V, 123. Cf., also Goldziher, *Die Zāhiriten*, 153, n. 3. For lexical discussions of the saying, with particular reference to *nafas*, see the following note.

⁴⁹³ According to the lexicographers, *nafas* is sometimes used with the meaning of the verbal noun of Form II (*tanfīs*: liberating or freeing from...). For more on this interpretation, see Bayhaqī, *Asmā'*, 463, who reports the view of al-Azharī; cf., also *Lisān al-'Arab*, VI, 236/2, 7ff.; *Asās al-Balāgha*, 648/1; *al-Qāmūs al-Muḥīṭ*, II, 255; Lane, 2829/1; and Ibn al-Jawzī's *Gharīb al-Ḥadīth*, II, 425.

⁴⁹⁴ See *DST*, 77; Ibn Qutayba, *Ta'wīl*, 268; and Ibn al-Jawzī, *Gharīb al-Ḥadīth*, II, 425. For additional references, see the notes to §242.

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⁴⁸⁵ Cf. §30.

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⁴⁸⁷ Identified in S. 51: 41 as th
al-Masīr, VIII, 39; Lane, 2117/2-3

⁴⁸⁸ The wind that blows from the

⁴⁸⁹ The cold, dry north wind. "V
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⁴⁹¹ The scorching west wind; it b
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⁴⁹² Ibn Fūrak, *Mushkil*, 195, 199.

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members of the Ḥanbalī school asserting that breathing (*yatanaffas*) is a divine attribute.⁴⁹⁵ They said: 'The various winds (*riyāḥ*) that blow such as the *ʿāṣifa*,⁴⁹⁶ the *ʿaqīm*,⁴⁹⁷ the *janūb*,⁴⁹⁸ the *shamāl*,⁴⁹⁹ the *ṣabā*,⁵⁰⁰ and the *dabūr*⁵⁰¹ are all created (*makhlūqa*); there is, however, a wind (*rīḥ*) that is one of God's attributes (*ṣifāt*): it is a gentle, life-giving breeze (*nasīm ḥayāʾī*) that comes from the breath (*nafas*) of Raḥmān.'" Those who believe such things are under a curse (*laʿna*), for they represent God as a body with a hollow interior (*jasad mujawwaf*).⁵⁰² Such persons are not Muslims.

[Concluding Remarks]

245 When a group of ignorant men learned of this book of mine (*ʿalima bi-kitābī*) they were not pleased, since they were fond of the views of their anthropomorphist teachers.⁵⁰³ They responded: "[The viewpoint defended in

⁴⁹⁵ Cf., §30.

⁴⁹⁶ Said to be the violent (cold) wind that brings clouds (Lane, 2064/2).

⁴⁹⁷ Identified in S. 51: 41 as the westerly wind that destroyed the people of ʿĀd (*Zād al-Masīr*, VIII, 39; Lane, 2117/2-3).

⁴⁹⁸ The wind that blows from the south bringing rain.

⁴⁹⁹ The cold, dry north wind. "When it blows for seven days upon the people of Egypt, they prepare grave clothes, for its nature is deadly" (Lane, 1601/1).

⁵⁰⁰ The east wind, frequently described as gentle and pleasant (Lane, 1650/1-2).

⁵⁰¹ The scorching west wind; it brings neither clouds or rain and is said to be the worst of winds (Lane, 847/ 1-2).

⁵⁰² Ibn Fūrak, *Mushkil*, 195, 199.

⁵⁰³ The first part of this paragraph seems to imply that Ibn al-Jawzī's critics were privy to the contents of *KAS* and apparently offered criticisms of it even before it was completed and issued. How could they have learned of the contents of the work in advance of its "publication"? Two possibilities suggest themselves: a) perhaps they had learned of the contents of the work indirectly, by word-of-mouth, perhaps from sources close to Ibn al-Jawzī (colleagues, friends, students)—persons in whom Ibn al-Jawzī might have confided as the work was being written; or perhaps b) a shorter version of *KAS* had already been in circulation prior to the latter's completion—from which Ibn al-Jawzī's critics could have learned of his views and the arguments developed in support of those views. We know that Ibn al-Jawzī did produce a shorter version of *KAS* (under the title of *Dafʿ Shubhat at-Tashbih*). On the basis of our present knowledge, however, it is impossible to assign a definite date to this latter work. To assume that it was in circulation prior to the completion of *KAS* is going too far given the present state of our knowledge. Until more data are forthcoming,

this book] is not in keeping with the teaching of the [Ḥanbalī] school." I replied: "It is not [in accord with] your views nor with those teachers of yours whom you follow blindly. [fol.42a] [In this work] I have held up the teaching of the Imām Aḥmad and disassociated it from views falsely ascribed to him, along with the irrational prattle, not being one who follows the views of others blindly.⁵⁰⁴ How can I ignore such distortions (*bahraj*) when I find them [so] objectionable?

The end of the treatise—God knows best!⁵⁰⁵

the second possibility remains purely speculative. It seems entirely possible that Ibn al-Jawzī's critics could have learned of the main elements of the position presented in *KAS* from sources close to him and would have been in a position to critique it even before the work was "published." In addition, we should not forget that Ibn al-Jawzī had never been shy about expressing his views. His *madrasa* lectures provided such an opportunity as did the sermons he preached frequently at some of the largest mosques in Baghdad.

⁵⁰⁴ See §37 (latter half) where he levels the same charge and speaks of his efforts, in *KAS*, to counter the distortions of his fellow Ḥanbalīs. Cf., also §30-32.

⁵⁰⁵ The colophon of the MS of *KAS* reads: "I copied [the present MS] from a MS [1] whose colophon reads: 'this was copied from a MS [2] which was copied from a MS [3] that was in the hand of my master Nūr ad-Dīn ʿAlī b. Jamāl ad-Dīn b. ʿAbd Allāh ad-Dimashqī ash-Shāfiʿī, a student of the renowned *shaykh* and *imām* Shams ad-Dīn al-Muḥaddith ash-Shāfiʿī. May God benefit Muslims through this work.' The transcribing of the present copy was completed on the 17th of Rajab in the year 890 (30th of July 1485)." —The last sentence containing the date of the present copy of *KAS* is marked off from what precedes by a circle with a dot in the middle indicating the end of the colophon of MS no. 2. What we have here, in effect, are two colophons: an older one nested within the colophon of our MS. While the colophon of our MS is dated it has so far not been possible to assign even relative dates to the other MSS mentioned in the colophon. Until Nūr ad-Dīn ʿAlī is identified, it will not be possible to say very much about the manuscript tradition of *KAS* except that the work did attract the interest of some Shāfiʿites and that the MS of *KAS* had made its way to Damascus sometime before 890 A.H.. My efforts to identify Nūr ad-Dīn ʿAlī from the existing biographical literature and indices has so far produced no clues as to the dates or identity of this person.

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